BELL v. CITY OF CLAIRTONBELL v. CITY OF CLAIRTON
I. INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, Plaintiff Penelope Bell (“Plaintiff” or “Bell”) brings claims for sex and age discrimination, hostile work environment, civil rights violations, and several state law torts arising from her employment at the Clairton Public Works Department against Defendants City of Clairton, Duane Ringgold, and Eric Fusco (collectively, “Defendants”). (Docket No. 28). Presently before the Court are two motions to dismiss brought by Defendants Eric Fusco and City of Clairton pursuant to
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts come from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 28). The
Plaintiff worked for Defendant City of Clairton (the “City”) as a laborer in the Public Works Department, where her job duties included, inter alia, lawn maintenance, street sign installation, road repair, and snow removal. (Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 12–13). She was over the age of 40 during all relevant times in this matter. (Id. ¶ 125). She consistently received positive feedback from the City’s officials and community members regarding her work performance. (Id. ¶¶ 14–16). Defendant Eric Fusco (“Fusco”) was Plaintiff’s supervisor and Defendant Duane Ringgold (“Ringgold”) was her coworker between 2018 and 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18).
When Plaintiff started working for the City, Fusco and the City Manager voted against hiring her as a full-time employee. (Id. ¶ 19). She alleges that they did so because she is a woman. (Id.). Notwithstanding their opposition, she was brought on board full time. (Id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff asserts that Fusco subsequently subjected her “to discriminatory treatment based on her sex and age” on numerous occasions over the course of her employment. (Id. ¶ 21). In particular, he: (1) told her that “women belong in the kitchen;” (2) referred to menopause as “mentalpause;” (3) called her derogatory names, such as delusional, liar, coward, bootlicker, town crier, and “stuuuuper”—i.e., “super stupid;” (4) told others that she is a “fucking embarrassment;” (5) denied her a promotion; (6) insulted her on Facebook; (7) refused to credit her accomplishments; and, (7) blamed her for “things she has not done.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–25, 27–30). Moreover, Ringgold witnessed Fusco “say derogatory things to Plaintiff” and repeated his remarks to her. (Id. ¶ 31). Plaintiff alleges that she reported “the harassment and discrimination” to George Glagola, the Code Enforcement Officer at Public Works, but no action was taken to address the situation. (Id. ¶¶ 122, 123, 137, 153).
The bulk of Plaintiff’s factual allegations concern Ringgold. To that end, at some point in mid-August 2018, Plaintiff was working with Ringgold and he exposed himself and tried to force her to touch his penis, but she refused. (Id. ¶¶ 32–36). Ringgold promptly apologized. (Id. ¶ 36). Then, between late August and early September 2018, Plaintiff and Ringgold were working together at a park. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38). As they approached a building with blocked windows, Ringgold grabbed Plaintiff and she fell to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 38–39, 45). Ringgold allegedly proceeded to pull Plaintiff’s clothing off and rape her. (Id. ¶¶ 45–51). Afterwards, Plaintiff returned to the City’s Municipal Building in tears, where she cleaned herself up and continued to work. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54).
Following this assault and until Ringgold resigned in March 2023, he sexually harassed Plaintiff on multiple subsequent occasions. (Id. ¶ 57). In addition, he told Plaintiff that “snitches get stitches,” which she understood was a threat to discourage her from reporting the assault. (Id. ¶ 56). Although she was afraid to come forward, Plaintiff reported “everything” to George Glagola, the Mayor, and an unidentified councilwoman. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57, 137). However, no action was taken. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 108, 153). Plaintiff alleges that she continues to work “by herself in a hostile work environment” to date. (Id. ¶ 121). In particular, on June 8, 2024, someone slashed her tires after she filed a formal complaint against her foreman. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57).
The federal causes of action in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint include claims for sex/age discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on July 31, 2025. (Docket No. 1). After Defendants moved to dismiss her claims under
Fusco and the City challenged the Amended Complaint by filing motions to dismiss and supporting briefs on January 2, 2026. (Docket Nos. 32; 33; 34; 35). Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff timely answered Ringgold’s counterclaims and filed briefs in opposition to his joinder motion and the two motions to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 36; 37; 38; 39). That same day, Ringgold and the City submitted a consent motion to stay the City’s response to Ringgold’s crossclaim pending resolution of his Motion for Joinder, which the Court granted on January 22, 2026. (Docket Nos. 40; 41). On January 27, 2026, Ringgold challenged the Amended Complaint by filing a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and supporting brief. (Docket Nos. 42; 43). Fusco and the City subsequently submitted reply briefs on February 9, 2026 and February 12, 2026, respectively, and Plaintiff filed sur-replies to same on February 24, 2026 and February 26,
Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Ringgold’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on February 16, 2026. (Docket No. 48). This brief contained several deficient citations and suspect metadata, which resulted in the Court issuing two separate show cause orders upon Plaintiff’s counsel on March 17, 2026 and April 2, 2026. (Docket Nos. 56; 67). The issues set forth in these orders, as well as Plaintiff’s counsel’s responses thereto, will be addressed in a separate forthcoming decision. For purposes of the present motions, the Court simply notes that the March 17, 2026 Show Cause Order directed Plaintiff to submit an amended brief in response to Ringgold’s motion, which she filed on March 19, 2026. (Docket No. 56; 57). Additionally, in the briefing submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel in response to the April 2, 2026 Show Cause Order, she advised that Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of her Title VII and ADEA claims against the individual Defendants, and the Court dismissed those claims, i.e., Counts VI, VII, and VIII, as to Ringgold and Fusco on May 6, 2026. (Docket Nos. 69–71).
The Court heard oral argument on all the foregoing matters on May 18, 2026, the official transcript of which was filed on June 22, 2026. (Docket Nos. 75; 78). During the hearing, the Court granted Ringgold’s request to stay his Motion for Joinder pending resolution of his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket Nos. 75; 76). In addition, the Court granted the City leave to supplement its Motion to Dismiss with copies of Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint and the corresponding EEOC decision, which the City subsequently submitted on May 21, 2026. (Docket No. 77). Accordingly, as the pending motions have been fully briefed and argued, they are now ripe for disposition.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under
Detailed allegations are not necessary to survive a
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed district courts to utilize a three-step process in evaluating a
“The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to
V. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that all counts in the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as time-barred and/or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Docket Nos. 33; 35; 43). Plaintiff counters that her claims are timely under the continuing violation doctrine and meet the federal pleading standards such that the case should be permitted to move beyond the pleadings and into the discovery phase. (Docket Nos. 38; 39; 57). While Defendants lodge several arguments in support of their respective motions, the Court primarily focuses on the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims as this issue is largely dispositive. Then the Court explains its declination to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ringgold’s remaining state law claims. The Court’s rationale follows.
a. Title VII and ADEA Claims
i. Timeliness
At the outset, the Court notes that the Third Circuit permits a defendant to assert the statute of limitations defense via a motion to dismiss when the dates alleged show that the cause of action has not been brought within the applicable limitations period, i.e., where it is apparent on the face of the complaint that the claims asserted therein are time-barred. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994).
In the context of employment claims, “[a] plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative
Here, the City argues that Plaintiff’s employment claims are time-barred because Plaintiff failed to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. (Docket No. 35). Plaintiff counters that these claims are timely under the continuing violation doctrine, and that, the last incident—i.e., her tires being slashed after she filed a formal complaint against her foreman on June 8, 2024—falls “well within the 300-day period before her EEOC filing on May 2, 2025.” (Docket No. 39 at 3).
As referenced above, the City supplemented its motion to dismiss with a copy of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge following oral argument. (Docket No. 77).1 The supplement shows that Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC on May 2, 2025, which is 328 days after the June 8, 2024 tire-
To the extent Plaintiff relies on her contention that “[t]his situation continues to the present time” to rescue her employment claims, this allegation is too conclusory and vague to establish that “at least one act falls within the applicable limitations period.” Mandel, 706 F.3d at 166 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 210 F. Supp. 3d 658, 687–88 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“It is clear from the record that Vasquez is unable to point to an incident that occurred within the applicable limitations period. Hence, her claim is time-barred.); Snyder v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., No. CIV.A. 08-566, 2009 WL 185993, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2009) (finding that allegations based on conduct that was “continuous and ongoing” to the present time were “devoid of facts suggestive of the proscribed conduct” and “failed to state a claim under the plausibility standard announced in Twombly.”).
In the hostile work environment context, the Third Circuit clarified the extent of the continuing violations doctrine with respect to these claims:
Under [the continuing violation] doctrine, discriminatory acts that aren’t individually actionable may be aggregated to make out a Title VII hostile environment claim. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013). These acts can occur at any time if they’re linked in a pattern of actions continuing into Title VII’s limitations period. Id. All the alleged acts, however, must be part of the same unlawful employment practice, id. at 165–66, meaning they involved “similar conduct by the same individuals, suggesting a persistent, ongoing pattern.” id. at 167.
Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 566 (3d Cir. 2017). On the other hand, a “discrete act” constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice, which includes acts such as
Plaintiff does not dispute that most of the individual acts she complains of occurred outside the applicable limitations period. Nor does she “contend that there are any acts occurring inside the period which, considered in themselves, are sufficient to support liability.” O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006). Instead, she argues that “[t]he discriminatory conduct by Defendant Fusco, including telling her that ‘women belong in the kitchen’ and mocking menopause, constituted part of an ongoing pattern of sex and age discrimination that continued through June 8, 2024.” (Docket No. 39 at 2–3). Therefore, the Court must “determine whether the acts about which [Plaintiff] complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120, 122 S. Ct. at 2076.
The Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations which suggest that the “the last act evidencing the continuing practice,” Napier, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 427, is sufficiently “linked in a pattern” to the other alleged discriminatory actions. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d at 566. Even if the tire-slashing incident on June 8, 2024 fell within the limitations period, there is no information regarding who slashed Plaintiff’s tires or how this event relates to the other gender or age-based discrimination she allegedly endured. Perhaps more importantly, there is no indication that this incident was similar in nature to Fusco’s alleged comments or general favorable treatment of male/younger employees, nor the purported sexual assaults and harassment by Ringgold. In other words, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the tire-slashing event was “similar conduct by
ii. Sufficiency
Even if Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims were timely, they nonetheless fail to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To that end, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” that she: “(1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position which she held, (3) suffered an adverse employment action which was (4) taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” McCreary v. Adult World, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 3d 458, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, “[t]he elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination are that: (1) the plaintiff is at least forty years old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and (4) the plaintiff was ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to support an inference of a discriminatory motive.” Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015). “Where the plaintiff is not directly replaced, the fourth element is satisfied if the plaintiff can provide facts which ‘if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.’” Id.
Here, the City argues that the only adverse employment action that Plaintiff alleges she suffered is the denial of a promotion. (Docket No. 35 at 8–9). However, the City maintains that “Plaintiff does not plead any facts to plausibly allege that her lack of promotion was related to her age or gender or even if a promotion occurred,” including that “any employee received a promotion, let alone a younger or male employee.” (Id. at 8). Plaintiff counters that she has alleged “specific instances” of sex and age discrimination, including Fusco’s comments, which “combined with the differential treatment” of male/younger employees, are sufficient to state discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADEA at this stage. (Docket No. 39 at 4).
As to the third element, to establish an adverse employment action, an employee “must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974, 218 L. Ed. 2d 322 (2024). “[I]n other words, that the employer treated the employee ‘worse’ because of a protected characteristic.” Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355, 144 S. Ct. at 974).
With respect to the final element, the “inference of discrimination requirement can be established ‘in a number of ways.’” Fennell v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, 628 F. Supp. 3d 554, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 703 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010)). “For example, a plaintiff may point to ‘comparator evidence, evidence of similar . . . discrimination against other employees, or direct evidence of discrimination from statements or actions by [the plaintiff’s] supervisors suggesting [discriminatory] animus.’” Id. (alterations in original). However, “[d]erogatory comments or stray remarks in the workplace that are unrelated to employment decisions, even when uttered by decision-makers, do not constitute
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has only alleged a single discrete discriminatory act which, if timely, harmed “an identifiable term or condition” of her employment such that it could plausibly be considered an adverse employment action—that is, the failure to promote. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S. Ct. at 2073; Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355, 144 S. Ct. at 974. However, other than the bare assertion that she was denied a promotion because of her gender and age, Plaintiff makes no further factual allegations regarding this action. As the City points out, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how any of the “male and younger employees” whom Fusco allegedly treated with “respect” are similarly situated to her such that the denial of a promotion could be plausibly based on her gender or age. (Docket No. 28 ¶ 26). In this regard, Plaintiff does not state whether these other employees had the same job title, performed similar work-functions, held their positions for a similar time frame, or performed their tasks in a similar manner as she. See Arevalo v. Brighton Gardens, Sunrise Senior Living, LLC, No. CV 15-2563 (MAS), 2016 WL 4975199, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2016). Perhaps most importantly, she does not “provide any characteristics of those individuals who received the promotion[] to which she alleges she was entitled” or “whether she was, in fact, qualified to fill [the] position.” Golod, 403 F. App’x at 702. See Sousa v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 22-3043, 2023 WL 7486751, at *3 (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (finding that a
Further, Plaintiff fails to establish “any causal link” between Fusco’s comments and her denial of a promotion which would indicate that this decision was “taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” McCreary, 729 F. Supp. 3d at 463. While Plaintiff alleges that Fusco denied her the promotion, the “purpose and content” of the derogatory names he directly called her—i.e., delusional, liar, coward, bootlicker, town crier, and “stuuuuper”—do not permit an inference of sex- or age-based animus. Danao, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 375. Nevertheless, the general remark that “women belong in the kitchen,” as well as the reference to menopause as “mentalpause,” are remarks which could evidence such animus. Yet, Plaintiff “does not allege any date or date range that these comments occurred” or “allege that the comments occurred during the time . . . when Plaintiff was [denied the promotion].” Emerson v. Stern & Eisenberg, P.C., No. CV 21-3096, 2022 WL 10208548, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2022). Nor does she provide any indication that these comments were made in relation to the decision to deny her a promotion. See Parker, 309 F. App’x at 559 (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). “Without alleging facts that connect the discriminatory behavior with the employment decision at issue,” the Court cannot plausibly conclude that the decision to deny Plaintiff a promotion was made under circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex- or age-based discrimination. Emerson, 2022 WL 10208548, at *5.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts necessary to establish a prima facie claim of
b. Section 1983
i. Timeliness
Plaintiff brings her final federal claims under
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations to the extent that she complains of events which took place more than two years prior to her filing of this lawsuit on July 31, 2025, and that she has not otherwise presented sufficient evidence to sustain her claims. (Docket Nos. 33; 35; 43). Plaintiff counters that equitable tolling should apply to her § 1983 claim against Ringgold because he “engaged in active concealment and intimidation designed to prevent [her] from timely reporting his misconduct,” and that the continuing violation doctrine rescues her remaining § 1983 claims against the other Defendants. (Docket Nos. 57 at 2–3; 39).
Title 42 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights,
Unlike Title VII claims, “§ 1983 has only a one-step ‘remedial scheme’: plaintiffs may file § 1983 suits directly in federal court,” meaning “[t]here is neither an administrative process to be exhausted nor any mechanism by which discriminatory practices may be informally resolved with an administrative agency.” Williams v. Pennsylvania Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). “The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.” Montanez v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based.’” Id. (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).
As noted above, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 31, 2025. (Docket No. 1). Therefore, for her § 1983 claims to be timely, they must have accrued, at the latest, on July 31, 2023. See Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480. With respect to Ringgold, the Amended Complaint alleges that he committed the sexual harassment and assaults between mid-August 2018 and his resignation in March 2023. (Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 32–57). When each of these incidents occurred, Plaintiff knew about her injuries arising therefrom such that her § 1983 causes of action against Ringgold accrued
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that her claims against Ringgold should be equitably tolled because he prevented her from timely reporting his misconduct “through threats and intimidation,” including by telling her that “snitches get stitches.”2 (Docket No. 57 at 2–3). However, this argument is contradicted by Plaintiff’s allegation that she reported “everything” to George Glagola, the Mayor, and an unidentified councilwoman. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57, 137). Even in the absence of such factual allegations, “[t]he remedy of equitable tolling is extraordinary, and we extend it ‘only sparingly.’” Kach, 589 F.3d at 645 (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)). Ringgold’s statement that “snitches get stitches” does not rise to the level of severity necessary to prevent Plaintiff from asserting her claims as required for equitable tolling. See Frasier-Kane v. City of Philadelphia, 517 F. App’x 104, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2013) (assault by a police officer and fear of retaliation did not rise to the requisite level of “extraordinary” for equitable tolling purposes). Nor does it explain why her claims were brought over two years after she last worked with Ringgold, and such a “lack of diligence further supports our conclusion that tolling is inapplicable.” Poole v. Marks, 441 F. App’x 854, 858 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011). See, e.g., Fox v. Lackawanna Cnty., No. 3:16-CV-1511, 2017 WL 5007905, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2017)
It follows that more than two years elapsed between the other Defendants’ discriminatory acts which occurred during Ringgold’s employment at the Public Works Department and the filing of this action. To the extent Plaintiff’s equal protection claims are based on the City’s alleged failure to supervise Ringgold or “take appropriate action” to prevent his misconduct, these claims necessarily accrued prior to his resignation in March 2023 and, therefore, are time-barred. (Docket No. 28 ¶ 153). Likewise, Plaintiff alleges that Ringgold repeated the offensive remarks Fusco made towards her, so her claims arising from Fusco’s “derogatory comments” about her gender and age must have occurred at a time when Ringgold still worked with them. See id. ¶ 31 (alleging that Ringgold heard Fusco “say derogatory things to Plaintiff”). Therefore, inasmuch as Plaintiff’s equal protection claims stem from any comments made by Fusco prior to March 2023, these claims are also time-barred.
The foregoing conclusion is supported by Plaintiff’s attempt to apply the continuing violation doctrine to her § 1983 claims against Fusco and the City. (Docket Nos. 38 at 4; 39 at 3). As in Title VII cases, the continuing violation doctrine provides an equitable exception to the statute of limitations in § 1983 cases. Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481. But, “the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff ‘is aware of the injury at the time it occurred,’” and a
Once again, the Court finds that the continuing violation doctrine does not save Plaintiff’s claims. First, while the tire-slashing incident on June 8, 2024 falls within the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, as the Court has already explained above, the Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient facts to plausibly infer that this event involved “similar conduct by the same individuals, suggesting a persistent, ongoing pattern.” Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d at 566. Aside from this incident, Plaintiff does not allege any other unlawful acts occurred within the two-year limitations period, nor that Fusco or any other individual engaged in similar incidents of gender-based discrimination or harassment which would permit her to invoke the continuing violations doctrine. See Walton v. Westmoreland Cnty., No. CV 21-860, 2024 WL 36971, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2024). Furthermore, Plaintiff was plainly aware of the alleged harm caused by Ringgold’s actions at the time the assaults and harassment occurred, as evidenced by her contemporaneous complaints to various individuals, rendering the continuing violation inapplicable to these acts for purposes of her § 1983 claim against the City. See Montanez, 773 F.3d at 481. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims arose prior to Ringgold’s resignation in March 2023, the Court concludes that these claims are time-barred as she has not established a continuing violation. See id. at 480–81.
While the Court further analyzes Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against Fusco and the City below, her § 1983 claim against Ringgold is facially time-barred and his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be granted as to this claim.
Notwithstanding the general untimeliness of Plaintiff‘s
Beginning with the former, the City contends that Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom that led to her constitutional injuries at issue, which is necessary for a local governing body to incur liability under
“A plaintiff must identify the challenged policy [or custom], attribute it to the [municipality] itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the [constitutional] injury suffered.” Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 51 (3d Cir. 1985). If the policy or custom does not violate federal law on its face, “causation can only be established by ‘demonstrating that the municipal action was taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequence.‘” Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S. Ct. at 1388). “In certain circumstances, the unconstitutional custom can consist of a municipality‘s failure to train or supervise.” MGJ v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-318, 2017 WL 2277276, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2017). However, a plaintiff asserting a failure to supervise claim must “identify a specific supervisory practice that the defendant failed to employ.” C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Amended Complaint‘s allegation that the City allowed Fusco and Ringgold to violate Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights through its “policies, practices, and customs” is too conclusory to state a cognizable claim that a municipal policy or custom, adopted or promulgated by the City, caused her constitutional injuries. See Kranson, 755 F.2d at 51. Likewise, the sweeping allegation that the City “failed to adequately supervise, train, or discipline its employees” is a threadbare allegation that does not rise to the level of “deliberate indifference” for purposes of
Turning to the hostile work environment arguments, Fusco maintains that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish an equal protection claim against him. (Docket No. 33 at 12–13). Like discrimination claims, a hostile work environment claim under the Equal Protection Clause shares the same elements as those brought under Title VII. See Starnes, 971 F.3d at 428. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show: “1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex; 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167. “The conduct must be so severe or pervasive as ‘to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff‘s] employment and create an abusive working environment.‘” Laymon v. Honeywell Int‘l Inc., 645 F. Supp. 3d 443, 457 (W.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Moody v. Atl. City Bd. Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2017)).
Initially, the allegation that Fusco denied Plaintiff a promotion constitutes a “discrete act,” which the Court has already found to be unsupported by enough factual allegations to conclude it was taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See § V.A.ii, supra; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S. Ct. at 2073. To the extent Plaintiff relies on Fusco‘s comments to support her hostile work environment claims, as the Court already indicated above, most of the derogatory names Fusco allegedly called Plaintiff—such as delusional, liar, coward, and bootlicker—are unsupported by “any facts from which the court can reasonably infer that [he] did so because of her [sex], rather than because of some other reason.” Mudie v. Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 577 F. Supp. 3d 375, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2021). His remaining comments, such as “women belong in the kitchen” and “mentalpause,” standing alone, are not sufficiently severe or
All told, Plaintiff‘s failure to state a claim of municipal liability, as well as her failure to allege sufficient factual allegations to support a discrimination or hostile work environment claim under the Equal Protection Clause, renders her
c. Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
Turning to Plaintiff‘s state law causes of action, we begin with her intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED“) and negligent supervision claims against the City at Counts IV and V of her Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 28 at 9–10). The City moves to dismiss these counts because it is immune from such suits under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA“),
“The PSTCA governs the extent to which political subdivisions, like the City, may be held liable in tort.” Jean v. City of Philadelphia, 604 F. Supp. 3d 271, 274 (E.D. Pa. 2022). “The PSTCA grants broad immunity to municipal defendants based on intentional conduct,” only
Because Plaintiff‘s IIED claim is based upon intentional conduct, this claim is barred by the City‘s immunity under the PSTCA. See Butler, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 453. By the same token, none of the nine exceptions for negligent acts listed in
d. Remaining State Law Claims
The remaining state law claims in the Amended Complaint allege causes of action for sexual assault, rape,5 and battery against Ringgold at Counts I–III, as well as a claim for IIED against both Ringgold and Fusco at Count IV. (Docket No. 28). Defendants argue that these
Under Pennsylvania law, an action for assault or battery assault must be commenced within two years from the time the cause of action accrued.
The foregoing precedent instructs that Plaintiff‘s assault and battery claims against Ringgold accrued on the date of the alleged assaults, i.e., between August 2018 and March 2023. See, e.g., Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 249 (Pa. 2021) (“Consequently, the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, when Rice was last assaulted by Bodziak. Rice had two years from that date to discover other actors potentially liable for her injury.“) (footnotes omitted)); Oldham v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 752 (3d Cir. 2025) (“Thus, applying Pennsylvania law, the claim accrued the day the alleged battery occurred.“). In other words, because these claims were not brought within two years from the time of accrual, they are barred by the statute of limitations. See
Plaintiff does not dispute that these claims are late, rather she argues that equitable tolling should excuse her untimely filing because Ringgold‘s “explicit threats against reporting his misconduct” fall “squarely” within the recognized grounds for same. (Docket No. 57 at 2). The
As for Plaintiff‘s IIED claim, to state such a claim under Pennsylvania law: “(1) the conduct [of the defendant] must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; [and] (4) the distress must be severe.” Zucal v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 760 F. Supp. 3d 290, 305 (E.D. Pa. 2024). It follows that “an IIED claim that is founded upon sexual harassment will accrue when the defendant‘s intentional or reckless conduct rises to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous’ behavior and causes severe emotional distress.” Smith v. RB Distribution, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 3d 311, 316 (E.D. Pa. 2021). “Pennsylvania maintains a high bar for what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, often requiring a showing of ‘continuing malicious actions’ in cases of workplace harassment.” Zucal, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 305 (quoting Smith, 515 F. Supp. 3d at 316–17). See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that extreme and outrageous conduct is that which goes “beyond all possible bounds of decency” and would be considered “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community“).
Assuming that Plaintiff stated a plausible IIED claim arising from Ringgold‘s conduct, this claim would have accrued, at the latest, between August 2018 and March 2023. See Rice, 255 A.3d at 249. Therefore, even viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, her IIED claim against Ringgold is time-barred by Pennsylvania‘s two-year statute of limitations. See
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff‘s state law claims against Ringgold are plainly time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and she has otherwise failed to allege a plausible IIED claim against Fusco. See Robinson, 313 F.3d at 135 n.3. Therefore, Counts I–III against Ringgold, as well as Count IV against both Ringgold and Fusco, will be dismissed.
e. Leave to Amend
The Court‘s next inquiry is whether the dismissal of the claims in Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint should be with prejudice or without prejudice. The Third Circuit has held that in civil rights cases, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). An amended complaint is futile where it cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, the Court finds that any further amendment of Plaintiff‘s claims would be futile as they are largely time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations for the reasons set forth above. See In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that an amendment was futile because the claims would be barred by the statute of limitations). Moreover, Plaintiff does not set forth any additional facts in her briefs in opposition that would make the Court believe that she could state a claim against Defendants, nor has Plaintiff indicated that she is unable to provide her counsel with facts against those that she believes violated her rights.6 (Docket Nos. 37; 38; 39; 57). Finally, Plaintiff has already amended
f. Remaining State Law Claims
Since Ringgold‘s counterclaims and crossclaim are state law tort actions and the parties are not diverse, this Court has discretion in whether it continues exercising supplemental jurisdiction. As this Court has held previously:
Section 1367(c)(3) “permits a district court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction if ‘the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.‘” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ). “Congress explicitly green-lighted” the dismissal of state law claims in such situations. Kach, 589 F.3d at 650. With that said, “[t]he decision to retain or decline jurisdiction over state-law claims is discretionary” and “‘should be based on considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants.‘” Id. at 650 (quoting New Rock Assets Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996)) (further citations omitted).
Pletcher v. Giant Eagle Inc., No. CV 2:20-754, 2022 WL 17488019, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2022). Because this case is only in the initial stages, the Court finds that it is in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims as there is no ongoing case or controversy of federal law and only state law issues
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Eric Fusco‘s and City of Clairton‘s Motions to Dismiss [32] [34], as well as Defendant Duane Ringgold‘s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, are [42] granted. All claims in Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint (Counts I–IX) will be dismissed, with prejudice as to all Defendants. Since there is no other basis for this Court to assert jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ringgold‘s remaining state law claims, and his counterclaims against Plaintiff and crossclaim against the City, are dismissed, without prejudice. Finally, the stay on Defendant Duane Ringgold‘s Motion for Joinder [76] is lifted, and his Motion to Join an Indispensable Party [31] is denied, without prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.
s/Nora Barry Fischer
Nora Barry Fischer
Senior U.S. District Judge
Dated: August 5, 2026
cc/ecf: All counsel of record