Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Kentucky Public Service CommissionBellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Kentucky Public Service Commission
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., doing business as AT & T Kentucky (AT & T Kentucky), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from decisions of Defendant Kentucky Public Service Commission (the Commission). SouthEast Telephone, Inc. (SouthEast) and Competitive Carriers of the South, Inc. (CompSouth) intervened as defendants pursuant to
I.
The legislative and procedural history of this dispute is relevant to this analysis. Although the facts are straightforward, the parties have submitted voluminous briefs and exhibits detailing various provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act). These provisions— §§ 251, 252, and 271 — regulate the activities of both incumbent and competitive local exchange carriers (LECs). AT & T Kentucky is an incumbent LEC. SouthEast is a competitive LEC.
Under the 1996 Act, incumbent LECs are required to provide certain services and resources to competitive LECs to promote the over-arching goal of the 1996 Act: competition within local telecommunications service markets.
See
1996 Act prmbl., 110 Stat. 56 (“An Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies”). In furtherance of this effort, AT & T Kentucky was, until recently, required to provide various network elements, to competitive LECs at a low, regulated rate.
However, the FCC eliminated incumbent LECs’
After the FCC eliminated AT & T Kentucky’s unbundling obligations, numerous competitive LECs in Kentucky petitioned the Commission to require AT & T Kentucky to continue to provide unbundled network elements until they could renegotiate their interconnection agreements. The Commission granted the requested relief, prompting AT
&
T Kentucky to file a complaint with this Court. In a series of decisions issued by Judge Joseph M. Hood, the Commission was enjoined from forcing AT & T Kentucky to continue to provide unbundled network elements.
See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Cinergy Comm’ns Co.,
No. 3:05-CV-16-JMH,
SouthEast filed a complaint with the Commission. Once again, the Commission ordered AT & T Kentucky to provide a “delisted” network element to SouthEast and set the rate at one dollar more than the old, low unbundled TELRIC rate plan, relying on § 271 as authority. Judge Karen K. Caldwell enjoined the Commission’s actions, explaining that state commissions had no authority to act pursuant to § 271.
BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
No. 06-65-KKC,
On remand, the Commission refused to calculate damages and this Court once again directed the Commission to calculate the amount due to AT & T Kentucky and reminded the Commission that it has no authority to act pursuant to § 271.
Bell-South Telecomm., Inc. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
II.
AT & T Kentucky specifically appeals five findings in the
PSC Order.
It appeals the Commission’s determinations: (1) that the Commission has the authority based on Kentucky statutory law to regulate the terms and rates of those network elements which were “delisted” by the FCC; (2) that interconnection agreements containing obligations under
The Commission’s findings of facts are reviewed based on an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, which requires that the decision be upheld if it is the result of a deliberate principled reasoning process and supported by substantial evidence.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Strand,
A. The Commission’s State Law Authority
CompSouth requested that the Commission establish rates for those network elements that the FCC “delisted” in the Triennial Review Remand Order. PSC Order at 10. The Commission found “as a matter of Kentucky statutory law, that AT *708 & T Kentucky must furnish [the “delisted” network elements] ... at fair, just, and non-discriminatory rates.” Id. at 10-11. The Commission found that it has the authority to establish the rates requested by CompSouth pursuant to KRS §§ 278.030 and 278.170. Id. at 11. AT & T Kentucky does not dispute that Kentucky law provides such authority to the Commission. [Record No. 59, p. 10]. Instead, it asserts that the state-law authority claimed by the Commission is contrary to, and thus preempted by, federal law. Id.
The Commission points out that it has relied on state authority to promote competition in the intrastate marketplace for nearly eighty years. It maintains that its state authority is preserved in
Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254 of this title, requirements necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers.
As the Supreme Court has declared, a state law may not be enforced if it conflicts with federal law.
H.D. V-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit,
All parties agree that the Commission is asserting state-law authority to regulate precisely those network elements that the FCC declared not to regulate under
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Box, the Seventh Circuit dealt with a similar issue and comprehensively explained the purpose of the statute:
The FCC has been charged by Congress with determining the optimal amount of unbundling-enough to enable [competitive LECs] to compete with [incumbent LECs] but not so much as to enable them to take an almost free ride on services that [the incumbent LEC] has spent a lot of money to create. That judgment, which is certainly within the power of the federal government to make, is without force if a state can require more unbundling ... than the FCC requires ... Remember that the [1996] Act seeks to create a competitive telecommunications industry, in which carriers that compete with incumbent local exchange carriers are allowed to demand access at a price below the market price to those carriers’ facilities only to the extent necessary to prevent those carriers from using their facilities to throttle their competitors. So it is only bottleneck facilities that competitors can demand access to-the facilities they need to provide a network service.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Box,
The Commission contends that it is not acting contrary to federal law, as was the state commission in Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Box, because it only required that the elements be provided at “fair, just, and non-discriminatory rates.” The Commission asserts that the FCC’s decision was to have the “delisted” network elements no longer provided at the low TELRIC rate, not to remove the Commission’s authority to require that incumbent LECs’ share these network elements. However, this assertion is simple incorrect. The Triennial Review Remand Order did not alter the rate structure for certain network elements from the TELRIC rate to “fair, just, and non-discriminatory rate.” The Triennial Review Remand Order does not state that “fair, just, and non-discriminatory rates” would promote competition and encourage rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. The FCC eliminated AT & T Kentucky’s unbundling obligations for various network elements to promote innovation and investment in new facilities. Triennial Review Remand Order. If AT & T Kentucky wants to provide access to the “delisted” *710 network elements to a competitive LEC, it can do so at a negotiated market price.
By determining that the Commission cannot require additional unbundling, the Commission is not preempted from exercising its role of overseeing the local telecommunications market. The Commission can ensure the quality and low cost of local telecommunications services in Kentucky and safeguard the rights of consumers. However, it cannot act contrary to the FCC’s interpretation and application of federal law. Therefore, the Commission’s authority based on Kentucky statutory law to regulate the terms and rates of those network elements which were “delisted” by the FCC is preempted.
B. Interconnection Agreements Containing
The Commission was asked to determine if it has the authority to require AT & T Kentucky to file interconnection agreements that include network elements other than those required to be provided pursuant to
AT & T Kentucky argues that the Commission’s decision is “contrary to the limits placed on state commissions under the deregulatory federal scheme, and it is unlawful and preempted.” [Record No. 59, p. 20]. Under
Any interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or arbitration shall be submitted for approval to the State commission. A State commission to which an agreement is submitted shall approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any deficiencies.
Upon receiving a request for interconnection ... pursuant tosection 251 ... an incumbent local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with the requesting telecommunications carrier.... The agreement ... shall be submitted to the State commission under subsection (e) of this section.
AT & T Kentucky further points to the FCC interpretation of these statutes in support of its position. The FCC’s interpretation of the 1996 Act is persuasive authority and will be given the appropriate deference.
See Michigan Bell Telephone
*711
Co. v. Strand,
Specifically, the FCC determined that agreements addressing dispute resolution and escalation provisions relating to the obligations set forth in
The Commission argues that requiring the filing of provisions containing
*712
The Tenth Circuit addressed this specific issue, and the Commission agrees with its interpretation.
Qwest Corp. v. Public Utilities Com’n of Colorado,
AT
&
T Kentucky argues that the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted the FCC’s order as to what constitutes “an ongoing obligation relating to §§ 25 1(b) or (c).” [Record No. 43, p. 26] It asserts that the proper reading is that agreements are subject to filing when they relate to the actual elements that are obligated by
' SouthEast and CompSouth support the Commission’s broad interpretation pointing to the language in
According to the
PSC Order,
the issue is whether “the Commission [has the] authority to require AT & T Kentucky to include in its interconnection agreements any network elements other than those required to be provided pursuant to
The simple answer to the issue is yes. This Court adopts the standard set forth by the FCC that an agreement that creates an ongoing obligation pertaining to resale, number portability, dialing parity, access to rights-of-way, reciprocal compensation, interconnection, unbundled network elements, or collocation is an interconnection agreement that must be filed pursuant to
C. Obligation To Commingle Network Elements
AT & T Kentucky also challenges the Commission’s decision regarding its obligation to commingle network elements. It asserts that the Commission incorrectly determined that it must commingle the facilities that must be provided under
connecting, attaching, or otherwise linking of an unbundled network element, or a combination of unbundled network elements, to one or more facilities or services that a requesting telecommunications carrier has obtained at wholesale from an incumbent LEC, or the combining of an unbundled network element, or a combination of unbundled network element, with one or more such facilities or services.
For support, AT & T Kentucky points to an FCC decision 6 that states:
We decline to require [AT & T Kentucky and other similar carriers], pursuant tosection 271 , to combine network elements that no longer are required to be unbundled undersection 251 . Unlikesection 251(c)(3) , items 4-6 and 10 ofsection 271 ’s competitive checklist contain no mention of “combining” and, as noted above, do not refer back to the combination requirement set forth insection 251(c)(3) .
Triennial Review Order
at ¶ 655, n. 1990. AT & T Kentucky asserts that since there is not a substantive difference between
*714
“combining” and “commingling,” the FCC determination means that it does not have a requirement to commingle
AT & T Kentucky further argues that the FCC eliminated AT & T Kentucky’s unbundling obligations for various network elements to promote innovating and investing in new facilities. Triennial Review Remand Order. It asserts that the Commission’s decision requiring commingling essentially negates the Triennial Review Remand Order by forcing AT & T Kentucky to furnish network elements in combinations that the FCC determined it was no longer required to furnish to competitive LECs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this FCC determination that
AT
&
T Kentucky further maintains that the FCC explicitly decided to remove
*715
AT & T Kentucky point to the FCC’s statement in the
Qwest
case for support. The FCC explained that Qwest, a company similar to AT & T Kentucky, had “introduc[ed] a commercial product designed to replace [the UNE Platform] — and to keep customers on its
network
— even
in the absence of a legal mandate to do
so.”
9
AT
&
T Kentucky reasons that this statement would not make sense if the FCC rules already impose a legal mandate to combine facilities that must be made available under
The Commission contends that it lawfully found that AT & T Kentucky must provide
(e) Except as provided in § 51.318, an incumbent LEC shall permit a requesting telecommunications carrier to commingle an unbundled network element or a combination of unbundled network elements with wholesale services obtained from an incumbent LEC.
(f) Upon request, an incumbent LEC shall perform the functions necessary to commingle an unbundled network element or a combination of unbundled network elements with one or more facilities or services that a requesting telecommunications carrier has obtained at wholesale from an incumbent LEC.
In
Qwest,
the Commission contends that the FCC repeatedly used the term “
The
PSC Order
states that competitive LECs seek to link UNEs or combinations of UNEs with local switching. The crux of AT & T Kentucky’s argument is that
The Code of Federal Regulations does not provide a definition of “wholesale.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “wholesale” as “[t]he sale of goods or commodities [usually] to a retailer for resale, and not to the ultimate consumer.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Using this definition, any network element provided by AT
&
T Kentucky to a competitive LEC is a “wholesale service.” After all, the competitive LEC’s business is to sell the network elements obtained from AT & T Kentucky to the ultimate consumer. However, even using this expansive definition of wholesale services, AT & T Kentucky is still not required to provide local switching to competitive LECs under
Next, this Court must determine AT & T Kentucky’s obligations under
D. Splitter
The Commission found that AT & T Kentucky must provide the splitter functionality upon request of a competitive LEC. AT & T Kentucky also challenges this decision. The term “line splitting” is used to describe the scenario where one
*717
competitive LEC provides narrowband voice service
(e.g.,
basic phone service) over the low frequency of a loop and a second competitive LEC provides xDSL service
(e.g.,
internet service) over the high frequency portion of that same loop.
Triennial Review Order
¶ 251. The Seventh Circuit determined that a line splitter is not a network element; it enhances rather than enables a telecommunications service.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Box,
Here, both parties agree that AT & T Kentucky must establish the necessary processes in its operational support systems (OSS) to facilitate a competitive LEC’s ability to engage in line-splitting arrangements. It is also undisputed that AT & T Kentucky must permit competing carriers to engage in line splitting where a competing carrier purchases the whole loop and provides its own splitter to be collocated in the central office. Id. However, at issue is whether AT & T Kentucky must provide the line splitter equipment to the competitive LECs upon request.
AT & T Kentucky points to a 2000 FCC opinion in support of its position. 10 This opinion states, in part:
327. We reject AT & T’s argument that [the competitive LEC] has a present obligation to furnish the splitter when AT & T engages in line splitting over the UNE-P. The Commission has never exercised its legislative rulemaking authority undersection 251(d)(2) to require incumbent LECs to provide access to the splitter, and incumbent LECs therefore have no current obligation to make the splitter available. [FN910] As we stated in the UNE Remand Order, “with the exception of Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAMs), the loop includes attached electronics, including multiplexing equipment used to derive the loop transmission capacity.” [FN911] We separately determined that the DSLAM is a component of the packet switching unbundled network element. [FN912] We observed that “DSLAM equipment sometimes includes a splitter” and that, “[i]f not, a separate splitter device separates voice and data traffic.” [FN913] We did not identify any circumstances in which the splitter would be treated as part of the loop, as distinguished from being part of the packet switching element. That distinction is critical, because we declined to exercise our rulemaking authority undersection 251(d)(2) to require incumbent LECs to provide access to the packet switching element, and our decision on that point is not disputed in this proceeding.
Texas 271 Order ¶ 327 (emphasis added). In 2003, the FCC affirmed this finding, stating, “The Commission previously found that existing rules require incumbent LECs to permit competing carriers to engage in line splitting where a competing carrier purchases the whole loop and provides its own splitter to be collocated in the central office.” Triennial Review Order ¶ 251 (emphasis added).
AT
&
T Kentucky also relies upon
(ii) Line splitting. An incumbent LEC shall provide a requesting telecommunications carrier that obtains an unbun *718 died copper loop from the incumbent LEC with the ability to engage in line splitting arrangements with another competitive LEC using a splitter collocated at the central office where the loop terminates into a distribution frame or its equivalent. Line splitting is the process in which one competitive LEC provides narrowband voice service over the low frequency portion of a copper loop and a second competitive LEC provides digital subscriber line service over the high frequency portion of that same loop.
* * *
(v) Control of the loop and splitter functionality. In situations where a requesting telecommunications carrier is obtaining access to the high frequency portion of a copper loop either through a line sharing or line splitting arrangement, the incumbent LEC may maintain control over the loop and splitter equipment and functions, and shall provide to the requesting telecommunications carrier loop and splitter functionality that is compatible with any transmission technology that the requesting telecommunications carrier seeks to deploy using the high frequency portion of the loop, as defined in paragraph (a)(l)(i) of this section, provided that such transmission technology is presumed to be deployable pursuant to § 51.230.
AT & T Kentucky argues that
The Commission argues that
The First Circuit determined that the 1996 Act does not say that a state commission cannot require the unbundling of non-network elements, nor does it say that about unbundling network elements, but to allow a state commission to require it would defeat the 1996 Act’s goals.
Verizon New England, Inc. v. Maine Public Utilities Comm’n,
This Court finds that the FCC has clearly stated that an incumbent LEC must grant competitors the ability to en *719 gage in line splitting arrangements with another competitive LEC using a splitter collocated, or stored, at the incumbent LEC’s central office. The FCC has further stated that an incumbent LEC has no obligation to provide the splitter to the competitive LEC. If the incumbent LEC chooses to provide a splitter to a competitive LEC, the incumbent LEC may maintain control over its splitter. Thus, AT & T Kentucky, as an incumbent LEC, is not obligated to provide the splitter functionality to a competitive LEC.
E. Fiber Loops
The Commission was asked to determine the rules regarding the availability of unbundled access to loops where fiber facilities are the first and only telecommunications facilities to be deployed by the incumbent LEC.
PSC Order
at 50. The newly constructed areas where telecommunications services had not been previously deployed are known as “Greenfields.” The Commission found that “AT & T Kentucky is obligated to unbundle DS1/DS3 loops consistent with
we find that different policy considerations, as well as different technical considerations, are associated with copper loops, hybrid copper/fiber loops, and fiber-to-the-home (“FTTH”) loops. For example, we decline to require incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to their hybrid loops for the provision of broadband services. [FN627] Similarly, we decline to unbundle loops that consist of FTTH facilities for broadband services. As explained more fully below, this unbundling approach-i.e., greater unbundling for legacy copper facilities and more limited unbundling for next-generation network facilities-appropriately balances our goals of promoting facilities-based investment and innovation against our goal of stimulating competition in the market for local telecommunications services.
Id.
However, AT & T Kentucky fails to cite the footnote within the above paragraph, which states:
FN627. Incumbent LECs must continue to provide unbundled access to the [Time Division Multiplexing] features, functions, and capabilities of their hybrid loops. This will allow competitive LECs to continue providing both traditional narrowband services {e.g., voice, fax, dial-up Internet access) and high-capacity services like DS1 and DS3 circuits.
Id. at n. 627. As the footnote explains, the FCC only declined to require incumbent LECs to provide access to hybrid loops for broadband services but required incumbent LECs to provide access to the features, functions, and capabilities of their hybrid loops.
AT & T Kentucky second argument relies on
(i) Definitions.
(A) Fiber-to-the-home loops. A fiber-to-the-home loop is a local loop consisting entirely of fiber optic cable, whether dark or lit, serving an end user’s customer premises or, in the case of predominantly residential multiple dwelling units (MDUs), a fiber optic cable, whether dark or lit, that *720 extends to the multiunit premises’ minimum point of entry (MPOE).
(B) Fiber-to-the-curb loops. A fiber-to-the-curb loop is a local loop consisting of fiber optic cable connecting to a copper distribution plant that is not more than 500 feet from the customer’s premises or, in the case of predominantly residential MDUs, not more than 500 feet from the MDU’s MPOE. The fiber optic cable in a fiber-to-the-curb loop must connect to a copper distribution plant at a serving area interface from which every other copper distribution subloop also is not more than 500 feet from the respective customer’s premises.
(ii) New builds. An incumbent LEC is not required to provide nondiscriminatory access to a fiber-to-the-home loop or a fiber-to-the-curb loop on an unbundled basis when the incumbent LEC deploys such a loop to an end user’s customer premises that previously has not been served by any loop facility.
The Commission counters with a different section of the same regulation:
(4) DS 1 loops.
(i) Subject to the cap described in paragraph (a)(4)(h) of this section, an incumbent LEC shall provide a vequesting telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to a DSl loop on an unbundled basis to any building not served by a wire center with at least 60,000 business lines and at least four fiber-based col-locators. Once a wire center exceeds both of these thresholds, no future DS 1 loop unbundling will be required in that wire center. A DS 1 loop is a digital local loop having a total digital signal speed of 1.544 megabytes per second. DS 1 loops include, but are not limited to, two-wire and four-wire copper loops capable of providing high-bit rate digital subscriber line services, including T1 services.
(ii) Cap on unbundled DS 1 loop circuits. A requesting telecommunications carrier may obtain a maximum of ten unbundled DS 1 loops to any single building in which DS 1 loops are available as unbundled loops.
(5) DS3 loops.
(i) Subject to the cap described in paragraph (a)(5)(h) of this section, an incumbent LEC shall provide a requesting telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to a DS3 loop on an unbundled basis to any building not served by a wire center with at least 38,000 business lines and at least four fiber-based col-locators. Once a wire center exceeds both of these thresholds, no future DS3 loop unbundling will be required in that wire center. A DS3 loop is a digital local loop having a total digital signal speed of 44.736 megabytes per second.
*721 (ii) Cap on unbundled DS3 loop circuits. A requesting telecommunications carrier may obtain a maximum of a single unbundled DS3 loop to any single building in which DS3 loops are available as unbundled loops.
The Commission further argues that an incumbent LEC has a competitive advantage not only in routing calls within the exchange but, through its control of this local market, in the markets for terminal equipment and long-distance calling.
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
The FCC determined that “because the record does not demonstrate that carriers can economically self-provision at the DS1 level, we do not delegate to the states the authority to consider DS 1 loop impairment on a location-specific basis based on a self-provisioning trigger.” Triennial Review Order at ¶ 327. The Commission interprets this to mean that the FCC determined that impairment already exists regarding DS1 enterprise loops and the states need not do the analysis. [Record No. 47, p. 36] The Commission further asserts that the FCC has delegated to the states to resolve issues on DS3 enterprise loop impairment. Triennial Review Order at ¶ 321 (the FCC delegates to the states the authority to collect and analyze more specific evidence of DS3 loop deployment on a customer location-specific basis, applying uniform national triggers that measure self-provisioning or wholesale alternative availability to determine customer locations where competitive carriers are not impaired without access to incumbent LEC unbundled DS3s).
There appears to be a conflict in the statutes when a DS 1 loop, made entirely out of fiber optic cable, is deployed to an end user’s customer premises that previously has not been served by any loop facility where the wire center to which it is connected serves less than 60,000 business lines and less than four fiber-based colloeators. The same conflict appears to exist when a DS3, made entirely out of fiber optic cable, is deployed to an end user’s customer premises that previously has not been served by any loop facility where the wire center to which it is connected serves less than 38,000 business lines and less than four fiber-based collocators. The FCC eliminated unbundling with respect to dark fiber loops on a nationwide basis. Triennial Review Remand Order, at ¶ 166.
The over-arching goal of the 1996 Act is to promote competition and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies See 1996 Act. The Commission asserts that, due to the high cost to deploy local loops using fiber optic cable, it is not economically feasible for a competitive LECs to compete within a Greenfield enterprise area because a competitive carrier would be forced to build its own identical network. However, *722 the Court finds this assertion to be incorrect. The cost would be the same to an incumbent LEC and a competitive LEC to deploy a DS1/DS3 loop using fiber optic cable to an end user’s customer premise that previously has not been served by any loop facility. The recovery cost would also be the same. When connecting a new customer to the telecommunication network, the 1996 Act encourages the deployment of new technologies. It would not appear that AT & T Kentucky would spend substantial sums deploying DS 1/DS3 loops using fiber optic cable if it would then be required to provide nondiscriminatory access to its competitors.
In summary, an incumbent LEC is still obligated to unbundle DS 1/DS3 loops consistent with
III.
The Commission’s authority based on Kentucky statutory law to regulate the terms and rates of those network elements which were “delisted” by the FCC is preempted. All agreements that create an ongoing obligation pertaining to resale, number portability, dialing parity, access to rights-of-way, reciprocal compensation, interconnection, unbundled network elements, or collocation is an interconnection agreement that must be filed pursuant to
AT & T Kentucky must allow a competitive LEC to install their own network element connecting, attaching, or otherwise linking the network elements purchased from AT & T Kentucky. And while AT
&
T Kentucky is not obligated to sell
AT & T Kentucky must grant competitors the ability to engage in line splitting arrangements with another competitive LEC using a splitter collocated, or stored, at the incumbent LEC’s central office. However, AT & T Kentucky has no obligation to provide a splitter to a competitive LEC. If AT & T Kentucky chooses to provide a splitter to a competitive LEC, AT & T Kentucky may maintain control over its splitter.
AT & T Kentucky is obligated to unbundle DS1/DS3 loops consistent with
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows
1. AT & T Kentucky’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, in accordance with this opinion.
*723 2. The Kentucky Public Service Commission’s Orders, Case No.2004-00427, dated December 12, 2007, and January 18, 2008, are declared unlawful and preempted by federal law, in part, in accordance with this opinion.
3. All Defendants and other parties acting in concert therewith are ENJOINED from seeking to enforce the unlawful decisions against AT & T Kentucky in accordance with this opinion.
4. This case is REMANDED to the Kentucky Public Service Commission to vacate the relevant aspects of their opinion and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5. This matter is stricken from the active docket of this Court.
Notes
. In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533, 2654-2655, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket No. 01-338, FCC 04-290 (Feb. 4, 2005) [hereafter, the Triennial Review Remand Order],
.
See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3709, CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 99-238 (Nov. 5, 1999);
. See Order, Petition of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. to Establish Generic Docket to Consider Amendments to Interconnection Agreements Resulting from Changes of Law, Case No.2004-00427 (Ky. PSC Dec. 12, 2007) [hereafter, PSC Order],
. See Order, Petition of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. to Establish Generic Docket to Consider Amendments to Interconnection Agreements Resulting from Changes of Law, Case No.2004-00427 (Ky. PSC Jan. 18, 2008) [hereafter, PSC Order Denying Reconsideration ].
.
In the Matter of Qwest Communications International Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling on the Scope of the Duty to File and Obtain Prior Approval of Negotiated Contractual Arrangements under
.
In the Matter of Review of the
.
See
Errata,
Review of the
.
Errata
at ¶ 31 deleted the last sentence of footnote 1990: "We decline to require BOCs, pursuant to
.
In the Matter of Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to
.
In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications, Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to
. See Eirata
at ¶ 38;
see also
Errata,
In the Matter of Review of the