39 Ga. App. 826 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1929
An indictment can properly contain a count for burglary and one for receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen when the articles were knowingly received from the person who committed the burglary and were taken from the store at the time it was burglarized. In Williams v. State, 72 Ga. 180, it is held that “Different counts charging offenses of the same nature may be joined in one indictment.” Mitchell v. State, 6 Ga. App. 554 (1). Burglary and receiving the fruits of the burglary are of the same nature. Each is a felony, and in each the same quantum of punishment would follow a conviction. In Johnson
Where an indictment contained two counts; the first charging burglary and the second receiving stolen goods' knowing them to be stolen, and in his address to the jury the solicitor-general confined his argument to the burglary count, and on the conclusion of the arguments the judge instructed the jury relative to the burglary count only, and, on his attention being called by the solicitor-general to the second count, he charged the jury relative to that count, it was not error for the judge to charge as to the second count, although the solicitor-general by his argument had led the court to believe that he had abandoned that count.
When considered in the light of the entire charge as it relates to the second count, there is no error in the portion of the charge embraced in the second special ground of the motion.
The excerpts from the charge embraced in special grounds 3 and 4 related to the first count of the indictment, and even if they are erroneous, they are harmless, as the defendant was convicted on the second count only. Shaw v. State, 38 Ga. App. 269 (2) (143 S. E. 600).
A ground of the motion alleges that the court erred in refusing a mistrial because of “the prejudicial and unfair remark of the solicitor-general in the presence of the jury and on account of
Judgment affirmed.