*1 BELL, STATE et al. Term, 91, September 1961.]
[No.
Decided, 22, 1964. October 23, 1964, De granted November Petition rehearing for filed 7,1964, April 9, 1965. judgments cember and reversed The cause was argued on remand before C. J., Henderson, Sybert Hammond, Prescott, Horney, Marbury, Oppenheimer, JJ. Nabrit,
James M. III and Tucker R. (on remand), Dearing Mitchell, with whom were Juanita Greenberg, Jackson Jack Black, Jr., (cid:127)Charles D. Clark Ronald R. Daven- Leroy L. brief, port on the appellants. General, C.
Robert Murphy, Deputy Attorney (on remand), *3 Finan, with whom were Thomas B. Attorney General and Wil- O’Donnell, liam J. Attorney Baltimore City, State’s on the for brief, for appellee. J., delivered the Hammond, of the Court. majority opinion J., Oppenheimer, Dissenting dissents. 369 opinion page at infra. were in The convicted 1961 in the Criminal appellants Court 27, of of Baltimore violation of Code Art. (1957), 577 Sec. which “wanton the upon (Trespass), prohibits private They rights land of others.” were civil demonstrators who sat Baltimore, in restaurant in leave Hooper’s refusing to until the of establishment from its fixed not departed practice serving negroes. The of conviction were affirmed judgments by this 1962, 302, Court in Bell v. Md. 227 and the January from appellants sought certiorari the Court of the Supreme States, writ, 10, the until granted United which but not June 805, Bell v. Maryland, 1963. 374 U. 2d S. 10 1030. Ed. L. 1963, Meanwhile, 29, on March the General of Assembly Mary law, land public enacted to Baltimore applicable counties, Maryland’s and twelve of ity C twenty-three 1, effect on 1963. This which took is to be June Art. found in 49B Commis (1964 Supp.), (Interracial Code
359 11, of a made it for the sion), operator unlawful owner Sec. defined, accommodation, deny as to refuse place of public accommodations, any of the to or privileges place facilities creed, race, origin.1 his color or national person because of the tres of the was make Thus the effect to State in Balti pass to accommodation act inapplicable places more and the covered Counties. 1964, handed 22, On of the Court June Justices Maryland, Bell v.
down their the case before us. opinions See Warren 2d 822. Chief U. S. L. Ed. Justice Clark, Brennan, Stewart, an opinion Goldberg, Justices Brennan, remand by Mr. their to explained votes Justice consideration, case light further this Court been made which had statutory law of the changes after the Criminal appellants the convictions dissent, Mr. Black in joined by Baltimore. Justices White, Amendment did urged Harlan and the Fourteenth service to refusing the owner of a restaurant from prohibit Assembly 1. the General re-enacted On March provisions application. The gave of the law State-wide provided go that it into effect on law was June valid, which, calling petitions filed if but were for a referendum operation suspend would the law under Art. XVI petitions validity these was at- Constitution. proceedings pending in the of Balti- tacked in now Circuit Court City. go recently That court on more ordered referendum general election in November. City ac- like Baltimore enacted ordinance shortly 8, 1962, (Ordinance 1249) on commodations No. June That ordinance was declared before the State law. ground Superior City, Baltimore on the invalid Court of *4 statute, Trespass a in conflict with that public it was the Criminal and, hence, beyond City general power the of the Baltimore, Inn, City Mayor Inc. enact. Karson’s Council of & 1964, 4, Court, August 6, Record, February Daily This on 1963. Assembly appeal moot, the dismissed Maryland by as because the General 453 without otherwise Ch. Laws statute, changing the the and re-enacted had Criminal pre- provide nothing Trespass therein should contained Act enacting Mayor City and of Baltimore from clude the Council City act, an that the enacted such and had February approved ordinance, 1964. Ordinance Warren, negroes. Mr. Chief al- Goldberg and Justice Justice from the dis- though joining majority opinion, dissented sent, in a Douglas, and Mr. with separate opinion Justice of Mr. filed support Goldberg, gave an which opinion Justice for out- reasons his vote to reach the merits and reverse right judgments of conviction. In the said opinion majority, Mr. Brennan Justice
the Court did not reach the constitutional issues presented had, convictions, the reasons: since the abolished Maryland (a) convicted; the crime of an which were appellants (b) ap- final pellate Court will the law effect at the time of apply judgment; cases were (c) judgments present not yet final because were still on review in the they Supreme Court a case has oc- (thus making where the law “* * * curred a writ from the pending appeal on of error court,” judgment an inferior as in Keller v.
322, 326); and it would thus seem that the (d) Court of would take account of Appeals supervening changes in the law and which principle statutory offense apply all, has longer ceased to exist no at and reverse punishable the convictions of the appellants. Mr. Brennan reached these conclusions an in- upon as the of a
terpretation, eyes majority it, saw of common Maryland, law of and the ef- (a) (b) clause, fect general and Code operation Maryland’s savings (1957), which reads as follows: Art. Sec. re-enactment,
“The or or repeal, revision, statute, of any amendment or consolidation statute, or of section or of a section of any any part criminal, release, civil or have shall not the effect alter, in whole or in extinguish, modify change, or forfeiture or either civil or part, any liability, penalty, criminal, shall been incurred such have under thereof, statute, unless section part repealing, re-enacting, revising, amending or con- repealing solidating act shall so such expressly provide; and thereof, so section repealed, repealed re-enacted, revised, consolidated, amended or *5 in force remaining as shall be and held still treated ac- and all sustaining proper any for the purpose or tions, suits, or civil proceedings prosecutions, criminal, forfei- penalty, enforcement of such * * or liability ture law, said refer- (page Brennan As to the Mr. common Justice be to :S.) ences will 378 U. rule
“For common-law Maryland follows universal statute criminal repeals that when legislature condemnation or otherwise removes the State’s from criminal, this ac- conduct deemed formerly that was criminal pro- tion requires the dismissal a pending rule applies ceeding such conduct. charging which, at time the super- such any proceeding final reached vening yet disposi- has not legislation, it.” (p. tion court authorized to review highest 230) (emphasis supplied) Bren-
As to the Mr. Maryland savings clause nan statute the rele- said examination of that upon “far from persuaded” vant cases the Court was savings applicable this Court hold the clause statute would that since the sav- suggests save the convictions. The opinion and re-enact- “repeal clause refers to the ing “repeal,” only ment,” “revision,” “amendment” or “consolidation” of any thereof, does in terms apply present statute the criminal tres- situation “the effect wrought upon because laws accommodations statute pass by supervening seem to described none these terms.” would be properly It was then said: (p. 233) ‘re- apply could even are only arguably
“The two that nor But city ‘amendment.’ neither peal’ gives the state enactment considered it- legislature indication that slightest law. trespass to be ‘amending’ self ‘repealing’ refers in to the any Neither enactment way characteristically as is done when fact alone or amended. This raises being a substantial possibility that the clause would be held for the clause inapplicable, might narrowly *6 since especially derogation it is of the construed— common law and since this is a criminal case—as re- quiring that or ‘amendment’ be as ‘repeal’ designated such in the supervening 233-4) (pp. itself.” Further, Brennan suggested that: Justice
*“* * even if the word ‘repeal’ ‘amendment’ were deemed to make the saving clause facie prima appli- cable, that would not be the end of the There matter. would remain a substantial that the possibility accommodations laws would be construed as' falling within the clause’s exception: ‘unless the repealing ” * ** act shall so expressly provide.’ (p. 236) The Court found for this support possibility “public policy considerations” (“a legislature that accommo- passes dations law it making unlawful to on account of service deny race did probably not desire that should still be persons prose- cuted and punished for the ‘crime’ of from a seeking service place public accommodations which on denies it account race.”) (p. and because 235) while most criminal statutes speak tense, in the future and so apply the state only prospectively, enactment speaks tense present and that “it is provides * * * unlawful an owner or operator (emphasis supplied) and this Court in Beard v. found the use of the word “shall” an indication that the statute was prospective and not intended to apply past cases.
The appellants adopt urge suggestions and reasoning of Mr. Brennan’s opinion for the of the majority Su- Court and preme argument add the the Fed- eral Rights 88-352, Civil Act of 1964 (Public 241) Law Stat. 2, 1964, Court, on July after the remand over- rides law and abates the State convictions under re- presently view. takes the position State that since the acts of trespass
here involved were conducted without violence or outrage, by students with a bona fide belief that their conduct consti- was like conduct made has Legislature and the privileged, tutionally conduct, like that resulting lawful and the that of the appellants unlawful, restaurant, of Hooper’s and operator owner these were suffer likely would “no real interest the State controlling vitiated,” the applicable but that convictions federal affirmances, no and that requires law inexorably State ingenious skirting no so that law overrides this State be availed law can or the statute of the cases interpretation of conviction. bring judgments about reversal that be said for the State position There is much to done would be no harm to the welfare general if convic- achieved result would a desirable public we, read- reversed, but urges, the Supreme tions were as meaning to have the ineluctable law ing bad has, making feel constrained to avoid argues *7 hard, as we find the law be and to apply because the cases may it to be. re of is law
It is clear that the common Maryland offense, after conviction a a criminal peal of statute creating the final including judgment, but final under the statute before convic to review the of court highest empowered judgment tion, the decision because reversal of requires judgment, judgment, of as the time final must accord with the law it at 572; and the Md. State, 177 supra; Clifton, Keller v. v. State same, United seem to be the States general rule would 103; Sutherland, Con Statutory 1 Peggy, Cranch Schooner has Maryland ap 1943), p. struction 524. (3rd Sec. Ed. re has not Legislature where the the rule to situations plied a sub in terms but has passed law pealed expressly itself, act, of which in the terms sequent independent complete act, in to or the earlier destroyed were necessarily repugnant a or amendment and so had effected whole or part, creating so as to statutes crimes. and has done by implication, State, no (constitutional provision Davis v. 7 Md. revived, amended or reference to its repealed by law shall be act, es independent to new apply title or section does only reversing a previous policy a new tablishing policy rule of con establishing for fact of very particular “the of on the for intention presupposes duct the public, and there that a rule should not legislature, contrary prevail, law, of all incon fore the enactment of one is as much a repeal laws, if inconsistent laws had been repealed by sistent as those Gambrill, Md. 506 stat express words.”); (penal a later act since the- ute by implication by independent were in their and both could not stand repugnant provisions two 513) and In time). (at page be executed at the same Gambrill af was of a demurrer to the indictment below sustaining “* * * the repeal firmed this Court 1911 because after by for no can enforced nor imposed be penalty punishment violation, force, in the re its without a when * * *.” The took pealing Legislature apparently hint for in two clauses general savings (Ch. 1912 passed com now 1912), together and Ch. 365 of the Laws also the substance of 3 of 1 of the Code. prise Art. See Sec. Co., McDonagh 264. v. Matthews-Howard think passage We it too plain argument Legislature brought accommodations law the It made about act. a fundamental trespass lawful in situations what before its variety given situations. In those situa- would have been unlawful those tions that law specified by executed, together act cannot stand and both extent, irreconcilable and to that are and in the two repugnant conflict. of Baltimore January On Superior Inn, City Mayor Karson’s Inc. v. Council Baltimorer Record, 4, 1963, invalid, in conflict declared as Daily February Trespass with Code Art. Wanton (1957), (the Sec. Mayor City Ordinance No. 1249 Council section), *8 Baltimore, which prohibited places approved June accommodation, defined, or from services denying as public the because of his race. thereafter any facilities person Soon amended Legislature by the Ch. Laws that noth- 577 of Art. 27 of the Code a adding proviso Sec. from enacting Baltimore ing preclude public therein should City similar to that invalid by accommodations declared legislation There can be no real doubt of the legisla- the Court. Superior that there was and irreconcilable recognition repugnancy tive trespass conflict between the wanton section the Code and laws, public accommodations such as Ordinance 1249 Ch. 227 of Laws of accommodations (the public State law, 49B of of Art. which it had Code) passed Sec. it amended 577 of Art. 27. accommo- (The public Sec. before dations law was March passed 29 and the amendment Indeed, wanton section 17.) Court trespass April Supreme in its shows its of a remanding opinion recognition fundamental change act in its that this trespass expressed expectation will Court reverse convictions because the public accommodations statute made former criminal con- duct of the a longer crime that no existed. appellants The suggestion Mr. Brennan opinion majority that accommoda- tions law and ordinance did not or amend the wanton repeal “* * * * * * trespass act because neither nor the state city enactment gives slightest indication that the con- legislature law”; sidered itself to be or ‘repealing’ ‘amending’ the trespass “* * * and neither enactment refers in to the way any trespass law, as is done when a characteristically prior being statute is or amended” (p. 233) will not wash. ac- simply tion of the Legislature amending the act trespass to remove in terms the conflict between that controlling law and a ordinance, municipal public after it had passed a state public accommodations law which in effect and necessary result made a fundamental in the trespass gives rise to an almost inescapable inference that the knew Legislature it was repealing part, amending, law when it passed the accommodations act.
There are innumerable decisions in almost every state and in the federal courts holding a subsequent independent itself, complete which alters or changes a act in such a way the two are repugnant and cannot stand to- gether, whole or in effects part, an amendment of the earlier act though even is there no reference whatever in the later act to the earlier. “An implied amendment is an act of, which purports to be independent but which in substance alters, modifies, or adds to Sutherland, prior act.” Statutory Construction (3rd 1943), p. Ed. Sec. 365. “The definition n ofan implied amendment is purely formal —it an amendment *9 366 cit., Sutherland, op. not
that does state that it is amendment.” Sutherland, cit., 1920, 382, op. see and also Secs. 1901 p. Sec. and 1921. 801, 1, 9, States, 65
In United 256 U. Chase v. S. L. Ed. act of 1912 impliedly repealed held that federal the Court it was on same matter because subject similar act of 1882 out, not carried saying that both acts could be plain therefore, it that act contains though later act: “It supersedes, Franca, 282 United no also v. words.” States La repealing See act, 568, orig- of an 75 551 section (a independent U. S. L. Ed. form, existing to an added a provision inal in effect McGee, F. 2d thereof); Baxter v. 82 held amendatory act was 383 Lapp, (6th United v. Fed. Cir.); 695 (8th States Stores, Cir.). 2d 145 (10th F. Safeway Vance v. Cir.); Co., Farms 94 F. Supp. In Ice v. Arden Balian Cream Co. Yankwich, said: Cal.), (S. 798-9 D. J. is existing act is amendatory “Whether an alone, declarations by not title by determined to amend On the purports existing act it law. new that and com- by determined an-examination contrary, it is If its aim existing with law. provisions its parison uncertainties which arose from or correct is to clarify law, or reach sit- existing the enforcement not stat- by original were covered uations which its ute, though in wording is even amendatory, the act to amend the language does not purport it legislation, or- existing supplements act. Whatever the societal object more successfully der to achieve be to amend it.” may obtained said to be sought Co., 472; R. Cal. v. Omnibus Ger- Robbins also See Chadbourne, 469, and Me. N. E. (Ind.), hardt Court said: where the effect, an act name given “And it If subsequent character. statute does its determines to be had un- proceedings fact modify act, act is an the later amendment of the former ader treated, so regarded al- and must act earlier in the act itself.” so called is not though cases Many recognize amendments repeals *10 not be the two—are not but will implication equating favored — refused of or irrecon recognition cases manifest repugnancy cilable (Ind.), conflict. of are Watson v. Some these Strohl 204; LaRue’s, 46 N. 2d Inc. 154 N. (Ind.), v. E. State E. 708, 712; 2d N. Transport Co-Ordinated Barrett 106 (Ill.), v. 510, 515; Metropolitan 2d Jordan Dist. v. Greater E. San. of 297, 303; Chicago 155 v. (Ill.), N. 2d Fowler (Ore.), E. State 167, 173; 199, 295 P. 2d Rickards v. A. 77 2d (Del.), State 203; 718; 714, v. Bedingfield Parkerson 2d (Ga.), 94 S. E. 252, 418, 262, see also 82 C. 432. S. Statutes pp. Secs. J. has been in accord with authorities elsewhere fact act not (including amending or need repealing in terms to in this refer the cases act) although earlier State where there has have been only partial repugnancy thought of repeal and referred to the result as a by implication tanto; pro rather than as an amendment by implication. See Mallott, 435; Miggins v. Agri. Beall Md. 169 Md. v. Southern Asso., 305, State, 311-312, cited; 136 Md. Ulman v. cases 642, 645, cited; Gambrill, 137 Md. v. Davis cases State, Co., v. supra; McDonagh v. Matthews-Howard all Green, 134, v. Green 170 Md. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania 63, 67-69. do, Finding, as we 453 of (Code, Ch. Laws 49B, 1964 Supplement, Art. and com- 11), necessary Sec. by amended, tanto, pelling or implication repealed pro similarly 27, 577, Code Art. (1957), it that the provisions follows Sec. statute, 1, the general saving (1957), clause Code Art. Sec. release, or (that amendment a statute ex- shall tinguish the criminal on penalties imposed ap- pellants unless the statute so repealing “expressly provide”) applies. saving The clause statute here pertinent was taken from similar clause Congress enacted 1 U. C. 109. The S. federal clause was saving applied by Sec. Reisinger, Court United v. States U. S. States, 32 L. and Great Northern v. Ry. Co. United Ed. Carter, U. 567. also United S. See L. Ed. States (5th F. 2d 530 Its effect is Cir.). discussed 572, 576, Clifton, 177 Md. where Court said: further any “While of a statute prevents the repeal common it is well estab- thereunder at proceedings granting clause saving lished that where there is a government right punish the state or federal repeal, general for offenses committed before the The be contained may rule rescinded. be a general pro- or may repealing In either statutes. penal vision which all applies case, continuing it has the effect in force for the offenses punishing for the purpose committed to the repeal.” Leg- -by see no basis direction finding express We existing crimi- accommodations law that islature the public Legis- nal to be extinguished/ liabilities were penalties *11 of3 must have known that under be to Sec. presumed lature words, direction, many Art. in so 1 of the Code an express an extin- to effect such was to show intent required legislative Legislature of the The demonstrated guishment. preoccupation law on the trespass of accommodations with the effect the public ex- it have been act that would strengthens completely view rule general in its had it wished to plicit directions clause. saving established by majority Mr. Brennan The for suggestion in the of the tense present pub- Court use that with- lic to an express provision accommodations law amounted crimi- existing clause that general saving of the meaning reasoning under the extinguished, nal liabilities should State, is, think, in- supra, much too tenuous and Beard v. we Beard decided In the first was place, to stand up. substantial Mary- clause became general saving before the years stat- that had the opinion recognizes repealing land law and the cases from its pending op- ute contained express imposed. could have been eration the prior penalty undoubtedly In place language the second means, convinced, we are clearly “it that is unlawful” that after the effective date of the act do from and to it is unlawful is, the of the act makes things; them the proscribed Court, knew that this and other Legislature The unlawful. and State, lawful for owners courts had held that it was to to those defined in the act refuse serve operators places act did not to invoke the they trespass choose to serve and their against property. those who refused to leave and to certain named places act terms trespass applied only reason, for if for did not to other named this apply places, other, de- no inferred was not Legislature it must be common law or exist- the act the claring existing but, rather, ef- creating was new ing right, constitutional fective from the date of its only passage.
We have been referred to and found to indicate nothing as was ren- legislative intent that so much of the act to dered accommodations law was not survive nugatory by convictions its violation. support past Act of Finally, nothing Rights we see thé Federal Civil indicate it was to other than prospectively. apply It this found uses the word “shall” which consistently persuasive supra, Beard v. to show prospective appli- statutes, general cation. The is that all presumption federal, are presump- intended operate prospectively tion is found if ex- to have been rebutted there are clear only pressions in the statute to the even contrary. Retroactively, found, where and is not permissible, except up- favored States, on the plainest mandate in act. Bruner v. United Comm’r., 786; 343 U. Apts. Claridge S. Co. L. Ed. 323 U. There is expression S. 139. no Ed. L.
Federal Civil Act to usual If Rights rebut the presumption. were possible to reasoningly discover from the terms of the act *12 —-wedo not think it is—that the Congress intended the act to operate the owners and of retrospectively, operators covered establishments, who had discriminated before the of passage the act, would be the subject to sanctions of the act provided for such behavior are and we certain Congress intended no such result.
Judgments affirmed, with costs. filed the J., following dissenting opinion. Oppenheimer, The only difference between the of the Court and majority myself is on issue of the whether the convictions of the appel-
370 which,
lants for accommoda- public acts under the Maryland tions law would are to be because today legal, upheld saving clause statute. I brethren that the agree my pas- with sage of law about brought the 1963 accommodations public that, statute; in in trespass fundamental the criminal change law, the the situations in accommodations specified the public in con- two and are irreconcilable repugnant enactments are flict; and common our deci- law of is that sion final judg- must accord with the law as it is at the time of that, It the cases ment. of the remand of because undisputed States, to us af- of after our the the United firmance of in Bell v. Md. the convictions A. 2d 771 after of accom- (1962), public modations not become judgments conviction have It is is clearly final. in the implicit opinion majority, law, that, clause saving from apart operation statute, majority the convictions could not now stand. The holds, however, that, law does while the accommodations public terms amend or criminal trespass all due saving clause statute is nevertheless With operative. brethren, deference I my disagree. to the views construction, The is one of question statutory phraseology inferences, must but as in cases which the Court other enactments, must look determine we meaning legislative Connor, to the Darnall v. nature and of the statutes. purpose ; Simpson, Md. 161 Md. 155 Atl. (1931) Shut 2d A. 332 (1950). essence, it not deals with individual. In rights of the important of certain only negates formerly the criminal nature acts which rights but restricts trespasses very property constituted least, at designed, which the statute was criminal includes accommodations law The effect of protect. and the formerly the removal of a which existed property right is a substitution affirmative This personal right. positive of an rule the law. The governs and basic change stat continuing criminal prior has the effect of offenses committed for the purpose punishing ute force legal makes the in law which same acts 2d 703 Clifton, (1940). A. future.
371 While the clause statute does not of itself saving impose which, criminal in but it continues effect penalty, penalties it, abolished, therefore, would be and should my opinion, to laws subject to the same strict construction which applies impose rights the first instance. The penalties liberties of the individual are involved against directly in both Atl. Fleming, cases. v. 173 Md. See State State, (1937); A. 2d 914 Wanzer (1953). statute, terms, its to the saving only by applies re-enactment, revision, or amend-
“repeal, or the repeal or or ment consolidation of or of section any any a section statute.” 3. any (1957) Code Article Section amendment, When there is such effect or the act has the of continuing the or in force for the repealed amended statute amend- purposes punishing offenses committed to the ment or is repeal. Where it applicable, affects the common law.
The common law which the clause statute principle affects, when it Mar- was stated Chief applicable, shall in these words:
“It is in general true province court is appellate only enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous not. But if subse- quent and before judgment the decision court, a law appellate intervenes and changes positively which governs, the rule the law must be or its obeyed, * * * denied. If the law obligation be constitutional I know of no court which can contest obligation its * * * In such a case the court must decide according laws, if it be existing necessary to set aside rendered, when judgment, rightful but which cannot be affirmed but violation the judgment must United be set aside.” States Schooner Peggy, 103, 110 Cranch (1801).
This was cited with language approval Keller v. Md. 71 Am. Dec. In most of the (1858). decisions apply- ing the principle, subsequent legislation amended
the prior act under which there was a
The
conviction.
rule ap-
also, however,
plies
where there is
or
but
no
amendment
repeal
where the effect of the
law is
or
prior
abrogated
destroyed.
Sutherland,
Construction,
;
Statutory
1943)
(3d
ed.
§
Berger v. Berger, 104 Wis.
ciple followed by effect, subsequent cases comes into it does so because the prior amended, when, rule or statute has and that been or case, as in this the of re- act contains no subsequent language amendment, or peal the or amendment is to be implied, repeal therefore, This saving clause statute becomes operative. me, reasoning, invalidity the distinction between disregards of or prior legislative convictions because of subsequent in change amendment and because of a fundamental invalidity here, of basic individual rights which, and property law— — itself, makes the convictions prior repugnant present pol- icy. cases, rule,
Many language the common-law use applying or amendment as a means of aside implied repeal setting prior enactments; in do not they convictions light subsequent reach the in other None of cases cited prong rule. on this deals with the construction majority opinion point involved; of a clause such as is here saving they only statute be- go setting the survival aside of the conviction cause of the law. subsequent The effect of the on the is to construe majority opinion point statute to extend to saving any legislative change legal. which makes acts The statute does not so prior illegal and, read, should not be so construed. my opinion, Nor, in Legislature did the the 1963 my opinion, enacting accommodations law intend to save convictions under public criminal by way impliedly repealing that act so that the clause statute would amending saving The enactment of the become operative. followed of a Baltimore ordinance to the City had been introduced after the appel-
same
The ordinance
effect.
and while their
from the convic-
appeals
lants had been convicted
The ordinance was
on
passed
tions were
this Court.
pending
day
same
decision
petition
certiorari from our
affirming the convictions was filed in the United
Su
States
Further,
clause,
preme Court.
no saving
the ordinance contained
and it is generally
held that state
statutes do not apply
to ordinances. Pleasant
City
Lindsay,
Grove
Utah
Gadsden,
As out, the majority opinion a few weeks had points after it law, passed the public accommodations Legislature the repealed re-enacted the criminal statute. This re- trespass act, enactment was in the same terms as those the earlier for the except addition of a proviso the enabling Mayor City Council of to Baltimore enact legislation such as its former ordinance. This re-enactment of the criminal trespass statute did not If, refer in to the any way public accommodations law. holds, as the majority the latter law in amended statute, that, the criminal is trespass it reasonable to assume the re-enacting statute after trespass it had passed public law, accommodations Legislature would have out spelled which, the changes in the in- opinion majority, it had tended to A make. more probable explanation legislative of the intent, me, it to seems is that the Legislature recognized by its acts that public accommodations law did not amend the criminal trespass law but rather fundamentally changed as to certain public policy basic rights. It was that direct fundamental change, rather than implied legislative ac- tion, which vitiated the appellants’ convictions.
In no case have we prior held that the clause saving statute a operates continue former law in effect for the purpose an offense punishing committed prior to the subsequent leg- islation where the later act did not either in terms eliminate criminality defendant’s action or change penal- Md. Kennerly, 204 Clifton, supra;
ties. Cf. v. State State accommodations (1954). public 104 A. 2d re-en- repealing did neither. did Legislature What after it had a few weeks the criminal statute acting trespass law, altering without passed the accommodations public statute, recognize was effect terminology tres- constitutes “wanton in the of what meaning ac- law. This later accommodations pass” effected by that, tion, when the the inference in my opinion, strengthens rights created new Legislature only clause it did intend the saving not amendment or repeal, apply. cases of
applicable
clause
saving
In
this Court when the
two cases decided
effect,
in basic conflict
law was
subsequent
statute was in
cases,
held that an
In
the Court
with
both
prior legislation.
Bond-
v. American
action
act could
lie.
upon the
prior
Co.,
Green v.
(1916);
Md.