55 Conn. App. 400 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1999
Opinion
The plaintiffs
The complaint alleges educational malpractice,
For purposes of this appeal, we take as true the following facts alleged in the complaint. See Sassone v.
The plaintiffs further allege that during those school years, the Pagels School was the only public school in West Haven subjected to the entire responsive classroom method. Furthermore, during these school years, the defendants encouraged, created and tolerated an atmosphere of chaos, disruptiveness and violence at the school so that the children were exposed on a daily basis to so much physical and verbal violence that it became a place of fear. As such, learning at the school could not and did not take place in any meaningful sense. As a result, the plaintiffs’ minor children were deprived of an education comparable to that available to other children of their age attending different elementary schools in West Haven and elsewhere in Connecticut.
I
The plaintiffs first assert that the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike as to their educational malpractice claim.
In Gupta, our Supreme Court joined the vast majority of states that have rejected educational malpractice
On the basis of clear language in Gupta, we decline the subtle invitation to extend the two exceptions to tort-based claims for educational malpractice. We conclude, therefore, that mder the facts of this case, the plaintiffs’ claim of educational malpractice does not survive the defendants’ motion to strike.
II
The plaintiffs also claim that counts seven, eight and nine of the complaint allege facts constituting an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress sufficient to survive a motion to strike. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the complaint does more than merely conclude that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous. The plaintiffs maintain that facts supporting their claim are detailed in counts one through three and incorporated by reference into comts seven through nine. We agree.
In comts seven through nine, the plaintiffs repleaded the factual allegations recited in the prior comts. They further allege in each count that “[t]he actions of the defendants . . . were extreme and outrageous and
“[F]or the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [the intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn. Sup. 305, 329 A.2d 609 (1973); 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46. Petyan v. Ellis, [200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986)], quoting Murray v. Bridgeport Hospital, 40 Conn. Sup. 56, 62, 480 A.2d 610 (1984). Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 254 n.5, quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.) § 12, p. 60. Thus, [i]t is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988) . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 266-67, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).
The trial court found that the facts alleged in the complaint, even when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, do not describe conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. That court therefore concluded that the facts alleged, were not outrageous. We note that it has always been a relatively commonplace circumstance that some students are afraid of schoolteachers, examinations and other students. We also note that it is likely that students who experience these concerns also will suffer some degree of stress and anxiety, whether these acts are lawful and proper or wrongful and tortious in nature. To survive a motion to strike, therefore, there must be allegations that the extreme arid outrageous conduct “exceedfed] all bounds usually tolerated by decent society . . . .” (Emphasis in original.) Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 254 n.5.
The plaintiffs in the present matter allege that the defendants affirmatively “encouraged, created and tolerated an atmosphere of chaos, disruptiveness and violence,” (emphasis added) that their children were
As to the second element, extreme and outrageous conduct, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ actions subjected the plaintiffs’ minor children to an “atmosphere of chaos, disruptiveness and violence” in which school became a “place of fear” where learning did not take place in “any meaningful sense.” Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that this conduct continued for two years. The plaintiffs also allege that the Pagels School was the only public school in West Haven subjected to the entirety of the responsive classroom method, a method sold to them by Northeast Foundation for Children, the Massachusetts corporation that also employs Fenty-Morrison. Within the context that Fenty-Morrison implemented a method created by the company that employed her, knew of the chaos, disrup-tiveness and violence that continued over a two year period and caused the plaintiffs’ minor children distress, a trier of fact could find that this constitutes outrageous conduct on the defendants’ part.
As to the third element, the defendants argue that “the plaintiffs failed to allege the causation element altogether” and, moreover, that there is no “ ‘peculiar
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress counts and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs are Elizabeth Bell, who brought this action on behalf of her minor children, Stephanie Bell and Kristin Bell; Barbara Murphy-Finneran, who brought this action on behalf of her minor children, Jennifer Finneran, Kelly Finneran and Erin Finneran; and Paula Brown, who brought this action on behalf of her minor children, Elisa Brown, Kevin Brown, Timothy Brown and Daniel Brown.
The defendants are the board of education of the city of West Haven and Ellen Fenty-Morrison, the principal of the Alma E. Pagels School.
In educational malpractice cases, a plaintiff sues his or her academic institution for tortiously failing to provide adequate educational services; see, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); or for tortiously failing to diagnose educational impediments. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); see generally, D. Morgan, ‘Liability for Medical Education,’ 8 J. Legal Med. 305, 307-15 (1987).” (Emphasis in original.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 591 n.15, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).
The complaint originally contained counts ten through twelve, which pertained to equal protection claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On the basis of these claims, the defendants removed the case to federal court. Thereafter, the defendants moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint. The federal court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
The plaintiffs do not address the issue of whether their educational malpractice claims are distinct from their negligence claims. In their brief to this court, the plaintiffs state that “[t]he action was brought in nine counts on two legal grounds—intentional infliction of emotional distress and educational malpractice.” Furthermore, their appeal fails to address the action of the trial court in striking those counts addressed to the negligence claims. We decline to review whether the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike as to the negligence counts, as it is deemed to be abandoned. See Nazarko v. Conservation Commission, 50 Conn. App. 548, 550 n.2, 717 A.2d 850, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 940, 723 A.2d 318 (1998).
The vast majority of courts to consider this issue have refused to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice. See, e.g., Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941-42, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Hunter v. Board of Education, 292 Md. 481, 489-90, 439 A.2d 582 (1982); Hoffman v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 444-45, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979); but see B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 63, 649 P.2d 425 (1982), on appeal after remand sub nom. B.M. by Berger v. State, 215 Mont. 175, 698 P.2d 399 (1985) (court found duty of care owed to special education students under Montana constitution).
The phrase educational malpractice is a recent expansion of traditional tort law. The expression has been used to describe different causes of action, namely, failure to counsel and educate students adequately, in terms of needs and achievement; see, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
See footnote 6.
With respect to the public policy concerns, the court in Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, supra, 60 Cal. App. 3d 825, stated: “Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the controversies, or incurred the public dissatisfaction, which have attended the operation of the public schools during the last few decades. Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with outright failure in the achievement of their educational objectives; according to some critics, they bear responsibility for many of the social and moral problems of our society at large. Their public plight in these respects is attested in the daily media, in bitter governing board elections, in wholesale rejections of school bond proposals, and in survey
In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, supra, 47 N.Y.2d 444, the New York Court of Appeals noted that a complaint alleging educational malpractice might, on the pleadings, state a cause of action under traditional notions of tort law. The court further noted, however, that, as a matter of public policy, courts should not entertain such claims because that would interfere with the responsibility for the administration of a public school system in school administrative agencies. Id. Our review of the record in the present matter does not indicate that the plaintiffs have availed themselves of the opportunity to consult the administrative agencies. The court also noted that it did not discount the possibility that there could be “gross violations of defined public policy which tire courts would be obliged to recognize and correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 445.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts further describes the conduct as follows: “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
To protect themselves against broad based allegations, the defendants could have filed a request to revise pursuant to Practice Book § 10-35, formerly § 147, to compel the plaintiffs to amend the complaint to provide "a more complete or particular statement of the allegations . . . Our review of the record indicates that the defendants failed to do this.