Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc.

621 A.2d 872 BELCHER Cаrol v. FOUNDATION, T. ROWE PRICE et INC. al. Term, Sept.

No. 1992. Appeals Maryland. Court of March 1993. Baltimore, brief, Jeff E. on Messing, appellant. for (Mason, brief), Alan M. Carlo Morgan, Ketterman & on Baltimore, for appellee. (Stan Semmes, L.

Rudolph Haynes, Rose M. & Bowen Baltimore, brief), Semmes amicus curiae American Ass’n, Corp., Ins. Steel Corp., Bethlehem Certainteed Fund, Ins. Injured Workers’ and The National Council on Compensation Ins. RODOWSKY,

Argued ELDRIDGE, McAULIFFE, before CHASANOW, BELL, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. ORTH, Jr., (Retired, CHARLES E. Specially JJ. Assigned) ORTH, Judge.

I appeal again On this visit Compen- we once the Workers’ Act, sation now 9 in codified as Title the Labor and Employ- ment (1991).1 article of the Code We are called upon to expanse determine the of the phrase “accidental personal in the injury” contemplation of the Act. phrase in appears first 9-101 under the subtitle “Defini- § (b) tions.” provides Subsection part: relevant personal “Accidental injury” means: (1) an injury accidental arises of out and in the course of employment;

(2) injury an caused a or negligent willful act of a third a person against directed covered employee course the employment of the covered employee____ “ employee’ ‘Covered means an individual listed in Subti- 2tle of for whom person required ... is by law [the Act] provide to coverage 9-101(f). under The Act [the Act].” § applies to an employer “who has at least 1 covered employ- indicated, 1. opinion Unless otherwise hereafter to the reference Compensation Act shall mean the Workers’ act and to a reference section shall be to a section of act. 712 9-201(1). “an is Generally,

ee.” individual ... a covered § an employee employer the service an under while 9-202(a). of hire.” Ordi- express implied contract ... § narily, employer employee provide “each of a covered shall compensation in accordance with Act]” [the personal for an accidental employee covered employee____

sustained the covered 9-501(a)(l). provide compensa “An is liable to employer § (a) 9-501], regard tion in accordance with subsection [§ personal injury.” less of as to a cause of accidental fault 9-501(b). The Act it “shall be construed commands that § 9-102(a). its It declares: general purpose.” out carry § derogation “The common law rule that statute to this 9- apply construed does strictly § [Act].” 102(b) These dictates are to assure that Act’s benevo legislation lent social will be effectuat purpose remedial Tornillo, Italiane, v. Linee et al. 329 Alitalia Aeree ed. City Lovellette v. (1993); Md. A.2d Baltimore, (1983). A.2d

II Upon the Act. sought compensation Carol Belcher under Compensation Commission hearing, the Workers’ plenary her took her cause the Circuit disallowed claim. She ruled in Baltimore court accord City. Court for in the sought the Commission. Belcher relief intervened the intermediate Special We before Appeals. and, motion, on our own certified court entertained case (1992). A.2d to resolution. 328 Md. it us for A claim leading to Belcher’s We learn of circumstances hearing through transcript compensation for from statement of facts Commission and before the upon par- gleaned transcript agreed from that ties.

Belcher as a secretary was for T. Rowe Price employed Foundation, Inc. Her desk was in the corner northwеst the top floor in IBM building. downtown Baltimore’s An- other high-rise office being was erected next to the IBM building, and the din of its nearby construction made way into workplace. Occasionally Belcher’s she had trouble hearing people on the phone. At times the floor beneath vibrate, her things bump would on the would roof. Overall, the barely intrusions were tolerable. Then on the morning April A 1991 disaster struck. three-ton beam being hoisted a construction crane broke loose and feet, crashing tumbled some twenty without warning through the thick roof concrete over Belcher’s head. It landed feet five from she her tending where sat at desk The sound day’s deafening; business. was it was if a bomb exploded. lights out; had in the office went pipes and were ripped apart; wires debris sifted over her and her surroundings; concrete dust went down her throat. “I move. I get couldn’t could not up move out way.” sought Her employer immediately counsel- trauma ling for her. The counselling proved ineffective. She disturbances, sleep “suffered nightmares, palpita- heart tions, pain, chest and headaches as a result of the occur- rence.” came She under the care of Alan psychiatrist, H. Peck, M.D., for “evaluation and for treatments the emotion- al/mental trauma suffered as a result of injury, [she] this accident.” him She saw some twenty-two times. Dr. Peck’s reports were introduced into hearing. evidence at the His report, initial under date May of 8 1991 included a history the accident. When fell the beam fear, was frozen in did not know what happened had [s]he and wondered if it quite had been a bomb. She was shaken. She seemed to have had some amnesia next several hours but told that she was shaking, smoking chain holding was, onto the walls. She that point, quite cold and been in may have shock. Con- crete pieces were all over her bodice. There are still some on her nuggets present desk. She went home early and ironed the quite upset, sleep,

that could not day, day entire returned to the next night. She work building although found not at the she up she could look did do her has had serious try job. enter it and She since this incident which have been problems emotional Prior saw quite bothersome for her. to the incident she herself solid control who very enjoyed as a woman ability proud some over her life and was say have at T. Price history particularly her work Rowe Com- always three children and felt that pany. She has raised her she way. she could take care of whatever came Now she and her chest upset is the fact that is unsure over hurts as does her shoulder. Headaches occur constantly is fearful a heart dry and she often has mouth. She may explode. panic attack. feels like she She has She to leave area. attacks at work and sometimes has is to return. She may She fearful she be able nightmares, waking up screaming has sever- ongoing had and, in she herself has been nightmare, al times each has easily killed. finds she now is startled and She her ones particularly irritable with loved quite become weight her. She has had some children which bothers and, feels if she gain, loss of senses times “as dead”. he report hearing,

Dr. Peck in his last before the stated first her “for of a Post Traumatic symptoms had seen (PTSD) a work related Disorder as a result of Stress incident____” He said: most problems, important

In to some addition overwhelming problems aspect psychological has been for Miss Belcher. opined

He that Belcher “suffers Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of this incident.” He concluded: Perma-

According to Guides the Evaluation of Edition of Medical nent 3rd the American Impairment, Association, impairment suffers Miss Belcher a Class “impairment level are incom- impairment moderate where patible function,” some but not all useful or a 40% psychiatric disability as a result of this incident. There was no evidence that Belcher had received treatment for any purely condition, physical or for any her physical manifestations.

The Commission issued an order which set out that a hearing had been held on following issues:

1. Did the employee sustain personal an accidental inju- ry arising out of and in the course of employment? 2. Is the disability of the employee the result of an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment?

The Commission found that

the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of the course of employment alleged to have 1989; occurred on 11 April and finds that the disability of the claimant is not the result of the alleged accidental injury....

The Commission disallowed Belcher’s claim.

B The Commission’s disallowance of Belcher’s claim prompted her appeal the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She asserted that the holdings of the Commission were erroneous. Each side filed a motion for summary judg- ment. After hearing arguments from counsel at the hear- ing on motions, the judge found it

hard to believe with all the Compensation Workmen’s cases that passed have through these courts and the courts of the State of Maryland, that there has not been a this____ case that is on all fours with thought He that the issue presented whether or not a purely mental condition is compensable where there is no injury.

He deemed it to be “really issue, a simple but complicated to interpret----” suggested He could argue “[o]ne either side of very ... comfortably, ... as both [coun- read, I the courts on have have,” and what “[b]ased

sel] recognized He direction, honestly.” quite ingo could either law, under the but construed liberally is to that the Act mean- change does warned, construction he “liberal a case “There has not been iterated: of the words.” He ing treatment but no medical there is as this ... when such in such circum- He doubted that treatment.” mental purely opined He compensation. Act permitted stances the indicated Le v. had so Appeals Special the Court of (1989), A.2d 42 Stores, Md.App. Dep’t Federated spoken has not observed, Appeals the Court of but, he the matter. He concluded: writer, I will and not a law I the law

“As am bound I the law by what believe Le,] abide accord with [in Motion for Sum- reason And for that today. [Belcher’s] Motion [employer’s] The denied. Judgment will be mary Judgment granted.” will be Summary the circuit as the Commission well apparent It is Appeals Special of the Court of opinion court relied on at length at argued The case was holdings. its reaching in hearing ended and the the Commission hearing before upon “I employer: rely counsel for by on these words and the as the Commission case.” As far Thach Le in our concerned, they governed, werе circuit court were by in Le matter, the law announced by on the silence Special Appeals. Ill Stores, 80 case, Dep’t Le” Le v. Federated The “Thach counsel 42, employer’s which the 89, 560 A.2d Md.App. cited, seeking an action court the circuit referred and defamation, and arrest, of false for the torts damages distress.2 Circuit infliction of emotional intentional distress was first of emotional of intentional infliction 2. The tort Jones, ago. 281 years See Harris v. recognized Maryland fifteen Harris, Md.App. 560, (1977), affirming v. 35 Jones 380 A.2d 611 Md. 556, (1977). A.2d 1104 Court for held Montgomery County the exclusivity clause of Compensation precluded the Workmen’s Act3 action. The court granted summary judgment favor the employer. Special reversed, The Court of Appeals but it did so for a by reason not relied on the circuit court. question the view of the Court of Special Appeals was whether non-physical tortious acts committed against by Thach Le fell employee fellow within the ambit then-styled Workmen’s Compensation Act so as to preclude direct against suit It employer. reasoned that since “[tjhere was no claim for any physical injuries” Le, his claim was not compensable Therefore, under the Act. it did all, not fall within the ambit of the Act at and thus the provision exclusivity applicable. was not 80 Md.App. at 560 A.2d 42. The intermediate appellate court took the position that “tort actions are not barred when [the Act] the essence of the injury is at non-physical.” Id.

A.2d 42. Court, It stated that interpreting “acciden- Act, tal injury” under the has held that the term “means injury person caused some unusual condition or occurrence in the emрloyment.” Id. at A.2d 42 (emphasis original). It was the intermediate appellate court’s notion that an compensable only when there is an accidental physiological change arising out of and in the course of employment. 560 A.2d 42. words, In other the absence of a physiological change or physical harm or damage precludes finding that an injury under the Act occurred. Id. The court concluded that the circuit court erred granting summary judgment favor of the employer gave explanation: Compensation 3. The "Workmen’s formerly Act” was codified as Art. 1991, 8, By 101 of the Code. Acts Ch. Art. 101 was revised Employment transferred to a new Labor and article as Title 9 heading Compensation.” under the ‘Workers’ (§ Section 15 of Employment Art. 101 9-509 in the new Labor and Article) provided, exceptions, with compensation certain under employee the Act to against a covered employer. was exclusive the 718 arrest, defamation, of false and intention- quiddity Those non-physical.

al infliction of emotional distress is the the of Workers’ ordinarily scope torts are outside Act, the Compensation they Act. are not within the Since the from actions protect employer statute does grounded particular on those torts. 93, 560 42. appellate

80 at A.2d The intermediate Md.App. out: pointed court Special Court of Appeals

Neither the Court of nor [the question addressed the of wheth- Appeals] has heretofore of the torts are ambit non-physical injury er within Act____ 92,

Id. at A.2d 560 42.4 Ap- of judgment Special We reviewed Court Le, 1067 Federated Stores v. 324 Md. 595 A.2d peals (1991) judg- on of certiorari. affirmed the grant our We its of but Special Appeals rejected ment of the Court (now in Instead, to 44 of Art. reasons. we looked 101 § 9-509(d) of the and Employment form as Labor revised § article) which provided: Special Eight years Appeals decided it decided before the Court of Le

4. Co., Educ., Sargent Md.App. 1209 v. A.2d Board Balto. (1981). Sargent support Belcher to to In the circuit court here looked claim, point it her Sargent the court found that was not because but physical injury, case at whereas in the there evidence it, hand, no Belcher viewed there was evidence court . physical injury. entering Sargent’s job it. While was to enter a boiler clean her, claustrophobia she an which disabled boiler the extent that she was necessary suffered attack composure temporarily maintain the unable to compensation sought under the her work. She continue however, established, sus- that the nervous shock Act. tained evidence which attempt boiler her to her to enter the caused blackout injury physiological ... Special Appeals Court ruled as "a personal injury qualify as under [the Act]." sufficient to an accidental Collett, 584-585, Geipe Md.App. quoting Inc. v. 433 A.2d seems, (1937). Special it A. 836 So injury concept by Appeals tempered to extent the some finding may directly injury under Act cause that an accidental physical disability. In other which then results in mental illness words, may physiological psychological overtones compensable. If or death results to a from workman deliberate intention his employer produce inju- such ry death, widow, widower, child, or employee, children or of thе shall ‍‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‍dependents employee have the privilege either to take under this article or have cause of against action such as if this article employer, had not passed. been

We construed as decisive of the issue. We held that § case, “under the facts of this the circuit court should not granted have motion for employer’s] summary judg- [the ment. ...” 324 Md. at 595 A.2d 1067.

So it was that had no need to determine we whether injuries psychological, nature, emotional or mental in as distinguished physiological, from those within purely were purview of the of such Act. status trauma under Act was left limbo Court. question compensability injuries under the mental, Act which are in essence psychological, emotional distinguished as from purely physiological those which are nature, squarely is now us. This is not before Court bound the decisions of the of Special Appeals, although we persuasive. have ofttimes found them to be So it behooves us to determine the of the interme- propriety diate appellate court’s statutory interpretation “injury” used the Act.

IV A seen, As we have the Act does not define “injury” trauma, terms of or mental Legisla- and what the ture respect intended apparent from the language of the Act. So are called upon again we once Legislature divine what the spoke meant when it of “acci- personal dental injury.” We turned first to see how our predecessors on this Court the term viewed “accidental personal injury.” began

We our review with Schemmel v. Gatch & Sons Co., (1933) etc. 166 A. 39 and then examined touching on sampling to be a fair of cases what we believe thereafter. We then reviewed discus question decided under thе compensation sions of the context “injury” Unger, cases: Moller Motor Car Co. v. in the following Act Collett, Inc. v. Geipe, 198, (1934); A. 777 172 166 Md. 170 Ferree, 173 Md. 400, Jackson v. (1937); 165, 190 Md. A. 836 474, Foble v. Knefely, (1938); 176 Md. 6 A.2d 48 196 A. 107 403, R.R. Co. v. 192 64 Zapf, Baltimore & Ohio (1939); Md. Daniels, 199 Md. Co. v. (1949); Kelly-Springfield A.2d 139 Co., Inc. v. Saus Caled Products 156, (1952); 85 A.2d 795 v. Brauns (1952); ser, 199 Md. Greenwalt 514, 86 A.2d 904 (1953); 313, 100 A.2d 804 Sp. Corp., 203 Md. Bdg. Stancliff Co., Beth. (1955); 191, 117 A.2d 577 v. H.B. Davis 208 Md. Golombieski, 231 Md. 124, (1963); v. 188 A.2d 923 Steel Co. Gooch, 160, Food, 225 A.2d 431 Giant et al. v. 245 Md. Associates, 245 Md. 583, 227 Beauchamp Mize v. (1967); it seems that (1967). surveyed, 5 In the cases we have A.2d directly occasion to address the Court did not have focus, main, in the They se. injury per nature an on its “accidental” rather than injury an was whether Schemmel, 680, 39, 166 A. 164 Md. at composition. So it did so in terms of of an “accident” but spoke Court physical bodily to the resulting injury mischance “any tissues____” 836, 171, A. more informative.

Geipe, 172 Md. at was personal injury” an “accidental The Court observed that need not be meaning of the statute scope within body. direct impact injury or by physical caused may an injury Such emotional not a mere produces

a nervous shock effect proximate as the impulse physiological injury but event____ unexpected an unforeseen or Id. Jackson, 403, 107, stated:

In 173 Md. at 196 A. contemplates any statute means injury an as the Such casual, fortuitous, unexpected happening which or disability causes death.... personal Daniels, 85 A.2d indicated that an external any happening is accidental “even without trauma present. of an accidental nature.” But explained injury may The Court that an accidental be the portion sudden and of some unexpected rupture or body, hemorrhage internal structure cerebral or the failure of some essential function of the apoplexy, paralysis, brought as heart failure or about body, еngaged perfor- exertion of the while employee duties, mance of his the conditions of the employ- ment. ... Sausser,

The Court Md. at A.2d spoke personal of an “accidental in terms of “a injury” Greenwalt, 318, physical injury____” and 203 Md. at 100 804, opined meaning A.2d the Court that the of “accident” Compensation any mishap Workmen’s cases “includes Golombieski, which results in 231 physical injury....” 129, 923, citing Md. at 188 A.2d and Zapf Schemmel pointed out that under the Act of “accidental” has extended to include meaning been and other internal rupture aneurysm injuries an

order to a more construction in give word liberal general intent of the law and make the harmony with compensable. injury symptoms injury

This Court has further held that can time lapse follow the incident some and still be result of an “accident.” In other considered natural words, the harm does not have to be immediate or coincide 203, 206-207, the accident. 166 Md. at 170 A. Unger, 777. gather predecessors

We from these cases that our em- braced, qualifications, with some for the Workers’ Compen- sation act the common notion that an injury solely law’s accompanied mind is unless absque injuria one’s damnum indicated, however, harm. that the by physical We need not caused or harm injury by physical impact be 722 the result of a nervous may but be

directly body externally Furthermore, need not be injury shock. body, to the internal structure apparent, may but be heart fail- hemorrhage, apoplexy, example, as for cerebral need not be paralysis. symptoms ure or some the accident may but follow immediately apparent sug- may of the cases be viewed of time. Some lapse compénsable injuries may gesting psychological trauma, none of them but physiological result they when question. answer expressly

B nature a mental or emotional injuries The matter of and in actions negligence founded in tort actions arises distress, infliction of emotional of intentional under the tort textually of a demon- 2, In the absence (see note supra). compensability exclude from intent legislative strable alone in mental harm that result injuries those accidental in our a definitive answer Workers’ in the lack of cases, to tort cases. we turn Compensation Co. v. following Ry. cases: Pass. City culled the We Mitchell, 107 (1883); P., B. & R. Co. v. 61 Md. 74 W. Kemp., 69, Shoemaker, 111 Md. (1908); v. 600, A. 422 Green Md. 69 Harris, 121 Md. v. (1909); R.R. Co. 73 A. 688 Balt. & Ohio Hobbs, Md. v. (1913); Loan Co. Patapsco 88 A. 282 Roch, 160 Md. (1916); Company Tea v. 98 A. 239 Williams, 397, 165 A. (1931); Bowman v. 153 A. A.2d 923 Moore, 197 Md. (1933); v. Mahnke (1979). 490, A.2d 728 Vance, Md. 408 (1951); 286 Vance v. 81, general referred to the Md. at the Court In 61 Kemp, rule that wrong-doer the negligence]

in actions of tort [founded wrong- from his injury resulting the direct for all is liable extent or nature act, although special too the and that ful not, certainty, have could resulting injury of the of probable as the result contemplated or foreseen been the act done. 607, 69 A. found that

Mitchell, Md. at and of of text books authority both weight of [t]he no there can be the view supports decided cases suffering, fright mere or mental damages for recovery impact physical unconnected with negligence, caused by has been reached generally This conclusion injury. or as damage well reliance the remoteness upon door to claims difficult opening the inexpediency nature easy and from their proof disproof or precise exaggeration. simulation and liable any opinion upon from expressing refrained The Court results, unaccompanied fright of mere or its when adequacy action for or as a cause of impact injury, by physical there is sufficient judgment damages, because “[its] to the ... go jury record before us to evidence being] [injured person impact and physical fright____” with her contemporaneous 607-608, explained: 422. The 69 A. Id. at impact injury requisite or While the it need not be must be actual purpose under discussion external wound or bruise. Severe such as to occasion an no there is injuries, internal of which and even incurable evidence, may produced external immediate visible or accident. by violence 608, A. 422.

Id. at Green, were 73 A. The circumstances in the case now before like the circumstances remarkably blasting vicinity rocks us. The defendants were that the first blast dwelling. She testified Rebecca Green’s from the wall of the plastering half the nearly knocked in, none of it then part ceiling; she room her, child. though some fell on fell on woman’s] [another it fall. It up lift the house and then let It seemed to except in the one. It threw every glass broke window belonging It dozen jars down. broke two upside table the house. in the cellar of [her] days 73 A. 688. Ten later Md. at came down through ceiling the roof and a stone burst bed, spring, mattress and broke through [Rebecca’s] 724 slats 22 weighed pounds. and rollers. It That blast out, two,

tore window sash some in broke and threw them across the room. Her reaction pages

Id. is recounted on 73 and Md., 73 A. 688. and her sleep She husband did not that for six “in They night bed weeks after that. were terror all being killed.” said: She nerves broken [M]y completely through were down fright, my and I able to do work. was Before health, I ordinary time was in and nеver was nervous. then I had no at all. Since have health nervousness,” Her doctor attended her for “this seeing daily part April, every her the latter and thereafter week until According “developed so fall. to her doctor she prostration” which he nervous attributed shock blasting. Her testified that “his wife become husband had wreck; she thirty years age, nervous was had blasting always before attended to all her house- duties, then hold but since has been unable to do so.” The our question inquiry relevant to a cause lie physical injury resulting Does of action nervousness, fright wrongful from caused acts of [another]?

The Court observed: is divergence judicial

There a wide as to opinion lie physical whether cause action will for actual from and nervous caused injuries resulting fright shock another____ wrongful acts of But, 111 Md. at A. 688. posited: the Court settled, may be considered as that mere with- fright, [I]t any out cannot injury resulting therefrom, form basis of cause of action. (emphasis in original). explained: so, simulated, mere is fright easily

This because practical measuring because there is no standard for testing the truth of or of suffering thereby, occasioned fright. of the as the results person of the to the claims injury physical it is shown that a material But when act, wrongful and a fright caused resulted from has case, repetition a constant as in this from especially, to con- acts, calculated cause in their nature wrongful difficult, impossible, if not terror, it is alarm and stant in right of action denying sound reason perceive any law, injury. physical for such original). (emphasis Kemp, from length at quoted The Court Kemp: recognized rule general set out the is, present, of tort like the gеneral rule actions “[T]he injury for all the direct is liable wrongdoer too, act, although and that resulting wrongful from his could resulting injury of the or nature special the extent contemplated or have been foreseen not, certainty, of the act done.” probable as the result at v. Sloane approval looked with Id. at 78. (1896),in which R., 111 44 P. 320 R. Cal. Cal. Southern physical impact: no there was is, the subse- presented ... whether question “The real was a suffer- plaintiff of the quent nervous disturbance * * * mind. The nerves and body or of the ing of the physical body part centres of are nerve from exter- susceptible are not lesion system, only and de- causes, also weakened nal but are liable If upon the mind. acting primarily from causes stroyed nerves, are thus system or the entire nervous these affected, produced; and thereby is a physical injury there tortious, it is immate- if of this primal injury cause indirect, direct, blow, through it is as aby rial whether upon mind.” action some 79, A. conceded 111 Md. at 688. The Court gen- weight authority supports numerical that the no for nervous recovery there can be eral rule unaccompanied contemporaneous affections view, injury, but the sounder opinion, is, our that there are exceptions rule, to this and that where the wrongful act complained of is the proximate cause of the injury, within the principles announced in Case, Kemp’s supra, ought, light where the of all the circum- stances, to have contemplated been natural and probable thereof, consequence the case falls within the exception and should be left the jury.

Id. 73 A. 688.

The Court referred to Denver & G. Roller, R. R. Co. v. (9th Cir.1900), 100 F. 738 in which the jury instructed as follows:

“If great fright was a and reasonable natural conse- quence of the circumstances which the collision afore- said, ensuing explosion with the wreckage, and conflagra- tion, placed plaintiff, and if she put was actually circumstances, fright by those and injury her health was consequence a reasonable and natural such fright, and actually was and proximately occasioned thereby, then said is one for which injury damages are recovera- ble.”

111 Green Court declared that 82, Md. at 73 A. The 688. reasoning upon is, which that conclusion was reached “ft]he in our opinion, The Roller Court sound....” ex plained: know,

We all by common knowledge, that serious results may from naturally bodily injuries, follow without break- arm, ing leg, an or or bones The body. body and mind intimately are so connected that the ‍‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‍mind is very often and directly necessarily affected by physical inju- shock, A ries. nervous without a person, blow to the might, circumstances, under some so great as to cause bodily injury.

100 F. at 748. We have set out Green such detail cited, because it is much quoted upon and relied our opinions.5 282, looked 254, A. was a case which

Harris, 121 Md. fright injuries can be from that there holding to Green in in Harris was the physical impact. without fright produced by and by the shock of a fall caused result escape blowing a whistle loud locomotive the sudden Hobbs, A. was another Green- 129 Md. of steam. aby bed was harassed hospital A woman in a case. based into shock. She that she went debt collector to the extent convulsions. that she suffered mentally so disturbed was so hemorrhaging severe convulsions caused per- her had to be performed which had been surgery cоmpany held that the loan again. The court formed Green, Twenty-two years after injuries. for all of her liable manager of Roch, 153 A. 22. The we decided store, containing package sent Roch a grocery joke, rat, instead of when she saw the alleged dead rat. She she expecting, been the loaf of bread she had mind, and fell ill in fainted body sick and very became floor, a result thereof her and as great force suffering still is excruciat- suffered and system nervous injuries other ing anguish and mental physical pain by her. were then and there sustained flatly 22. The Court declared: Id. at A. damages may of this be recov- Under the decisions shock. injuries by fright caused ered Green, Harris and Hobbs. Kemp, Id. The Court cited Bowman, the 165 A. nourished seed home, his wife was Williams was planted Green. 69, 78, (1909), Shoemaker, 111 73 A. 688 5. The Court in Green v. Md. declaimed: rule, knowledge general as It common the is ... matter of men, are of women more sensitive to that those nerves are disturbed, disturbed, injurious easily that when and so more consequences lasting. are more serious and Hamlet, I, "Frailty, thy Shakespeare ii: said in Act scene William name is woman!” suggest and the Bard We do not that these observations of tune are in with modern times. the kitchen and his two children were the basement. house, From a in the window front of the Williams saw a large truck loaded with coal coming steep icy down a hill. control, ofOut truck crashed into the stone foundation of the side the house. did Williams not any sustain nor did impact jar the violent to the house cause him to fall. fright plaintiff and his alarm for the safety of

his two sons occasioned young were, this accident however, suсh a shock to system his nervous he fell the dining floor of immediately room after the impact house, of the truck fabric of the and was carried into the kitchen in a weak and hysterical condi- tion. for, The doctor was sent and plaintiff remained regular bed two weeks under medical treatment. 164 Md. at A. 182. Williams was unable work for six months. health,

From a state of normal immediately [Williams] became quite nervous, and continued weak and manifested to family physician expert his and an consul- disorders, tant in nervous by tangible evidence sus- ceptible simulation, the absence of any physical reason for his condition.

Id. The Court observed that “the primary effect upon personality fright him, was the it caused since [Williams] untouched____” his person was Id. at 165 A. 182. The Court opined: In fright a man’s being whole reacts. The shock to his nervous system reflected in instinctive excitement and intensive action of organs the muscles and of the body, so it is clear that the mental state has correspond- ing physical accompaniment, although there has been no impact suffered. “The fear’s as falling.” bad as Id. The Court noted: exists,

When fear the nervous physical reactions, although differing degree, probably are fundamentally identical, purely whether fear is subjective, as when it safety, objective, or is as when the victim’s own is for relative, wife, friend, child, or even for the fear is victim’s stranger. a as injury, suffers an party a The Court concluded:

Id. “[I]f fear of for health, mind, life, through safety or of loss of may had for family], recovery his members of self [or added). (emphasis Id. negligent act of another....” The Court observed fright nervous shock or sustained [Williams] of an grounds apprehension for on reasonable

based children, and was one which and his injury [him] distinguished produced deterioration naturally physical moral primarily which work from those shocks nature, physical injury. of actual the exclusion Harris, 402, Green, read 165 A. 182. at Court Id. having and Roch as Hobbs sustain action plaintiff that a can an principle

settled the caused, shock or without damages injury for for nervous defen- fright arising directly from impact, by omission, in some negligent resulting or dant’s act as mani- apparent physical injury, and substantial clearly by symptoms clearly an condition or fested external physiological, pathological, indicative a resultant mental state. added). (emphasis 165 A. 182

Mahnke, applied rulings 77 A.2d Md. It noted: Green Bowman. weight this the numerical beginning century,

At the country the rule that authority supported this affections unaccom- cannot recover nervous plaintiff by contemporaneous physical injury. panied reminded, citing 923. it Green: 197 Md. at 77 A.2d But 1909, however, adopted the rule In act of is the wrongful complained proximate where ought and the to have been injury cause the circumstances as contemplated light in the all thereof, probable natural and cause the case should be left to the jury. Mahnke, In in Bowman,

Id. there no physical were inflicted, only injuries severe trauma. Her psychological was, Bowman, physiological harm as set no out more than a result which ordinarily flows from severe mental state. event, Vance,

In any Md. 408 A.2d clarified the the questions presented matter. One of in Vance was whether, under “physical injury” test set forth Bow- man, damages for may recovered emotional distress from resulting negligent at misrepresentation. Id. Green, 408 A.2d 728. The Court discussed Roch Bow- man and cited to The Court Mahnke. concluded: think provides

We it clear that the requi- Bowman that “physical site from injury” resulting emotional distress proved in may be one four It that ways. appears these alternatives formulated purpose were with overall objective mind requiring guard against evidence to feigned claims. 408 A.2d 728. “The first categories,” three “pertain explained, of a physi- manifestations

cal injury through evidence of an external or by condition symptoms pathological or physiological state.” Id. however, proof fourth of a category, permits “physical state____” by injury” indicating evidence a “mental Id. added). (emphasis The Court formed this conclusion consis- Green, tent holdings Bowman and Roch. Id. The Court observed: rule, therefore,

In the context of the Bowman term is “physical” ordinary not used its sense. dictionary Instead, represent it is used to for which recovery sought is capable objective determination. (footnote omitted, added). emphasis of evidence of a type resulting mental state in an injury “capable of objective determination” was illustrated the distress suffered Muriel Vance. She Arnold for Vance, ceremony, together in a lived religious married left Then Arnold Muriel had two children. years awarding her alimo- sought a decree another woman. She action on the opposed Arnold support. and child ny had not marriage his Muriel he at the time of ground that and, therefore, his mar- his wife from first been divorced original- Arnold appeared It Muriel was void. riage to from his first of absolute divorce that his decree believed ly final, he was free to told Muriel that and had wife was marriage, their Arnold one month after marry her. About final until decree had become that his divorce discovered told Muriel that Arnold never to Muriel. marriage after his it until She did not discover marriage nullity. their was marriage 20 later. sought years annul the Arnold to Muriel’s that the disclosure that The at trial was evidence devastating effect on had a marriage was void twenty-year her. spontaneous shock, engaged into a state of

She went and unaware for a seemed detached crying period normally, to unable function presence. her She was own to In embarrassed socialize. sleep unable to too ulcer, of an Muriel symptoms to experiencing addition man- depression which collapse an emotional suffered condition, i.e., significant- her ifested itself in her external hair, sunk- appearance—unkempt ly physical deteriorated eyes. en cheeks and dark held that this evidence was at 408 A.2d 728. We

Id. of a mental state symptoms sufficient to establish “legally meaning within the evidencing a physical standard.” Bowman

Id. an objectively

The showed that Muriel suffered evidence magnitude manifested, nervous disorder of definite Green, established Bow- similar to the mental distress Rock____ man, and support finding a jury was sufficient to evidence

[T]he as a result injured foreseeable physically that Muriel was 732 negligent misrepresentation concerning his [Arnold’s]

marital status. (footnote omitted).

Id. argued Arnold that because Muriel adduced no medical evidence claim support distress, her for mental the case go should not to the jury. We observed that use although of medical testimony may be advisable to establish mental distress, Id. at 502- testimony always such is not required. 503, 408 A.2d 728. Court ruled that such testimony in the necessary case before it recover mental light distress of the evidence adduced. claim rejected Court also Arnold’s that the only proper Id. at way to causation is through show medical testimony. pointed 728. The A.2d Court out it had “permitted persons to to their plaintiff lay testify injuries and mental distress supporting without medical Id., Dasher, v. Tully testimony.” citing 250 Md. (1968) (nervousness, stomach). A.2d headaches, upset Tully, State out, Wilhelm v. pointed relied Comm., (1962), 185 A.2d 715 which Traffic distinguished between where cause situations of injuries expert testimony, need not be proved by and situations Vance require quoted Wilhelm proof. medical Md. 99, 185 715: A.2d are,

“There unquestionably, many occasions where causal connection a and a negligence between defendant’s claimed a disability plaintiff does not need by expert Particularly established is this true testimony. with, when the disability develops or coincidentally within after, act, a time the negligent reasonable or where the apparent causal from clearly connection is the illness it, itself and the surrounding circumstances or where the cause of experi- relates to matters of common ence, knowledge, or observation of laymen____” 503, occasions,” 286 Md. at 408 A.2d 728. “These we noted Vance, in from distinguished complex

were situations involving questions, especially medical cases on turning purely in there subjective instances where symptoms and the significant temporal lapse disability between of negligent type proof act. In the second situation expert testimony. causation must be by Id. is, time, the of Bowman at this explication

Vance’s as the definitive case on mental distress basis It traced the damages negligent carefully tort actions. rule, ‍‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‍The traditional formulated concept. evaluation damages solely for century, permit the nineteenth did not Vance, 408 A.2d 728. mental distress. Instead, parasitic for mental distress had a damages status; dependent upon physi was an immediate recovery independently cal an actionable tort. injury accompanying Furthermore, denied recov early generally Id. cases “[t]he alleged ery personal injury for mental distress when the of mental or operation resulted from the internal solely stresses____” developed exception emotional There an Id. physical impact upon person to this rule when there was place producing coincident time and with the occasion 496-497, “impact mental distress. 408 A.2d 728. The Id. rule,” occasion, permit on stretched to extreme limits to distress, rule in for mental and we recovery rejected Green, seen, As Id. at 408 A.2d 728. we have Green “a as the ‘modern rule’— adopted rule—later characterized inflic permitted damages negligent which for recovery if from the injury’ tion of mental distress results ‘physical tort, Roch, regardless impact.” commission of a noted, “damages we have stated that recovered for may be or shock.” 160 Md. at physical injuries by fright caused A. It accept 22. Then Bowman was decided. was ed as “the case on the of dam leading Maryland recovery distress____” ages negligently inflicted emotional Vance, 286 Md. at 408 A.2d 728. elaboratеd Vance suggested the term “mental state” the more liberal posited ways Bowman rule. addition to the Vance requisite resulting from proving “physical injury” distress, pertain emotional which to manifestations of a physical injury through evidence of an external condition or by symptoms pathological state, of a or physiological the requisite “physical injury” may proved be “by evidence of a capable indicative ‘mental state’ ... of objective deter- It, thus, mination.” 286 Md. at 408 A.2d 728. defined “physical injury” to include demonstrable emotional dis- tress. take present We this as the status of the of law actions, Maryland—in damages tort for may be recovered capable emotional distress of In objective determination. words, other under definition of “physical injury”, Vance’s damages resulting psychological from harm in nature may obtained, harm, be of independent physiological provided the cause and of psychological effect harm are established. dispel Vance-Bowman standard went far to the fear that the right damages emotional would distress open floodgates feigned claims. opposing Those that, right argued ground upon expediency, right denied, should be of the damages opening because door to fictitious and the litigation impossibility of estimat ing damages. this argument: Green answered from mere argument expediency cannot commend

itself to a justice, resulting the denial of a cases, logical legal right remedy all because injury may urged some a fictitious be as a real one. The apparent strength theory of the lies in the expediency fаct injuries that nervous disturbances and are sometimes real, imaginary more than and are sometimes feigned, but reasoning sight loses fact that equally obvious injury arising a nervous from actual is as impact likely imagined resulting to be as one from fright without physical impact, capable and that former is as simulation as the latter. (emphasis original). Md. at 73 A. 688. Page W.

Keeton, (5th Prosser and Keeton on the Law Torts ed. 1984), real, recognized problem one that very but as must met: simulated,

Mental is easily disturbance and courts which plagued are fraudulent personal injury may claims more unwilling to the door to an even dubious open be insuperable. field. may But the difficulties be out: p. pointed Id. 361. Keeton § shock, Not other kinds of mental only fright but physical symptoms, are marked definite which capable objective proof. are of medical or other (footnote omitted). He suggested: Id. possible recovery only upon

It is to allow satis- entirely nothing it there is to factory deny evidence when claim, guarantee corroborate the or to look for some genuineness prob- in the circumstances of the case. The lem from is one of and it perspective adequate proof, necessary deny remedy is not all cases because some claims false. may be omitted). (footnote effect on

Id. Keeton also looked to the the defendant:

And the concern excessive imposing where avoid defendant, punishment upon negligent it must be asked leaving the of loss permit whether fairness will burden upon instead the innocent victim. adequately troubling policy answered the basic Vance for surrounding liability

issues the definition of the limits requiring inflicted emоtional harm that such negligently capable objec- harm be determination. Such an objective assurance that the provides tive determination reasonable found, spurious. claim is not this assurance can be Where serious, so that appears the mental distress to be real and there is no reason to such good deny recovery. Where found, assurance is not denied. recovery should be See Keeton, 54, p. 362. §

We have traced the development law interpreted our concerned with liabili- judicial opinions harm, for inflicted mental from a standard ty negligently limiting such trauma to a stan- liability purely physical permitting damages resulting dard for trauma recovery from emotional distress that can be deter- purely objectively recognition mined. The should person compensat- ed for mental harm resulting from the negligent act of another is in accord with the increasing knowledge ever specialties which have evolved the field of medicine and in the disciplines of psychiatry and Per- psychology. sons suffering from severe mental distress are no longer simply institutions; warehoused in Bedlam type are they treated by experts medical at no small cost. We are now aware that mental injuries can be as real as broken bones result in may greater even disabilities.

y The meaning “personal of in injury” the contemplation the Workers’ Compensation act has not path followed the by taken the meaning “physical in injury” tort actions. seems, It as demonstrated the disposition of Belcher’s claim, that there has been steadfast adherence in Work- Compensаtion ers’ cases to a standard we have found to be outmoded in tort cases—a standard which treats an injury as in only “physical” dictionary meaning “physical,” is, in body, mind, relation to the not the corporeal as to opposed mental.

The to right benefits under Compensa Workers’ tion laws is “based on a largely theory social of providing destitution, support preventing settling rather than accounts between two individuals according person to their Larson, al deserts or blame.” 1 Arthur The Law Work Compensation, (1992) (hereinafter, men’s 1.20 at 2 Lar § son). In exchange receiving compensation regardless of fault, employee an abandons the right to seek common law damages tort from employer. Act; Section 9-509 of the Sandlers, Inc., see 193, 198-199, also Cox v. 209 Md. (1956); A.2d 674 some actions against parties third are still possible, though proceeds of a successful lawsuit may times applied to reimburse for the employer compensation payments. 9-902(e)(2); Railway Co. v. As § 97, 102-103, Corp., (1932); surance Md. 161 A. 5 Lar son, 2; 1.10 at McCormick, Anne Arundel County v. § cf. 692-694, (1991). employer 323 Md. 594 A.2d 1138 Compensation on to the passed expense of Workers’ of the consumer, premiums, part compensation “since in the price cost of will be reflected production, Larson, 1.10 at 2. product.” § compensation behind philosophy ultimate social in the most providing, in the liability is belief wisdom form, financial efficient, most and most certain dignified, for the of work-connected and medical benefits victims feel enlightened community an would injuries which obliged satisfactory case some less provide any form, payments of these allocating and оf the burden the consumer of payment, most source of appropriate the product.

Larson, 2.20 at 5. §

Thus, serving than purpose the Act has a broader More than employees. the interests of and their employers sustained on the indemnifying injuries workers for merely compensation provides embodied the Act job, system is lost as a result of work-related earning power when addi expectations society, The needs and disabilities. force, into In Knoche play. tion to those of the work come 449-450, (1978), Cox, 385 A.2d 1179 we v. underlying philosophy found the rationale of the Act and its Assembly set out the General the Preamble clearly original legislation: the

“WHEREAS, recognizes of The State enterprises industrial which prosecution the of various preserve to create and the wealth and upon must be relied large of the involves to prosperity State numbers workmen, resulting incapacity in their or total partial of death, the rules of the common law and or and that under unequal the in force an provisions the of statutes now citizens, in determining cast its and that upon burden is of employer injuries the of the on account responsibility workmen, and cost is by great unnecessary sustained his by in cost is the litigation, now incurred which borne in workmen, part, and the employers, taxpayers, the juries courts and to determine the the maintenance of exists; as it of under the law now question responsibility and thereto, the and its tax-

WHEREAS, in addition State providing care heavy are to a burden payers subjected their depen- workmen and support injured and for such should, consistent dents, may insofar be which burden State, people of the of the obligations and rights with provided; in this Act and distributed as fairly be more governing the WHEREAS, system the common law re- against employers injuries remedy of workmen inconsistent mod- work is ceived extra-hazardous work, conditions; in such for- injuries ern industrial and inevit- occasional, frequent now become have merly able.” Act, language philoso of light

In the it, it, purposes and the behind we believe underlying phy concept “physical injury”, for the modern times call respect to emotional distress adopted with which we have Act. injury” under the “personal to apply tort actions it; has prohibit expediency not of the Act do provisions The deterrent; in medical the advances proved it; feasible; the needs logic supports make it science mind that a appreciate have come society require it. We person’s maimed. A body as a injured as well may be depending upon type not vary trauma does psychic is scrutinized. Disabilities the harm legal action which pursued by way compensation lessened are not because in a tort damages sought by way Act rather than earning power and the loss of inability to work action. are the same. bones, flesh, ligaments, consists body

The human state does not controlled the brain. law nerves produce elements must particular of these which exists, or not it is If whether disability disability. mental, brought if it is real and is psychic liberally being a humane law and injury, accident construed, compensable. it is nevertheless dissenting This observation made director when was the case of North America v. Indemnity Insurance Co. Ga.App. in 103 120 S.E.2d Loftis, reported (1961) Compensation Board on was before Workmen’s It is the court in its quoted approval by review. opinion at 656 and is often cited the courts and scholars Larson, 42.23(a) (1992). 7-911 principle. sound See § concept see no sound or cause just why We reason assessing dam- “physical injury” adopted which we have in tort should not ages apply equally concept cases “personal injury” awarding compensation Workers’ Compensation claims. is no distinction really valid between

[T]here medical injury. Certainly opinion sup “nervous” would view, port longer and insist that it is no realistic to draw a line what and what is between “nervous” “physical.” Perhaps, in earlier much years, ... when less was known mental and nervous injuries about behavior, their relation to there “physical” symptoms excuse, difficulties, grounds was an evidentiary ruling out on such injuries, recoveries based both tort and in compensation. workmen’s But the excuse no longer exists. And therefore a state which would with compensation hold the of workmen’s from a man benefits who, mishap, before an obvious industrial a compe was tent, iron-worker, respected mishap and after the totally incapacitated for, to do the he only job was trained doing unjustifiable would violence to the nowadays act, intent of the compensation workmen’s for reasons support legal that are without either theory. medical Larson, added). (emphasis 42.23 at 7-906 Sparks See v. § Clinic, Tulane Med. Hosp. Ctr. & So.2d (La.1989). caution, There is a puts however. As it Sparks at 147: however, emphasize, showing

We that a mere that a mental was related to of em- general conditions or to incidents ployment, occurring over an extended time, period enough is not to entitle the claimant to compensation. injury The mental must precipitated by be accident, i.e., unexpected an an and unforeseen event that suddenly violently. occurs in (Emphasis original; omitted). footnote The cases note that

by rejecting century approach” the “nineteenth of making availability dependent upon rigid benefits and physical absolute distinction between and mental injuries, reach a result that approved by ... we has been of the majority jurisdictions country.

VI Due to the interest and concern of than imme- others parties question us, diate before granted we a re- amici curiae. The amici curiae quest to file a by brief in the stated that participating they brief represent the entire spectrum compensa- workers’ tion the In- payors Maryland—self-insured employers, Fund, jured Insurance organizations Workers’ trade representing overwhelming majority workers’ com- pensation insurers in the State. course,

They speak, support T. Rowe Price and its insurer, they proclaim that each of them significant

has a interest in seeing compen workers’ coverage Maryland sation remains limited to claims definite, employee wherein an has a immediate physical occurrence.[6] injury as a result of a work-related amici curiae that “the urge Workers’ Com- should not to include pensation judicially expanded law personal injuries’ as ‘accidental claims for mental conditions parties 6. The did not file additional briefs when this Court assumed jurisdiction by grant They over the case of cеrtiorari. were-content to proceed Special before us on the briefs filed them in the Court of Appeals. requesting permission There was no motion to file a brief as an support amicus curiae in of Belcher. gist that involve no physical injury body.” argument their is that adhere to we should the construction terminology used in the Act requiring body prerequisite as a compensability which the Maryland courts have observed for more than half a century. They point out that “other states with statutory language and prior case law similar to that of Maryland rejected attempts expand have to judicially workers’ com- pensation coverage to include non-physical injuries.” We have fully argument, believe we answered such lines of are persuaded we otherwise the amici curiae. do They found, as acknowledge, we have trend in [generally, grant- the the law has been towards for ing injury resulting awards mental from mental stress. Antonetti,

Marc A. Labor Law: Compensation Workers’ Statutes and the Emotional Recovery Distress Dam- of the ages Physical Absence Injury, Annual of Antonetti, of Survey American 671 at Law 695. his trend, analysis allowing sees the same justification mental-mental claims as we found:

This allowing trend toward the mental-mental claim is justified by goals both the compensation workers’ laws and evidence regarding injuries. nature mental primary goal of workers’ compensation compen- is to sate disabled If employees. an individual is unable to work job because of a related he remains injury, disabled whether injured he was from either mental or physical Therefore, stress. workers’ compensation laws should make allowances for the mental-mental claimant. Addi- tionally, modern medical psychological theory sup- ports the proposition that those are to who unable work are psychological reasons as disabled to same extent those who injured. are physically (footnote omitted). Id. at 696 We are not at odds with Antonetti’s comment that compensation because “workers’ legislature, statues are drafted the judiciary should to legislative defer judgments.” at 698. Id. “Neverthe- accord,

less,” avers, complete judicia- are in “the he we determining compensability to ry play has a role claims.” Id. compensation workers’ define adequately failed to legislature When the has interpret the law terms, ‍‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‍obliged the court is to statutory courts policy. Additionally, social and decide the best to statutes their defini- by interpreting modernize law limits. tional safe- this and reasonable precisely have done We

guards. final in their quiver.

The amici curiae have a arrow shoot Belcher with assertion They use it down try of the term “accidental legislative history personal [t]he during the 1991 recodification injury” the legislative demonstrates Compensation Workers’ law only compensable to limit claims to intent to continue person. involving physical injuries those way. We do not see it that presented Legislative Reference Department Assembly Maryland General the 1991 session of the (Acts 1991, article, Bill 1 House Employment new Labor (Acts 1991, 21), it 8) prepared by Bill 692 ch. ch. and House the statutory responsibility in its revise accordance with “Plain in the was a Code. Included revision Annotated of Article English” recodification 101—The Workmen’s file legislative the Compensation We have exhausted Act. bills, Department Legislative the of on the maintained of HB 1 ex- The Department’s Reference. “Overview” in a the law revising that to rewrite plained goal “[t]he making sub- any more and concise manner without clear Thus, language the of a revi- changes____ while stantive statute, legislative the sion differs from the derivative compen- In the case of workmen’s change.” intent does of the understanding practical application sation the largely from case law. Act was derived “Report The Bill 1” Department’s House proposed that compensation the workers’ Title 9 in the law be new Labor Employment 9-101(b) article. Section was to “(1) define “accidental injury,” an accidental injury arises and in (2) out of the course of employment; injury an negligent ...,” caused willful or person act of third 67(6). accord with the Art. Maryland former § proposed Chamber of Commerce reacted to the revision. who the attorney Compensation chaired Workers’ Com- mittee of the Chamber of Commerce the wrote Chairman the Economic expressing House Matters Committee “con- cern and the opposition to new definition of ‘accidental ” injury’ ‘personal’ because it “removes the from the word current personal injury.” substantive use accidental (Emphases in original). He claimed: change

This is a substantive from the and it current law eliminates a very substantial and fundamental defense historically applied available since 1914 and uniformly by our over the past seventy-six years. courts Hе observed:

A Legislative from Analyst assigned letter to the Article poten- Review Committee concedes there is a problem tial with proposed new definition of acciden- tal if the Maryland Appeals were interpret term “accidental other injury” include than physical injuries.

He requested that the “personal” word be included injury. definition of

The Director of Industrial Relations Chamber of Commerce followed this with a to the letter Committee, Chairman which, Senate Rules among suggestions number of respect revision laws, other he said that the Chamber was “concerned about ‘personal’ the deletion of the very word from the basic personal defined term ‘accidental injury’ workers’ title____ compensation believe,” We continue to he assert- ed, “that the use of the open term ‘accidental injury’ leaves possible the that interpretation the is to com- law intended well dam- damages as as

pensate psychological for term urged He “the use the ‘accidental ages.” too compensation definitions.” in the personal injury’ workers’ “Bill Analysis” file a legislative the We discovered con- House Economic Matters Committee prepared by the The of the was: cerning “Summary” Analysis HB 692. changes changes to cross- “This the technical bill makes (Code House Bill 1 by Revi- necessary references made sion).” background the the bill: gave It (Labor House Bill companion is a bill to This bill Article) makes all the technical bill and Employment are portions to of the Code that necessary other changes Revision. affected the Eco- added). Analysis explained

(Emphasis on appointed had Subcommittee nomic Matters Committee changes suggest- the proposed that examined Code Revision changes” HB Among 1. “technical hearing ed at the accepted had was the Subcommittee changed to injury” should be Argument that “Accidental personal (proposed by injury” “accidental Commerce)____ Chamber of the “personal” take the insertion word The amici curiae an indication of clear into the statute as proposed back mental compensation legislative permit intent Legislature intend perceive that trauma. We cannot Appeals on fears of the Court of thing such based what any ascertain, the inclusion As far as we are able do. might as a Legislature deemed “personal” word one. It cannot change, not substantive mere “technical” intent to foreclose expression legislative taken as an Legislature any harm. Had the for mental compensation matter, declared very easily it could have doubt about not compensable. harm is Overview psychological process HB revision by-product 1 noted that “[a] that exist in the law.” problems of substantive identification bill is not a for correct- a code revision vehicle Although they are discussed 9-101(b) The Special Revisor’s to “Acciden- Note headed § personal tal injury” suggest did not that there was a problem respect the “personal.” substantive word The provides Note a plain explanation why phrase the personal “accidental was used: injury” 9-101(b)], In introductory language the Chs. 8 [§ and Acts of deleted former “injury,” the terms “personal injury,” injury” and “accidental as unneces- the sary, personal since term “accidental is used injury” consistently throughout this title to avoid confusion. MTA, See & v. Md. Employees Int’l Office 453 A.2d 1191 Prof. (1982)(“The a reports negligent or caused and either accidental was is only question remaining person. act of a third So psychological sufficient reaction Belcher suffered whether for alleged qualify compensation. injury from the by the application must be resolved question now issue. This evidence adduced on the Vance standard to the Commission, rehearing a before the accomplished is best the first hear- presented review the evidence may which as the deems ing such additional evidence Commission course, be counsel shall afford- or Of necessary advisable. heard. Accordingly, ed the to be opportunity FOR BALTI- THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGMENTS OF REVERSED; MORE CITY DI- TO THAT COURT WITH

CASE REMANDED THE TO THE WORKERS’ TO REMAND CASE RECTION TO WITH DIRECTION COMPENSATION COMMISSION PETITIONER’S ITS ORDER DISALLOWING VACATE AND FUR- TO CONDUCT CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION OPINION; THIS THER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO IN THE COURT OF IN AND COSTS THIS COURT BE PAID THE TO BY RESPON- SPECIAL APPEALS DENT.

RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE concurring which Judge, CHASANOW, join JJ. opinion, not in the judgment, I in the Court’s but join view, is, my so as to be expansive of which rationale legally incorrect. Gilbert, formerly late Richard P. Chief Judge Special Jr.,

Court of L. Appeals, Robert Humphreys, (1988), Maryland Compensation Workers’ Handbook have synthesized rule from the cases that should be 5.2, applied here. Injury,” At “Personal those authors § state:

“A review case law a compensable injury shows that may found an whenever accidental physiological change found to arisen have out of and course is no employment. statutory There nor re- decisional quirement injury that the arise concurrent to or immedi- after ately the accident.

“The absence a physiological change or physical damage harm or preclude finding should that an reason, occurred. Fоr this emotional mental disorders are properly classified as injuries accidental unless they arise from an accidental event and include a physio- logical component.” (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 85-86 In matter, the instant requirement accidental event is dramatically rule satisfied. The requirement physiological change satisfied, is also at least to the extent was it satisfied in Sargent v. Board Educ. of Md.App. 577, (1981). Baltimore 433 County, A.2d 1209 Sargent building involved a custodian who was required enter a boiler to it. clean “She out blacked for several hours, is a reaction, which clearly physiological and after- wards, was temporarily unable to maintain the composure necessary to her 584-85, continue work.” A.2d Id. at at 1213. The Commission awarded “im- compensation, making plicit in its decision that did suffer a physical [the claimant] change response to her claustrophobic reaction to enter- ing the boiler.” Id. at 433 A.2d at 1213. The Special Appeals concluded “that there was sufficient evi- dence support contention that suf- she [the claimant’s] Thus, physiological court, fered a injury.” Id. the Sargent having after found error a circuit court’s conclusion no accident, there was also rejected ground an alternate for that the sustaining judgment holding the circuit court’s personal injury was sufficient. evidence ruling in In the matter the circuit court’s favor instant court judgment. is on circuit employer summary ground on the that the claimant here distinguished Sargent is, however, out. There sufficient evidence to did not black physiologi- Belcher sustained generate a factual issue that of the accidеnt. It could found injury cal as the result accident, that, she suffered amnesia for as a result of the hours, shaking, quite cold involuntarily became several shock, she suffers chest and shoulder and was in and that headaches, attacks, sleeplessness night- pains, panic this evidence a generates jury mares. I would hold that Certainly, Belcher’s claim is change. issue on physiological claim on complaints demonstrable than is a based more back, resulting unusual, from an allegedly pain the low if work, compensable, can be twisting motion at which believed, complaints cannot be though objectively even corroborated. is not a case analysis, the instant matter foregoing

On mind,” unaccom- solely to one’s in which there “an 709, 721, 621 A.2d harm. 329 Md. panied by physical (1993). attempt is no need to Consequently, there body Maryland a tort law single phrase condense into (said “a for distress to be bearing damages emotional damages for trauma re- recovery standard permitting objective- distress that can be sulting from emotional purely Id. determined”). 621 A.2d at 885. Whether or ly condenses foregoing accurately statement law, into the Com- imported should not be Workers’ tort it Act). (the pensation Act takes a opinion expansive majority rationale presents under the Sargent which, analysis,

state of facts claim,” it by recognizing and resolves “physical-mental compensable “Physical- claim. “mental-mental claim” a leads a mental claims which involve conversion neurosis fol- example, for disability; mental DeCarlo, Workplace Stress: D. lowing injury.” traumatic Trends, (Am.Ins.Ass’n.1987). Perspectives Outlook and “Mental-mental claims refer to mental stress which results in a mental example, disability; nervous breakdown brought by job on harassment or termination.” Id. “ erects a “caution”—the majority ‘mental injury ” must precipitated be by an accident.’ 329 Md. at A.2d at 887 (quoting Sparks v. Tulane Medical Ctr. Hosp. Clinic, (La.1989)). & 546 So.2d What the majority apparently considers to be an appropriately compensable claim, mental-mental and what the considers to majority the appropriate scope of the accident requirement, are illus- trated in the cited favorably Sparks decision. claimant was hired employer hospital 1980.

She years worked for four sup- distribution medical plies, promoted regular manager work-week of the distribution center in stopped April and work 1987. Relatively early her she had employment, complained to supervisor her about smoking marijuana, co-workers and she had cautioned a possible co-worker about drug posses- sion. From time to time property was stolen from the storeroom, including belonging claimant, some vandalism, there were acts of some of might which have been directed at the claimant.

In at a staff meeting, the claimant expressed her opinion crew, that a weekend charge of another supervisor responsible shelves, for restocking supply had performing been In poorly. protest criticism, of the two weekend employees refused to restock at all the following weekend. When a senior supervisor decided protestors that the should be suspended for five days, “ supervisor weekend told the claimant that ‘a lot of people ” around here want to kick your butt.’ at 141. A majority Supreme that, Court of Louisiana held law, as a matter of the communication of threats accident, claimant was an and that her fright upset threats, over the which resulted in an emotional disability, 750 Id. at 148. “The Louisiana injury. legislature

was the decision, to the passing reacted amendments quickly Sparks in agreement reasoning.” to the statute with the dissent’s Antonetti, Compensation M. Labor Law: Workers’ Stat- utes the Emotional Distress Recovery Damages of of 1990 Ann.Surv. Am.Law Physical Injury, the Absence of 671, omitted) (footnote (Antonetti). 680 “ the approval ‘allowing I the of disagree majority’s with claim the justified by goals mental-mental both [as] the compensation regarding workers’ laws evidence ” 741, 329 at 621 A.2d at injuries.’ nature of mental Md. 696). legislative history 888 Antonetti at The (quoting Maryland Compensation the of the recodification Workers’ that Assembly’s Act to me the General intent plain makes Further, not compensable. mental-mental claims should in, and Assembly’s ongoing the interest concern General over, compensation judicial dictate the costs workers’ by expansion judicial than an of benefits restraint rather “ fiat, the view of ‘the best social majority’s based on ” 742, at at (quoting 621 A.2d 888 Antonetti policy.’ 698). 101 of the Md. recodified from former Art. Act was the Article of the Employment

Code Title 9 of Labor 8 of Acts of 1991. It was introduced by Chapter Code the 9, 1991, to the January Bill 1 on and referred House As the staff of proposed Economic Matters Committee. Department of Legislative Legislative Division of the Revisor), introduced, 9-101(b) cre- (the and as Reference § throughout term the Act—“acciden- ated definitional usеd January chairperson tal letter of injury.” By of the Compensation Maryland Committee Workers’ Chairperson Chamber Commerce wrote this defini- opposing House Economic Matters Committee term, Title use the “acci- urging proposed tion and that used, had dental been albeit personal injury,” Although Revisor’s Note to in. Art. 101. uniformly, in House no 9-101, included Bill indicated that that was § intended, position taken change substantive of merit. Chamber of Commerce was not devoid We have out, through Judge Eldridge, recently pointed speaking “personal injury normally physical injury ... connotes Streidel, 533, 539, United States v. a victim.” (1993). A.2d in part Chamber Commerce pointed Legislative out that letter from the Analyst “[a] assigned to the Article Review Committee concedes that potential problem proposed there is a new defini- Appeals tion of accidental if the Court of interpret were to the term ‘accidental to include injury’ other physical injuries.” than

Companion to the and legislation proposed new Labor Bill Employment prepared Article was House to correct the cross-references that ren- throughout Code would be dered obsolete the new Labor and Article. Employment 1, 1991, Bill February House introduced on also was referred to the House Economic Matters Committee. That Bill inserting committee amended House 692 a new 5 § bill, consisting eighteen printed pages. changed Laws 1170-87. The amendments the Revisor’s personal definitional term “accidental to “accidental injury” and inserted that term Title 9. injury” throughout proposed House Bills 1 and 692 the reported favorably by were 1, 1991; House Committee on March passed by both were 6, 1991; the House on March introduced into the both were 7, 1991; Senate on March and enacted. House both were Bill 1 Bill was enacted on March while House 692 was enacted on March 22 as 21 of the Acts of Chapter 1991.

In Maryland the Code the combined effect of both bills appears under the Revisor’s Note to 9-101 that has § unchanged remained from introductory its form House Bill 1. But the Assembly agree General did not with the Revisor that there was no difference “accidental between injury” personal “accidental We should not injury.” engaged consider that the General a useless Assembly act it throughout when caused amendments to made Act. Clearly general purpose of the amendments was prevent judicial interpretation injury” of “accidental physical injuries.”

that included “other than amendments, however, legislative At time of the Appeals Sargent already interpreted had Special to include personal injury” physiological “accidental Thus, changes. I Belcher’s claim is not agree while barred, I this Court should respect also believe that covering Assembly intent of the General and refrain from of “acciden- mental-mental claim with the mantle purely personal tal injury.”

Further, ongoing legislative executive and recent economic that seek to balance benefit to workers studies against against should dictate employers cost economically disruption uninformed that balance Court’s Act to include mental-mental claims. On by expanding the of Economic Maryland Department December (DECD) issued Community Development reрort in fifty- costs compared Maryland’s compensation workers’ twenty-nine those of other occupational one classes with Compensation Maryland Workers’ DECD, states. (1985)(the Report). It found that “ranked DECD respect in the third of the states high-cost (SEP), losses, and indemnity Premium Standard Earned losses.”1 Id. at 73. also Report total found in all “Maryland high-cost categories ranked in the third ... loss- permanent partial including indemnity under injuries, Id. es, losses, and claim count.” Iden- medical total losses reform permanent partial tified as areas of were possible containment, awards, medi- medical cost use standardized file-and-use, guides, rating—modified data competitive cal Id. at workplace. in the reporting, safety collection and and 77-84. (or (SEP) premium paid premium is

1. earned the total "Standard paid) by employers given in a risk classification contracted to be rating beginning experience at the based on manual rates and gross policy period. premium The SEP sometimes identified as average employers' gross cost of workers’ because it is a estimate Report compensation DECD at 40. insurance." 31, 1985, the Ad-Hoc Work- group, another On December (the Working Group), Compensation ing Group on Workers’ entitled, Compensation “Workers’ report, issued a also Compensation Workers’ Group, Working Maryland.” Group comprised (1985). Working Maryland labor, community, the business organized from members availability quality “researchers familiar with compensation experience.” Maryland’s of data on workers’ propose was “to Id. Working Group’s purpose 3. The compensа- workers’ Maryland’s effective initiatives for cost Id. at 1. Working Group In its report, tion system.” recommendations, several of which were made numerous Report. made in the DECD the same as those 01.01.1986.11, 5, 1986, on June Gover- Executive Order By nor established the Governor’s Commission Hughes (the Compensation System Commis- Study Worker’s sion). 3, 1986). The for the impetus Md.Reg. (July Report from the DECD Executive Order came Governor’s See id. The Executive Working Group’s report. and the laws, reviewing the charged the Commission with Order to “the cost of work- relating and other matters procedures provision adequate and the efficient compensation ers’ workers,” recommending and with benefits to changes. the Governor’s Commission replaced

The Commission “fo- Laws. That commission Compensation Workmen’s fairness efficiency more on the issues of cused law, and did compensation of the worker’s implementation of the new cost reduction mandate specific not have the Report Services, of Fiscal Department Commission.” Staff Paper Compensation Maryland: Briefing on Worker’s (Jan. 19, 1987). Assembly 1987 General 1987. Governor’s reported January The Commission Compensation System, Study Commission to Workers’ to Study the Governor’s Commission Work- Report of (1987)(the System Report). Commission Compensation ers’ stated: Report to the Commission Summary The Executive is a social compensation system major “The workers’ million Maryland’s two program Maryland, providing in ill- injuries and remedies work-related workers with clearly studies have estab- nesses. Previous research compensa- present lished that the costs of the workers’ in- employers significantly are Maryland tion to system an workers’ Maryland expensive and that creasing, Mary- reform of Comprehensive state. compensation is critical to compensation program land’s workers’ modern, equita- that is both system effective achieving and cost effective.” ble at 1.

Id. session, Assembly made the General During its 1987, chs. Act. Acts of revisions to the See substantial a Work- things, Chapter 590 established Among 591. other Oversight Benefit and Insurance Com- Compensation ers’ Committee). 1987, ch. Acts of (the Oversight mittee examin- charged Oversight 3. The Committee § compensa- “the condition of workers’ ing evaluating ‍‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‍and the Maryland” structure and insurance tion benefit Oversight Commit- Id. legislation. effects of the 1987 year 31 of each December report by tee must It has done so. Assembly. and the General Governor 1889, 1990, 1991, Committee, Oversight Reports See and the to the Governor 1992 Interim Assembly. General question addresses the expressly studies

None of these never claims, they have apparently because mental-mental there in the Act and because to included considered been Act include them. Whether the significant impetus is no claims re- include mental-mental expanded should be interests many of costs benefits an evaluation quires is, It in my of the entire State. economy up that make to decide that view, for this Court inappropriate particularly need not be decided. that issue a case which question have authorized and CHASANOW Judges McAULIFFE expressed join the views they me to state that concurring opinion. notes ing problems, substantive of the revision. following each section

Notes

notes revisor or revision commission are еntitled to weight considerable in ascertaining intent.”). legislative See also Dean v. Pin der, 154, 163, (1988) (“It 538 A.2d 1184 is a well- settled practice of this to refer to the Revisor’s Notes when searching enactment.”). for intent of legislative an The “personal” quieted inclusion of the apparently word the Nevertheless, fears of the Chamber Commerce. in circumstances, the we do not think demon- action strated legislative intention to for preclude compensation emotional distress. VII presented Belcher questions appeal two on her the Special Court of Appeals accepted we them our grant of certiorari. She asked: (1) Is mental condition under the compensable [Act] where there is no physical injury? (2) Did Belcher such suffer reaction from psychological the accidental injury qualify compensa- sufficient to as a personal ble accidental injury? question first is a matter of law. The answer is “yes” in the the context of definition of “physical Vance injury,” applied which we have now a “personal injury” contemplation the Workers’ Compensation act. is, That injury may an under Act psychological if nature the mental state for recovery sought which is Inasmuch as circuit capable objective determination. “no”, granting court that the answer was it erred decided made summary judgment employer the motion by Belcher. summary judgment and in made denying concerns a matter of fact. In the question second us, parties, it is argued by appeal before as briefed Act, that, Belcher contemplation in the disputed T. her Rowe Price was insured employee; covered injury personal; she suffered was employer; whatever employment the course of her arose out of

Case Details

Case Name: Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Mar 25, 1993

Citation: 621 A.2d 872

Docket Number: 78, September Term, 1992

Court Abbreviation: Md.