268 Pa. 459 | Pa. | 1920
Opinion by
This action of trespass is to recover for loss of a guest’s money through the alleged negligence of an innkeeper. At the time in question, the Colonial Hotel Company was operating the General Forbes Hotel in Pittsburgh, of which the plaintiff, David Benjamin, was, and for some months theretofore had been, a guest. For the care of valuables, three large metal boxes were built into the desk of the hotel office, and there was also a vault in the lobby (referred to by defendant as “a cabinet” ), constructed of steel plate one-fourth inch in thickness. This vault was divided into boxes of convenient size, each having a door, made of like steel plate, with an individual lock and key; and there was a master key
Defendant submitted evidence tending to show that on one occasion, some months before, plaintiff had kept a large sum of money over night on the table in his room with a door leading thereto unlocked. Eeferring to this, the trial judge told the jury, “the plaintiff denies that any such occurrence took place, and it was only offered as evidence by the defendant to show that the plaintiff himself was careless in guarding his valuables, money,
The box in the vault being in view of the office and protected by a double lock, requiring two keys to open, was undoubtedly a proper place for the temporary deposit of money; hence, defendant was not culpable for offering it, nor plaintiff for accepting it, for that purpose. It was at least as suitable for the custody of valuables as the metal drawers in the desk, and so used by the defendant for its own money and that of its guests.
Protecting the property of a guest is for the joint benefit of both host and guest, and stands on the basis of a bailment for hire, where the bailee is required to use ordinary care and is liable for ordinary neglect: Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, 546; Woodruff v. Painter & Eldridge, 150 Pa. 91; First National Bank of Carlisle v. Graham, 79 Pa. 106; Kleckner v. Hotel Strand, 60 Pa. Superior Ct. 617. In other words, it was defendant’s duty to use such care as an ordinarily prudent person would use under like circumstances. Should the jury find that plaintiff put his money in the vault on Saturday evening and locked the box, and that it could not be unlocked except by the help of the master key, which was in defendant’s possession, and also that it was found unlocked on Monday morning, that would make out such
Plaintiff founded his case entirely upon an allegation of negligence and made no claim against defendant on its common law liability as an insurer, hence, the said Act of 1913 is not here important, as it does not attempt to relieve an innkeeper from liability, for loss of property on deposit, as a result of his own negligence or that of his servants. See section 2 of the act.
The trial judge in the charge correctly stated the rule as to defendant’s liability for negligence, but fell into error in affirming its first point, viz: “If the defendant company complied with the Act of Assembly of June 12, 1913, P. L. 481, and if plaintiff failed to offer his money for safekeeping to defendant’s employees and demand a receipt therefor, in accordance with the provisions of said act, your verdict must be for the defendant.” As plaintiff had a box in the vault, his failure to tender the money at the desk would not relieve defendant from the duty of using due care to protect it while in the vault. The answer to this point is not separately assigned as error, but, in connection with the charge as a whole, which is so assigned (3d assignment), gave the jury contradictory instructions, by which they may have been misled. See Baker v. Hagey, 177 Pa. 128; Selin v. Snyder, 11 S. & R. 319; Pister v. Benefit Association, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 50. A cardinal error in the charge was in treating the Act of 1913 as a controlling factor, which it was not, under the pleadings or evidence.
From the evidence tending to show that the box could be locked by the one individual key, and from the bolt in
The second and third assignments of error are sustained and thereupon the judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.