221 Pa. 232 | Pa. | 1908
Opinion by
This is an important case in the sense that it has to do with the rights, duties and liabilities of a parent in dealing with a married child. The action is brought by a son-in-law against his father-in-law to'recover damages for the alienation of the affection of the wife of the former and daughter of the latter. At the old common law it is doubtful whether the al
In actions of this character the question is whether the father was moved by malice and without justification, or by a proper parental regard for the welfare and happiness of his child. There can be no law to restrain a father from honestly and properly endeavoring to protect his daughter, b}r means of counsel and advice concerning her marital relations, so long as he in good faith advises what he believes to be right and proper under the circumstances.
There is a wide and essential difference between the rights and privileges of a parent in such cases and those of an inter-meddling stranger. In all such cases the motives of the parent are presumed good until the contrary is made to appear. It is true a father has no right to restrain his daughter from returning to her husband if she desires to do so. On the other hand, he may lawfully give counsel and advice for her own good and shelter her in his own house, if she chooses to remain with him, without making himself liable in an action of
In the present case the,amended statement of claim alleges that the defendant did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause his daughter to separate from her husband and that he encouraged her to receive1 the attentions of other men under a promise that he would procure a divorce for her so that she could remarry, by reason of which acts and promises the affection of the wife for her husband was alienated. These allegations were evidently made in the amended statement because the averments of, the original declaration'were not deemed sufficient to sustain the action against the father under the rule hereinbefore referred to. In this connection it is proper to remark, that it is not only necessary to allege all the essential elements required to sustain the action, but the measure of proof must be correspondingly high. It will not do to allege an extreme case and' support it by indifferent proof, or by proof which fairly considered only shows that the parent did what any,parent would have done under similar circumstances for the peace and comfort and happiness of his household. We have, examined with painstaking care the record in this case, and have carefully read all the testimony in order that it might be propérly determined whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the' submission of the question to the jury. In this class of, cases" thb first duty rests with the court to say whether the evidence iá. Sufficient to meet the measure of proof required' aMwhether,df4>elieved, it would warrant a finding
As to the letters offered in evidence, we are inclined to think there is some force in the suggestion of the learned counsel for appellant that they were improperly admitted for the purpose offered. They showed not any alienation of affection, but continued affection by the wife for her husband. However, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the question of their admissibility because, if properly admitted, there was nothing to show that the father had anything to do with them, or had been responsible for having them written. Certainly under these circumstances nothing said in the letters would be sufficient to support a charge • that the father had alienated the affections of the daughter.
Our conclusion is that the testimony was wholly insufficient to support the action, that the case should not have been submitted to the jury and that a verdict should have been directed for the defendant.
Judgment reversed and is here entered for defendant.