111 P. 1032 | Mont. | 1910
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action on a certificate of insurance issued by the defendant, a mutual benefit association, to James Beirne, plaintiff’s husband, upon his life, for her benefit. The issues in the pleadings are made substantially as follows: Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Beirne at the time of his death was a member of the defendant association or order in good standing, having complied with all the requirements of the articles of association, and the by-laws, and performed all of the agreements and conditions on his part to be performed. Defendant denied this allegation and alleged affirmatively that Beirne had neglected to comply with certain by-laws of the association, in that he had failed to pay his monthly dues for December, 1908, and January, February and March, 1909, and was thereby suspended icom membership. The allegation is that he had neither paid nor tendered the dues. By reply, plaintiff denied that the dues for December, 1908, were not paid, and alleged that they were paid. She admitted that the dues for January, February and March, 1909, were not paid, and alleged as a reason therefor that “the defendant association prevented performance on the part of the deceased in those particulars.” Then, “in avoidance of the new matter in the answer, ’ ’ she alleged in effect that tender of the dues was made and refused. At the trial the plaintiff rested her case without attempting to prove the tender. Thereupon the defendant made a motion for a nonsuit. The court expressed the opinion that the motion should be granted, whereupon counsel for plaintiff asked.leave to prove the affirmative matter set forth in the reply. After argument and without ruling on plaintiff’s request, the court granted the nonsuit. The plaintiff then asked leave to reopen her case and make the required proof. The court said: “I think I have no discretion in the matter, and the motion to reopen is denied.” Judgment was entered for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals therefrom.
1. It is contended by the appellant that, in an action on a contract of life insurance, it is not necessary for the plaintiff, in the first instance, to prove that the deceased was in good standing
2. It is urged that the court was in error in deciding that it had no discretion in the matter of allowing plaintiff to reopen her case and offer evidence of tenders made. We think this point is well taken. Such matters are always within the sound legal discretion of a trial court. (1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 343; State v. De Hart, 38 Mont. 211, 99 Pac. 438; Dempster v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 37 Mont. 335, 96 Pac. 717; Butte Consolidated Mining Co. v. Barker, 35 Mont. 327, 89 Pac. 302, 90 Pac. 177; Tyler v. Healey, 51 Cal. 191.) The court having held that it had no power to grant plaintiff’s request, she was of course precluded from appealing to its discretion. (Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176, 17 Am. Rep. 337; Heinlen v. Cross, 63 Cal. 44.)
It is suggested that counsel for the plaintiff was trifling with the court. The record does not so disclose, and we should hesitate to so believe. We are inclined to the opinion that the court should have allowed plaintiff to reopen her case. (See Roach v. Rutter, 40 Mont. 167, 105 Pac. 555.) No substantial right of the defendant would have been prejudiced by such action. Causes should be tried on the merits whenever it is possible to do so. It is the policy of the law.
Reversed and remanded.
