37 F. 817 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Arkansas | 1887
Lead Opinion
The complainant is a citizen of Texas, the defendants all citizens of Arkansas; prima facie, therefore, this court has jurisdiction. But these facts appear, and upon them a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction has been filed. One Belding died, having the equitable title to a tract of land in Arkansas, and leaving four heirs. One of them, a defendant herein, obtained the legal title. The complainant is one of the heirs, and files this bill claiming as against such defendant a one-fourth interest in the property, and as against all the defendants—the other heirs being made .defendants—partition. Such other heirs file a cross-bill, claiming their separate ownerships of one-fourth interest, and also asking partition. It is insisted that the interests of these two defendants are the same as those of the complainant, and that they are collusively joined as defendants for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction; that the court should ignore the action of the pleader, rearrange the status of the parties litigant, and place such last-named defentlants on the side of the complainant; and, so placing them, there would he a suit between citizens of this state, of which this court could not take jurisdiction. I think this is a mistake. It may he true that the complainant and the two defendants are alike interested in divesting the other defendant of whatever right and protection he may claim from holding the legal title, hut there their identity of interest ceases. Each seeks to recover for himself, and not for the three jointly, his one-fourth share of the property. Partition implies a setting apart to each owner his hitherto undivided interest, and each owner has a separate interest in establishing the fact and extent of his title, and in securing his separate share of the estate. Take an ordinary law action. There must be a unity of interest, not merely in the subject-matter of the action, but also in the relief sought,
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the conclusion reached by the- circuit judge. The plaintiff was compelled to make all the heirs parties, and, according to. a well-settled rule of equity pleading, he had the right to make them defendants, without regard to the question of the attitude they occupied .towards each other or the plaintiff. But it is said that the defendants in -this state, -whose interests harmonize with the plaintiff’s, are“collusively joined as defendants.” It docs not follow that, because some of .the parties to the. suit have common interests with the plaintiff, they must be made plaintiff's, or so treated for any purpose. “ In a suit by joint tenants or tenants in common for a partition, all must be before the .court; but it is not necessary of course that all should be plaintiffs.” Pom. Rem. §.254. It was a rule of common-law pleading that all persons having the same interest should stand on the same side of the suit, but that rule never had any application in a court of chancery. All that the rules in chancery pleading require is that all parties materially interested in the subject of the suit be brought on the record either as
"In regard to the petition presented by Wheeler, asking to be made a co-plaintiff in the bill, 1 think the point is disposed oí by the rules in equity prescribed by the supreme court. .4 case like this one was probably foreseen, and is provided tor in the forty-seventh and forty-eighth of the rules of practice for courts of equity. * * * These rules have been acted upon ever since they were adopted in reference to cases of this kind, particularly in regard to corporations where the stockholders are numerous, and reside in various places. But, independently of all that, it is apparent that, in this case, to make Wheeler, who is a citizen of the state of ¿New York, a party plaintiff, would oust the jurisdiction of the court; and under those circumstances, irrespective of the rules referred to, the rule of equity would be to make the person a party defendant, and not a party plaintiff. It is not at all necessary, in order to give to Wheeler, as a stockholder in the Pacific Mail Company, the benefit of this suit, that be should bo made a co-plaintiff. lie may come in and contribute to the expenses of the suit, and avail himself of the benefits of it by being made a defendant.” Brown v. Steam-Ship Co., 5 Blatchf. 535.
“For the purposes of a removal the matter in dispute may be ascertained and the parties to the suit arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If in such arrangement it appears that those on one side are all citizens of different states from those on the other, the suit may be removed.” Removal Oases, 100 U. S. 457.
This doctrine is applied alone in cases brought originally in a state court, and then in aid of the federal jurisdiction, or, as expressed by the supreme court, “ for the purposes of a removal.” It is to prevent plaintiffs from depriving defendants of the right of removal by uniting with them as defendants persons whose citizenship would prevent a removal, and who either have no real interest in the suit, or whose interests are on the side of the plaintiff. Arapahoe Co. v. Railway Co., 4 Dill. 277; Sewing-Machine Co. Case, 18 Wall. 586. The doctrine has no application in the case at bar. The cross-bills filed by the Beldings are proper. Peay v. Schenck, 1 Woolw. 175.