90 N.J.L. 355 | N.J. | 1917
The opinion of the court was delivered by
'Florence M. Brabban was injured on May 1st. 1913, while in the employ of Benjamin & Jolines. On April 30th. 1915, nearly Iwo years afterward, she filed a petition in the Essex Common Pleas setting up- that there was a dispute beiween her and the present prosecutor concerning her claim for compensation and praying that that dispute might he determined in accordance with the act. To this petition an answer was filed claiming that her right was barred by the lapse of the year allowed by the statute, and obviously tills defence was valid. Thereupon, on June 16th, 1915, she filed an
On November 13th, 1915, Miss Brabban filed a second amended petition in which she recited that two weeks after the accident an agreement was entered into between her and the prosecutor, in which it was agreed that the prosecutor should pay or reimburse her for the amount she had become indebted to a physician for medical attendance made necessary by the accident. The petition states that more than one year had elapsed since the agreement becáme operative; that the statement in her former-petition that it was agreed that she should receive no compensation for the injury was made
Obviously, she could not recover under any of these petitions as an original petition for compensation under ihe act, for they were all tiled more than a year after the injury. The only ground on which the proceedings can be sustained is that there had been an agreement for compensation between the parties within a year after the accident, and that this agreement might he reviewed under section 21 of the act on the ground that her incapacity had increased. The difficulty with this claim of the petitioner is that it is necessary that there should have been an agreement upon the “compensation payable under the act,” which shall be subject to diminution as well as to Increase. The payment of the physician’s bill required, no agreement, as the present prosecutor was under an obligation to pay that bill under section It of Hie statute, without any agreement. It is very doubtful, we think, whether the opinion of the learned judge of the Common Pleas that the physician’s bill was compensation is sound, but whether so or not the payment of the physician’s bill required no agreement and would not be subject to review; it is only where Hiere is an agreement, that there can lie a review after the year and a case where there is an agreement is contrasted by the statute with a case where there is a dispute. The provision is clearly not applicable to a case like this. To call an agreement that there should be “no compensation” an agreement for compensation under the act, is a more perversion of language.
Force is added to this view by the wiry fact stated in the first amended petition that the agreement was that the petitioner should receive no compensation for the injury which slie had sustained by reason of the fact that she had returned to her employment on the sixteenth day after the injury. Ob
We pass by the questions as to the technical form of the procedure on which a rehearing was had, as we do not regard that as important, but it is important that a. case solemnly adjudicated should not be reopened for the purpose of allowing a party to make a new and distinct case.