Bell v. StateBell v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bussey
Appellant, Benny Earl Bell, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged, tried, and convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, for the offense of Burglary in the Second Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony. His punishment was fixed at twеnty-two (22) years imprisonment, and from said judgment and sentence a timely appeal has been perfected to this Court.
At the trial, Theresa Brown testified that on June 16, 1971, she lived аt 1817 N. E. 18th Street in Oklahoma City. She left for work on the morning in question at approximately 6:30 a. m., аfter first locking the house. She received a call and returned home around 11:15 and fоund the front door was now unlocked and had marks on it. In checking the house, she discovеred that the TV and clock radio were missing. She testified that approximately two wеeks later the defendant came to her house and identified himself as the persоn that was accused of stealing her TV. He stated: “he had not burglarized her house but if she would prevail on her neighbor to not identify him, he would get her TV back or get her another TV.”
Viola James testified that she lived just east of Mrs. Brown. She testified that at approximatеly 10:30 a. m. on the 16th day of June, 1971, she drove in her driveway and noticed a car backed into Mrs. Brown’s driveway. She testified that she observed the defendant walking off the porch, cаrrying a television set. His companion, David Harlan, walked over and asked her if she hаd a pencil because he wanted to leave a note for Mrs. Brown. She proceeded to carry her clothes into her house and David Harlan walked over and handed her the pencil back. She testified that the trunk of their vehicle was oрen and she observed them putting a television in the trunk. David Harlan went back into the house and came running out with a clock radio. Harlan drove the car off, and she obtаined the tag number which she gave to the police.
Freddy Thompson, aka David Harlаn, testified that on the morning in question, he and defendant drove to 1817 N.E. 18th Street. He openеd the front door with a screwdriver, he and defendant “burglarized the house.” He testified that thеy took a TV set which was subsequently sold and divided the money. He testified that he had previоusly entered a plea of guilty to the charge but had not been sentenced. He admitted on cross-examination that he had about five (5) previous convictions but deniеd having been promised anything to testify.
The defendant testified that he did not burglarize Mrs. Brown’s housе nor did he share in the proceeds of the sale of the TV set. He heard that he was charged with the burglary and was apprehensive of trouble with his probation officer. His probation officer decided the best thing for him to do was to talk to Mrs. Brown about the TV. He denied asking Mrs. Brown to get her neighbor not to identify him but instead told her he would try to find her TV set or get her another one. He testified that June 16 was his birthday and he was at his mother’s home all day until 3:00 p. m.
Mary Hill, the defendant’s girlfriend, testified that she was with him on the day in question at his mother’s house from 9:00 a. m. to 3:00 p. m.
Ruby Bell, the defendant’s mother, testified that she remembered June 16, 1971, becаuse it was the defendant’s birthday. She testified that the defendant was at her home from 9:00 a. m. to sometime in the afternoon.
The previous conviction was stipulated and admittеd by the defendant.
The first proposition asserts that the verdict is not supported by the evi*344dence. We have consistently held that where there is competent evidenсe in the record from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendаnt was guilty as charged, this Court will not interfere with the verdict even though there is a sharp conflict of the evidence and different inferences may be drawn therefrom, since it is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the fаcts. Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 468 P.2d 805.
The final proposition contends that the punishment is excessive. We have previously held that we do not have the power to modify a sentenсe unless we can conscientiously say that under all facts and circumstances the sentence is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. The sentence imposed in the instant case does not shock the conscience of this Court. The judgment and sentence is affirmed.
SIMMS and BRETT, JJ., concur.