Deborah Austin was injured when her car was struck from behind by a van operated by Curtis Bell. Seeking to recover damages, Mrs. Austin and her husband (Appellees) filed a tort action against Bell (Appellant). Pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-18 (a), they gave timely pre-trial notice that they intended to introduce into evidence a narrative medical report made by one of Mrs. Austin’s physicians. Also acting pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-18 (a), Appellant filed a timely challenge to the admissibility of the report on various grounds, including an attack on the constitutionality of the statute itself. The trial court overruled the objections, and admitted the report at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the case to this Court on the ground that it is within our jurisdiction over appeals raising constitutional issues.
1. A constitutional question will not be decided unless it is essential to the resolution of the case.
Bagwell v. Cash,
(a) Appellant contends that OCGA § 24-3-18 permits the jury to hear medical testimony without sanction of the oath otherwise required by OCGA § 24-9-60.
“[U] ns worn statements are not treated as amounting to any evidence, except ‘in specified cases from necessity.’ [Cits.]”
Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co.,
shall be admissible and received in evidence insofar as it purports to represent the history, examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, or interpretation of tests or examinations, including the basis therefor, by the person signing the report, the same as if that person were present at trial and testifying as a witness. . . .
OCGA § 24-3-18 (a). Thus, the very purpose of the statute is to dispense with the necessity of producing the author of the medical report as a sworn witness at trial, by authorizing the admission of the report itself. In doing so, it extends to civil cases involving injury or disease the same hearsay exception which has long been applicable in the workers’ compensation context. See
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Crews,
(b) Appellant also contends that the statute denies him the right to conduct a cross-examination of the author of the report. To the contrary, however, OCGA § 24-3-18 (a) expressly provides that “any adverse party shall have the right to cross-examine the person signing the report and provide rebuttal testimony.” Thus, the statute does not violate Appellant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See
Foster v. Aladdin Mills,
(c) Appellant next urges that the report was inadmissible because, even though it contained medical opinions, it did not set forth the expert qualifications of the author. The reports within the scope of OCGA § 24-3-18 (a) are limited to those created
by an examining or treating licensed medical doctor, dentist, orthodontist, podiatrist, physical or occupational therapist, doctor of chiropractic, psychologist, advanced practice nurse, social worker, professional counselor, or marriage and family therapist. . . .
*846
At least 60 days prior to trial, Appellees were required to provide the report to Appellant and to advise him of their intent to introduce it. He was then authorized to “object to the admissibility of any portion of the report, other than on the ground that it is hearsay, within 15 days of being provided with the report.” OCGA § 24-3-18 (a). Thus, Appellant had ample opportunity to determine whether the report was in fact created by one of the professionals enumerated in the statute and to contest its admissibility on the ground that the author lacked the expert qualifications to offer any of the opinions expressed therein.
See Bacon v. State,
2. Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IX of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 provides that “[a] 11 rules of evidence shall be as prescribed by law.” A similar provision does not appear in earlier state constitutions. Thus, the effect of this paragraph is to elevate to constitutional status the long-recognized principle that “[t]he legislature has power to establish rules of evidence where not in conflict with the constitution or rights guaranteed by it.”
Banks v. State,
(a) Appellant urges that OCGA § 24-3-18 violates equal protection by discriminating against those non-medical professionals whose reports are not excluded from the hearsay rule. By its terms, the statute authorizes the admission into evidence of only those reports created by certain medical professionals. However, Appellant lacks standing to challenge the statute based upon its limited applicability, since he is not among the class of non-medical professionals whose reports are not within the scope of its provisions. “A party will not be heard to complain of the violation of another person’s constitutional rights.”
Sims v. State,
“The Georgia equal protection clause, which is construed to be consistent with its federal counterpart, requires that the State treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. [Cits.]”
City of Atlanta v. Watson,
The person who is asserting the equal protection claim has the burden to establish that “ ‘he is similarly situated to members of the class who are treated differently from him.’ ” [Cit.] If the person asserting the violation cannot make the foregoing showing, “there is no need to continue with an equal protection analysis.” [Cit.]
Rodriguez v. State,
(b) Appellant also urges that the statute violates due process, because the phrase “medical report in narrative form” is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. “To withstand an attack of vagueness or indefiniteness, a civil statute must provide fair notice to those to whom the statute is directed and its provisions must enable them to determine the legislative intent. [Cit.]”
Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games,
3. Appellant urges that Appellees used their peremptory strikes to discriminate against two African-American potential jurors. See
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
The nature of a prospective juror’s employment is “not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race.” [Cits.] Likewise, a strike based upon a prospective juror’s lack of responsiveness during voir dire... is a race-neutral peremptory strike. [Cits.]
Trice v. State,
[W]here, as here, racially-neutral reasons are given, “the ultimate inquiry for the (trial court) is not whether counsel’s reason(s are) suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based.” [Cit.]
Smith v. State,
“(W)e are not authorized to create an inference of discrimination where none is apparent, and where none has been found by the trial court, to whose findings we must give great deference. (Cits.)” [Cit.] The trial court’s finding that there was no racial motivation in [Appellees’] exercise of peremptory strikes against.. . two of the .. . black potential jurors ... for whom ... non-racial reasons were given is not clearly erroneous.
Smith v. State, supra at 452-453 (3).
4. Appellant contends that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. However, the jury was authorized to find that the collision was proximately caused by Appellant’s negligence and, in addition, there was evidence to support a finding that the injuries for which Appellees sought damages were the proximate result of the collision. See
Georgia Cas. & Surety Co. v. Jernigan,
Judgment affirmed.