91 Va. 99 | Va. | 1895
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first assignment of error in this case is that the Circuit Court of the city of Petersburg, which entered the decree appealed from, had no jurisdiction of the case. It appears from the record that the suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Powhatan county by the appellants, William M. Flanagan and Robert Bell, citizens and taxpayers of that county, for the benefit of themselves and other taxpayers, against the Farmvilie & Powhatan Railroad Company and the Board of Supervisors of that county, to enjoin the railroad company from asserting and exercising any rights under an afieged subscription of $40,000, made by that county to the railroad company, and to restrain the board of supervisors from levying taxes to pay the bonds issued to pay such subscription, to set aside and annul the same, and for general relief. After the cause had been pending in that court from January, 1891, to April, 1892, during which time the bill and amended bill, petitions,
Another ground of objection relied upon by the appellants is, that the bonds issued by the county of Powhatan in payment of its stock subscriptions to the railroad company are invalid because of numerous irregularities attending the election authorizing their issue. Among the more important of these are the allegations that the order of the County Court directing the election was irregular and void; that no legal notice was given of the election; that the election itself was irregular and illegal; that the meetings of the board of supervisors appointing commissioners to make the subscription of stock to the railroad company, and also their meetings directing the bonds to be issued, were illegal; and that the bonds issued are payable at a different date from that provided by the statute authorizing their issue. The record shows that the election,
It is also contended by the appellees that, even if the facts stated in the bill and amended bills were true, and the matters
The act is as follows:
“ Whereas, the counties of Cumberland and Powhatan have each subscribed forty thousand dollars to the capital stock of the Farmville and Powhatan Railroad Company, and have paid such subscription in conditional bonds, as authorized by an act of Assembly approved February fifth, eighteen hundred and eighty-six, entitled 1 An act to authorize a subscription by the counties of Cumberland and Powhatan to the stock of the Farmville and Powhatan Railroad Company;’ therefore,
“1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, That on the completion of the Farmville and Powhatan Railroad, as proposed, across the counties of Cumberland and Powhatan, respectively, the said conditional bonds, issued by the said counties respectively, shall, in the discretion of the respective boards of supervisors of said counties, be exchanged for coupon bonds, stating that the sum due is for value received, aggregating an*108 equal amount, with like conditions as to rate of interest and time, and place of payment of principal and interest. On such exchange being made, there shall be delivered to such county, certificates of stock of the Farmville and Powhatan Railroad Company for an amount equal to that of said coupon bonds delivered.”
The general rule of construction is that a statute ought not to be given a retrospective effect, unless it can be ascertained with certainty from the language of the act that such was the intention of the legislature. Mr. Dillon says (Vol. 2, Mun. Corp., sec. 544): “Subsequent legislative sanction within constitutional limits is equivalent to original authority, but the intention of the legislature to validate the subscription, or the bonds, must clearly appear from the terms of the curative act. ’ ’ Mr. Cooley says: ‘ ‘ Legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” Cooley, Const. Lim. 456. Testing the act in question by these rules, it would seem that its only effect would be to give to the boards of supervisors of * those counties, respectively, the right, if they chose to exercise it, of exchanging coupon bonds for the conditional bonds theretofore issued, and to receive an equal amount of stock of the railroad company therefor, without in any way depriving those counties, or their taxpayers, of the right of setting up any defense which they might have to the validity of the conditional bonds. This seems to be the fair and legitimate construction of the act, for there is nothing in it that shows with clearness and certainty an intention to ratify. As was ■ said in State v. Stoll, 17 Wall, on p. 436: “If the legislature intended to do what is claimed, they ought to have done so openly, intelligibly, and in language that could not be misunderstood. And as a doubtful or obscure declaration would not be justifiable, so it is not to be imputed.” Hays v. Holly
In the case of Redd v. Supervisors, supra, a statute was held to ratify and confirm a subscription to a railroad company made by that county. The people of Henry county had voted a subscription of $100,000 to the capital stock of the Danville and New River Railroad Company. Before the bonds were issued, a suit was brought by taxpayers of that county to .enjoin the issue of the bonds with -which to pay the subscription, alleging that the proceedings which led up to the subscription were irregular and illegal. "While that case, which had been appealed, was pending in this court, the General Assembly passed a statute, which will be found in the Acts of Assembly of 1878-’79, p. 282. In the preamble of that act it is recited that a subscription of $100,000 had been voted by the people of that county to the stock of that railroad company, and then it is recited that it has been suggested that the said subscription of $100,000 may require the imposition of an annual tax in excess of the amount on the $100 value of taxable property specified in section 62, ch. 61, of the Code of 1873. For that reason the statute -was passed which authorized the supervisors of that county to carry out the wishes of the majority of the voters of that county as expressed by said vote, or which may hereafter be expressed by the voters of said county, and to assess and levy such tax as might be necessary to pay that subscription, or any such sub
In the case of Supervisors v. Randolph, supra, the act of February 8, 1888, was brought before this court for construction. In that case the judge, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “Besides,-whatever ground of objections there might be if the case stood upon the act of February 5, 1886, alone, any irregularities which may have occurred in the proceedings under that act were cured by the act of February 8, 1888. The latter act recognized the validity of the subsciption that had been made, and all that had been done under the prior act, and in express terms authorized the issue of coupon bonds, on completion of the railroad across the counties of Cumberland and Powhatan, in lieu of the conditional bonds which had already been issued to the railroad company under the prior act. This it was clearly competent for the legislature to do, both on principle and authority. ’ ’
These authorities seem to be conclusive of the question that the effect of the act of February 8, 1888, was to cure all irregularities or defects in the bonds, or in the proceedings leading up to their execution. Having reached this conclusion, it renders a decision of the other questions raised unnecessary. Our opinion, therefore, is that there is no error in the decree of the Circuit Court of the city of Petersburg, and that it should be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring, said:
I concur fully in the conclusion reached by Judge Buchanan
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting, said:
I am unable to concur in the conclusion reached by my brethren in this case. I cannot see that the act under consideration ratifies anything, or was intended to be retrospective in its operation. It seems to me the only purpose of the act was to give the county of Powhatan the privilege of issuing coupon bonds in the place of conditional bonds. The county declined to exercise this privilege. And the act, which, on its face, was intended as a benefit, is now made the means of ruin to the beneficiary, so far as the payment of this large debt is concerned. My views on this subject are so fully expressed in the reasoning of Judge Buchanan against his conclusion that 1 deem it unnecessary to say more, except to add that I do not attach to the two cases relied on for his conclusion the weight given them by him. The construction of the act was not necessary to the decision of either of those cases. In Redd v. Supervisors, 31 Gratt. 695, the case had been decided on its merits in favor of the railroad without regard to the act; and in the case of Supervisors v. Randolph, 89
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs with Buchanan, J.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs with Keith, P.