497 N.E.2d 556 | Ind. | 1986
Roy Bell was convicted after a jury trial of robbery, a class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1984 Supp.). The trial court imposed a sentence of fifty years to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for another cause. The sole issue in this direct appeal is whether the evidence identifying Bell as the perpetrator is sufficient to sustain his conviction.
The State's case was based exclusively on the victim's testimony. While Bell acknowledges that a conviction may be sustained upon uncorroborated testimony, he
Blackman positively identified Bell in court as his assailant. The victim testified that at the time of the robbery his eyesight was good, but that his vision at the time of trial was partially impaired as a result of the injuries he sustained during the robbery. Blackman was familiar with defendant prior to the robbery; during the robbery, Blackman recognized Bell's voice and later removed the shirt. The only inconsistency in Blackman's testimony was the date of the robbery. However, a defense witness, Officer Pat Harper, testified that the date of the offense was November 4, 1983.
This Court will consider only that evidence most favorable to the State and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Taylor v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1310. If the victim's testimony were incredibly dubious or inherently improbable then its exclusion from our review of the evidence would be warranted. Rodgers v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1211. However, Blackman's testimony was understandable and generally consistent; it clearly showed that an assailant intentionally and forcibly removed money from the victim, who sustained injuries during the course of the, robbery. The victim positively identified Bell as the assailant. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
. Appellant moved for a judgment on the evidence after the jury returned its verdict of guilty. After hearing arguments, the trial court denied the motion. The standard of review of denial of such a motion is the same as that used for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Jones v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1255. Therefore, the issues have been consolidated.