120 Me. 468 | Me. | 1921
When the Legislature, in defining the respective functions of the court and of the jury in the trial of a case, laid down the inhibition that the Judge must not express opinion on arising issues of fact, it went no further in its meaning than that he should refrain from speaking of the facts in manner implying his utterance entitled to obedience. R. S., Chap. 87, Sec. 102; State v. Mathews, 115 Maine, 84. He must separate the questions of law from the questions of fact, and thus disunited sent the questions of fact to , the province of the jury, free from authoritative verbal invasion by himself. But it never was intended that a Judge should sit listlessly by, fulfilling duty as though he were administering the rules in a contest for superiority by chance and skill, utterly powerless to aid in the ascertainment of truth as the underlying essential to a proper verdict. Far from it. The Legislature meant that, in the employment of the exerpience of his career, he should make the positions and contentions of the litigants clear, by stating, analyzing, comparing and explaining the evidence, by stripping it of extraneous considerations, pointing out any seeming contradictions, resolving it into its simplest elements, supplementing all by definition of the law’s governing power, that the jury with discerning appreciation might come to a correct result, and the gladsome light of jurisprudence shine on undimmed. State v. Mathews, supra; York v. Railroad Co., 84 Maine, 117; State v. Day, 79 Maine, 120; Jameson v. Weld, 93 Maine, 345.
Plaintiff sued to recover a balance claimed as due for items of personal property sold through the intervention of the agency of his son, who at the time was the defendant’s husband. An account annexed to the writ is inclusive of a cash credit. For the purpose of establishing his case, the plaintiff, invoking the provisions of R. S., Chap. 87, Sec. 127, introduced a supporting affidavit comprehensive
The exceptions may be considered in inverse order. The Judge interrogatively read the letter, or a substantial part of it, sentence by sentence, to show either its relation to the subject of the controversy or the want thereof, saying in concluding animadversion: “To what was she alluding? What is the subject matter? That is all I wish to say, to call your attention to that letter. But you read it, and see how far that corroborates this plaintiff in his claim for these charges.” If by any mischance there was error in the exposition of the letter, it has altogether lost its way out of the record.
It was clearly within the absolute discretion of the presiding Judge, notwithstanding defendant’s case had been rested, and though the closing speech of the plaintiff was, already under way, to grant leave for the introduction of further evidence, whether omitted by inadvertence or because of a previous lack «of knowledge by' counsel. Rule XXXIX; McDonald v. Smith, 14 Maine, 99; State v. Martin, 89 Maine, 117. The exercise of such power is not subject to revision on exceptions. Ruggles v. Coffin, 70 Maine, 468. Nor does the collateral statement of the Judge, in association with granting leave
Exceptions overruled.