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Bemis v. Hare
718 S.W.2d 481
Ark. Ct. App.
1986
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*1 J., Corbin, dissent. joins M. v. Freddie Hare BEMIS T. BEMIS and Debra Ralph HARE 718 S.W.2d 481 CA 86-197 of Arkansas Court Appeals

En Banc 5, 1986 November delivered Opinion *3 Walls, Firm, P.A., Charles A. Jr. and J. by: Law Walls Stuart, for Michael appellants. Hale, Ward,

Hale, Green & Milas H. Morley, by: Young, appellee. for Judge. L. Bemis Corbin, T. Appellants, Ralph

Donald Bemis, ruling Debra a the Probate Court of Hare appeal by child, Lonoke their for of a County denying petition adoption Hare, 12, David who was born the of age during marriage Paul M. We Hare Bemis to Freddie Hare. appellant appellee, Debra reverse and remand. 1983, evidence was that from October to the undisputed

The time of no the by trial was natural father. support paid appellee, Force, in he who is the Air testified that Appellee, voluntarily chose the and discontinued his military not to child allotment. also that did not dependent appellee It was undisputed visit nor communicate with the child in manner from October any However, of in hearing of 1983 to the time the of 1986. February the trial court ruled had to do justifiable that cause not so, and denied for appellants’ petition adoption. in argue (1) the court erred

Appellants appeal holding (2) consent to the adoption required; appellee’s court in it would be best of the finding erred in the interest (3) child the court erred petition; allowing deny and, (4) of inadmissible settlement testimony negotiations; child over court abused its discretion questioning appel- objection. lants’ 1985) 56-206 (Supp.

Ark. Stat. Ann. provides § must consent to an for it to generally the natural parents adoption in 56-207(a)(2) 1985) be valid. are set forth Exceptions (Supp. § which as follows: provides

(a) (2) Consent is not of parent of: a adoption required another, of in the if the for a custody parent period at least one [1] year has failed significantly justifiable (i) (ii) cause communicate with child or provide the care of the child as required by decree; law judicial

It well settled that statutory provisions involving of minors are construed and Roberts strictly applied. Swim, v. (Ark. 268 Ark. 597 S.W.2d 840 1980). The App. holding Caskin, supreme court Harper Ark. 580 S.W.2d 176 (1979), places burden heavy upon party seeking to a child without the adopt consent of a natural parent proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed or without significantly justifiable cause to communicate with the child or to for the care and provide of the child as law or required by judicial decree. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as being:

Evidence a by credible witness whose of the facts memory *4 about which he testifies is distinct and whose narration of the details thereof is exact and due order and whose clear, direct, is so testimony weighty and convincing as to enable the conviction, fact finder to come to a clear of the hesitancy, truth of the facts related is and clear . convincing. . . This of measure proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of the and evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt.. . . It is simply that of degree proof which will in the trier of fact a produce firm conviction as to the allegation to sought be established. 865, 870, v. Kelly, 672, 264

Kelly Ark. 575 S.W.2d 675-676 (1979) (citations omitted). “Failed not mean significantly” does “failed totally” but the be significant failure must a one as contrasted with an one. insignificant It denotes a failure that is

202 that the cause” means “Justifiable meaningful important. of being voluntary be willful in the sense failure must significant intentional; the acted parent arbitrarily it appear must and Money, Henson v. 1 excuse. cause or adequate without just 203, S.W.2d 97, 123, 273 Ark. 617 aff'd, 613 S.W.2d App. Ark. (1981). 367 516, 78 606 S.W.2d v. Ark. Dudgeon,

In Watkins the dismissal of court of reversed 1980), the (Ark. App. appeals the natural holding for In adoption. the appellants’ petition circumstances, under we was not the required father’s consent stated: of statute Stat.

The obvious the purpose applicable [Ark. real father is to a child a provide Ann. § 56-207] conduct, who, be a his has to by proven instead of one cannot force legislature blood only. Although father by meaning be proper a man to a father within term, whereby method a judicial it can and has afforded a to the benefits of have an may opportunity experience real Our statute having by permits a father adoption. courts, them- present where the circumstances proper selves, to who petitioners to grant petition love, child, care for a demonstrate affection and true dissent natural father. regardless arbitrary by 521, omitted). (citations at S.W.2d at 81 Id. de we novo probate proceedings

While review record, will judge it is well settled that the decision of the probate (clearly not be disturbed erroneous against unless clearly evidence), regard of the due preponderance giving opportu of the judge judge trial nity superior position credibility 52(a); supra. of the witnesses. ARCP Rule Henson Money, had Debra appellant David been awarded Custody Bemis and was ordered the divorce decree dated June appellee by $100 month for David’s per support. Appellant Debra Bemis and involved in were subsequently litiga- arrearages tion over David in reference to child with visitation. was ordered increase his problems Appellee *5 $150 arrearages child and the month support payments per were reduced to him. of counsel for judgments against Argument arrearages totalling for judgments reflects that the appellants $10,000 hearing of were at the time of the excess unsatisfied of February 1986. his and testified that he wanted to child

Appellee acknowledged would see him He regular that he like to on a basis. his that willing love his son and indicated he was place on During his cross-examina- military again. allotment tion, son admitted that he had made no effort to see his appellee 1983; since October of he missed visitation with scheduled his and he son could not remember if had notified Debra appellant visitation; Bemis that he would not be exercising his and that he a given had not his son Christmas since 1982 nor he present had called David or done for David on his as of anything birthdays 1982. his Appellee son seemed to acknowledged good receive care from and that he was a to be of. appellants proud Appellee questioned the court in to his by regard voluntary of allotment and suspension stated that he took that payments action because was it harder to getting get David. Appellee testified that each time he went home to appellants’ pick up David, appellant Debra Bemis had David his ready go and suitcase packed. stated that on Appellee one occasion he had physically pick David who was up, and screaming kicking, put David the truck. noted that lot of Appellee times David run would from However, while still in appellee the house. appellee testified that unequivocally Debra Bemis appellant never physically his exercise of prevented visitation with David. Debra Bemis

Appellant testified that David was two of years age at time her divorce from She married appellee. 16,1976. appellant Bemis June Ralph She stated that appellee had not made regular visits David since 1981. She would have David each time and on ready occasions many would not show up. Appellant Debra Bemis acknowledged there had never been any birthday or Christmas cards Christmas sent to presents David She by appellee. described the her relationship between husband and David as that of a father and son. did lot of They together were things very happy.

Appellant Bemis Ralph testified that he had lived with David since he was two and had years age enjoyed relationship father son with him since that time. He was a *6 fishing hunting, and enjoyed leader of David’s troop Scout Boy aged daughters, had two other with Appellants and David. sports able to six, he was financially in He stated and their home. three David. support and her grandson she loved mother testified that

Appellee’s filed and husband had him. stated that she her wanted to visit She times. Mrs. with David several rights seeking visitation petitions those exercising in she was unsuccessful Hare testified that in took events which place She described the rights. visitation her to exercise times she during attempted home appellants’ She was a “scene”. always stated there visitation with David. She would Mrs. Debra Bemis tell would David appellant ask for would ask David Mrs. Hare Hare David was in the house. She her husband had her. go and David would refuse with since not visited with David 1983. in order his findings made judge specific

The probate his are following denying adoption appellants’ petition failure to which are to the issue of findings appellee’s pertinent in of one year: with David excess or communicate support Hare, Max has (5) The Freddie respondent, nor for over one year, visited the child paid however, was Court believes in case action of A.S.A. 56-207. justified within the meaning witnesses, it is view of the (6) From the Court’s possible Debra S. Bemis did everything believed that father, Mr. avoid from natural collecting support Hare, Mr. was led effect an That Hare order to adoption. was since he to believe that he should not pay support child, greatly visitation with the unable have Mr. Hare’s testimony him. The Court upsetting accepts this regard. record, our de novo review the we must

Upon failure judge’s finding appellee’s conclude the probate In Henson v. erroneous. justified clearly David is Court, granting the Arkansas Money, Supreme supra, father, over objection duty stated “[t]he of the custodial duty independent visitation, by to allow both be enforced the courts.” parent may as *7 Green, 868, In v. Ark. S.W.2d 41 Id. at 207. Green 232 341 (1960), recognized the court that the father’s to supreme duty support his minor child cannot be excused on the basis of the others, conduct of unless that conduct him from prevents per- forming McKee, 18, his See also Pender v. 266 Ark. 582 duty. Johnson, S.W.2d (1979); 929 Brown v. 10 Ark. 661 App. (1983). S.W.2d 443 The probate judge undoubtedly overlooked the above law in had principles determining appellee justifiable cause to not David. There was no evidence to support competent show that appellants’ conduct precluded from appellee making his support There was payments. no evidence that was appellee financially unable to meet his obligation the record clearly reflects that appellee chose not to the voluntarily pay The support. probate judge in concluded his findings that Debra appellant Bemis “did to everything possible avoid collecting support... order to an effect Her adoption.” as well testimony, as witnesses, of all the testimony does this support conclusion. She testified that she had been to court twelve approximately times since her divorce from Her reasons for not appellee. having pursued recourse any against for child appellee since support March of 1984 as were follows: she did (1) not feel one should child; have to make a (2) father his support if the father did not it, it; want to do you can’t make him do it was (3) not worth staying court and going through (4) man expense; any who loved his child would not have be to made child pay support. case,

Under circumstances it made simply no difference if appellee believed interfered his appellants with ability observevisitation with David or not. has a Appellee duty and obligation to David whether ordered to so support do aby McKee, court or not. See v. Pender The supra. probate judge also determined that was appellee led to believe that he by appellants did not have to since he was pay support unable to have visitation with David and the court appellee’s accepted testimony regard. The evidence in this case illustrates clearly beginning 1, 1976, unjustifi- on June time of the divorce child. Appellee to his obligations his failed to meet

ably support three-year period David in the his failure to contends justifiable hearing adoption petition on the preceding Debra Bemis he and alleges appellant of an he agreement because also This support. obligation into his excusing entered obligation of his duty did not relieve appellee David. Neil, 661 S.W.2d 10 Ark. App.

In Dangelo consent of ruling judge’s we affirmed the (1983), probate her son by for the required mother was not natural had no communication The natural mother had the appellees. the care and no contribution toward and had made significant was evidence year. of her son in of one There excess believe no contribu- gave the natural appellees mother cause stated, however, “Whether from We tion was her. expected from appellant contributions appellees expected requested *8 to parent obligation support factor. has the determining not the A is Ann. 57- child, and no Stat. necessary. a minor Ark. request § 122, 1971).” Id. at 450. 633 at S.W.2d (Repl. 661 was an to Appellee’s failing action We find that without cause excuse. arbitrary just adequate act convincing evidence that proved by appellee clear appellants to for the significantly provide failed and without cause justifiable adoption care and of David. consent the Appellee’s therefore required. not of whether

A closer the issue question presented by failed without cause commu- justifiable significantly In view of year. nicate with David for a of more than one period our holding significantly on the issue of failure appellee’s David, we cause need not decide this justifiable have raised in appellants nor the other which question arguments their appeal. grant

A court for probate may petition adoption it of the hearing required if determines at conclusion the the is in have been obtained or and that adoption consents excused of to be Ark. Stat. adopted. best interest the child or individual Dixon, 128, Ann. Dixon v. 286 Ark. 56-214(c) (Supp. 1985); § 100, Howard, v. 271 Ark. 607 (1985); 689 S.W.2d 556 Falbo

207 (1980). S.W.2d 369 In the case at bar the of the probate order does not address appellants’ petition adoption for judge denying it is in the best interest of David be the issue whether adopted. logical It is for this court to assume that only probate judge did not consider this view of his determination question consent was We stated in McKee v. appellee’s necessary. Bates, 10 if Ark. S.W.2d 415 the trial App. (1983), determines a unnecessary, court consent is such a parent’s finding does not that the require granted. be Before an adoption adoption be petition may granted, judge must find that the probate is in the best interest of child. Shemley See also v. Montezuma, 337, 676 S.W.2d 759 12Ark. (1984). App. Accord ingly, cause is reversed and remanded with directions probate court to conduct a limited hearing purpose determining whether it inis the child’s grant best interest to adoption.

Reversed and remanded.

Cracraft, C.J., Cloninger, J., Wright, Judge, Special . join the majority.

Cooper JJ., Mayfield, dissent. Mayfield, dissenting. doI

Melvin Judge, agree that judge’s trial decision in this case should be reversed. The rules by which we review the trial judge’s decision were clearly set out in our Hill, Taylor case Ark. 661 S.W.2d 412 App. (1983) as follows:

Ark. Stat. Ann. 56-207 has been the subject of a § *9 of number recent opinions of the courts appellate of this state from which the principles issues of this governing appeal have been established. Statutory involv- provisions ing the of are minors and strictly construed Swim, applied. 917, Roberts v. 268 Ark. 597 840 S.W.2d (Ark. App. 1980). The party seeking to a child adopt without the consent of a natural parent bears the heavy of burden proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have failed justifiable and significantly without cause to communicate the child or to for its provide care and the prescribed period. v. Harper Caskin, 558, 265 Ark. (1979). 580 S.W.2d 176 208 has defined as evidence” been convincing

“Clear and of facts whose memory of witness evidence a credible whose narration of is distinct and about which he testified as clear, direct, convincing weighty, is and the details so conviction, to come to a clear the finder of fact enable facts related. This truth of the hesitancy, of the a between preponderance measure of lies somewhere proof is doubt. It and reasonable beyond of the evidence proof will the trier of which degree proof produce simply be allegation sought fact a firm conviction as of 865, S.W.2d 672 264 Ark. 575 Kelly Kelly, established. v. does not mean “failed to- “Failed (1979). significantly” one as con- must be a significant but the failure tally” one. It denotes a failure that trasted with an insignificant cause” means that meaningful important. “Justifiable being be willful in the sense of significant failure must intentional; it that the parent must voluntary appear cause or arbitrarily just adequate acted and without 97,613 1 Ark. S.W.2d 123 Money, App. excuse. Hensonv. 203,617 273 Ark. S.W.2d 367 (1981) on appeal [affirmed McKee, 18, S.W.2d 929 v. 266 Ark. 582 (1981)]; Pender (1979). on de novo

While we review probate proceedings record, judge it is well that the decision a probate settled erroneous, giving will be unless due clearly disturbed of the trial regard to the opportunity superior position ARCP Rule credibility of witnesses. judge judge 82, v. 644 52(a); Chrisos Ark. S.W.2d Egleston, App. v. (1983); Money, Henson Personal observa- supra. weight entitled to even more in cases judge tions are Wilson, the welfare of a small child. Wilson involving 789, (1958). 228 Ark. 310 S.W.2d 500 The record contains evidence that the showing appellant, Bemis, Debra Freddie Hare. first married to the appellee, son on March 1974. At that They are born parents time, were They Debra was 17 old and Freddie was 18. years 1, 1976, was married to the divorced June and Debra Bemis, Freddie on June 1976. Both appellant, Ralph at County were in Pulaski Ralph in the Air Force and stationed *10 the time of both events. Freddie testified that he child paid until late but admits he his allotment for stopped hearing at that time. At the he purpose February admitted he had not made nor seen his son any support payments court, for more than two In years. response to he questions by testified as follows:

I allotment stopped my because payments it was getting harder and harder get to David. Everytime I would go over there she’d have him She would have his ready. suitcase but he wouldn’t be ready go. to One time I had to him pick just up kicking screaming put him the truck and take him with us. A lot of times he would run in the house and I wouldn’t him I get out. wouldn’t want to go in there after him. It just would seem like it wasn’t going She had made anywhere. this offer several times to me. The same offer that is on that paper.

THE COURT: What paper?

A. On the —the letter there that Mr. sent me. Craig Well, THE COURT: tell me what the offer was. A. She said if I quit seeing my son that I wouldn’t have support. THE COURT: When did that start?

A. Several years ago. Almost from the first. THE COURT: What was and her yours relationship on these times you when were attempting to exchange child?

A. Mine and hers?

THE COURT: Yeah. A. They were I peaceful enough, I didn’t guess. have—it wasn’t her gave me the trouble. Not directly. *11 to talked, got ready fine until I was everything

We when all the trouble And that’s and take David. leave try physically every you She didn’t would start. know— — get to me, try mentally you but she stop to know— never— either. go him to ready abstract, 24-25. pages Appellants’ evidence, from there was evidence to In addition the above grandson. her not allowed to see mother that she was Freddie’s but said rights visitation allowing order She obtained a court even there right because exercise that successfully not able to she was him, Debra get went to the house to When she was scene. usually “I not am say, is in and David would would “He there” say, visit him in 1983. going.” stopped trying She evidence, then 12 boy, talked The court heard all the old, chambers, in court: open in and then stated years I under advisement. am

I to take this case going am statement, in Court basically, make this one going to more thought a child that I I have never seen today. is what to It say. very upsetting, coaxed and prepped with that child to see what has occurred my opinion, that’s all his father. And how he has been turned against now. right I’m going say order, findings: following pertinent In made the judge his Hare, has not Freddie Max

(5) The respondent, one year, nor for over visited the child paid however, the action was the Court believes in this case 56-207. meaning within the A.S.A. justified witnesses, it From the Court’s view of (6) did everything possible believed S. Bemis that Debra father, Mr. from the natural collecting avoid Hare, That Mr. Hare was led to effect an adoption. order he was not since to believe that he should child, greatly with the unable to have visitation testimony accepts him. The Court Mr. Hare’s upsetting this regard. of the twelve

(7) year That the Court’s examination Hare, child, The old David was most important. Paul has done Court believes that Debra Bemis everything this) to turn possible, (although may recognize she not child from his father. That the child was his taught hate father, he was unable to that dislike. although explain Although jurisdiction, within this Court’s the Court is certain that of the unjustified because child’s attitude *12 father, towards the will visitation be almost impossible so, number of will be years. This if the particularly mother continues to the child’s thought relating to control his father.

(8) The Court the accepts of the father testimony it was to visit impossible the child without greatly upsetting him.

(9)That the petition for should be and is hereby denied. that, Hill,

Considering under Taylor one supra, seeking to a child adopt without the consent of a natural parent bears “the burden of heavy proving by clear and convincing evidence” that the natural parent has failed justifiable without significantly to cause communicate with the child or to for its provide care and support for the prescribed that in period; order for the failure to or support communicate be significant, it must appear that the parent acted arbitrarily “and just without cause or adequate excuse”; and that we are not to disturb the decision of the trial judge erroneous, unless it is clearly giving due regard to his superior position to the judge witnesses, credibility of the it is clear to me that we should affirm the trial judge’s decision in case.

The opinion majority lays great stress the upon fact that the appellee has paid the child ordered support court. by However, as the statute provides, the right without adopt consent of a natural is allowed parent where the failure is only without justifiable cause-—or as the case law provides, Here, “just cause adequate excuse, excuse.” the appellee’s court, accepted by was the problem visitation. While both mother did not concede that the boy’s and his mother father there is clear evidence rights, by boy’s visitation refuse no have mother made boy’s attempt grandmother Thus, the father mentally ready for their visitation. the boy making support payments. stopped exhibit, failure shows that the abstracted by appellants, An by different occasions eight was raised to allow visitation noted that specifically in the court. The judge motions filed trial no real to collect the mother had made effort in court staying that it was not worth She even testified payments. not have and that should “you to enforce support payments try reason for this make father his child.” The real to attitude, submit, who was in the same I is that the stepfather, the boy’s with the father and who married military boy’s unit divorced, able, mother were mother 15 after the father and days testified, and, therefore, have been they the boy as he to support if visiting content father’s he would forget stop fact, such an agreement In is evidence to the effect that boy. there None of this the debt forgives was made between the parties. *13 view, does, in the trial is owed for but it my past support, adoption. court’s decision to deny petition joins am to state Judge Cooper I authorized dissent. v. Bob BOARD

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LIQUOR L. HICKS BOB’S STORE d/b/a CA 85-485 718 S.W.2d of Arkansas Court Appeals

Division I 5, delivered November Opinion [Rehearing denied December 1986.]

Case Details

Case Name: Bemis v. Hare
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Date Published: Nov 5, 1986
Citation: 718 S.W.2d 481
Docket Number: CA 86-197
Court Abbreviation: Ark. Ct. App.
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