4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 627 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1967
The plaintiff brought this action to recover the balance alleged to be due on a promissory note made by the defendant. The defendant’s answer set forth his discharge in bankruptcy as a special defense, to which the plaintiff replied that the financial statement furnished by the defendant was false and was relied on by the plaintiff and the debt was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. On a trial to the court, it found the issues for the defendant, and from the judgment and the denial of a motion to open the judgment the plaintiff has appealed, assigning as error the conclusions of the court and its denial of the plaintiff’s motion to correct the finding.
The court found the following facts: On July 17, 1964, the defendant executed his note to the
The plaintiff has made a wholesale attack on the finding, seeking to strike out certain facts and adding what is in essence its version of the facts. Much
The basic question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was justified in its conclusion that the plaintiff did not rely on the defendant’s financial statement in making the loan and that the statement was “merely a ceremonial device obtained perfunctorily as part of the loan transaction.” In testing the conclusions reached by the court, we look at the finding and not the evidence, and unless the conclusions are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case, they must stand. Gorman v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation, 146 Conn. 383, 386; Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Sciortino, 138 Conn. 690, 692.
The Bankruptcy Act in § 17a (2), as amended in 1960, provides in part: “(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false repre
“Whether the plaintiff relied on the financial statement of the defendant, which was admittedly untrue and false, is a question of fact. “[Rjeliance in the end is to a considerable degree a matter of one’s opinion.” Wylie v. Ward, 292 F.2d 590, 592. “In the final analysis the question of whether or not the plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentations of the defendant is a matter of fact to be decided by the trial court.” United Credit Plan, Inc. v. Seminary, 162 So. 2d 807, 809 (La. App.).
The facts and circumstances surrounding this loan transaction — thirtieth renewal of a note originally made in 1955, prompt payment with no defaults of the prior notes and renewals, incomplete financial statements on all renewals after the original note, listing only balance due the plaintiff and balance on mortgage, knowledge by the plaintiff’s manager of the defendant’s poor financial condition, statement by the manager to the defendant not to list any debts except the balance due the plaintiff and the balance on the mortgage, the few minutes involved in con
The assignment of error relating to the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment, not being briefed or argued, is deemed abandoned. In any event there is no merit to it.
There is no error.
In this opinion Jacobs, J., concurred.
This appeal was argued on May 16, 1967, before an appellate panel consisting of Prwyn, Jacobs and Levine, Js. Before the rendition of this decision, Levine, J., was appointed a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. The parties have stipulated that this appeal may be decided by Pruyn and Jacobs, Js.