BENJAMIN TAGGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STRAUSS GROUP LTD., Defendant-Appellee, SABRA DIPPING CO., LLC, Defendant.
No. 18-3189
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
February 27, 2020
August Term, 2019
(Argued: January 8, 2020 Decided: February 27, 2020)
Before: KEARSE, CALABRESI, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
BENJAMIN TAGGER, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
SILVIA OSTROWER, JOSEPH J. SALTARELLI, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We hold that
Appellant Benjamin Tagger, pro se, sued the Strauss Group Limited (“Strauss“) for various common law contract and tort claims, alleging that
We review factual findings in dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Under
We conclude that Tagger is an alien for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. As the district court discussed, section 1332 was amended in 1988 to state that “an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled” (the “deeming clause“). Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 203(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988). This created disagreement in the federal courts with respect to whether permanent resident aliens, like Tagger, would be considered aliens when suing other aliens. Compare Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 306–12 (3d Cir. 1993) with Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But in 2011, section 1332 was amended as a part of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act to remove the “deeming clause” and to amend
Accordingly, because federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over lawsuits between two foreign parties, we conclude that
Tagger does not challenge the district court‘s interpretation of
We have previously commented that these types of “access” provisions of international commercial treaties were “intended to guarantee treaty nationals equal treatment with respect to procedural matters like filing fees, the employment of lawyers, legal aid, security for costs and judgment, and so forth.” Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d 53, 62 (2d Cir. 1985). The terms “national treatment” and “most-favored-nation treatment” also do not offer Tagger any relief. The Supreme Court has stated that “national treatment” means nothing more than offering foreign nationals “equal treatment” with domestic nationals. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 188 n.18 (1982). Similarly, “most-favored-nation treatment means treatment no less favorable than that accorded to nationals or companies of any third country.” Id. Therefore, the access provision of the Israel-U.S. FCN Treaty does not offer Tagger any more substantive rights than any U.S. citizen would be entitled. Tagger is still required to show that there is complete diversity between the parties, just like any U.S. citizen would. Because there is no complete diversity, the district court properly
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that
