**144Cobb and Gwinnett Counties have sued telephone companies for their failure to collect and remit to the Counties a charge imposed on subscribers to offset the cost of 911 services. The telephone companies have raised various defenses to the Counties' suits, including that the 911 charge is a tax that the Counties are not allowed to collect by a lawsuit like this one. The trial court rejected that argument and allowed the cases to proceed, but the Court of Appeals vacated that aspect of the trial court's ruling and remanded because further development of the record was needed to determine whether the charge is a tax. We conclude, however, that the charge is a tax regardless of more factual development, and we conclude that the Counties lack legal authority to collect that tax in this lawsuit. We reverse.
This case finds its roots in the Georgia Emergency Telephone 911 Service Act, OCGA § 46-5-120 et seq. ("the 911 Act"), originally enacted in 1977, see Ga. L. 1977, p.
*2351040.
Telephone companies are intermediaries in the statutory scheme. The statute provides that "[e]ach service supplier shall, on behalf of the local government, collect the 9-1-1 charge from those telephone subscribers ...." OCGA § 46-5-134 (a) (1) (B). Telephone companies are entitled to retain an administrative fee on amounts collected. OCGA § 46-5-134 (d) (1). At the time this lawsuit was filed, the **145statute provided that local governments could initiate a "collection action." OCGA § 46-5-134 (b) (2012). Although the statute did not provide expressly against whom that collection action could be brought, in that same subsection it provided that "[e]very telephone subscriber in the area served by the emergency 9-1-1 system shall be liable for the 9-1-1 charges and the wireless enhanced 9-1-1 charges ... until it has been paid to the service supplier" and that "[a] service supplier shall have no obligation to take any legal action to enforce the collection of the 9-1-1 charge or wireless enhanced 9-1-1 charge." Id. The statute also provided that local governments could audit the telephone companies with respect to the collection and remittance of the 911 charge. See OCGA § 46-5-134 (d) (4) (2012).
The Counties sued Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC and Earthlink, Inc., Earthlink, LLC, Deltacom, LLC, and Business Telecomm, LLC (collectively, "the Telephone Companies") in two separate complaints. The complaints as amended allege that the Telephone Companies had underbilled two classes of customers.
The Telephone Companies moved to dismiss the Counties' complaints, arguing that the Counties do not have a right of action to enforce the 911 Act. The Telephone Companies also argued that a common-law claim was not available because the 911 Act imposes a tax, and a common-law action for recovery of taxes does not lie where a statute provides remedies for collections of taxes that do not include an action at law. The trial court denied the motion. It held that the 911 *236charge is a fee, not a tax, and that the 911 Act, read in conjunction with OCGA §§ 51-1-6 and 51-1-8,
On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. Bellsouth Telecomm., LLC v. Cobb County,
We granted the Telephone Companies' petition for certiorari, directing the parties to address several questions, including whether the 911 charge is more properly characterized as a tax or a fee. We conclude that the charge is a tax, and that the 911 Act does not give the Counties a right of action to collect that tax from the Telephone Companies. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions for the Court of Appeals to direct the trial court to dismiss the Counties' actions.
1. "A tax is an enforced contribution exacted pursuant to legislative authority for the purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes, and not as payment for a special privilege or a service rendered." Gunby v. Yates,
Applying the four factors set forth above, we conclude that the 911 charge is a tax as a matter of law. First, as the Counties note, it is true that the 911 Act restricts the use of the funds to pay specific communications costs enumerated in the statute. See OCGA § 46-5-122 (11), OCGA § 46-5-134 (f) ; OCGA § 46-5-134.2 (j) (4) (2019); see also OCGA § 46-5-134.2 (j) (5) (2012). But although the 911 charge raises funds for a dedicated purpose, it is assessed based on the extent to which a person or business subscribes to telephone service, not the extent to which a person can or in fact does summon emergency services. It is not charged to persons who have access to phone service paid for by someone else, such as a house phone in a hospital lobby or a homeless shelter. And the assessment does not depend on whether a person actually calls 911. Moreover, requiring a governmental charge to be deposited in a special purpose fund does not make it not a tax. See Gunby,
The Counties next argue that the 911 charge is not mandatory because people may opt to not receive telephone service and avoid the charge. But the charge is mandatory in the way we have used that term in determining whether something is a tax.
Although the Counties suggest that we have held that a charge - in particular, a solid waste disposal charge - may be a fee even where a payer is bound to pay it despite declining the service provided, the case they cite did not address that question. See Mesteller v. Gwinnett County,
Finally, there is no relationship between the obligation to pay the charge and the burden the payer places on emergency services systems in Georgia, and those who pay the charge receive no special access to emergency services. A person who pays the charge year after year might well never make a 911 call on the associated telephone line, while another person may use a public phone or borrowed phone to summon emergency services (or others may summon emergency services on their behalf) on a regular basis. Although a person with active telephone service may be able to dial 911 more easily than one who does not, emergency services are available to all within a given emergency services area.
**150The Counties argued before the Court of Appeals that, even if they must show that *239those who pay the 911 charge receive a "special benefit" in order for it to be a fee, they would be able to show as much when evidence is presented at the summary judgment or trial stages of the case. Specifically, the Counties argued that 911 services vary from county to county, such that those who do not have a wireless telephone or landline billing address within one of the Counties cannot take advantage of certain "enhanced" services, such as the dispatcher having near-immediate access to the location of the caller. Thus, they argued, visitors to the Counties and those whose telephone billing address is not within one of the Counties' service areas do not receive the same benefit as those who do pay a 911 charge to one of the Counties. Based on these arguments, the Court of Appeals concluded that further discovery was required to resolve the question of whether the 911 charge is a tax or a fee.
The Counties suggest that the 911 charge cannot be a tax because, if it is, the 911 Act's provision for collection by telephone **151service suppliers is invalid. They cite OCGA § 48-5-233, which provides that "[a]ll taxes levied for county purposes ... shall be collected by the tax commissioner or tax collector." See also Levetan,
2. While maintaining that the 911 charge is not a tax, the Counties argue that they may pursue tort remedies to recover taxes even in the absence of express statutory authority. We disagree.
The power to tax is the power to destroy. See M'Culloch v. Maryland,
This rule applies to counties, as "[a] county is a mere political division of the State," Penick v. Foster,
Notwithstanding these principles, the Counties argue that even if the 911 charge is considered a tax, the Counties do not need express statutory authorization to recover the charge in a tort action. Citing Clayton County v. City of College Park,
Three of the cases cited predate Kirk and do not control this case for the reasons stated in Kirk. As we noted in Kirk, although we held in Coca-Cola Co. that the action was not subject to dismissal, it involved a "petition ... brought for the purpose of discovery" that was "preliminary to an effort to collect taxes." Kirk,
The Counties rely heavily on Citizens' and Southern Bank, wherein we upheld a trial court's refusal to dismiss a lawsuit by the state and a county over taxes owed by a liquidating bank. The suit sought to recover taxes that became due by the liquidating bank after a tentative agreement between it and the defendant bank was reached but before the transfer of assets took place.
As for our recent ruling in Clayton County, it considered no issue other than whether the city-plaintiff's claims against a county were barred by sovereign immunity, ultimately remanding the case for further consideration of that issue by the trial court. See
The 911 Act does not itself provide that express authorization. At the time these lawsuits were filed, the 911 Act provided that "[a] collection action may be initiated by the local government that **154imposed" the 911 charges, but described only the "telephone subscriber" as "liable" for the charge and provided that "[a] service supplier shall have no obligation to take any legal action to enforce the collection of the" charge. OCGA § 46-5-134 (b) (2012); compare OCGA § 48-8-35 (providing that any dealer who fails or refuses to collect sales and use tax "shall be liable for and shall pay the tax himself"). The Court of Appeals observed that the parties agreed "that the [911] Act does not contain an express right of action authorizing local governments to enforce the statute against telephone companies and service suppliers." Bellsouth Telecomm.,
To the extent the Counties suggest that OCGA § 51-1-6 provides sufficient explicit authorization for them to bring these suits even if the 911 charge is a tax, they are wrong. That general tort statute, which provides for recovery "[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another," OCGA § 51-1-6, does not satisfy the Counties' burden to show that authority to bring this action has been "plainly and unmistakably granted by the State[.]" Gower,
The Counties argue that, as "sovereign" government entities, they " 'inherently' have *242all remedies not relinquished and must be allowed to pursue a remedy outside the 911 Act to recover for damages suffered." They cite a host of scenarios in which, they say, statutes impose upon private parties duties to handle public money without also explicitly authorizing an action to recover for a breach of those duties, including the statute at issue in Clayton County that addresses allocation of tax proceeds collected on the sale, storage, and distribution of alcoholic beverages at the airport, see OCGA § 3-8-1. But as **155explained above, our decision in that case did not address the question of whether the city's lawsuit against a county and two vendors was authorized by statute. And with respect to the other scenarios cited by the Counties, they make no assertion that any of the charges in question is properly characterized as a tax.
Concluding that the 911 charge is a tax as a matter of law, and the Counties' lawsuits thus are precluded, we reverse the Court of Appeals. That court is directed to remand the case to the trial court with instructions to grant the Telephone Companies' motions to dismiss the Counties' claims for damages.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.
Melton, C.J., Nahmias, P.J., Benham, Blackwell, Boggs, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., and Judge Thomas Brittan Hammond concur. Warren, J., not participating.
In 2018, shortly after we granted certiorari in this case, a version of the statute containing significant amendments throughout was signed into law, becoming fully effective on January 1, 2019. See Ga. L. 2018, pp. 689, 714, § 4-1. None of those amendments apply to the claims in this case, which largely relate to 911 charges the Counties argue should have been collected prior to the filing of these lawsuits in December 2015 and January 2016.
"Telephone service" is defined as "any method by which a 9-1-1 emergency call is delivered to a public safety answering point." OCGA § 46-5-122 (16.1) (A) (2019); see also OCGA § 46-5-122 (16.1) (2012) (same).
The amended version of the statute provides that the monthly charge "shall" be $ 1.50 absent a reduction designed to avoid excessive accumulation of unexpended revenues. OCGA § 46-5-134 (a) (1) (A)(i), (d) (4) (2019).
The 2018 amendments created the Georgia Emergency Communications Authority ("the Authority"), comprising all local governments. See Ga. L. 2018, pp. 689, 691, § 1-1 (OCGA § 38-3-182 (a) (2018)). The amendments shifted to the Authority the right to bring collection actions and audit service providers, and clarified that collection actions may be initiated against subscribers. Id. at p. 697, § 1-1 (OCGA § 38-3-189 (a) (1) (2019), p. 707, § 2-12 (OCGA § 46-5-134 (b) (2019))). The Authority also is now authorized to bring an administrative action for a civil penalty against telephone companies that fail to bill the monthly 911 charges. Id. at pp. 694-695, 697-698, § 1-1 (OCGA §§ 38-3-182 (l), 38-3-189 (c) (2019)).
The Counties allege the Telephone Companies did not bill customers that purchased services capable of carrying multiple simultaneous calls over a single physical line for every exchange access line available over that line and did not bill Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) customers for every 10-digit telephone number those customers obtained.
OCGA § 51-1-6 provides, "When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby." OCGA § 51-1-8 provides, "Private duties may arise from statute or from relations created by contract, express or implied. The violation of a private duty, accompanied by damage, shall give a right of action."
Now-Chief Judge Dillard wrote a concurrence, saying that further evidentiary proceedings on that point were unnecessary, because the court previously held in FultonCounty v. T-Mobile South, LLC,
The Counties argue that the Court of Appeals erred in T-Mobile South by assuming that for the 911 charge to be a fee, those who pay it must receive a special benefit "not received by others."
Given the breadth of these examples, the Counties' attempt to distinguish SPLOST and school taxes as exceptions to a general rule on the ground that they are authorized by the Georgia Constitution and on the ground that they are (directly or indirectly) paid by renters as well as property owners, is unavailing.
Even income and sales taxes would not be mandatory under the Counties' standard, as they could be avoided by not earning income or making purchases.
Although in one case we discussed property owners' ability to opt out of solid waste removal services, we declined to decide in that case whether the charge for such services were a tax or a fee. Mayor & Alderman of City of Milledgeville v. Green,
Although there was some discussion at oral argument and in post-argument briefing about whether an "inactive" cell phone can successfully summon emergency services through the 911 system, our resolution of this case does not require resolution of that factual question.
We note that our analysis also is consistent with most other jurisdictions to have considered the question. See Bay Area Cellular Tel. Co. v City of Union City,
Arguing before this Court, the Counties do not focus on any alleged differences between 911 services available to those whose have billing addresses within the Counties and those who do not, relegating their argument based on such differences to a footnote.
The Telephone Companies argue that the businesses the city also sued in Clayton County were taxpayers, not mere middlemen, but do not address whether the county defendant would have been properly characterized as a taxpayer.
The Counties point to agents who sell hunting and fishing licenses on behalf of the state, fees charged by trial court efiling service providers, and those with duties to the judicial retirement system. We need not and do not reach any conclusions here as to whether any of those scenarios involves a tax, but note that, as pointed out by the Telephone Companies, such arrangements may give rise to a breach of contract action or other means of recourse that could not be characterized as a tax collection action.
The Telephone Companies expressly did not appeal to the Court of Appeals the trial court's failure to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, so that claim remains unaffected by this appeal. The Telephone Companies did appeal the trial court's failure to dismiss the Counties' petition for accounting pursuant to the 911 Act's audit provision. The Court of Appeals "disagree[d] with the trial court's finding that the [911] Act provides an implied right of action to the Counties for the [Telephone Companies]' alleged failure to collect the proper amount of fees under the statute." Bellsouth Telecomm.,