This negligence action was brought by the plaintiffs-appellants, Roy D. and E. Alene Bell, to recover damages for injuries sustained by Roy D. Bell in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on April 22, 1969. On that date, a 1960 Chevrolet one-half ton pickup truck in which Bell was riding as a passenger was struck by a school bus owned by the defendant school district and being driven by the defendant Terry R. Farris. The case was tried to a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. On appeal, the appellants request that this case be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The pickup truck in which Bell was riding at the time of the accident was owned by the United States Department of Agriculture and assigned to the Soil Conservation Service. It was being driven by Kenneth Schwartz, an employee of the Soil Conservation Service. Bell was Schwartz’s immediate supervisor, and Schwartz had requested that Bell assist him at their intended destination. Their pickup truck and the school bus were traveling in the same direction; the accident occurred when the school bus attempted to overtake the pickup, which was moving much slower than the bus. When the bus was in the process of passing, the pickup initiated a left turn and was thereupon struck by the bus. The testimony is conflicting as to whether Schwartz signaled his intention to turn left; Schwartz testified that he activated his left-turn indicator some two hundred feet before initiating the turn, but the school bus driver testified that he saw no signal whatsoever. In addition, four witnesses who were passengers on the bus also testified that no signal was given by the driver of the pickup in which Bell was riding. Schwartz testified that prior to the collision, he had observed the bus approaching rapidly from the rear.
The appellants’ first assignment of error alleges that they should have been granted a new trial because there was insufficient evidence to show that Schwartz was negligent and that his negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the accident. A jury finding will not be set aside
on
appeal where it is supported by substantial, competent, though conflicting, evidence. Cahill v. Logue,
The appellants’ second assignment of error alleges that the evidence adduced at trial did not warrant giving to the jury an instruction regarding the relationship of the driver (Schwartz) to his passenger (Bell). In this regard, the appellants’ third assignment more specifically alleges that the court’s instruction No. 14,
1
relat
*839
ing to the doctrine of joint venture, was inappropriate where, as here, the driver and passenger were fellow servants employed by a governmental agency. The record indicates, however, that the appellants also requested an instruction
2
relating to the question of joint venture. Having done so, the appellants are in no position to complain now that such could not be an issue where the driver and passenger are coemployees. Hansen v. Howard O. Miller, Inc.,
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in giving its instruction No. 15, reading as follows:
“You are further instructed that although the right of control over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of imputed negligence, it is a factor to be considered with all other circumstances in determining whether the plaintiff was guilty of independent contributory negligence which would bar recovery.
“In other words, the negligence, if any, of the driver Kenneth Schwartz, would become a factor in the instant case if you determine that Roy D. Bell had supervisory authority only over Kenneth Schwartz and that he failed properly to supervise or direct the driver Kenneth Schwartz after he has a reasonable opportunity to see or to know that the driver was operating the pickup without due regard for the safety of others and that plaintiff was negligent in failing to exercise his authority or acquiesced or cooperated in the act complained of.”
The appellants claim that this instruction is erroneous because no evidence was adduced at trial to show that Bell knew or had reason to know of Schwartz’s negligence, if any, and because Bell’s supervisory power was not such as to require him to act affirmatively to control the driving of the vehicle. On appeal from a jury verdict, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent and least favorable to the appellant. Cahill v. Logue,
supra;
Christensen v. Stuchlik,
The appellants’ final contention is that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence as an exhibit a chart showing average stopping distances, as published in a publication known as the Idaho Driver’s Handbook. In order to be admissible, such evidence must be relevant and material; but it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether sufficient foundation has been laid to admit such a chart. Dewey v. Keller,
The order appealed from is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
Notes
. The pertinent part of the court’s instruction No. 14 reads as follows:
“ * * * if you should find that Kenneth Schwartz and Roy D. Bell were joint venturers as that relationship is defined, then Kenneth Schwartz’s negligence must be imputed to Roy I). Bell, and the latter may not recover.
“A joint venture is a relationship which arises from an understanding or relationship between two or more persons to undertake some common objective for the benefit of all. There must be a joint interest or community of interest in the purpose of the undertaking, express or implied, and an equal right, express or *839 implied, to exercise some control over the conduct of each other in respect thereto, although they need not have actually exercised such right, it being sufficient if the right merely exists.”
. The plaintiffs’ (appellants’) requested instruction No. 10 in pertinent part reads as follows:
“If you find that Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Bell were in an agency relationship or that they were on a joint venture, as heretofore instructed, and that the negligence of Kenneth Schwartz, if any, would be imputed to Mr. Hoy Bell, you should then further determine whether or not Mr. Kenneth Schwartz was contributorily negligent in failing to comply with his duties as above set forth.”
. The court’s instruction No. 16 reads as follows:
“Every person under all circumstances, and whether on business or pleasure, must exercise ordinary care for his own safety. This duty of self-protection applies not only to a person who is the driver of an automobile, but also to a person who is merely an occupant such as a guest or passenger.
“Whenever the conduct of the driver in his operation of the car becomes in any respect negligent and such negligent conduct creates danger to the degree of subjecting the occupants to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the occupants know, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to know, that they are unreasonably exposing themselves to such danger, they are then required, in order to measure up to the standard of ordinary care for their own protection, to conduct themselves in the manner that a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would conduct himself under the same or similar circumstances. Conduct, as used herein, may involve the action, inaction, protest or silence of the passenger.”