Benfeld v. Fleming Properties, LLCBenfeld v. Fleming Properties, LLC
Ordered that the amended order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, with costs, and that branch of the motion which was to vacate so much of the preliminary conference order dated November 1, 2006 as directed the appellants to produce their 2004 and 2005 income tax returns is granted.
The plaintiffs in the main action purchased a home on Staten Island. They contended that it was defectively constructed and on December 12, 2004 commenced this action against the seller
In a preliminary conference order dated February 7, 2006, the court directed Fleming to produce its 2004 and 2005 income tax returns and K-1 schedules. It appears to be undisputed that Fleming did not comply with that order. In a preliminary conference order dated November 1, 2006, the court directed Fleming and the appellants to produce their 2004 and 2005 income tax returns. In the order appealed from, that branch of the appellants’ motion which was vacate so much of the order dated November 1, 2006 as directed them to produce their 2004 and 2005 income tax returns was denied. This was error.
“[T]ax returns are generally not discoverable in the absence of a strong showing that the information is indispensable to the claim and cannot be obtained from other sources” (Altidor v State-Wide Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 435 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The respondents’ cross claim in the main action is against Fleming for indemnification and/or contribution. They failed to make any showing as to how the information contained in the appellants’ income tax returns would be in any way useful, let alone indispensable, in proving that claim. Thus, they failed to meet their burden (see Altidor v State-Wide Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 435 [2005]; see also Panasuk v Viola Park Realty, LLC, 41 AD3d 804 [2007]).
Similarly, there is nothing in the record on appeal, or even in the briefs, demonstrating how the information in the appellants’ income tax returns would be useful, let alone indispensable, in proving the first three causes of action in the third-party action seeking contribution, indemnification, and an attorneys’ fee from the appellants.
The respondents also failed to make any showing as to how that information would be useful in proving their fourth cause of action in the third-party complaint, to disgorge all money and
The respondents’ remaining contention is without merit (see Koczen v VMR Corp., 300 AD2d 285 [2002]). Schmidt, J.P., Rivera, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.