Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
STEVEN BENANAV, et al. , оn behalf of CASE NO. C20-421-RSM themselves and all others similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S Plaintiffs, MOTION TO DISMISS v.
HEALTHY PAWS PET INSURANCE, LLC,
Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Healthy Paws Pet Insurance, LLC (“Healthy Paws”)’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended class action complaint, Dkt. #28. Plaintiffs oppose Healthy Paws’ motion. Dkt. #35. The Court finds oral argument unnecessary to resolve the underlying issues. Having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, the Court GRANTS Healthy Paws’ motion to dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant Healthy Paws markets and administers pet insurance policies to consumers for insurance companies, with its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. Dkt. #25 at ¶¶ 3-5. The insurance companies underwriting the policies advertised and administered by Healthy Paws include ACE American Insurance Company (“ACE”), Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (“Indеmnity”), and Westchester Fire Insurance Company (“Westchester”), which are subsidiaries of parent company CHUBB Ltd. Id. Pursuant to a General Agency Agreement dated October 1, 2012 between Healthy Paws and the insurance companies, Healthy Paws takes responsibility for selling and administering policies through advertising, website development, policy quoting, issuance, servicing, and claims adjudication.
Plaintiffs allege that Healthy Paws misrepresented the basis for changes to a policyowner’s monthly premiums. This alleged misrepresentation is contained in (1) the insurance policy, (2) a sample policy document posted on Healthy Paws’ website (“the Sample Policy”); and (3) a “Frequently Asked Questions” page on Healthy Paws’ website (“the FAQ page”). The insurance policy for Plаintiffs Benanav, Kowalski, and Thomas contain the same language under paragraph I(5):
MONTHLY PREMIUM: Your monthly premium is set forth on your declarations page. Monthly premiums may change for all policyholders to reflect changes in the costs of veterinary medicine.
We will notify you at least sixty (60) days in advance of such change.
Dkt. #25 at ¶¶ 28, 36, 51 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend that these statements mislead them to believe that their premium would only increase as the costs of veterinary medicine increased. Id. at ¶ 6. The Sample Policy repeats the same language stating that policy premiums may change “to reflect changes in the costs of veterinary medicine.” at ¶ 46. Furthermore, when Plaintiff Kowalski purchased her policy in 2011, Healthy Paws stated the following on its FAQ pagе:
Will my premiums increase over the life of my pet? Due to the increasing cost of new technology and advances in veterinary care, your rates will increase slightly each year. These slight increases provide you the opportunity to offer your pet the best medical and diagnostic options available today. Keep in mind your rates will never go up to due to making claims. And all pet insurance companies, no matter how they try to market their benefits, will raise rates to keep up with the rapidly rising cost of veterinary care.
Dkt. #25 at ¶ 41 (emphases added). Healthy Paws posted a similar statement on its FAQ page when Plaintiffs Benanav and Thomas purchased their policies in 2012 and 2014, respectively:
Will my premiums increase over the life of my pet?
Due to the increasing cost of new technology and advances in veterinary care, your rates will increase slightly each year. Our plan has factored the expected increase in the cost of veterinary care into your rates so that the annual premium increases are manageable.
These manageable annual increases provide you the opportunity to offer your pet the best medical and diagnostic options available today. Rest assured, we will never penalize you with higher rates for making claims. It’s not your fault your pet is unlucky! All pet insurance companies, no matter how they market their benefits, will raise rates periodically to keep up with the rapidly rising cost of veterinary care.
Dkt. #25 at ¶ 42 (emphases added).
Between 2011 and 2014, Steven Benanav, Monica Kowalski, and Katherine Thomas purchased pet insurance policies through Healthy Paws. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16. After purchasing their pet insurance, Plаintiffs discovered that their policy premiums increased each year at a rate that allegedly exceeded the general rising costs of veterinary medicine. Mr. Benanav claims that his premiums increased by over 300% between 2013 and 2020, starting with a $33.85 monthly premium in January 2013 to his current payment of $104.50 in 2020. Id. at ¶¶ 66-68. Ms. Thomas purchased insurance in July 2014, and her monthly premiums increased from $40.61 in 2014 to $54.53 in 2020. Id. at ¶¶ 74-77. Ms. Kowalski purchased her policy in 2011 for her dogs Lola, Olive and Jenks. at ¶¶ 83-90. Jenks passed away in 2015, but Ms. Kowalski’s premiums for Lola and Olive, respectively, increased from $25.41 and $31.44 per month in 2011 to $69.18 and $86.36 in 2020.
Plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding Healthy Paws’ representations to the contrary, their monthly pet insurance premiums increase based on factors besides changes in the cost of veterinary medicine, such as the pet’s age. Dkt. #25 at ¶ 51. As evidence of Healthy Paws’ misrepresentation, Plaintiffs cite to a correction at the bottom of a 2019 New York Times article which stated, “An earlier version of this article, using information supplied by Healthy Paws Pet Insurance, misstated how a pet’s age affects premiums for the company’s policies. The pet’s age affects the premium at the time of enrollment and as the pet gets older, not just at enrollment. ” Id. at ¶ 56 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also cite to a statement from Healthy Paws’ customer service team responding to a complaint posted on the Better Business Bureau website. In this statement, Healthy Paws confirmed that several factors besides the general rising cost of veterinary medicine affect the prеmium:
In accordance with the terms of the Pet Health Insurance Policy and the associated rating rules, monthly premiums may change for all policyholders. Premiums are determined based on the rates and rating rules filed and approved within each state’s Department of Insurance, which reflect the cost of treatment advances in veterinary medicine, your individual pet’s breed, gender, age, and other factors, in addition to the overall claims experience for the program within the region your pet resides.
Id. at ¶ 58 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also cite to a report from the Nationwide Purdue Index stating that the costs of veterinary medicine only rose by 21.1% from the end of 2014 through the end of 2018. at ¶¶ 69-70. In contrast, Plaintiff Benanav’s premiums rose by 65.4% during this four-year period.
On Mаrch 19, 2020, Plaintiffs brought this action against Healthy Paws on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on June 8, 2020 alleging violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86, et seq . (“WCPA”) on behalf of all plaintiffs, the California Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq . (“UCL”) on behalf of Plaintiff Benanav and the California class, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. (“ICFA”) on behalf of Plaintiff Kowalski and the Illinois class, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et seq . (“CFA”) on behalf of Plaintiff Thomas and the New Jersey class. Dkt. #25 at ¶¶ 101-145. Plaintiffs seek compensatory, consequential, statutory and punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief to address Healthy Paws’ ongoing deceptive conduct. Id. at 24. On July 15, 2020, Healthy Paws moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Dkt. #28.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Request for Judicial Notice
“Generally, on а 12(b)(6) motion, the District Court should consider only the pleadings.”
Shaver v. Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund,
First, Healthy Paws moves the Court to consider additional pages from the policy terms
that Plaintiffs omitted from their exhibits to the Amended Complaint. at 4. Specifically,
Healthy Paws attaches the endorsement page, signature, declaration, and notice pages for each of
these policies. Healthy Paws argues that these documents are properly considered under the
“incorporation by reference” doctrine, given that the incomplete agreements attached to the
Amended Complaint “presented the Court with only a portion of their entire insurance policies.”
at 4. Under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine, a court may review documents “whose
contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.”
Knievel v. ESPN,
Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of the attached documents or otherwise
oppose the Court’s consideration of these omitted pages. Furthermore, the contents of most of
these documents are expressly referenced in the complaint. The “Signatures” pages set forth the
name of the insured, date of issuance, and name of the issuing insurance company,
see
Dkts. #29-
1, #29-2. #29-3. #29-4, and the “Declarations” pages list each plaintiff’s pet and their monthly
premium,
see
Dkts. #29-9, #29-10, #29-11. Accordingly, these documents are properly
considered under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine. However, the content of the “Notice”
pages, which informs each policyholder of the process for making claims, is not referenced in the
Amended Complaint.
See
Dkts. #29-5, #29-6, #29-7. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims
do not depend on the content of these pages or otherwise require consideration of the entire
contract at the pleading stage.
See Eclectic Properties E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co.
, No.
C-09-00511 RMW,
Next, Healthy Paws requests judicial notice of the California rate filed by Markel
American Insurance Company (“Markel”) in 2012. Dkt. #30 at 4. Federal Rule of Evidence 201
permits the court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(2). Consistent with that rule, courts may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of
public record, such as documents on file with аdministrative agencies.
Palmason v.
Weyerhaeuser Co.
,
B. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss
In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as
true and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Baker v.
Riverside County Office of Educ.
,
[2]
See
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/warff/front?event=rateFilingPdf&function=downloadPDF&
serffFilingNumber=MRKC-126573195&filingNumber=10-2837&typeCode=PC.
24
However, the court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
(quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
,
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
The purpose of the short and plain statement rule is to provide defendants with “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly
,
Healthy Paws argues that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is warranted because (1) Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a material misrepresentation or omission by Healthy Paws; (2) Washington, California, and New Jersey’s filed rate doctrines bar Plaintiffs’ respective state law claims; and (3) claims under Washington, California and Illinois state law are time-barred. Having considered Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and attached exhibits, the relevant briefing, and the judicially noticeаble materials, the Court GRANTS Healthy Paws’ motion for the reasons set forth below.
C. Failure to Adequately Plead Fraud
Healthy Paws first moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to adequately plead affirmative misrepresentations or material omissions by Healthy Paws in (i) the insurance contract or (ii) the Sample Policy and FAQ Page that Plaintiffs relied upon in purchasing their policies. Dkt. #28 at 15-19. The Court will address each argument in turn.
i. Misrepresentations in Insurance Contract
Healthy Paws argues that as a non-party, it cannot be held liable for any
misrepresentations or omissions in the policy statement. Dkt. #28 at 15-17. In support of its
argument, Healthy Paws cites to cases holding that an insurance agent cannot be held liable under
a principal’s contract pursuant to California, Washington, Illinois and New Jersey state law.
See,
e.g.
,
Meisel v. Allstate Indem. Co.
,
Plaintiffs respond that
Meisel
and the related cited cases are inapposite, given that the
amended complaint does not allege breach of contract. Dkt. #35 at 14-15. However, Plaintiffs
fail to meaningfully address the broader proposition set forth in each of these cases: that in the
context of insurance cases, “liability to the insured for ‘
acts or
contracts of an insurance agent
within the scope of his agency, with full disclosure of the principal, rests on the [insurance]
company.’”
Meisel
,
For these reasons, to the extent Plaintiffs allege claims arising from the terms of the insurance policy, they have failed to state a claim. However, because state law recognizes certain exceptions to the general rule precluding insurance agent liability, see, e.g. , Good , 5 F.Supp. 2d at 808, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that amendment is futile. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims alleging misrepresentation or material omission in the insurance contract without prejudice.
ii. Misrepresentations in Sample Policy and FAQ Page Plaintiffs also allege misrepresentations in Healthy Paws’ advertising of the insurance contracts—namely, its statements regarding premium increases in the Sample Policy and its FAQ Page. See Dkt. #25 at ¶¶ 41-46. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not dispute that these claims are subject to the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b). See Dkt. #35 at 11. Healthy Paws contends that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient detail to satisfy the Rule 9(b) heightened standard and have furthermore failed to plead that Plaintiffs relied on these statements in deciding to purchase their policies. Dkt. #28 at 17-19.
To satisfy the pleading standard under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must articulate “the who,
what, when, where, and how of the misconduct alleged.”
Kearns
,
Here, Plaintiff Benanav states that he “purchased the policy in reliance on Healthy Paws’ representations on its website , including that monthly premiums would not increase based on a pet’s age and instead would only increase for all policyholders based on the rising cost of veterinary care.” Dkt. #25 at ¶ 64 (emphasis added). In contrast, Plaintiffs Thomas and Kowalski merely state that they “purchased the policy in reliance on Healthy Paws’ representations , including that monthly premiums would not increase based on а pet’s age and instead would only increase for all policyholders based on the rising cost of veterinary care.” Dkt. #25 at ¶¶ 76, 87. Plaintiff Benanav identifies Healthy Paws’ website as the source of the misrepresentation he relied upon, indicating that he reviewed the allegedly misleading statements in the FAQ Page and the Sample Policy. In contrast, the vague wording in Plaintiffs Kowalski’s and Thomas’ claims makes it unclear which of the alleged misrepresentations they were exposed to when purchasing their policies.
Plaintiffs argue that under
Opperman v. Path, Inc.
, they need not specify the particular
misrepresentation they saw and relied upon. Dkt. #35 at 13 (citing
The remaining claims, Plaintiff Benanav’s claims under the UCL and WCPA, survive
Healthy Paws’ remaining arguments for dismissal for failure to adequately plead fraud. To have
standing to pursue claims under California’s UCL, a plaintiff must allege actual reliance on the
fraudulent statements.
Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc.
,
Plaintiff Benanav states that he “purchased the policy
in reliance on Healthy Paws’
representations on its website
, including that monthly premiums would not increase based on a
pet’s age and instead would only increase for all policyholders based on the rising cost of
veterinary care.” Dkt. #25 at ¶ 64 (emphasis added). While Healthy Paws attempts to analogize
this case to
Rugg v. Johnson & Johnson
, No. 17-CV-05010-BLF,
D. Filed Rate Doctrine
Healthy Paws also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Washington, California, and New Jersey
claims under each state’s filed rate doctrine.
[3]
In Washington, the filed rate doctrine bars lawsuits
that challenge the reasonableness of insurance rates filed and approved by a regulating agency.
Tenore v. AT&T Wireless
,
Plaintiffs argue that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable here, since (i) Healthy Paws cannot assert the filed rate doctrine as a non-insurer or rate filer; (ii) Healthy Paws’ insurance partners did not comply with their filed rates; and (iii) Plaintiffs challenge Healthy Paws’ misrepresentations about the filed rates as opposed to their reasonableness. Dkt. #35 at 16. The Court will address eаch argument in turn.
i. Applicability of Filed Rate Doctrine to Insurance Agents
Plaintiffs’ first argument is easily dismissed, given that courts consistently acknowledge
that the filed rate doctrine applies to claims against entities other than rate filers.
See, e.g.
,
Alpert
v. Nationstar Mrtg.
,
Plaintiffs cite to several cases where courts declined to apply the filed rate doctrine, yet
none of them stand for the proposition that the doctrine does
not
apply to claims against insurance
agents.
See, e.g.
,
Ellsworth v. US Bank
,
ii. Compliance with Filed Rates
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine does not apply where Healthy Paws has failed to show that Washington, California or New Jersey approved the pet insurance rates at issue. Dkt. #35 at 17-18. Plaintiffs’ argument improperly shifts the burden to Healthy Paws to show that the insurers complied with the filed rates. at 18 (“Healthy Paws has not proven its insurers complied with their filed rates”). At the motion to dismiss stage, the complaint must allege that Plaintiffs paid premiums in excess of the filed rates in order to escape application of the filed rate doctrine on this basis. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (Requiring complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”). The amended complaint alleges that the Washington Insurance Commissioner fined ACE and Indemnity “for increasing policy premiums due to age,” Dkt. #25 at ¶ 52, yet there is no mention of whether the premiums that Plaintiffs paid in their respective states—California, New Jersey and Illinois—exceeded the filed rаtes in those states. Furthermore, Defendants have provided a California rate-filing document filed by Markel in 2012 to show that Markel complied with its filed rate for that time period. See Dkt. #29-8.
Plaintiffs attempt to remedy this pleading deficiency by attaching a declaration to their
Response, which shows that ACE promised the California Department of Insurance that age
would not be a factor in premiums. Dkt. #35 at 18 (citing Dkt. #38 (Doerrer Decl.)). Plaintiffs’
introduction of this new allegation, which is not contained in the amended complaint, is
procedurally improper at the motion to dismiss stage. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court’s
analysis is limited to “allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint,
and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”
Akhtar v. Mesa
,
iii. Implication of the Filed Rate Doctrine
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not implicate the filed rate doctrine because they concern Healthy Paws’ mischaracterization of the rates—not the reasonableness of the filed rates. Dkt. #35 at 18-23. Under Washington law, claims for damages that relate to a plaintiff’s insuranсe premiums are not barred per se by the filed rate doctrine. See McCarthy , 347 P.3d at 874. Rather, courts must “determine whether the claims and damages are merely incidental to agency-approved rates and therefore may be considered by courts or would necessarily require courts to reevaluate agency-approved rates and therefore may not be considered by courts. . . . The mere fact that a claim is related to an agency-approved rate is no bar.” Id . at 875 (emphases added). A WCPA claim may proceed “to the extent that claimants can prove damages without attacking agency-approved rates” because in such cases, “the benefits gained from courts’ considering [W]CPA claims outweigh any benefit that would be derived from applying the filed rate doctrine to bar the claims.”
In
McCarthy
, plaintiffs claimed damages in the form of (1) a refund of the excessive
overcharges in premium payments due to defendant’s unfair business practices and excessive
premiums, and (2) a refund of any excess surplus to the insureds who paid the high premiums.
McCarthy
,
[A]warding either of the two specific damages requested by the Policyholders would run contrary to the purposes of the filed rate doctrine because the court would need to determine what health insurance premiums would have been reasonable for the Policyholders to pay as a baseline for cаlculating the amount of damages[,] and the [Washington Office of the Insurance Commissioner] has already determined that the health insurance premiums paid by the Policyholders were reasonable. at 876 (emphasis added).
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that
McCarthy
is inapplicable since the rates at issue
here were not approved by Washington’s insurance commission. Dkt. #35 at 22. Again, however,
nothing in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint indicates that Plaintiffs paid premiums in excess of the
filed rates in their respective states. Plaintiffs further argue that
McCarthy
is inapposite, since
they are attacking Healthy Paws’ conduct in misrepresenting the premiums as opposed to the
premiums themselves.
See
Dkt. #35 at 22. Yet the amended complaint, as currently pleaded,
plainly attacks the reasonableness of the rate Plaintiffs were forced to pay as a result of factoring
in a pet’s age.
See
Dkt. #25 at ¶ 105 (“Had Plaintiffs known their premiums would increase based
on their pet’s age, they would not have signed up for the policies.”). Plaintiffs concede that their
damages “may be the increased premiums they paid in violation of Healthy Paws’ promises,”
Dkt. #35 at 22, thereby placing the Court in the position of calculating the reasonable rate
Plaintiffs expected to pay. To that end, this case is similar to
Alpert
, where the complaint’s
“references to the facially unreasonable amounts . . . place the Court directly on the toes of the
Insurance Commissioner, a situation that courts specifically contemplated with constructing the
doctrine.”
Plaintiffs also rely on
Harvey v. Centene Management
to argue that Washington’s filed
rate doctrine does not apply here.
The results are no different under California’s or New Jersey’s filed rate doctrines.
[4]
Plaintiffs cite a plethora of cases where courts declined to apply the filed rate doctrine, yet none
[4]
“California courts are split as to whether a general state filed-rate doctrine exists.”
Levay Brown v.
AARP, Inc.
, No. 17-09041 DDP (PLAX),
Similar to the kickback-related cases, courts have declined to apply the filed rate doctrine
to cases challenging the undisclosed payment of illegal commissions to an interest group.
Plaintiffs cite a line of cases challenging the concealment of illegal commissions to AARP in
premium rates, which courts concluded were not barred by the filed rate doctrine.
See Friedman
v. AARP, Inc.,
[5]
This Court has previously recognized “a split in authority with regard to whether federal courts apply
the filed rate doctrine to bar kickback claims.”
Alpert
,
Finally, Plaintiffs cite cases alleging various misconduct by insurers that did not implicate the reasonableness of the filed rate. For example, in Wahl v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co. , the court found the filed rate doctrine inapplicable to claims against an insurer for charging premiums for a period of time that would have been covered by an expired policy or, alternatively, a 60-day binder. See No. C08-0555 RS, 2010 WL 4509814, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (Finding “the claim is directed at [the insurer]’s allegedly unfair conduct and not at the Commissioner’s rate.”). Similarly, in King v. National General Insurance Co. , the court declined to apply the filed rate doctrine to claims alleging that defendants failed to offer the lowest available “good-driver” rates to plaintiffs that qualified as “good drivers.” 129 F. Supp. 3d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Plaintiffs do not challenge the reasonableness of any particular insurance rate, nor do they attаck acts done pursuant to the [California Department of Insurance]’s rate-making authority.”).
This case is distinguishable from the above-referenced cases that address undisclosed
kickbacks, concealed commissions, and other unfair conduct related to the administration of
agency-approved premiums. Here, Plaintiffs are attacking Healthy Paws’ misrepresentations that
directly implicate the reasonableness of the premiums they paid, as determined by the portion of
the rate improperly charged as a result of their pets’ increasing ages.
See
Dkt. #25 at ¶ 51
(“Notwithstanding Healthy Paws’ representations to the contrary, the monthly premiums on
Healthy Paws policies increase based on other factors besides the ‘changes in the cost of
veterinary medicine,’ including the pet’s age.”). To award damages, the Court would be required
to determine the amount Plaintiffs
should have been paying
under the policy terms.
See
Dkt. #35
at 22 (“Plaintiffs’ damages in this case will be . . . the difference between (i) the original quoted
price plus ‘the increased cost of veterinary care,’ and (ii) the premium that improperly included
the annual increase based on the pet age factor.”). Plaintiffs’ claims, as currently pleaded,
therefore “would require the court to set damages by assuming a hypothetical rate” of the
premium Plaintiffs should have been charged that excluded age as a factor.
Pub. Util. Dist. No.
1 of Grays Harbor County Wash. v. IDACORP Inc.,
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Washington, California and New Jersey filed rate doctrines. Because the Court is not willing at this time to conclude that no other facts exist that Plaintiffs could possibly plead to cure the deficiency, these claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Having found dismissal of Plaintiffs’ WCPA, UCL, ICFA, and CFA claims warranted under Rule 9(b) and the filed rate doctrine, the Court need not address Healthy Paws’ statute of limitations arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiffs’ Response, Defendant’s Reply, and the remainder of the record, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1) Healthy Paws’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Dkt. #28, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.
(2) Plaintiffs are ORDERED to file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.
(3) Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint, Dkt. #20, is terminated as moot.
DATED this 15 th day of October, 2020.
A RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
[3] Parties agree that Illinois had not adopted the filed rate doctrine and is therefore inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ ICFA claims. See Dkt. #28 at 13. 24