MEMORANDUM & ORDER
This bаnkruptcy appeal arises from the Chapter 13 proceeding of Debtors Kevin M. Belmonte and Piper L. Belmonte (“Debtors”). On November 17, 1999, thе Bankruptcy Court granted Mildred Bel-monte’s motion for relief from the automatic stay and to proceed with the eviction of Debtors from real property located in Malvern, Pennsylvania. In re Belmonte,
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 1, 1992, Mildred Belmonte (“Mildred”) entered into an installment land contract (the “Contract”) to sell a parcel of residential real estate to her son, Kevin Belmonte (“Kevin”). Id. at 845. The total sale price was $110,000, payablе in monthly installments of $600, with $2,600 due upon execution of the agreement. Id. Following execution of the agreement, Kevin took possession of thе property, where he and his wife currently reside. Id.
In February 1997, Kevin brought suit against Mildred in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas concerning the making of рayments pursuant to the Contract. Kevin Belmonte v. Mildred Belmonte, C.C.C.P. No. 97-01022. On May 28, 1999, following a bench trial, Judge Paula Francisco Ott of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas issued a “verdict” in favor of Mildred in which she concluded: (1) that Kevin had breached the Contract
On June 24, 1999, before Judge Ott could consider the motion for post-trial relief, Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, which automatically stayed the Chester County action. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). On August 26, 1999, Mildred filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court for reliеf from the automatic stay. In re Belmonte,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“On an appeal the district court or bаnkruptcy appellate panel may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for furthеr proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. The Court must accept the bankruptcy court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous, see Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013, but its review of issues of pure law, or mixed questions of law and fact, is plenary. See Jones v. Chemetron Corp.,
III. ANALYSIS
A. Issue Preclusion
The dispute in this case centers on whether the May 28, 1999 “verdict” is a “final judgmеnt” for purposes of issue preclusion. In the Pennsylvania courts, if post-trial motions are filed, as occurred in this case, judgment is not enterеd until the court grants or denies the relief requested by the post-trial motion, or, if the court does not enter an order disposing of all post-trial motions within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the filing of the first post-trial motion, a party may praecipe for entry of judgment. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4.
The Bankruptcy Court, however, found that the May 28, 1999 “verdict” was final for the purpose of issue preclusion pursuant to section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. In re Belmonte, 240
The Bankruptcy Court cited Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc.,
The parties were “fully heard” on the issue of damages and the jury’s verdict was “adequately deliberated and firm.” The jury’s decision would havе been appealable following Phase II, had no settlement occurred. Pursuant to the settlement, the Greenleafs voluntarily surrenderеd their right to further review, and the dismissal order entered pursuant to that settlement assured that the assessment of damages was “procedurally definite ” and not subject to change. Under these circumstances, we perceivе no justification for permitting the Greenleafs to relitigate the amount of their damages.
Id. at 359 (emphasis supplied). The Debtors in this procеeding have not voluntarily surrendered their right to further review of the May 28, 1999 “verdict.” Moreover, there is no dismissal order which would assure that the May 28, 1999 “verdict” is “procedurally definite” and not subject to change. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the May 28, 1999 “verdict” was a final judgment and is binding on the issue of whether Kevin retains any right to the Malvern property.
IY. CONCLUSION
Although the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that the May 28, 1999 “verdict” was final for purposes of issue preclusion in this bankruptcy proceeding, it correctly granted relief from the automatic stay. There has been no final resolution of the question of whether Kevin has an interest in the Malvern property. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the state court “vеrdict” is final for the purpose of issue preclusion in this proceeding will be reversed and its order lifting the automatic stay will be affirmed. An order fоllows.
ORDER
AND NOW this 18th day of January, 2001, upon consideration of the record submitted with the “Certificate of Appeal from Memorandum and Order of Bankruptсy Judge” (docket # 1), Appellant’s brief (docket # 3), and Appellee’s brief (docket #4), IT IS ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, that
1. The Order of the Bankruptcy Judge dated November 17, 1999 lifting the automatic stay is AFFIRMED, and the parties may proceed in state cоurt to seek resolution of their respective rights to the real property located at 321 Old Morehall Road, Malvern, Pennsylvania.
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the “verdict” in Kevin Belmonte v. Mildred Belmonte, No. 97-01022 (C.C.C.P. Mаy 28,1999) is binding in ■ this bankruptcy proceeding and thatKevin Belmonte has no remaining legal or equitable right to the real property located at 321 Old Mоrehall Road, Malvern, Pennsylvania is REVERSED.
Notes
. The acts of Pennsylvania's courts must be given the same full faith and credit in federal court that they are aсcorded in Pennsylvania’s courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Pennsylvania courts invoke issue preclusion only where:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was idеntical with the one presented in the later action, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in рrivity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action.
Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa.,