Beitner v. Becker
824 N.Y.S.2d 155
N.Y. App. Div.
2006
Check Treatment

Leo Beitner, Appellant, v Steve Becker, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York

[824 NYS2d 155]

■ Leo Beitner, Appellant, v Steve Becker, Respondent. [824 NYS2d 155]—

In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of a contract of sale of shares of stock, and to recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated October 11, 2005, as denied his motion for summary judgment on the first, second, and third causes of action.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff‘s motion which was for summary judgment on the third cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the plaintiff‘s motion which were for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action. In the first cause of action, the plaintiff sought to enforce the terms of a memorandum of indebtedness (hereinafter the memorandum) allegedly executed by the defendant on July 6, 1998 in which the defendant purportedly stated only that he “owe[d]” the plaintiff certain corporate stock, negotiable instruments, and action warrants. This memorandum was not in the form of a promissory note, as it did not by its terms contain a promise to pay (see Uniform Commercial Code § 3-104 [1] [a]-[d]; [2] [d]). Rather, the memorandum constituted a voluntary and unenforceable executory promise (see ; ; , affd ; ; ; cf. ). Hence, the plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in connection with the first cause of action, and the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff‘s motion which was for summary judgment on that cause of action.

The plaintiff similarly failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in connection with his second cause of action, seeking, inter alia, specific performance of a purported agreement with the defendant, pursuant to which the defendant allegedly agreed to tender to the plaintiff the stock certificates described above. All contracts must be supported by consideration, consisting of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee (see ; see also ; cf. ). The plaintiff, as promisee, seeks to recover the stocks from the defendant in consideration for his previous financial losses, purportedly arising from his detrimental reliance on the defendant‘s mismanagement of investment funds. Past consideration is insufficient to support a contractual obligation, unless the consideration is expressed in writing, which was not done here (see General Obligations Law § 5-1105; ; ; ; ; ). Since the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of an enforceable contract, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment on the second cause of action.

The plaintiff did, however, establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the third cause of action, seeking recovery on a promissory note dated September 15, 1999, in the principal sum of $300,000, by demonstrating that in consideration for a loan the defendant executed a promissory note containing a promise to pay the plaintiff a sum certain on or before a date certain. Contrary to the Supreme Court‘s determination, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition by his conclusory assertions that he did not sign the note. “Something more than a bald assertion of forgery is required to create an issue of fact contesting the authenticity of a signature” (; see ; ; ; cf. ; but cf. ). Therefore, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the plaintiff on his third cause of action. Crane, J.P., Krausman, Spolzino and Skelos, JJ., concur.