190 Iowa 529 | Iowa | 1919
Appellant asserts that several things furnish a sufficient consideration. It may be assumed this is untenable as to all but one of the matters urged. But if it may be found that some one thing is a sufficient support of the note, it is immaterial that that is the only thing. One good and sufficient consideration is as good as a dozen.
II. We proceed to inquire whether one thing urged as being a sufficient consideration is such. Whether it is or not depends upon what the situation was on August 3, 1914, when the note in suit was executed.
W. D. Cooper had made a valid contract with Bell to pay off a note that Bell had given to one Sylvester. On the day the note in suit was given, but prior to its delivery, Cooper was still under obligation to pay the Sylvester note when the same became due, but had the privilege to pay it off before maturity, if he so elected. On the day the note in suit was delivered, but prior to its delivery, Cooper could release himself from the contract with Bell only by on that day paying to Sylvester the face
The situation, then, is this: On the day the note in suit was given, but before it was delivered, the contract of assumption could be discharged by nothing less than by Cooper’s paying Sylvester $3,500 principal and $23.83 interest. Now, the note in suit was also payable before its maturity, at the election of Cooper. If, on August 3rd, he had elected to carry out his original contract, he would have been compelled to pay Sylvester $3,523.83. If, after he delivered his note to Bell, and on the same day, he used his privilege and elected to pay the Bell note, he could discharge the same by paying $3,500. The exact effect of the new arrangement, then, is this: On August 3, 1914, but before the Cooper note was delivered to Bell, Cooper could not obtain a release from the contract with Bell except by paying Sylvester $3,523.83. After the note was accepted, Cooper could release himself from that contract by paying Bell $3,500. In other words, without the making of the note in suit, an election by Cooper to carry out his contract would have cost him $3,523.83. Because of the making and delivery of the note in suit, Cooper obtained the right to discharge his contract of assumption by paying Bell $3,500. It would be pedantic to cite authorities defining what constitutes a consideration. It is a benefit to one party, a detriment to the other, or both. The arrangement effectuated by the acceptance of this note gave an advantage to Cooper, and, at the same time, worked a detriment
The cause must be reversed and remanded, with direction .that judgment be entered against appellee Florence C. Cooper, as prayed in the petition. — Reversed and remanded.
Supplemental Opinion
I. In response to a petition for rehearing, we deem it advisable to file this supplement.
‘ ‘ This note is given in lieu of a note of like amount, date of December 18, 1912, made by Florence A. Bell and P. H. Bell to V. W. Sylvester, and it is understood and agreed that'dhe pay
II. W. D. Cooper was liable to Sylvester because he had agreed to assume and pay the Sylvester note. As between Bell and Sylvester, Bell was primarily liable for said interest, because he had made the note to Sylvester. As between Bell and Cooper, Cooper was, by reason of the contract of assumption, primarily liable on the Sylvester note. He had the right to pay it off at any time. Had he done so an hour or a minute before or after the note in suit was executed, he would have had to pay Sylvester the sum of $3,523.83, $23.83 thereof being interest between the time interest was last paid, and the day on which the note in suit was made. The note in suit was also payable at pleasure of the makers, and was for $3,500. Cooper had the right to pay it to Bell in one minute after it was made, and $3,500 would then have paid it.
If the plea of want of consideration interposed is good, it is so because the execution of the note in suit worked neither a detriment to Bell nor a benefit to W. D. Cooper. True, the only contract change is that payment by Cooper of the Sylvester note should cancel the note in suit. True, that contract affords no consideration for the note sued on. But was not a change effected outside of what said contract provision effects? The very taking of the note because Bell was dissatisfied with the assumption of the Sylvester note written in the bill of sale, as matter of law, and as between Bell and Cooper, substituted the new note for the contract of assumption. In other words, when Bell obtained the note, Cooper was at liberty to pay it at once. On such payment, Bell could no longer enforce the contract of assumption. In still other words, under the contract of assumption, as between Bell and Cooper, Cooper was primarily liable to Sylvester. Bell could insist that Cooper pay, and could subject the property of Cooper to payment. While, despite the giving of the new note, Sylvester could still demand payment of Cooper, if Cooper paid the note in suit to Bell, Bell could no longer treat Cooper as a primary debtor. It follows that the obtaining of the new note, plus payment thereof (which Cooper was at liberty to make at any time), gave Cooper the new privilege of making Bell the primary debtor. He could sue Bell
It is elementary that the size of the consideration does not matter. On the plea of want of consideration, the law does not measure, but only ascertains existence. Equally elementary is it that, if the new note is supported by a consideration as to Cooper, the principal, it is supported as to his surety. It follows that the petition for rehearing must be overruled.