DARREN S. BELTON v. RONNIE FIELDS, et al.
1:23CV169
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
April 14, 2025
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to File Document (Docket Entry 56 (“Motion for Leave“)) and the Motion of Defendants Mr. Danley, Ms. Workman, and Ms. Hoover for an Extension of Time (Docket Entry 58 (“Extension Motion“)). For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant these Motions.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff commenced this case by filing a pro se Complaint against various local government officials alleging that they violated his federal constitutional rights during his time in their custody as a pretrial detainee. (See Docket Entries 1, 3; see also Docket Entry 2 (Declaration and Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis).)1 Upon initial screening, the Court (per Chief United States District Judge Catherine C. Eagles) ruled “that [
After obtaining an extension of time (see Text Order dated May 21, 2024), Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (see Docket Entry 46 (“Pro Se Response“)).2 The Pro Se Response states, inter alia, that “Plaintiff [wa]s currently in segregation [with] some [of his] legal documents in storage” (id. at 5),3 leaving him “[u]nable to file his interrogatories and admissions” (id.). In addition, before Plaintiff filed the Pro Se Response, he moved for an order from this Court requiring North Carolina‘s “Department of Adult Corrections to allow [him] to make copies of various documents.” (Docket Entry 44 at 1; see also id. (adverting to “difficulty in litigating from a prison cell“).)
The Court (per the undersigned Magistrate Judge) granted that motion in part by ordering “the Clerk [to] attempt to locate
On January 23, 2025, Mr. Trivette “move[d the Court] to extend for 45 days the time in which to file a [supplemental] response to the [ M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment . . . .” (Docket Entry 53 at 1.) According to that motion, after entering his appearance, Mr. Trivette “immediately sent a letter to Plaintiff at Scotland
The Court (per the undersigned Magistrate Judge) granted that motion and “extend[ed] the deadline for Plaintiff (through newly appearing pro bono counsel) to file a supplemental response to [the] Motion for Summary Judgment to 03/14/2025 . . . .” (Text Order dated Jan. 27, 2025.) On March 13, 2025, Mr. Trivette “move[d] for a second extension of 14 days (until March 28, 2025) in which to file a [supplemental] response to the [ M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment.” (Docket Entry 54 at 1.) In that motion, Mr. Trivette explained that, “[d]espite [his] diligent efforts, [he] ha[d] not yet received Plaintiff‘s affidavit, which [Mr. Trivette] deem[ed] important to support a [supplemental] response to [the M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment.” (Id.) Mr. Trivette further described these events that transpired since the Court extended the deadline for Plaintiff‘s supplemental response:
[I] mailed . . . a third letter [to Plaintiff] on January 23, notifying [him] of [my] representation and asking him
to respond. Plaintiff did respond by letter postmarked January 30, 2025, in which he gladly accepted [my] representation. [I] made legal calls to Plaintiff on February 5, 14 and 26. In the second and third calls[, I] urged Plaintiff to mail [me] his affidavit which would be attached to [the supplemental] response in opposition to summary judgment. [I] ha[ve] not received Plaintiff‘s affidavit as of the filing of this motion and ha[ve] arranged to call Plaintiff tomorrow (March 14) to inquire about the affidavit.
(Id. at 3; see also id. (“Plaintiff is incarcerated in close custody in [SCI]. It is possible that he is in a lock-down or otherwise cannot respond. [SCI] is 123 miles one-way from [Mr. Trivette‘s] office. Due to the pressures of other professional and personal commitments, [Mr. Trivette] is unable to travel to [SCI] to meet with [] Plaintiff at this time.“).)
Again, the Court (per the undersigned Magistrate Judge) granted that motion and “extend[ed] the deadline for Plaintiff (through pro bono counsel) to file a supplemental response to [the] Motion for Summary Judgment to 03/28/2025 . . . .” (Text Order dated Mar. 20, 2025.) That Text Order cautions that “Plaintiff should not anticipate receiving any further extensions of the[] now-twice-extended deadline[ for his supplemental response] based simply on any unexplained failure of pro bono counsel to have received documents from Plaintiff.” (Id.) On March 28, 2025, Mr. Trivette filed Plaintiff‘s Supplemental Response, stating therein that, “[a]s of [its] filing . . . , [Mr. Trivette] ha[d] not received [the] requested affidavit from Plaintiff.” (Docket Entry 55 at 2; see also id. (“As late as March 14, 2025, counsel called
The Supplemental Response adds that Mr. Trivette “will submit any affidavit subsequently received from Plaintiff” (id.) and “requests that this Court accept [the C]omplaint . . . as the functional equivalent of a sworn affidavit” (id.). Two business days later (on April 1, 2025), Mr. Trivette filed the instant Motion for Leave on Plaintiff‘s behalf, requesting entry of “an order allowing [Mr. Trivette] to file Plaintiff‘s attached affidavit late.” (Docket Entry 56 at 1 (referring to Docket Entry 56-1 (“Plaintiff‘s Affidavit“)).)4 The Motion for Leave relates as follows: “Yesterday (March 31, 2025), Plaintiff‘s [A]ffidavit arrived. Plaintiff signed [Plaintiff‘s A]ffidavit on March 26 and the envelope in which he mailed [Plaintiff‘s A]ffidavit shows that prison officials mailed it that same day.” (Id. (referring to Docket Entry 56-1 at 7 and Docket Entry 56-2 at 2, respectively).) As an explanation for the tardiness of Plaintiff‘s Affidavit, the cover letter therein includes this statement:
Sorry for the wait. But I had to start over because the same day you called I went back to my block [and] I got tased and true me I didn‘t like it at all and it was for nothing and they through [sic] all my legal papers away. But think [sic] god I‘m okay and I‘m in the hole and
looking forward to your call soons [sic] you get this letter.
(Docket Entry 56-1 at 1 (stray apostrophe omitted).)
Defendants have opposed the instant Motion for Leave (see Docket Entry 57 (“Opposition“)) and have filed the instant Extension Motion, requesting “an extension of time in the amount of seven (7) days, after the Court enters a ruling as to the . . . Motion [for] Leave . . . , [for Defendants] to file a [s]upplemental [r]eply in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 58 at 1 (italics and internal citation omitted)).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint first alleges that, on September 2, 2022, Defendant Workman - without adequate justification and after directing racially-based comments towards Plaintiff - (A) discharged (and/or attempted to discharge) a pepper-ball gun at Plaintiff while he showered, (B) then forced Plaintiff to come out of the shower in the nude in front of her, and (C) thereafter pepper-sprayed Plaintiff with a different device and (along with Defendant Danley) made Plaintiff return to his cell without allowing him to wash off the pepper spray. (See Docket Entry 1 at 4-6.) Next, the Complaint alleges that, on December 10, 2022, Defendants subjected him to the following:
- Defendants Workman and Hoover came to Plaintiff‘s cell with “two write ups” (id. at 7), Defendant Hoover ordered him to “turn around and cuff up, so [they] c[ould] come in [his] cell and take
[his] towel, soap and deodorant and books and paper” (id.), and “[Defendant] Hoover open[ed his cell-door] trap and said hurry up before [she] spray[ed him]” (id.); - “scared of being sprayed, [Plaintiff] . . . grabbed [his] mat and covered [his cell-door] trap so [Defendant Hoover] couldn‘t spray [him] for nothing” (id.);
- Defendant Danley subsequently arrived “holding a big can of pepper spray” (id. at 8), declined Plaintiff‘s request to talk (see id.), and instead immediately began “spray[ing] the fallger [sic] pepper spray through [his] door crack on the side” (id.);
- when Defendant Hoover relayed to Defendant Danley that Plaintiff said he would “cuff up after [Defendant Danley] sprayed that pepper spray in [Plaintiff‘s] room” (id.) and he “cant [sic] breath [sic]” (id.), “[Defendant] Danley replied back, [‘]Let him stay in there, [h]is black ass should‘ve been cuffed up[‘]” (id.);
- “[Defendant] Hoover asked [Defendant] Danley[ if] he wanted them to stay there with [Plaintiff], since [he] couldn‘t breath [sic] and [Defendant] Danley was like [`]no yall can come on[‘]” (id.), whereupon “[Defendants] Hoover and [] Workman walked away” (id.; see also id. (alleging that, when Defendants Workman and Hoover returned “15 minutes to 20 minutes later,” pepper-spray fog remained so strong that Defendants Workman and Hoover wore “gas masks” (stray apostrophes omitted)));
following another stand-off, Defendant Danley threatened “to spray the pepper spray in [Plaintiff‘s] room again” (id. at 9) and he submitted to full restraints (see id.); - while “walking to the door to leave the block[, Defendant] Hoover ram[med Plaintiff‘s] chest into the wall which made [his] face hit the wall hard” (id.);
- Defendant Danley then “hit [Plaintiff] in the right side of [his] ribs and got in [his] ear and said [`]you must don‘t [sic] know who you [sic] playing with Nigger[‘]” (id.);
- Defendants Danley and Hoover thereafter placed Plaintiff in a “restraint chair” (id.) and, after he “threaten[ed] to spit in [their] face[s] for doing [him] like they did” (id.), “they got a spit mask too [sic] put over [his] head” (id.);
- Defendants Danley, Workman, and Hoover left Plaintiff in the freezing, cool-down room for two hours in just a t-shirt and boxers (see id. at 10);
- Defendants Workman and Hoover thereafter took Plaintiff back to his cell block “in full restraints, cuffed behind [his] back, [with the] spit mask on [his] whole head” (id.) and, after Plaintiff made vulgar comments about Defendant Hoover to other inmates while en route and complained to her that his “cuffs [were] cutting [his] ankles” (id. (stray apostrophe omitted)), “she put her right leg in front of [his] left leg and slammed [him to the floor] so hard [he] blacked out for a few seconds” (id.; see also
id. (“I went down head first and hit my temple so hard on the floor[that] I blacked out.“)); - at Defendant Hoover‘s direction, Plaintiff then was returned to the restraint chair in the cool-down room for two more hours (see id. at 11), after which Defendants Danley and Hoover “took [him] to booking and put [him] on suicide watch[, despite the fact that he] never said [he] was gonna kill [him]self” (id.); and
- upon placing Plaintiff in a suicide room, Defendant Hoover told him “to lay on [his] stomach” (id.), after which she “cut [his] boxers off [and] then cut [his] t-shirt off” (id. (stray apostrophe omitted)), over his protest that, as a female, she was “not supposed to be cutting [his] clothes off” (id.; see also id. (“I asked [Defendant] Danley why is a female officer cutting off a male[‘s] clothes, . . . [with] three male officer[s] right [t]here, [but] he didn‘t respon[d]” (stray comma and apostrophe omitted))).
The Motion for Summary Judgment contends that the Court should enter summary judgment for Defendants on “Plaintiff‘s claims asserted against them in this matter on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are each entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Docket Entry 37 at 1.) “More specifically, [the Motion for Summary Judgment maintains that] Plaintiff was not subjected to any excessive or unlawful force, nor any other violation of his constitutional rights, such that [ D]efendants are each entitled to qualified immunity and []
To bolster Defendants’ request for summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff‘s claims from the incident on September 2, 2022, their Memorandum in Support points to evidence that “[D]efendant Workman informed Plaintiff that his allotted shower time was finished and ordered [him] to get dressed, come out from behind the shower curtain, and to ‘cuff up’ so that he could be . . . escorted back to his cell.” (Docket Entry 38 at 5 (citing Docket Entry 38-2, ¶ 9 and Docket Entry 38-4, ¶ 9).) According to the Memorandum in Support, only after Plaintiff repeatedly refused to comply with those and similar, lawful commands (see id. at 6 (citing Docket Entry 38-2, ¶ 10 and Docket Entry 38-4, ¶ 9)), even in the face of warnings that Defendant Workman “would deploy a pepper ball gun into his shower cell/stall in an effort to obtain his compliance” (id. (citing Docket Entry 38-2, ¶ 11 and Docket Entry 38-4, ¶¶ 9, 10)), did “[Defendant] Workman attempt[] to deploy the pepper ball gun” (id.), which - due to a malfunction - resulted in “merely [a] discharge[ of] empty air” (id. (citing Docket Entry 38-2, ¶ 11)). The Memorandum in Support concludes (as to that incident) by detailing that, after Defendant Danley arrived and “correct[ed] the
As to the incident on December 10, 2022, the Memorandum in Support similarly relies on record evidence to defeat Plaintiff‘s claims. (See generally id. at 7-13 (citing principally Docket Entries 38-1, 38-3, and 38-4).) For example, in contrast to the Complaint‘s allegation that Defendant Danley refused Plaintiff‘s entreaty to talk and instead immediately deployed the pepper-spray fogger (see Docket Entry 1 at 8), the Memorandum in Support cites evidence that Defendant Danley first made multiple, verbal attempts to gain compliance, to which Plaintiff responded with open defiance, including by challenging Defendant Danley to “‘spray, do what you do‘” (Docket Entry 38 at 8 (citing and/or quoting, inter alia, Docket Entry 38-1, ¶ 10, Docket Entry 38-3, ¶ 5, and Docket
In compliance with the
“[A] verified complaint is the equivalent of an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes, when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge.” Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). But Plaintiff did not verify the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 1 at 1-11 (containing no signature, let alone any verification under oath or penalty of perjury); Docket Entry 3 at 11 (bearing Plaintiff‘s signature without verification under oath or penalty of perjury).)6
6(...continued) “[t]here is a material disagreement . . . as to the versions of events of excessive force . . . in the Moore County Jail.” (Id. at 9.) The preceding pages of the Pro Se Response also contain only conclusory comments of that sort. (See, e.g., id. at 2 (alleging without any context that “Plaintiff was beaten“), 3 (referring generically to “incident of excessive force“), 4 (adverting in undeveloped fashion to “brutal[,] willful[,] malicious[,] sadistic[,] unjustified[, and] excessive force that occurred“).)
Based on those considerations, it appears that, at the time of the Supplemental Response‘s filing (which should have concluded Plaintiff‘s submissions opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment), Plaintiff had “fail[ed] to properly support [his] assertion[s] of fact [substantiating his claims and had] fail[ed] to properly address [Defendants‘] assertion[s] of fact [contradicting his
(1) give [Plaintiff] an opportunity to properly support or address the fact[s];
(2) consider the fact[s] undisputed for purposes of the [M]otion [for Summary Judgment];
(3) grant summary judgment if the [M]otion [for Summary Judgment] and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that [Defendants are] entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
The instant Motion for Leave effectively asks the Court to choose the first option by “allow[ing Plaintiff‘s A]ffidavit to be filed late.” (Docket Entry 56 at 2.)7 Conversely, in opposing the
The Motion for Leave rests its plea for the Court to excuse the tardiness of Plaintiff‘s Affidavit on the statements in its “cover letter” (Docket Entry 56 at 1 (referring to Docket Entry 56-1 at 1)), which indicate that, immediately after Plaintiff‘s
7(...continued) wall [while hand-cuffed and shackled, causing him to] hit [his] head and [the] right side [of his] face,” after which Defendant Danley “hit [Plaintiff] in the ribs” while making a racist comment), 6-7 (averring, consistently with the Complaint, that (on December 10, 2022) Defendant Hoover, while leading Plaintiff back to his cell wearing “leg restraints, [with his] hands cuffed to [his] back, [and with a] spit mask on,” put her leg in front of [his] left leg and used force [to] slam [him to the floor] on [his] head/temple so hard [he] went to sleep,” and thereafter forced him to “lay on his stomach” in a suicide room while she “cut[ his] clothes off[, before she] help[ed him] stand up[, ] made [him] back up naked . . . and took [his hand] cuff[s] off“).)
Subdivision (e) [of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ] addresses questions that arise when a party fails to support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party‘s assertion of fact as required by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56(c). . . . Before deciding on other possible action, subdivision (e)(1) recognizes that the court may afford an opportunity to properly support or address the fact. In many circumstances this opportunity will be the court‘s preferred first step. . . . The choice among possible orders should be designed to encourage proper presentation of the record.
8(...continued) March 14, 2025. One would presume that[,] if the NCDAC documents infractions of a relatively minor nature such as illegal cloth/sheet/linens, it would certainly document a conduct violation sufficiently serious to warrant Plaintiff being tasered as he claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).)
Put another way, when a party neglects to properly contest the opposing party‘s statement of facts, “taking [such] facts as admitted - particularly dispositive facts - is not the ‘preferred first step.‘” Lexington Ins. Co. v. Paddock Swimming Pool Co., 532 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 n.2 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Grimes, 794 F.3d at 92); accord Panarello v. Zinke, 254 F. Supp. 3d 85, 97 (D.D.C. 2017), aff‘d sub nom., Panarello v. Bernhardt, 788 F. App‘x 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019). And, for understandable reasons, as the alternative of “giving the party [who initially failed to properly support its own assertions of fact] an opportunity to support
Still, “invoking [
Here, on the issue of further delay (and as previously documented), Plaintiff filed Plaintiff‘s Affidavit (along with the instant Motion for Leave) only two business days late. The “fil[ing of the M]otion [for Leave] relatively shortly after [the filing of the Supplemental R]esponse[ means that, practically speaking, the] request [for leave to file Plaintiff‘s Affidavit] has not interfered with the [C]ourt‘s decisional process regarding [D]efendants’ [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment,” Wilson v. Deutsche Bank & Tr. Co. Ams., No. 3:18CV854, 2020 WL 4559822, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2020) (unpublished), which weighs in favor of “the [C]ourt grant[ing the M]otion [for Leave] and includ[ing Plaintiff‘s Affidavit] attached to the[ M]otion [for Leave] as part of [his Supplemental R]esponse,” id.; see also id. (assuming that motion to supplement summary judgment response was “procedurally defective,” but “nevertheless grant[ing that] motion under [
In sum, based on the foregoing analysis (and like other courts confronted with similar scenarios):
[T]he [C]ourt finds in its discretion that permitting [consideration of Plaintiff‘s Affidavit] is warranted. . . . [T]he purpose of summary judgment is to truly assess whether there is a genuine need for trial. And, under [
Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56(e) , it is ordinarily the preferred first step to allow a party [who has failed to properly support or address the facts at issue an opportunity] to properly support or address the fact[s] at issue.
Id.; see also Anderson, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (“find[ing the p]laintiff‘s reasons for not complying with [requirement to support her factual assertions with record evidence] in the first instance uncompelling,” but, in interest of obtaining “most complete record possible,” opting to “consider [the p]laintiff‘s amended filings in ruling on [the d]efendants’ [summary judgment] motions“).10
10(...continued) other time.” Hickenbottom v. Nassan, Civ. No. 03-223, 2007 WL 7753803, at *9 n.13 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) (unpublished) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
CONCLUSION
The Court will treat Plaintiff‘s Affidavit as timely, for the purpose of “giv[ing Plaintiff] an opportunity to properly support or address the fact[s . . . at issue in the Motion for Summary Judgment],”
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the instant Motion for Leave (Docket Entry 56) is GRANTED, in that the Court accepts Plaintiff‘s Affidavit (Docket Entry 56-1) as timely filed.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
April 14, 2025