delivered the opinion of the court.
This is аn action of ejectment brought by Belk, the plaintiff in error, to recover the. possession of a certain alleged quartz-lode mining claim, being, as is stated in the complaint, “ a relocation of a part of what is known as the old original lode claim.” Passing by for the present the exceptions taken to the rulings of the court at the trial on the admission and rejection of testimony, the facts affecting the title of the respective parties may be stated as follows: —
In July or August, 1864, George O. Humphreys and William Allison located the discovery claim on the original lode and claims one and two west of discovery. These locations were valid and subsisting on the 10th of May, 1872, and no claim adverse to them then existed. No work was done on them between that date and June, 1875. During the month of June, .1875, and before any relocation had been made, the'original locators, or their grantees, resumed Avork upon the claims, and did enough to re-establish their original rights, if that could be done by a simple resumption of Avork at that time. No work was aftenvards done on the property by the original locators, or any one claiming under them; and it does not appear that they were in the actual possession of the claims, or any part thereof, on the 19th of Decepaber, 1876-, or for a long time before. It is- conceded by both parties that the original claims lapsed on the 1st of January, 1877, because of a failure to perform the annual work required by the act of Congress in such cases.
On the 19th of December, 1876, Belk made the relocation under which he now claims, and did all that Avas neсessary to perfect his rights, if the premises were at that time open for that purpose. His entry on the property was peaceable, no ono appearing to resist. Between the date of his entry and the 21st of February, 1877, he did a small amount of Avork on the claim which did not occupy more than twp days of his time,
Upon this state of facts the questions presented in argument for our consideration are, —
1. Whether thé work done in June, 1875, was sufficient to give the original locators, or those claiming under them, an exclusive right to the possession and enjoymеnt of the property until Jan. 1, 1877.
2. Whether, if it was, a valid relocation of the premises, good as against everybody but the-original locators or their grantees; could be made by Belk on the 19th of December, 1876, his entry for that purpose being peaceable and without force.
3. Whether, if Belk’s relocation was invalid when made; it became effectual in law on the 1st of January, 1877, when the original claims lapsed; and,
4. Whether, even if the relocation of Belk was invalid, the defendants could, after the 1st of January, 1877, make a relоcation which would give them as against him an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the property, their entry for that purpose being made peaceably and without force.
By sect. 3 of the act of May 10, 1872, c. 152 (17 Stat. 91), entitled “ An Act to promote the development of. the mining resources of the 'United States,” it was provided that the locators of all mining locations theretofore made, br which should thereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, wherе no adverse claim then existed, should have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, so long as they complied with the laws of the United States, and with State, territorial, and local regulations, not in conflict with the laws of the United States, governing their possessory title. The fifth section further provided that on all claims located prior to the passage of the act, ten dollars’
. For all thе purposes of this case the law. stands as it would have stood had the original act of 1872 provided that the first annual expenditure on claims then in existence might be made at any time before Jan. 1, 1875, and annually thereafter until a patent issued. If it was not made by that time the claim wóuld be open to relocation, provided work was not resumed upon it by the original locators or those claiming under them, before a new location was made. Such being the law, it seenis' to us clear that if work is renewed on a claim after it
had
onсe been open to relocation, but befóre a relocation is actually .made, the rights of the original owners stand as they would- if there had. been no failure to .comply with this condition of the act. The argument on the part of the plaintiff in error is that, if.ífjo work is done before Jauuary, 187o,' all rights under the original claim are gone; but that is not, in our opinion, the fair meaning of the language which Congress has employed to express i'ts will. As we think, the ■ exclusive possessory rights of the original locator and his assigns were continued, without any;work at all, until Jan. 1, 1875, and afterwards, if, before another entered on his possession and relocated the claim,
From what has thus been said, it is apparent that as work was done in the present case during the year 1875, before any relоcation was made, the original claim was continued in force and made operative until there could be another forfeiture by reason of the failure of .the owners to do the necessary annual work. The year in which the work was done began on the 1st of January, 1875, and ended on the 31st qf December. The law fixes no time within a year when the work must be done. Consequently, if done at any time during the year, it is enough, and there can be no forfeiture until the. entire year has gone by. That, in this case, would not be until Dec. 31, 1876 ; and the work, if comрleted on that day, would be just as effectual for the protection of the claim as if it had been done on the 1st of January previous.' It follows that on the 19th of December, 1876, the owners of'the original location had, under the act of Congress, the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment, of the property in dispute.
A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be bought, sold, and conveyed, and will pass by descent.
Forbes
v. Gracey,
Mining claims are not open to relocation until the rights of a former locator have come to an end. A relocator seeks to avail himself of mineral in the public lands which another has discovered. This he cannot do until the discoverer has in law abandoned his claim, and left the.property open for another to take up. The right of location upon the mineral lands of the United States is a privilege granted by Congress, but it can only be exercised within the limits prescribed by the grant. A location сan'only be made where the law allows it to be done. Any attempt to go beyond that will be of no avail. Hence a relocation on lands actually covered at the time by another valid and subsisting location is void ; and this not only against the prior locator, but all the world, because, the law allows no such thing to be done. It follows that the relocation of Belk was invalid at the time it was made,.and continued tó be so until Jan. 1, 1877. .
The next inquiry is, rvhether the attempted, location in December became operative on the 1st оf January, so as to give Belk the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the claim after that. We think it did not. The right to the possession comes only from a valid location. Consequently, if there is no location there can be no possession under it. Location does not necessarily follow from possession, but possession from location. A location is not made by taking possession alone, but by working on the ground, recording and doing whatever else is required for that purpose by the acts of Congress.and the local laws and regulations. As in this case, all these things were done when the law did not allow it; they are as if they had never been done. On the 19th of December the right to the possession of this property was just as much withdrawn from the public domain as the fee is by a valid grant from the United States under the authority of law, or the
This brings, us to the inquiry whether the possession of Belk, after the 1st of January, was such as to prevent the defendants from making a valid relocation and acquiring title under it. The position taken in his behalf is, that even if the original locators, or their grantees, had, under the act of Congress, a right to the possession of their claim until January 1, a statute of limitations in Montana would bar their action against him for its recovery, because they had not been in actual possession within a year previous to his entry, and consequently his entry, though tortious as to them, was good as the beginning of an adverse possession, which, if continued for.
And sect. 2332 of the Revised Statutes is as follows: “ Where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the Statute of Limitations for mining claims of the State or Territory where the same may be situated, evidence of such possession and working of claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this chapter in the absence of an adverse claim.”
' The Montana statute was passed Jan. 11, 1872, and the act of Congress, under which both parties claim, on the 10th of May thereafter. Under the act of Congress, as has just been seen, the original locators, or their grantees, had what was equivalent, to a grant by the United States of the right to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property until January 1. The Montana statute, if in any respect repugnant to this, was repealed to the extent of suсh repugnancy by the act of Congress. As between possessors, having no 'other title than such as is derived from mere occupancy, an action would undoubtedly be barred by the Montana statute. Whether that would be so in a case where an actual right of possession had been acquired under the act of Congress is a question we need not consider, as here the controversy is not between Belk and the prior locators. It is clear that, whether in Montana an action could be maintained against him or not, his right of location depended entirely on the act of Congress, and under it, as has already been seen, what lie did had no effect to secure to him the grant of any rights. All he got or could get by his
Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes relied on, Belk could not get a patent for the claim he, attempted to locate, unless hie secured what is here made the equivalent of a valid location by actually holding and working for the requisite time. If he actually held possession and worked the claim, long enough, and kept all others out, his right to a patent would be complete. He had no grant'of any right of possession. His ultimate right to .a patent depended entirely on his keeping himself in and..all others out, and if he was not actually in, he was in law out. A peaceable adverse entry, coupled with the right t0‘ hold the possession which was thereby acquired, operated as an ouster, which broke the continuity of his holding and deprived him of the title he might have got if he had kept in for the requisite length of time. He had made no such location as prevented the lands from being in law vacant. Others had the right to enter for the purpose of taking them up, if it could be done peaceably and without force. There is nothing in
Atherton
v.
Fowler
(
This brings us to the facts of the present case. No one contends that the defendants effected their entry and secured their relocation by force. They knew what Belk had done and what ■ he was doing. He liad no right to the possession, and was only on the land at intervals. There was no enclosure, and he had made no improvements. He apparently exercised no
It is contended, however, that the court erred in its charge to the jury, because it assumed that the defendants’ relocation Avas good if that of Belk was bad. The notice of the relocation of the defendants was proved by the introduction of the county records, and if ive understand correctly the position Avhieh is noAV taken, it is that this notice aauis defective becausе of an insufficient affidavit. We cannot find that this precise objection was taken below. When the record Avas first offered in evidence it seems to have been objected to generally, but afterAvards, on a motion to strike it out, the reasons assigned ivere : 1, that the original was not shown to have been out of the possession or under the control of the defendants; and, 2, that the record did not give a sufficient- description of the location. As the affidavit to the notice of the relocation of Belk Avas 'identical in foivm with that of the defendants, it is possible such
This disposes of all the questions raised on the instructions to the jury. It remains to consider the various exceptions taken to the admission and rejection of testimony. These are; —
1. As to the admission of the book from the office of the recorder of Deer Lodge County to prove the record of the location of the original lode claims by Humphrey and Allison.
2. As to the admission of the books of record from the same. office to prove certain deeds by which it was claimed the title of Humphrey and Allison to the original lode claims was- transmitted, in whole or in part, to one Murphy ;■ and,
3-, The rejection of the testimony of one McFarland, a witness produced at the trial.
1. As to the proof of the record of the location of the original lode claim.
As Belk sets up title only as a relocator Of part of the original lode claim, he impliedly admits the validity of the prior location. There can be no relocation unless there has been a prior valid location, or something equivalent, of the same property. It is nowhere disputed that Humphrey and Allison
2. As to the deeds. ■ In the view we take of the case, it is entirely unimportant whether the original lode claim had been transferred or not. The work was done in 1875 by Humphrey, one of the original locators, for the express purpose of resuming • the claim. He says it was done under an arrangement which he .made to that effect with Thornton, who, according to the deeds put in evidence, was the ownеr of three-fourths of the property, Humphrey himself owning the rest. It is a matter of no importance to Belk whether the work that was done inured to the benefit of Humphi’ey alone or to him with others. Without, therefore, considering any of the questions presented in. the argument as to the competency of the evidence, or the proper execution of the deeds, we are clearly of the opinion that there is nothing in the assignments of error affecting this branch of the case which’requires a reversal of the judgment.
3. As to thе testimony of McFarland. He was in effect asked whether any one’ had that day pointed out to him the line between the National Mining and Exploring Company’s ground and the defendants’ ; and, if so, whom; .and if he knew where the line was. There was but one question, and the objection was made to the question. It was entirely immaterial, so far as anything appears in the record,' whether any one pointed
Upon a careful consideration of the whole case we find no error.
Judgment affirmed.