Benjamin Craig Long v. Bando Manufacturing of America, Inc.

аlleged result of the and, constitutional so, violation ror to review his constitutional and not a result of the trial counsel’s fail- on their merits.

ure to procedural meet state guidelines;”

(2) “the petitioner burden is on the to show that he was [actually] prejudiced by the

alleged ..., constitutional error merely (3)

a possibility prejudice;” “in ana- lyzing a petitioner’s preju- contention of

dice, the court should assume that petitioner has stated a meritorious consti- Benjamin Craig LONG, (citations tutional claim.” 785 F.2d at 139 Plaintiff-Appellee, omitted). course, Of if the district court petitioner finds that has established

рrejudice, it proceed should to decide the BANDO MANUFACTURING OF merits of his constitutional claims. AMERICA, INC., Defendant-

Appellant. Finally, we petitioner’s note the No. 99-5032.

argument 26(B) that Rule is unconstitu applied tional as in Ohio de United ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍States Court of Appeals, prives indigent, incarcerated, uncounseled Sixth Circuit.

inmates due process equal protection Argued: Oct. of the laws. These claims were not raised Decided and Filed: Jan. court, however. “When a party present fails to an argument to the we have to disсretion resolve

the issue only where the proper resolution beyond doubt, any injustice or where might otherwise result.” See Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning County Comm’rs, We de

cline, instance, in this to treat these issues

as a matter of initial review.

CONCLUSION We conclude that Ohio criminal defen- dants have a federal constitutional effective assistance of counsel during an application for reopening and that peti- tioner’s counsel this case was constitu- tionally in failing ineffective file such an

application in timely fashion, thus consti- tuting to excuse failure to сom-

ply with procedural requirements con-

tained in Ohio Rule Appellate Procedure 26(B). Accordingly, we remand to the dis-

trict court to consider peti- whether the tioner has established that he was actually

prejudiced by the alleged constitutional er- and Roberts(argued

Nancy Oliver Green, Ap- for briefed), Kentucky, Bowling pellee. (briefed), D. Jr. English, E.

Charles briefed), En- (argued Penn ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍Gaines Bowling Lucas, Owsley, Priest & glish, Green, Kentucky, Appellant. MOORE, WELLFORD, Before: GILMAN, Judges. Circuit of the MOORE, J., opinion delivered GILMAN, J., joined. court, in which 762), WELLFORD, delivered (p. J. opinion. concurring separate OPINION MOORE, Judge. Circuit defendant-appellant, appeal, In this America, Inc. Manufacturing of court’s (“Bando”), challenges original federal did not plaintiff- one of Craig Long’s Benjamin appellee to reverse this court and asks order remanding the case to state inspection Bando facilities Long had originally court. sued Bando in Gates. year that same and the follow- court, raising ing year, both state and federal poor received two perfor- claims, including one mance reviews state-law claim for and several warnings that he would be dischargе in public disciplinary violation of action performance his policy. Long improve, asserted in his culmi- amended nating in his suspension for days three in public policy the that was March of Long finally was by violated his in dis- embodied charged May of 1996 based on a several federal statutes. After Bando re- that he had a production falsified schedule. the moved case to federal district After his discharge, Long attempted to aid district granted summary judg- Gates reopening its motion for sanctions against Lоng ment on one of his federal against ground Bando on the that Bando claims and dismissed the other at Long’s had concealed destroyed and documents The request. district court then remanded relevant to the trade litigation. secrets case, including Long’s wrongful dis- claim, charge to the state court. Bando Long filed suit in Kentucky state court appeals order, now on arguing April alleging that he was wrongful discharge claim in- terminated as a result of his refusal volved a federal acquiesce issue sufficient to invoke the “cover up” of the compa- ny’s original court’s theft of trade secrets. alleged He due process jurisdiction pursuant violations under §§ to 28 U.S. and Ken- Constitutions, tucky 1441. For and “reverse reasons discrimina- discussed be- low, tion” in VII, violation of we AFFIRM Title district court’s dis- deci- charge “in violation of the public policy sion to remand based on its determination retaliatory (Com- discharge.” J.A. at it did not have original federal ques- plaint). case, Bando removed the relying over Long’s wrongful dis- on Long’s рrocess federal due and Title charge claim.-

VII claims as the basis for tion. Long then amended complaint, his I. BACKGROUND “[ojther adding that public policies of this Long was employed by Bando from Feb- Commonwealth and of the United States ruary of 1989 until he was terminated which have been violated the Defen- May of 1996. In Gates Rubber Com- dant’s wrongful termination of the Plaintiff (“Gates”), pany competitor, Bando, sued include, but are not limited to” policies alleging various forms of anticompetitive embodied in four federal criminal statutes: activity, including appropriation of Gates’s (Obstruction 18 U.S.C. of court or- trade secrets. Gates also charged that ders), 18 U.S.C. 2314 (Transportation of had concealed destroyed or infor- (Sale stolen goods), or mation relevant to competitive its strate- receipt of stolen goods), and 18 U.S.C. gies and trade secrets. the summer of § (Amended 1621 (Perjury).1 J.A. at 19 year less than a before he was termi- Complaint). Long also added claims of nated but several years after the Gates defаmation and breach contract. Sub- litigation ended, had Long reported to sequently, Long filed motion to dismiss Adams, Matt president Bando, vice voluntarily claim, his Title VII which was that he saw Adams and James Blanken- granted on June 1998. Bando filed a ship, president Bando, taking “stuff’ motion for summary judgment, to the dumpsters trash just before the thereafter moved to remand the case to words, 1. In other Long claimed that he was discovery obstruction of the orders in the terminated for his to participate refusal in the litigation, Gatеs employees’ and its perjury company’s ("stolen theft of trade secrets concealing about destroying documents. goods” 2314, 2315), §§ under 18 U.S.C. its law, the district of federal matter on a subject lack of the state court it find that acknowledged, it could jurisdiction. jurisdiction, without had federal mo- Bando’s granted The district remedy” test. “implied applying the as to judgment summary tion for Nonetheless, still found the district court The district process due case, no that, of this there was the facts to remand Long’s motion denied court also substantial, question of federal disputed find- jurisdiction, matter for lack of claim sufficient in the subject matter ing that “arising under” invoke none court found Finally, the district Bando’s therefore denied jurisdiction and (wrongful dis- remaining prior judg- or amend its request to alter breach public policy, charge to the state the case remanding ment defamation) a sub- contract, raised of ruling that timely appealed court. Bando therefore, de- question federal stantial that, although now hold to this court. We juris- supplemental its clining to exercise a federal that does not state complaint a the state diction, case to remanded the cases invoke may action some cause of the particular, In district court. statutes jurisdiction, the federal federal as federal statutes naming four found that claim discharge wrongful in Long’s cited policy the public evidence of ques- federal provide were insufficient wrongful dis- Long’s state convert did not jurisdiction. tion Relying a federal claim. claim into chargе in Merrell opinion Supreme Court’s on the ANALYSIS II. Pharmaceuticals, Thompson, Inc. v. Doio the district to invoke order 3229, 804, L.Ed.2d a defendant jurisdiction, removal court’s analyzed district the origi has the district must show that Long implied cited statutes the whether See 28 the jurisdiction over action. nal and, their remedy for private a 1441(a). showing of The burden § U.S.C. not, that did they concluded jurisdic original court has pres- claim not discharge did wrongful the seeking removal. See party on the tion is district invoking the question ent a federal Queen thе Right Majesty Her of jurisdiction. under” “arising court’s Detroit, 874 City Province Ontario of or amend to alter filed a motion (6th Further 332, 339 alleging judgment, district federalism more, implicate they concluding erred the district court nar to be concerns, statutes are removal not discharge wrongful claim &Oil Shamrock rowly construed. See giving question federal a substantial raise Sheets, 313 Corp. v. Gas question federal original rise to (1941). L.Ed. In its December court. in the district tion ease, parties do In this order, acknowl- the district court Removal citizenship. diversity of analysis allege that it had erred its edged U.S.C. thus based jurisdiction was claim Long’s wrongful whether “of 1441(b), of actions allowing removal § ques- federal original for provided basis jur original courts have which recognized The court aris on a claim founded determined, first, isdiction that there that, if it even Constitution, or laws treaties ing under of action implied private cause was no States,” regard without of the United listed statutes the violation of Because parties. consider, citizenship it must still in Long’s complaint, only where possible is jurisdiction removal second, the state “whether court would federal district ‘necessarily upon turned’ discharge [claim] case, and be over the jurisdiction original at 32 J.A. law.” language under” necessarily turned the claim (D.Ct.Op.). If 1441(b) § is almost identical to 345^46, the lan diction.2 See id. at 96 S.Ct. 584.3 guage Here, of 28 the scope the district court did not remand jurisdiction removal based on the existence because it subject jurisdic lacked matter 1441(b) a federal under is tion; on the contrary, the district cоurt considered to identical to the scope be explicitly subject stated that it had matter question jurisdiction under jurisdiction when the case was removed See, e.g., Williams, Inc. v. Caterpillar 482 and noted that it had not been divested of 386, 391-92, jurisdiction by the dismissal of the In determining re plaintiffs federal claims. Accord In re jurisdiction moval under inas de Carter, Cir.1980) termining original “arising jurisdic (“It is principle a fundamental of law that tion, federal apply “well-pleaded whether matter exists complaint” rule, pursuant to which “federal a question is answered by looking to the exists when a federal complaint as it existed at the time the presented on the face of the petition for removal was filed.... When plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.” subsequent narrowing of the issues ex 392, 107 Id. at claims, cludes all federal whether a pen dant [sic] state claim should be remanded Reviewability A. of the Remand Order court state is a question judicial of jurisdiction This court has to re discretion, subject not of jurisdic matter view the district сourt’s decision to remand (citations omitted)), tion.” denied, cert. 450 Long’s state law claims. parties The 949, 1410, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d 378 issue, but, not raise this it is a (1981). Furthermore, court this has re jurisdictional matter, we it consider sua peatedly held remand orders to be review See, sponte. e.g., In re General ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍Motors able See, cases similar to one. e.g., this 980, (6th Corp., Cir.1993). 3 F.3d 982 Motors, 983; General 3 at Van Meter Although Co., v. State plain 445, Farm Fire & language of 28 Cas. 1 F.3d U.S.C. 1447(d) (6th Cir.1993) § 449-50 suggests that (holding remand that the orders re- concerning viewability of a pursuant cases remоved remand depends to 28 order § reviewable, are never whether the district subject court had mat Supreme jurisdiction Court held in ter Thermtron when Prod- the case was re ucts, moved, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 336, and explaining that if the district 584, 96 S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 542 court initially jurisdiction, that had which was 1447(c) (d) §§ must be read together, destroyed by events, later the remand or 1447(d) and therefore that prohibits re- der would reviewable); Glass, be In re only view of remand Molders, orders pursu- issued Pottery, Plastics & Allied Work ant to a 1447(c), finding, under Union, that the ers 17S, Int’l Local No. 983 F.2d district subject court (6th lacked juris- 725, Cir.1993) matter (holding that the 1447(c) 2. 28 U.S.C. provides, Thermtron, pertinent holding 3. The limiting pro of part, "If at time judgment before final hibition on review it of remand orders to those appears that remands that are subject district based on a lack subject court of lacks matter jurisdiction, recently jurisdiction, matter was reaffirmed in the case shall be remand- Quackeribush Co., v. Allstate Ins. ed.” 116 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1447(d) provides, "An order Quackenbush, Supreme Court also held remanding a case to the State from court that falling remand orders not within the which it was removed is not reviewable on 1447(c) scope §of could reviewed be on di otherwise, appeal except or that an order appeal, thereby rect abrogating Thermtron's remanding a case to the State court from suggestion that remand were orders not final pursuant which it was removed to section orders and therefore could be reviewed 1443 of this by appeal title shall be reviewable by means of a writ of mandamus. See id. at or otherwise.” 712-15, 116 S.Ct. 1712. mis- drug Bendectin was that its alleging state pendent of Food, the Federal of of federal branded claims, after dismissal (FDCA). Act See time-barred, discretionary, Drug, and Cosmetic as claims Dow, 106 S.Ct. matter 478 U.S. at subject Merrell lack of not based on reviewable). that the Supreme Court held The and therefore jurisdiction, the federal has invoked Therefore, clearly this by rais jurisdiction at issue remand order courts’ tion to review negligence ing case. state-law this labeling stan drug incorporated federal Quеstion Federal of B. The Existence dards. See id. Jurisdiction holding scope of the Court’s Although the unclear, it is somewhat in Merrell Dow novo a dis reviews de

This clearly open possibility left regarding court’s decision trict an ex even the absence Hilliard v. Unit See matter action, cause of Serv., implied press Postal ed States great fed a substantial federal is raised eral interest argu into delving Bando’s Before law, if resolu in terms of framed had federal ment necessary to is tion of wrongful See, the resolution claim, to under helpful it is termination nn. 11- n. 813-14 & at 808-10 & e.g., id. not arguing. Bando is what stand 3229; City see Chica also arguing obviously not is Surgeons, College go International a federal claim is wrongful discharge is claim; it is clear (1997) (reaffirming that case action. Nor a state-law cause laws the United may “arise under” attempts to Long’s that arguing a sub resolution of requires if it States under the of action private right a imply law, even if of federal question stantial statutes, thereby criminal federal listed plaintiffs creates the state law Finаlly, action. cause of stating a federal action); Detroit Thornton v. Southwest state-law Long’s that not arguing is Cir.1990) (6th 1131, 1133 Hosp., 895 F.2d by federal preempted completely claim is jurisdic (noting that federal Long mean that law, which would a well- in which “only those cases tion he intended a federal claim whether stated either [cjomplaint establishes pleaded See, Corp. v. Aero e.g., Avco not. to or or of action the cause law creates federal Machinists, 735, Int’l Ass’n Lodge No. neces to relief рlaintiff[’s] that the 1235, 126 557, 20 L.Ed.2d of a substan resolution on sarily depends (1968). Rather, arguing Bando is add (emphasis law” federal question tial claim, without wrongful termination Board, ed) 463 Franchise Tax (quoting claim, federal implied raising an express 2841) (internal 27-28, 103 at S.Ct. U.S. ques disputed involves substantial omitted)). marks quotation suffi law and is therefore tion of federal the district court’s cient to invoke Oper- v. Industries Colt In Christianson under” Corp., 486 ating Supreme courts’ of the federal The exact contours circum- elaborated § 1331 are Court further jurisdiction under сlaim which a state-law stances under important The most imprecise. somewhat a “substantial upon “necessarily depends” this issue to deal case with Supreme Court case, the In that law.” of federal In Merrell years is Merrell Dow. in recent “arise not a claim does held that Court drug manu- Dow, had sued if the com- claim, patent laws federal negligence state-law facturer on'a plaint states alternate theories for that Long’s amended complaint, which intro- claim, only of which requires one resolu- duced the federal statutes at issue here patent-law tion of a question. See id. at saying, public “Other policies this Com- Thus, 108 S.Ct. 2166. Christian- monwealth and of the United States which suggests son ques- there is no federal have been violated by the Defendant’s when the complaint wrongful on its termination of the Plaintiff in- clude, face states theories supporting to, alternate but are not limited the follow- claim, added). at least one of which ing.” does J.A. at 19 (emphasis Since not involve a question.4 federal Lоng’s complaint offered state as well as policies federal as of wrongful evidence his Christianson, In light of it is clear that discharge, this case appears square- to fall the resolution of a is not ly within the Supreme Court’s holding in necessary or essential to the resolution of Christianson. Long’s wrongful discharge claim. Bando argues law, Kentucky Furthermore, that under a plaintiff although must public demonstrate that policy whether a discharge claim based making his unlawful is embodied public policies invokes fеderal in federal or legislative enactments. appears to one of be first im See, Evans, e.g., Grzyb 700 S.W.2d pression circuit, in this other circuits have (Ky.1985). contends that held that such do belong solely relied on federal statutes as evincing federal court. See Campbell v. Aerospace public policy, (9th and therefore that Cir.1997) Corp., court’s construction of those federal (finding stat- the federal interest to be insuffi utes is essential cient, to a determination of and noting that state law mirrors the Long’s clаim. argument This unpersua- policy issue), denied, cert. sive. complaint put forth alternate 140 L.Ed.2d 935 bases in state (1998); and federal law for the Willy v. Corp., Coastal public policy in Cir.1988) contravention of which he 1167-72 (finding the discharged. Long’s initial complaint federal element in a claim such to be insuf stated that his “discharge was in ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍ficiently substantial also noting public policy retaliatory dis- plaintiff supported his claim with state charge.” J.A. at (Complaint). theories); This as well as federal see also Drake statement could be read to refer to Ken- v. Cheyenne Inc., Newspapers, tucky 61.102, Revised Statutes Kentucky’s F.Supp. 1403 (D.Wyo.1994). prece These statute,” “whistleblower forbidding the re- suggest dents that the federal taliatory of an employee termination who insufficiently substan interferes with a company’s unlawful activ- tial and disputed to jurisdict invoke federal ities.5 This reading is further bolstered ion.6 4. Christianson scope dealt with the of argues the 6.Bando also the standard for patent-law Federal jurisdiction Circuit’s finding un- "substantial” federal is ex- 1295(a) 1338(a), §§ der 28 U.S.C. low; not the tremely however, the cases that it cites general federal courts' question juris- federal proposition for this dealt with the standard § diction under 1331. The Court noted in jurisdiction based on an Christianson, however, applies it the express implied private federal cause of same test to juris- determine action. simply Those cases state that when a 1338(a). §§ diction under both 1331 and See plaintiff attempts bring to a claim under a Christianson, 486 U.S. at statute, that claim need be non- frivolous in order jurisdic- to federal words, invoke not, tion: it need in other even be himself has not mentioned K.R.S. sufficient to avoid dismissal under Federal 61.102; brief, in his he Act, 12(b)(6). See, mentioned the Ken- Rule of Civil e.g., Procedure tucky Trade Secrets K.R.S. Oneida, 365.880 to County Oneida Indian v. Nation (1990), original 365.990 as the basis for his 414 U.S. 39 L.Ed.2d wrongful discharge (1974). claim. 1367(d) tolls Section Act of 1990.... that, although federal hold therefore We of limitations statute the state where may exist even court which a federal claim state a federal not stated has plaintiff

the supplemental has exercised not invoke action, Long’s complaint It thus its dismissal. days until 30 after “arising under” courts’ the federal in Car expressed one concern alternate state reduces forth tion, put would lose negie-Mellon his state- support to policies —'that case were dismissed claims their their concerns Other than remanded. rather however, to remain, convenience such as Propriety Remand C. a faster resolution parties and the the district note that alsoWe legis indication find no casе. We than rather authority to remand Improve history of the Judicial lative claims under state-law dismiss to Congress intended Act ments 1867(c). Carnegie-Mellon U.S.C. to court’s discretion limit the district Cohill, v. Univ. state case removed from remand Supreme L.Ed.2d court. has discre that a district held Court omitted). (citation Further at 1267 Id. pendent to remand one, circuits, including them, this more, if the values most dismissing rather than fairness, discretionary power convenience, and have assumed economy, §of 1367. adoption to survives remand dictatе. comity so Theatrical, Inc. Feder See, e.g., Musson before 28 decided was Carnegie-Mellon 1244, 1254-55 89 F.3d Express Corp., al however, and adopted, 1367 was (6th Cir.1996); Hosp. v. Decatur Mem’l not explicitly § 1367 does the language Co., 990 F.2d Ins. Gen. Connecticut Life authority to re courts grant district (7th Cir.1993); Executive 927-28 Soft than rather mand cases Dist. Am., States Inc. v. United N. ware None prejudice.7 without them dismiss (9th Cir.1994); Ct, 1551-53 the discretion theless, we believe Practice Com 28 U.S.C.A. see also into that statute. incorporated A. (1993); 14C ChaRles mentary 835 D.C. Appeals for thе The Court H. Arthur R. WRIght, Edward Miller & Gallagher & held Edmondson Circuit so Cooper, Prooedure: Federal Practice & Ass’n, Tenants Towers v. Alban at 498-501 3d Jurisdiction (D.C.Cir.1995). that court ex As D.C. analysis with agree We plained: and hold that Circuit is a mat or dismiss to remand Whether than remanding rather properly acted discretion of left to the normally ter case.8 dismissing Long’s Carnegie-Mellon, 484 see We at 622-23. III. CONCLUSION by unaffected discretion find this reasons, we AFFIRM foregoing For 28 U.S.C. enactment subsequent order. court’s remand the district 1367(d), Improvements in the Judicial claims only supplemental court has 1367(c) pertinent provides, in U.S. at Camegie-Mellon, 484 exer- may decline to it. See before part, "The district ("The if us is question before claim” supplemental cise added). (emphasis is met any four criteria court has discretion a federal district whether jurisdiction to pendent the doctrine under Camegie-Mellon and that both 8. We observe to state case properly removed remand only whether deal with this case the ac- claims in when all federal-law a narrow set pеrmits pendent have been eliminated all in which namely, cases removed cases— federal remain.”). claims been dismissed and WELLFORD, Judge, Circuit of action.” 478 at 106 S.Ct. 3229. concurring. It approval cites with Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation I concur in the result reached in this Trust, 463 U.S. case, but would base this decision on a L.Ed.2d 420 that “a may case arise straightforward more My rationale. con- under federal law ‘where the vindication of clusion plaintiff Long’s is that claims of right under state law necessarily turned wrongful discharge simply did not suffi- ” on some construction of federal law.’ Id. ciently raise a federal in order to Finally, Merrell emphasized Dow “pru provide jurisdiction in the district court. I dence and jurisdictional restraint agree Moore, my colleague, with Judge inquiry,” and that Congress where provid outset that the burden in this case is “private, ed no upon plaintiff and that federal cause of removal action for statutes are strictly construed. the violation [of Plaintiff must the federal statute]” show relied relying uрon he is on a claim complaint, jurisdiction fails, under the Constitution ... or laws of the and a United is not raised. Id. at 1441(b). States.” 810, 817, 106 S.Ct. 3229. I agree also Judge with analysis Moore’s Plaintiffs to relief did not neces- that we have to review the sarily depend of the federal stat- by court, action taken the district and that utes relied upon the complaint. There

remand was within the sound discretion of was no substantial question of federal law the district court once lack of a federal presented. None of the federal statutes question was determined. (and court) cited by discussed

The substance of created claims against his private former employer Congress clearly provided private no fed- wrongful discharge essentially by a eral remedy plaintiff with respect action since no federal employment dis- 'any of these statutes. There was im- no crimination law action is asserted. Nor plied federal cause of action by created does defendant Bando claim pre- necessarily springing from any federal emption under the circumstances of this ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍statute cited. short, The district case. prudence exercised and restraint in deny- ing I am persuad- There are several why reasons I believe by ed attempts Bando’s distinguish this case is essentially by controlled Mer Dow, Merrell and I find no basis under the Pharmaceuticals, rell Dow Inc. v. Thomp principles several expressed son, approved in that case to overturn the district court’s That case affirmed decision. See Miller v. Ry. & this W. court’s decision at 766 F.2d 1005 Norfolk Co., (6th Cir.1987).1 834 F.2d 556 Dow, believe, Mеrrell I despite some ambiguous language, affirmed our I see no need to pursue any state law “[fjederal holding that question jurisdiction rationale asserted Bando to jur- create would, thus, only plaintiffs’ exist right to would, isdiction in this case. I according- relief depended necessarily on a substan ly, AFFIRM the district court. tial question of federal law.” 766 F.2d at 1006. Merrell Dow cites Justice Holmes’

opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne Co., & Bowler 60 L.Ed. 987 that a “suit

arises under the law that creates the cause I see no conflict with the Graham, decision in this Corp. Telecommunications Express case with Milan Surety Co. v. Western (6th Cir.1993). Co., (6th Cir.1989), 886 F.2d 783 or MCI

Case Details

Case Name: Benjamin Craig Long v. Bando Manufacturing of America, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jan 13, 2000

Citation: 201 F.3d 754

Docket Number: 99-5032

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.