119 Iowa 215 | Iowa | 1903
The plaintiff’s claim is for services alleged to have been rendered her father, William Lutz, in his lifetime, at his request, under an agreement or under standing that he would provide for the payment of the value of such services out of his estate. The defendant, by answer, denies the claim, and alleges that whatever services were in fact performed were rendered by her while she and her father were living together as members of one family, and further sets up by way of counterclaim an itemized account of $758 for money and articles of personal property alleged to have been furnished by William Lutz in his lifetime to plaintiff’s husband, who, it is charged) “acted for himself and his said wife” in receiving such advances. The statute of limitations is also pleaded in defense of plaintiff’s claim. A demurrer to the countercliam on the ground that it states a cause of action against the husband only, and not against the plaintiff, was sustained. Four assignments of error are argued by counsel, and these we will proceed to consider:
All these promises and statements made to various witnesses, taken together, justify the conclusion that it was at all times his purpose to compensate the daughter for her assistance to him, but that such payment was to be postponed until after his death. But even if the evidence indicated that for the first few years of plaintiff’s service there was no agreement for her payment out of his estate, it does not follow that the statute of limitations can be interposed. If the promise related to past as well as future service,: — and we think it may be so construed, — it was sustained by sufficient consideration, and plaintiff ffiay ■enforce it. Past services which do not appear to have ■been performed as a gratuity will support a promise to pay for them. “The subsequent promise to pay implies that the services were rendered upon a previous request. ” See Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637 (7 Am. Rep. 100), where the rule above stated is held applicable to a promise to reward past services by testamentary bequest.
We see no reason, under the issues, even as they stood after the ruling complained of, why defendant would not be entitled, if able and so disposed, to prove how the parties lived together, by whom the provisions and supplies were furnished, and other relevant facts tending to-make clear the real character of their relations to each other. If such testimony had been offered, we must presume it would have been admitted; but the executor saw fit to rest the case upon the testimony of the plaintiff, and
V. The record, as a whole, strongly tends to sustain the justice of the plaintiff’s claim. After she had arrived at her majority, and was earning an independent support away from home, she was invited to return to care for her parents, with the assurance that her services would be-paid for. She continued in this employment ‘ for six or seven years, and it is not denied that she served faithfully as housekeeper and nurse, much of the time under circumstances of much difficulty and hardship. A will in which she received liberal recognition was afterward revoked by another which practically gave the entire estate to a son, the defendant herein. If there was any good reason for the change in the father’s attitude and purposes with reference to his daughter,it is not disclosed in the testimony..
The amount allowed the plaintiff by the district court does not appear to be excessive, and the judgment isAEEIRMEI