518 N.E.2d 25 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1986
Plaintiff-appellant, Gary C. Bennett, had been an assistant prosecuting attorney in Lorain County for five years when he was elected to the Elyria City Board of Education on November 5, 1985. Pursuant to R.C.
Bennett filed suit, seeking declaratory relief as to the application of R.C.
R.C.
"No prosecuting attorney, city director of law, or other official acting in a similar capacity shall be a member of a board of education."
Bennett raised two arguments below: (1) that the statute violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law, and (2) that the statute had been erroneously reproduced in the 1943 recodification, resulting in a change in its meaning contrary to the original legislative intent. He raises the same issues upon appeal. This court affirms the trial court's judgment.
Bennett contends the statutory prohibition violates his equal protection rights under the
"* * * Legislatures are ordinarily assumed to have acted constitutionally. Under traditional equal protection principles, distinctions need only be drawn in such a manner as to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end. Classifications are set aside only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them. * * *" Clements v.Fashing (1982),
Contrary to Bennett's assertions, there is no fundamental right to hold public office. The existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot "does not of itself compel close scrutiny."Bullock v. Carter (1972),
In State, ex rel. Platz, v. Mucci (1967),
Establishment of public policy for the state is a function of the state legislature, which speaks through its enactments. Technical rules of construction should not be employed to overthrow the manifest policy of the state. State, ex rel. Enos,
v. Stone (1915),
Here, the legislature could reasonably have concluded that the prohibition was necessary to prevent the appearance of impropriety. Such a statute can be a rational means of maintaining employee efficiency and avoiding any possible conflicts of interest likely to be destructive of public confidence in government. Bennett's first assignment of error is overruled.
Bennett argues that R.C.
With the adoption of House Bill No. 217 in 1943, the legislature changed a single word in the section in question. The section previously read:
"* * * No prosecuting attorney, city solicitor or other official acting in a similar capacity shall be a member of the board of education. * * *" (Emphasis added.) (G.C. 4762.)
The newly adopted section read:
"No prosecuting attorney, city solicitor or other official acting in a similar capacity shall be a member of a board of education." (Emphasis added.) See 120 Ohio Laws 475, 518 (G.C. 4832-12).
Bennett argues that where the entire legislation affecting a particular subject matter has undergone revision and consolidation by codification, the revised section will be presumed to bear the same meaning as the original sections, unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature intended a change. Loftin v. Loew's, Inc. (1944),
Courts are limited to the construction and interpretation of statutes as written. State, ex rel. Myers, v. Chiaramonte (1976),
There is no ambiguity here. The words, in their common and ordinary sense, can have but one meaning. That the meaning is undeniably clear is demonstrated by the fact that the statute has not previously been challenged in the forty-three years it has been in existence.
Furthermore, the Ohio Attorney General in 1969, asked if an assistant prosecuting attorney could run for a school board seat, commented:
"In reading this statute, it is obvious that a prosecuting attorney shall not be a member of any board of education. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 1969 Ohio Atty. Gen. Ops. No. 69-133, at 2-291.
While the possibility of inadvertent error in recodification was not raised to the Attorney General, it is still worth noting that the Attorney General read the words of the statute literally and saw no other interpretation. An assistant prosecuting attorney, appointed to assist the elected official named in the statute, also comes within the statute, he ruled. *263
The construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that such construction is wrong. E.I. du Pont deNemours Co. v. Collins (1977),
Judgment affirmed.
QUILLIN, P.J., and BAIRD, J., concur.