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Bell v. Slezak
812 A.2d 566
Pa.
2002
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*2 ZAPPALA, C.J., CAPPY, CASTILLE, Before NIGRO, SAYLOR, NEWMAN and JJ.

OPINION *3 Chief Justice ZAPPALA. appeal

This presents multiple, foundational questions con- cerning application provisions of of Pennsylvania Prop- erty and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act in a setting involving insolvency of a former medical malprac- tice insurance carrier. 1992,

In Appellants, late L. Shirley Bell, and P. Thomas commenced a civil action asserting claims Appellees, Slezak, Joseph (col- A. M.D. professional and his corporation lectively, Slezak”), “Dr. and others. The central averments of complaint alleged malpractice medical part on the of Appellees during the course of Mrs. Bell’s treatment abdominal In conditions. negotiations settlement supervised pleas court, the common parties consummated an agreement pursuant to which $500,000 would Bells receive in exchange joint for amount, tortfeasor release. Of this $200,000 represented the limits of a policy malpractice insurance which Dr. Slezak maintained with PIC Insurance (“PIC”), $300,000 Group was to be the responsibility Pennsylvania Liability Medical Professional Catastrophe

336 Fund”).1 party not a (the Although PIC was “CAT

Fund was made with agreement Dr. Slezak’s agreement, furnished limits would be policy that the understanding clear Prior, funds, of settlement to the disbursement by the carrier. placing an order Court issued the Commonwealth liquidation provisions with in accordance liquidation PIC 221.1-221.63. Act, §§ 40 P.S. Department the Insurance part statutory obligations on the triggered certain order Such Guaranty Casualty Insurance Pennsylvania Property (“PPCIGA” Association”), to the pursuant or “the Association Guaranty As- Casualty Insurance Property and Pennsylvania appeal. subject of Act,2 primary which are sociation portion its insolvency, failed to tender PIC a result of the As statutory Although PPCIGA’s proceeds. of the settlement arising of certain covered obligations include insurers, see casualty property insolvency out of the $200,000; 991.1803(b)(1),it, too, provide refused to § P.S. recovery provision that under the it claimed 991.1817(a), prescribes Act, § which 40 P.S. this act claim under on a covered “[a]ny payable amount recovery under other any amount of by the shall be reduced paid by insurance,”3 expenses to offset medical it entitled was settlement, non-party as a the CAT Fund served to the 1. In relation Malprac- Services pursuant to the Healthcare carrier excess Act, (superseded). 40 P.S. §§ 1301.101-1301.1006 tice 1301.701(d) (superseded). amended, 1994, 1005, (as 12, P.L. No. December Act of Act”). 991.1801-991.1820) (the legislation su- “PPCIGA This §§ Guaranty Pennsylvania Association Insurance perseded the former (as amended 40 P.S. No. 232 P.L. Act of Nov. 1701.101-1701.605), enabling legislation for PPCI- which was §§ Guaranty Association Pennsylvania Insurance predecessor, GA's *4 ("PIGA”). recovery provision is as follows: non-duplication of 3. The full text of the policy shall be having an insurance Any person a claim under purposes right policy. For of his under such required exhaust first to section, include a claim policy shall under an insurance a claim insurance, first-party or whether it a any of under kind limitation, include, claim, and health accident without and shall insurance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield compensation, worker’s Any policies an insolvent insurer. coverages except for of all other insurer, Capital and Blue Shield. Blue Cross the Bells’ health $200,000 Further, and thus also payments since such exceeded took the underlying policy, PIC PPCIGA the limits part payment on its to was any obligation that make position extinguished. settlement, seeking to enforce the petition

The Bells filed $200,000 was contending that Dr. Slezak in that did not responsible the event PPCIGA contribute opposed petition, emphasizing Dr. PIC’s funds. Slezak settlement, funding which he contemplated role terms per enabling its statute. contended was assumed that entitlement to invoke the non- He contended PPCIGA’s recovery provision present in the circumstances duplication Court, open pending was an issue before the Commonwealth agreement against of the him enforcement settlement since, alia, inequitable inter had all would be he tendered required premiums to PIC and the CAT Fund and was an resulting victim” of the circumstances PIC’s “innocent liquidation. granting petition, pleas

In on the Bells’ the common relief noted, court preliminarily, PIC was neither named party correspon- civil action nor the Bells’ referenced reflecting parties’ ap- dence settlement. The court then plied principles conventional contract to conclude that agreement fully was a one and valid remained enforceable Thus, insolvency. although acknowledging after PIC’s parties’ awareness of PIC’s as Dr. insur- involvement Slezak’s er, common pleas simply court did not deem this aware- disposition petition, particular- ness be material its ly parties where the had not memorialized intention that obligation Dr. should present Slezak be relieved his settlement funds in the event that his insurer became insol- In effectively weighing vent. the circumstances of the case in statute, express policy view of the court the PPCIGA explained as follows: payable amount on a covered claim under this act shall be reduced recovery any the amount under other insurance. 991.1817(a). *5 ... argues purpose

The that the statute’s of avoid- defense to ing policyholder financial loss as result of the insolvency of an insurer would be if the frustrated provisions apply agreement. did not to the settlement However, in a an situation where either innocent claimant or policyholder stands to suffer a financial loss as a innocent insurer, insolvency policyholder result of the of an it is the plaintiff relationship that should bear the loss. had no with the now insolvent insurer and had no reason in the preparation agreement, attempt of the settlement protect insolvency from themselves the insurer. The in protect result referred to must occur order to at least one (claimants protected policyholders) member of class suffering any way public from financial loss. In this policy expressed attempting protect the statute of financial insolvency claimants from loss as a result of the an insurer will be carried out. opinion Additionally,

Trial court at 12-13. since the Bells non-parties respect relationship were with to the contractual PIC, Dr. pleas between Slezak the common court ex- pressed doubt as to whether the Bells were “claimants” for PPCIGA, purposes such that of recov- ery provision implicated by was even virtue their health 991.1817(a). recovery. insurance appeal, Superior On Dr. Slezak’s an en banc Court consid- conjunction with two involving ered the matter other cases issues, Isdaner, overlapping Panea v. No. 3677 Phila. and Baker v. No. 642 E.D. Myers, and reversed. See Isdaner, (Pa.Super.2001). Rejecting Panea v. 773 A.2d 782 (and Bells’) pleas ordinary the common court’s on reliance principles controlling, majority contract indicated approach “ignore[s] litigation such the economic realities of interplay coverage and the insurance the settlement In process.” regard, majority See id. focused defendant-physicians on position vis-a-vis the insolvent carrier, malpractice explaining: insurance disputes agreements No one the fact that the settlement liability; established the defendants’ to the extent liability the defendants’ is covered insurance the insurer ultimately obligated pay. logically It cannot be denied parties anticipated that all the that insurance would cover payment of the settlement amounts. The defendants all paid premiums for malpractice expected their insurance and *6 coverage Thus, to in have the event of a claim. the defen- dant insolvency. doctors are also victims of In the insurers’ recognition by companies of the harm occasioned insurance becoming legislature insolvent the saw fit to fashion a remedy by enacting this Act. [PPCIGA] Panea, 773 In assessing remedy, A.2d at 789. the available Superior that, majority accepted although they Court were parties not in relation to Dr. Slezak’s insurance contract with PIC, the Bells nevertheless maintained a claim” for “covered purposes non-duplication of the of recovery provision. See id. Further, at 789-90. majority adopted Dr. Slezak’s charac- terization of himself as a victim of insolvency PIC’s that, matter, policy therefore believed as a he should benefit protective from the umbrella of non-duplication of recov- ery provision, along with (indicating PPCIGA. See id. at 789 that merely asserting “defendants are a statutory right extinguish either limit or obligations pay their on the claims”). majority The thus right referred the Bells’ payment under the agreement “nothing settlement more than a claim against an having insolvent insurer virtue of a claim against a tortfeasor who was insured that insurer.” Furthermore, Id. regards, these majority opined provides PPCIGA Act a adequate remedy clear and for a insolvency loss due to the of property casualty insurer, a noting that statutory remedies are favored over common law 1504). (citing ones. See id. at 789 Superior Pa.C.S. The majority Court noted that changed circumstances necessi- tating might provide PPCIGA’s involvement a basis for re- settlement, scinding emphasized parties but that had pursue not chosen to such course. id. See at 789 n. 3.4 concurring In opinion, Judge expressed Del Sole view his remedy plaintiff rescission is indeed a available to a faced with a following reduction settlement on the basis of the non- question to the majority specifically then returned The whether, non-duplication light application of the may be of the insolvent insurer recovery provision, the insured offset, responsible for the amount of the personally held precludes of the Act concluding legislative that “the intent (“To 791; see also id. at 792 an anomalous result.” Id. such amount would personally liable for the offset find the doctors which is ‘to purposes of the stated contravene one ... policyholders loss to as a result avoid financial 991.1801(1)). ”) insolvency (quoting of an insurer.’ (and argument majority rejected the Bells’ examined conclusion) that, common court’s as between pleas tortfeasor, with injured any and a loss should reside innocent tortfeasor, was no loss in the concluding simply that there circumstances, since, definition, present only in instances in which the recovery provision applies (“In recovery. id. at 791 already claimant has received loss, rather, any if loss who plaintiffs fact it is not the bear the *7 occurred, it is insurers who can said to have the solvent be insurance, claims under the other source of paid plaintiffs’ first.”). to be exhausted While requires which the majority recognized the need to consider Superior Court part Capital on the of Blue potential subrogation interest assessment, it and Blue in this reasoned Cross Shield Bells’ foreclosed as it was derivative such interest was not recover and, majority holding, under the Bells would id. at 791-92. expenses from Dr. Slezak. See the medical Inc., Lines, v. 421 Finally, majority Valley cited Burke (1992), Superior in which the Pa.Super. 617 A.2d 1335 finan- imposition had that the previously Court determined would contravene directly cial loss on the insured tortfeasor Panea, predecessor enactment. See purpose of PPCIGA’s 773 A2d at 792. parties arguments forth the same appeal,

In this set Thus, we must Superior made before the Court. were Assembly’s promulgating in determine the General intent Panea, (Del recovery duplication provision. See 773 A.2d at 797 Sole, concurring).

341 provisions parties of the Act which the various PPCIGA disparate meanings. largely facts are attribute Since the undisputed questions and us primarily the issues before are law, Products, our A-Best plenary. Phillips review v. (1995). 1167, 1170 Pa.

As has Superior explained, Court PPCIGA is unincorporated obligations in association vested with remedial property casualty circumstances which licensed and insur (describing §§ ers are deemed insolvent. See 40 P.S. 991.1801 purposes including “[provision PPCIGA’s as a means for of] payment claims property covered under certain casualty policies, delay [avoidance insurance excessive of] of such claims and loss [avoidance of] financial claimants or policyholders insolvency a result of the of an insurer”), id. 991.1803. See v. generally Sands PIGA 217, 221, (1980) Pa.Super. A.2d (discussing statute). predecessor PPCIGA Act’s obtains funding PPCIGA satisfy obligations collecting insolvent insurers monies from all companies property insurance that write casualty in the insurance Commonwealth. See 40 P.S. 991.1803(b)(3), § 991.1808. Under circumstances arising from PIC’s insolvency, ordinarily pay would assume ment of an insolvent insurer’s obligations arising from claims policies insureds, made under the insurance of its see 40 P.S. 991.1803(b)(1), subject to limitations embodied the PPCI See, 991.1803(b)(1)(B) Act. GA e.g., (establishing a $300,000 “per cap claimant” on obligation to pay PPCIGA’s claim). covered Under the also PPCIGA is “deemed the insurer to obligation the extent of the on the covered claims duties, and to such rights, obligations extent shall have all as if insolvent insurer had not the insurer become *8 991.1803(b)(2). insolvent.” See 40 generally P.S. Done gal 295, 300-01, Mut. Ins. 528 Long, 1124, Co. v. Pa. 597 A.2d (1991); Co., 1127 Matusz v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. 340 Pa.Su 116, 118-19, (1985). per. 868, A.2d 489 870 Accordingly, legal PPCIGA assumes certain obligations defense connec with against tion insureds of insolvent insurers. See 40 991.1803(b)(1).

342 and its from a predecessor were derived

The PPCIGA 221, Sands, model, Pa.Super. 283 at 423 uniform law. See particularly as the areas Significantly, applied A.2d model non-duplication recovery, law of exhaustion and being plagued multiple frequently has been described See,, apparent e.g., inconsistencies. New ambiguities and Frialator, Inc., Pitco 142 N.H. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Hampshire (1998).5 573, 1190, example, For 705 A.2d 1192-93 non- under has been construed duplication provision review differ Piteo, Compare, e.g., 705 A.2d at ently many jurisdictions. plain (concluding that both an insured and a 1193 purposes for of a of recov tiff are “claimants” v. and Cas. ery provision), Property with Insurance Comm’r (1988) 458, 518, (holding 313 Md. 546 A.2d 463-64 Corp., Ins. claimants). only operation obviously Its is insureds are straightforward in in which claimant and instances most entity, person example, insured the same or where are insurer, insured has a claim his which driver circumstances, In nonduplication such becomes insolvent. operate will to restore the insured provision generally insolvency, been in' his position he would have absent insurer’s Note, shifting any generally to solvent insurers. See loss Insolvencies and Insurance Company Guaranty Insurance Clause, A 74 Nonduplication Recovery Funds: Look at 1989). (May application L.Rev. 927 is somewhat Iowa complex, claimant and more where the asserted (or entities) persons potentially different with policyholder are conflicting interests. Benoit, Insolvency v. 723 A.2d

5. See also Rhode Island Insurers' Fund 303, (R.I.1999) ("we agree jurisdictions that have held that 307 with ambiguous contradictory,' language 'the [and] is if not '[t]he " (citations phrases confusing' interrelationship of the clauses and Ass’n, 442, omitted)); 915 v. Nevada Guar. 112 Nev. P.2d Cimini Ins. 279, (1996) (describing guaranty act clause as "nei 282 exhaustion craft”) clarity exemplar nor an of the draftsman's ther model of Herder, Guaranty Property (quoting & Ins. Fund v. 156 Cas. Arizona 203, 519, (1988)); 523 International Collection Sen. v. Ariz. 751 P.2d Ins., 978, (1988); Property & Cas. Vt. 980 Vermont Co., Guaranty McKinstry Wash.App. Washington Ass'n v. Ins. (1990). P.2d *9 In considering such paradigms, begin we with a central aspect of recovery provision, namely, concept of a “covered claim.” The PPCIGA Act defines as, covered claim inter alia: claim,

an unpaid including premiums, one for unearned claimant, submitted which arises out of and is within coverage and is subject applicable to the limits of an policy insurance to which applies this article issued insurer if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer after the effective date of this article.... 991.1802(1).6 §

40 P.S. In involving multiple cases tiers of claimants, potential controversy concerning arises which may possess be deemed to claims.” In “covered the medical malpractice setting, therefore, a threshold issue is whether the term refers to insured-physician’s potential claim against pursuant policy its with an malpractice insolvent carrier, or to a claim brought by patient-plaintiff physician, such as the case here. Jurisdictions are divided concerning question. See supra. Having surveyed the approaches, however, we persuaded by are assessment Hampshire Piteo, New Supreme Court 705 A.2d at 1190, in which the court determined that the term “covered claim” refers to both the first- third-party claims. See id. at 1193. In so holding, the court to multiple cited instances which guaranty the state enactment referred to “claimants or policyholders,” and “the claimant or the insured” within opera- provisions, tive thus suggesting that the terms were not legislature intended wholly be coextensive. See Piteo, (“A 705 A.2d at 1193 construction of the statute equated ‘claimant’ with ‘policyholder’ ‘insured’ or would con- travene the principles fundamental that all of the words of a given statute must be effect and that legislature pre- sumed not to have superfluous words.”). used or redundant Pennsylvania only statute not mirrors New Hamp shire’s in its proximate, disjunctive references to policyholders claimants, 991.1801(1)(“claimants 40 or policyhold ers”), (“claimant (“insured 991.1802 insured”), or 991.1816 or 6. The term "claimant" specifically is not defined under the Act.

claimant”), it also that both first- and plainly contemplates but may claims. exam possess claimants covered For within of “covered ple, includes the definition the PPCIGA 991.1802, premiums, claim” claims unearned see Further, obviously reposited which are the stat insureds. *10 “any first-party from such expressly ute excludes definition [$25,000,000],” worth claim an insured whose net exceeds id., negative that insureds suggesting, by implication, thus category will at least in some circumstances have outside this explicit reference claims. enactment also makes covered claims, 991.1817,conveying § to the Gener third-party of Assembly’s appreciation significance al of the the relevant desirability of differentiation be express distinction and claims differential treat third-party tween first- and where of import, cognizance ment is Of additional intended. is of consistent with the broad definition third-party legislation. and of the purposes claim” the remedial “covered PIGA, 137, Porter v. 75 F.3d 141-42 generally H.K. Co. (3d Cir.1996).7 first-party third-party that both and

Having determined may possess purposes “covered claims” for of the claimants Act, obligations nature of we next consider the PPCIGA’s it funding claim since is claim for of relation to the Bells’ their here. the settlement that is at issue regard, initially, agreement In we note our with the this funding are not to Superior Court the Bells entitled direct of from Dr. Slezak and that so conclude the settlement interplay of “ignore[s] litigation the economic realities v. coverage process.” of in the Panea insurance settlement earlier, Isdaner, Additionally, 773 A.2d at as set forth 789. logically that “it be aptly the court noted cannot denied Health, Recently, Pennsylvania v. in Main Inc. Med. Liab. Line Prof'l Fund, curiam, (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), per Catastrophe d 738 A.2d 66 566 off 4, (2001), rejected 1048 Pa. 777 A.2d Commonwealth Court position that insureds of the insolvent insurer are claimants under 70; Pennsylvania Osteopathic Act. Ass’n v. See id. at see also Med. 989, Foster, (1990). 995-96 Never 134 Pa.Cmwlth. theless, per Main Line not consti this Court’s curiam affirmance of did reasoning. approval tute of the Commonwealth Court's See Common 578, 589-90, (1996). Tilghman, 543 Pa. A.2d 903-04 wealth v. parties anticipated all that insurance would cover amounts,” recognition and that of “[i]n of the settlement companies becoming harm occasioned insurance insolvent legislature remedy by enacting saw fit to fashion a Thus, view, Act.” Id. only our the Bells’ source of [PPCIGA] funding for the settlement was virtue their Accordingly, language covered claim. we turn to regarding obligation pay Act PPCIGA’s “covered claims.” specific purposes of the One the PPCIGA is to “provide a means for the payment covered claims under property casualty policies....” certain insurance P.S. added). 991.1801(1) (emphasis Additionally, one the enu- powers merated and duties of obligated be “[t]o pay claims existing prior covered [to] determination 991-1803(b)(l). Thus, insolvency....” party once a possess is found to purposes covered claim for Bells, obligation such as the it is duty then the of PPCIGA pay provides such claim unless the PPCIGA Act a basis for *11 being obligated Here, the Association not on such claim. it is recovery provision that PPCIGA claims provides such a basis. recognize

We possesses rights PPCIGA all if insolvent insurer as that insurer had not become insolvent. 991.1803(b)(2). Moreover, 40 P.S. we are aware Pennsylvania, a party third to an contract possess- insurance ing a claim against the insured has no general right of action against 22, 24, the insurer. Folmar v. Shaffer, Pa.Super. (1974) (“The law is settled that ‘in the policy absence of a or a provision right statute on which such may predicated, person may directly be not maintain a suit against judgment the insurer to on a recover rendered ” (citations omitted)). Therefore, the insured.’ in ordinary circumstances, basis, statutory absent a an insurer would have obligation no pay third-party noted, claims as such. As specifically provides statutory PPCIGA basis for third-party beneficiary claims such as the Bells as specifically the Act contemplates third-party beneficiaries as claimants thereunder. possess covered

Having concluded that the Bells is a basis Act and that there pursuant claim to the claim, now turn to the on such we obligation for PPCIGA’s recovery provision of the Act to determine non-duplication of states, provision' may offset the claim. This if PPCIGA part: relevant

(a) policy a claim an insurance Any person having under such right first his under required shall be exhaust section, of this a claim under policy. purposes For any a claim under kind of policy shall include insurance claim, insurance, first-party it is a or whether limitation, include, accident and health without and shall insurance, and compensation, Blue Cross Blue workers’ policies for of an coverages except all other Shield on a covered claim Any payable insurer. amount insolvent any amount of this act shall be reduced under insurance. recovery under other 991.1817(a). is entitled to offset its provision, Pursuant to this claim “the amount obligation pay the Bells’ covered insurance,” which the Bells received. any recovery under other $200,000 Here, payments in excess the Bells received insurer, Capital Blue Cross Blue their medical health Thus, than greater an amount as the Bells received Shield. policy Dr. insurance with PIC Insurance the limits of Slezak’s $200,000, obligation Group, which was PPCIGA’s extinguished. claim was on the Bells’ covered purpose is consistent with the stated This result policyholders to avoid financial loss to claimants which is *12 insurer. insolvency of of an as a result the 991.1801(1). Court, Moreover, Superior as observed occurred, it can said to have is solvent any “if loss be claims under the other source paid plaintiffs’ who insurers insurance, requires Act to be exhausted first.” which the Isdaner, correctly court Panea v. 773 A.2d 791. As the points out Act clearly attempts protect policyholders

The both against policyholders those with claims from the conse- insolvency quences by establishing the insurer association, purpose compensate of which is to the sole those who paid have which have not been because the company insurance is insolvent. association is funded insurers, by assessing all and every fee member required insurer is to be a member as a condition of its authority property casualty policies. to write (b)(3), 991.1803(a), manner, §§ and 991.1808. In this risk of insolvency any loss due one insurer is spread companies out over all member insurance their effect, policyholders. every Id. at 991.1810. In time claim, pays every company member insurance paying part of claim. The Act therefore seeks to lessen the financial on industry by prevent- burden the insurance ing duplication recovery.

Id. at 790.8

Thus, only as funding the Bells’ source of for the settlement by way and, entered with Dr. Slezak is the PPCIGA obligation regard extinguished PPCIGA’s was by appli- cation of the of recovery provision found in the Superior affirm we Court’s decision. participate Justice EAKIN did not in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice a dissenting opinion SAYLOR files in which Justice joins. NIGRO previously, Superior

8. As noted potential Court considered the subrogation Capital interest of the Bells’ health insurance carrier Blue regard Cross and Blue Shield in this and concluded that such interest was foreclosed as it was derivative of the Bells’ interest. The court subrogee greater rights noted that a no has than those held thus, subrogor, subrogee recovering subrogation is limited to subrogor paid by amount received relative to the claim Isdaner, subrogee. (citing Panea v. 773 A.2d at 791 Ins. Allstate Co. v. Clarke, (1987)). Pa.Super. *13 SAYLOR, dissenting. Justice first- and agree majority I with the that both of “cov- Act’s broad definition claims fall within the PPCIGA respect. in this claim,” fully support reasoning I its ered majority’s, as concerns My opposite position in a tort action and obligations settling defendants to such surrogate responsibilities relation settle- PPCIGA’s that, in of the aim Centrally, I believe furtherance ments. attribut- ameliorating hardship policyholders to claimants and insolvencies, statutory devised to insurer scheme able to fund Assembly expressly requires PPCIGA the General Court, thus presently kind before the settlements restoring parties litigation to the tort effectively they occupied that would have but for the insurer position (and preserving insolvency, maintaining integrity while enter) My reasoning follows. settlements. incentives majority’s analysis announces that defen- The outset of the insur- to settle tort claims and whose dants who have chosen effectively immunized from have become insolvent will be ers commit- obligation to fund their settlement the contractual Presumably, it is also ments. Majority Opinion at 573. enjoy the that the defendants should nonetheless intended settlement, from namely, release benefit the under-funded ground not any underlying liability majority in tort. The does provision of the PPCIGA any such conclusions substantive rather, support only but references as the enactment’s necessary to Although recognize I that it is guiding policy. legislation, I believe policies giving in mind the rise to bear judiciary respect equally that it is essential Assembly sought which has to effectu- manner the General appli- purposes by implementing policies via ate its stated should cation of substantive terms of the statute. Courts a statute take care to evaluate the mechanics of therefore concerning what must be reaching before broad conclusions policy aims.1 I return implement done to the salient While regard, recognized In this it should be remedial frequently tempered PPCIGA Act and nuanced schemes such as the are below, policy perspective juncture merely I note majority’s decision to reorder the relationship of the parties underlying litigation to the tort and settlement at the opinion profound outset its has a on analysis effect its provisions PPCIGA Act’s which ultimately follows.

The terms of the PPCIGA reflect an effort to a create statutory claims administration process spread to the loss to insolvency attributable insurer from policy- claimants and segment See, holders to a broader public. e.g., §§ Notably, 991.1801-991.1820. legislation contains no ref- to, and no attempt govern, erence to litigation the outcome of among prospective claimants outside the administrative set- ting particular, solely distinct, it is in the context of the —in process administrative claims that of re- covery provision at issue here has on relevance its terms. See Isdaner, generally 782, Panea v. 773 A.2d 798 (Pa.Super.2001) (Todd, J., dissenting) (observing, in response Superior to the majority’s Court assertion that Dr. opposition Slezak’s to merely was his assertion of a statutory right extinguish his obligation claim, on entitlement, that such may exist, where it expressly is vested in PPCIGA and not with a defendant-physician).

Although, as all agree, Justices both the Bells and Dr. Slezak were entitled to assert covered claims under the PPCI- GA it is important to recognize also Legislature substantially obligations restricted PPCIGA’s in relation to covered parties claims of third Bells, such as the since PPCI- possesses GA rights all of the insolvent insurer as if that insurer had not 991.1803(b)(2). become insolvent. See 40 P.S. In Pennsylvania, a party third to an pos- insurance contract sessing a against claim the insured has no general right of against See, action the insurer. e.g., Folmar v. Shaffer, 232 22, Pa.Super. (1974) (“The law is settled ‘in absence a or policy provision statute on which such right may predicated, be person may not maintain a suit directly against the insurer to judgment recover on a legislative as a result of efforts to balance or competing accommodate

policies and interests. ” omitted)).2 (citations There insured.’ rendered here, presented such as are fore, ordinary in circumstances claims as such. pay third-party obligation no has (3d PIGA, 137, 142 & n. 5 Porter Co. v. 75 F.3d H.K. Cf Cir.1996) part to third- obligations on PPCIGA’s (recognizing action stat Pennsylvania’s direct pursuant claimants party insolvency not involving ute, in circumstances insured).3 defense, This insurer, but also of the only of the to a to PPCIGA relation obviously not available insured, predi maintained a who of the insolvent policyholder Accordingly, relationship. (first-party) cate contractual claim of case, recognized that the covered it should be present obligation has the claim that PPCIGA only is the Dr. Slezak , payment.4 consider statutory role with PPCIGA’s position comports This insol- (or void created a carrier’s ameliorating) filling character of the insolvent-insured’s accords with the vency, complexities liabilities, many conceptual and alleviates *15 has identified of cases. Since PPCIGA in this line presented provision have policy would that a statute or The Bells do not contend 2. PPCIGA; indeed, against PIC or direct claim them to assert a entitled they claim. they emphasize that made no such their brief provides specifically Act the majority that "the PPCIGA The states 3. beneficiary as Bells[’] claims such as the statutory basis for contemplates third-party as claimants specifically beneficiaries the regard, Majority Opinion at 573. In this thereunder.” 991.1803(b)(2), by which its majority gives account for Section no functions, alia, statutory express, limitation on PPCI- as an inter terms the insolvent obligation pay claims to the extent that covered GA’s right deny payment. See 40 P.S. possessed the would have insurer 991.1802(b)(2) among (listing express powers of PPCIGA § obligation its on the ability the insurer to the extent of to “be deemed and, extent, rights, have all shall [PPCIGA] to such covered if that insurer had not obligations of the insolvent insurer as and duties insolvent”). become argument reject that related first- regard, I PPCIGA's In this would necessarily claim. The constitute the same third-party claims and conclusion, nor it support such a is does not definition light enactment in such manner necessary to construe the only single statutory machinery requires which of PPCIGA express by making regard any overlapping claims available satisfaction with See 40 which were available to the insured. to claims to it all defenses 991.1803(b)(2). §P.S. Slezak, no Dr. recovery collateral source available to recovery provision implicated is not simply in relation to his covered claim as the insured. v. DeVane Cf (1999) (“Whether 519, 622, Kennedy, W.Va. 519 S.E.2d policy there exists another of insurance not does matter unless it provides coverage collateral for claim against asserted and, ultimately, against the insolvent insurer [Insurance Association].”). Guaranty statute, therefore, operates (the claimant) afford Dr. Slezak policyholder first-party protection the core that is purposes, central to its at the same indirectly benefiting (third-party time the Bells claimants who PIC) possessed no right direct action providing funding the source of to effectuate their settlement. This also in conformity with express aims of the PPCIGA Act. See 991.1801(1) (identifying the avoidance of financial policyholders” loss to “claimants or among as Act’s salu- tary purposes). Since the fully settlement should thus be funded, it should be appro- consummated absence of some PPCIGA, priate 991.1803(b)(4), contest see 40 P.S. there- by alleviating potential of compromises rescission alluded to Superior Court, members the en banc see Panea, (Del 3; 773 A.2d at 789 Sole, C.J., n. id. at 797 concurring); (Todd, J., id. at 801 dissenting), supporting strong public policy of this favoring Commonwealth con- sensual Taylor settlements. See v. Solberg, 566 Pa. 157- (2001); DeVane, 519 S.E.2d at 634 cf (“To guaranty rule the [state suggests association] would completely obliterate and destroy voluntary settlement agreement parties prior reached to [a carrier’s] insolven- cy[;][g]iven high esteem great preference accorded generally, settlements ... good we cannot in conscience set matter”). aside the voluntary resolution of this *16 Furthermore, this plain meaning interpretation advances public policy in support adequate of compensation injured parties. Forbes, 422, 426, See Bethea v. 519 Pa. 548 (1988).5 A.2d 1217 interpretation The also avoids the amicus, regard, 5. In this Pennsylvania allusion of The Medical Society, part to a windfall inapt. voluntary on the of the Bells is In the 352 that arises virtue of interest unseemly and conflict

inherent physi to insured obligations to avoid its efforts PPCIGA’s regarding upon based concerns as Dr. Slezak cians such him, at the same that are' remote to recovery duplication obligation to is endowed with the Association time generally J. interests. zealously physician’s defend the Associations, Insurance Guarantee Hartz, Jr., State Earnst (1992) clearly IGAs (positing “[t]he 22-Fall Brief and in the in the model acts the mandate abandoned have funds statute interpret guaranty statutes to various IGA insured”). broadly protect by costs. advantages are counterbalanced Certainly, these non-duplication of recognize I that a determination in a effectively operate does not vertical recovery provision potency in terms constrain- provision’s plane decreases Nevertheless, obligations.6 of PPCIGA’s ing the breadth concerning develop record attempted has not claim, subrogees may accept litigants a substantial settlement of a certainty. exchange It damages expediency for due reduction in therefore, litigant imposition represent for may, a substantial involuntary in the with an reduction to be faced such circumstances DeVane, 519 S.E.2d at compromise that was struck. proceeds of the Cf. uncertainties, ("in patently ... we find it unfair world of many undoubtedly these and plaintiff], who considered require [the making her decision to settle her lawsuit potential other outcomes defendants, voluntary against to sacrifice the and release her litigation[;][w]e find distasteful the her further and final resolution of all-too-real guaranty failure to account for this association’s] [state purpose protecting explicit potentiality given the Guarantee Act’s insurers.”). Particularly as a policyholders of insolvent claimants and subrogation impede does remote plain interpretation of the statute not interests, the characterization of windfall to I would not attach bargain. plaintiffs’ preservation of the benefit of mere PPCIGA, suggestion reject, of Dr. Slezak I would 362, 369, Lines, Inc., Valley Pa.Super. citing v. to Burke (1992), meaningless by provision is rendered that the liability. wholly the insured from interpretation that does not insulate recovery provision plainly operates to relieve possessed by with responsibility of claims those PPCIGA of right the insolvent insured who also claim or of action a direct recovery; regard, provision in this possess a collateral source Therefore, light and in salutary purposes of the statute. serves the also Assembly's to afford PPCIGA all defenses decision of the General claims, I do not insured in relation to covered available to the insolvent controlling. arguments Burke relative to find the

353 degree reading the to which such affects the fiscal soundness scheme; moreover, ill judicial process of the the is suited to considerations of these kinds. See On the infra. presented, in in employed record view the terms crafting say Legislature I cannot the PPCIGA particular did not intend to strike the balance between the befalling pooled casualty burden property resources insurers and collateral source insurers that results from a plain reading of the statute. reject final which to consideration causes me the con opinion favoring majori

struction affirmance is that the ty is fill simply required many large gaps too and too in the framework, solidify principal statute order to its envisioned ly in absolving terms of from liabilit defendant-physicians y.7 An alteration of magnitude substantive liabilities of such judicial has substantial throughout pro collateral effects cess, as the Superior observations the en banc Court pleas reflect, dissent and common court and is therefore suited, the kind of change substantive better least instance, first consideration of Assembly. the General Herdrich, 211, 221, 120 generally Pegram v. 530 U.S. S.Ct. 2143, 2150, (2000) 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (“complicated factfinding and such a judgment wisely required debatable social not are of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process, preferable with its forum for comprehen investigations judgments value”); sive of social Glenn Commonwealth, Revenue, 22, Johnston Inc. v. Dep’t 556 Pa. 30, 384, (1999) 726 A.2d 388 (emphasizing policy determi generally sphere nations are within Legislature); of the Coach, 417, Conner v. Quality 823, 561 Pa. (2000) (“to litigants’ rights the extent that substantive are to altered, substantially modified, be abridged or enlarged on the public basis of policy upon protection centered of the public through costs, fisc pass-through elimination of such a rule, if appropriate, originate will legislative have plain meaning interpretation, 7. Under the there is no cause to measure, implement remedy stopgap such a dramatic as a since relief liability ordinary from should occur in the course virtue contractual release to be furnished the Bells. branch”). Moreover, prerogative generally this Court’s traditions in absence of long-standing common law abide Lockett, v. Lonigro action. Accord express legislative (1993) 305, 625 N.E.2d Ill.App.3d 192 Ill.Dec. any judgment remains liable for (observing that “a defendant presence guaranty] despite [state him *18 Bokeir, [f]und”).8 Wash.App. v. But see Proios (1993). 1363, 1365 P.2d is that I read the majority with the

My primary difference furthering the of the PPCIGA operative provisions by creating an alternative source of salutary aims statute’s policy- to claimants and to the overall loss funding ameliorate private of insurers —the occasioned insolvencies holders law tort says nothing extinguishing about substantive statute (Todd, J., Panea, dissenting) 773 A.2d at 797 claims. Accord view, reasoning with of the common line the (expressing court, of a to molding actual or effective verdict pleas insolvency consti- account of an insurer’s reflect an offset on jury lawfully with a rendered improper interference tuted verdict). noted, Act administers Facially, as the PPCIGA by affording defenses primarily claims PPCIGA insurer, not to the insolvent that would have been available recovery to dis- non-duplication provision of extension of the out- or adversarial resolution of controversies turb consensual Moreover, process. of scope side the of (protection of statute of the interests objectives overall by applying are furthered policyholders) both claimants to fund require of statute to express terms expected was in the same manner as settlements insolvency in circumstances in which the prior to its insurer (who only asserting against a claim policyholder party is the PPCIGA) recovery.9 Implementa- duplicate has no source that, Assembly it intends Notably, the General has demonstrated when 8. liability, expressly. how to do so an insured from it knows release See, filing (providing of a claim with the e.g., 40 P.S. 221.40 party operate as a release of the statutory liquidator a third "shall party in the liability to the third on that cause of action insured’s limit”). applicable policy amount of the (as adjudicative legislative) process opposed I reiterate that i.e., equation, assessing aspects whether the ill suited to the fiscal majority’s paradigm gives tion of to claims for rescis- rise substantially sion of diminishes incentives on settlements part plaintiffs compromise their claims instances insolvency by eliminat- pre-dates which the insurer settlement ing funding. an essential source of

Thus, justification applying I find the non- insufficient duplication recovery provision remotely recovery to offset (or settlements) by plaintiffs on tort claims related asserted against I under state law the insureds of insolvent insurers. acknowledge interpretation enabling that PPCIGA’s of its Nevertheless, is to weight. statute be afforded substantial I controlling here conclude that the statute terms are clear, adequately sufficiently of action PPCIGA’s course' mandate, beyond far the bounds of its contrary to warrant the interpretation.

Accordingly, I would hold that the PPCIGA Act neither bars the Bells’ claims Dr. Slezak nor forecloses his them, liability and the recovery provision *19 does not relieve of its payment obligation relation to Dr. statute, Slezak’s covered claim. The effect of the therefore, should place be to the Bells and Dr. Slezak positions they occupied would have had PIC remained solvent. joins dissenting

Justice NIGRO opinion. design system put initial of the PPCIGA scheme can function as that practice present into marketplace. and future economic

Case Details

Case Name: Bell v. Slezak
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Dec 19, 2002
Citation: 812 A.2d 566
Docket Number: 77 WAP 2001
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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