The principal issue in these appeals is whether the president of the board of representatives
The plaintiffs and others took an appeal from the board’s approval of the zoning amendment to the Superior Court. The court, Gerety, J., sustained the appeal on grounds that are not relevant to this appeal. Upon appeal to this court, we reversed and remanded the cases to the trial court for further proceedings. Id., 443. The plaintiffs, Bull’s Head and Benenson, on remand, pursued the issues presented in this appeal before the Superior Court. The court, Mottolese, J., dismissed the appeals. The Appellate Court granted certification for the plaintiffs to appeal, and we transferred their appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 4023.
The plaintiffs are owners of separate parcels of real property in Stamford. On March 11, 1985, the zoning board of the city of Stamford (zoning board), as part
The charter gives to the zoning board the power to adopt zoning regulations and to amend the zoning map, but not in such a way as to permit a use “which is contrary to the general land use established for [the] area by the master plan.” Stamford Charter § C-552; Burke
The board received a total of sixteen petitions, all of which were filed by property owners who were adversely affected by the proposed rezoning. On May 6, 1985, the board acted on thirteen of the sixteen petitions, which included the plaintiffs’ petition. Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives, supra, 411.
On each vote, the following procedure was used. A motion was made that the proposed amendment, which was the subject of the petition, be approved. Upon the motion being seconded, the president of the board announced the voting procedure as follows: “The vot
The vote on the zoning amendment concerning the plaintiffs’ properties was fifteen votes in favor of the motion approving the amendment, twenty opposed to the amendment, one abstention and two not voting. “The board took no action on [the plaintiffs’ petition] because of the lack of majority votes of the entire membership of the board needed on each petition to reject the proposed zone changes. . . . The effect of ‘no action’ by the board constituted an affirmance of the changes proposed by the zoning board.” Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives, supra.
The plaintiffs first argue that the questions before the board were improperly framed in that the votes should have been on the petition objecting to the proposed amendment, and not on the zoning amendment itself. They point to § C-556.1 of the charter that requires an “affirmative vote of a majority of the entire membership” of the board in order to decide all matters referred to the board by the zoning board under § C-552.2 of the charter. Because what was referred
The plaintiffs misconstrue the plain language of § C-552.2. The question before the board was not the petition, which indicated the property owners’ objection to the zone change, but whether the zone change should be approved. The petition was merely the vehicle that brought the issue before the board. This is made clear in § C-552.2, which provides that after the petition is referred to the board the “board of representatives shall approve or reject such proposed amendment . . . .” The charter does not provide for the approval or rejection of the “petition” itself. “The manifest legislative intent expressed in the Stamford charter is that the board of representatives, in considering an amendment to the zoning map, shall review the legislative action of the zoning board on that board’s written findings, recommendations and reasons. The question before the board, of representatives is whether to approve or to reject the amendment. That board, in reviewing the action of the zoning board, is called upon to perform a legislative function.” (Emphasis added.) Burke v. Board of Representatives, supra, 39. The plain language of § C-552.2 leaves no room for any other construction. Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives, supra, 423-24; see Norwich v. Norwalk Wilbert Vault Co.,
The board members knew the meaning of their vote. The president of the board made the effect of each vote perfectly clear before each vote. Before the vote on the proposed zoning amendment that concerned the plaintiffs, the board had the benefit of earlier explanations by the president on other amendments. Indeed, through those prior votes, they had the opportunity to observe how their vote, one way or the other, would affect the outcome.
The plaintiffs also argue, under a strained interpretation of a trial court’s opinion,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
This issue, although raised in Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives,
Bull’s Head “owns property located at 22 Long Ridge Road. The property was zoned C-L [limited business district]. As part of [the zoning amendments], however, the property was rezoned to C-N (neighborhood business district). The rezoning reduced the plaintiff’s property’s floor area ratio development potential to approximately 25 percent of what it had been. . . . Benenson owns property in the general area of High Ridge Road south of Oaklawn Avenue and north of Bedford Street, and Long Ridge Road from Cold Spring Road to Bedford Street. It is a 25,450 square foot parcel improved with several retail stores. The property was zoned C-L. As part of [the zoning amendment], however, it was rezoned to C-N. The zone change rendered Benenson’s property nonconforming.” Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives,
Section C-552.2 of the Stamford charter provides: “After the effective date of the master plan, if the owners of twenty per cent or more of the privately-owned land in the area included in any proposed amendment to the zoning map, or if the owners of twenty per cent or more of the privately-owned land located within five hundred feet of the borders of such area, file a signed petition with the zoning board, within ten days after the official publication of the decision thereon, objecting to the proposed amendment, said decision shall have no force or effect but the matter shall be referred by the zoning board to the board of representatives within twenty days after such official publication, together with written findings, recommendations and reasons. The board of representatives shall approve or reject such proposed amendment at or before its second regularly scheduled meeting following such referral. When acting upon such matters the board of representatives shall be guided by the same standards as are prescribed for the zoning board in section 550 of this act. The failure of the board of representatives either to approve or reject said amendment within the above time limit shall be deemed as approval of the zoning board’s decision.”
Section C-556.1 of the Stamford charter provides: “In deciding all matters referred to the board of representatives pursuant to this chapter, the affirmative vote of a majority of the entire membership of said board shall be required.”
See footnote 1, infra.
Moreover, the procedure used by the board was also entirely consistent with the framing of the question and § C-556.1 of the Stamford charter, which requires an “affirmative vote” of the membership of the board. “Affirmative” has its ordinary meaning; it means that “which declares positively . . . [or] that which establishes . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.). In other words, an affirmative vote of the majority simply means
Judge Novack’s decision in Schlesinger v. Board of Representatives, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Stamford, Docket No. CV-77-0019744-L (September 9, 1980), is entirely consistent with the procedure and decision of the president of the board, the trial court, Mottolese, J., and this court. In Schlesinger, the amendments to the zoning regulations were referred to the board as a result of a petition filed pursuant to § C-552.2 of the Stamford charter. At the board meeting, a motion
The confusion in Schlesinger arises out of an order entered upon a motion for clarification after the formal opinion had been issued, in which the court instructed the board to reconsider and vote again on the matter. We need not address this supplemental order in Schlesinger.
