236 Pa. 519 | Pa. | 1912
Opinion by
It may be that because of modern innovations on the common law respecting the property rights of married women, the venerable estate known as estate by entireties has outlived the purpose of its creation and is out of harmony with present conditions. However this may be, if change is desired, it must come through legislative action and not through judicial construction. This estate is too well established and too well defined to be subject to judicial impairment. Recognizing its very anomalous character we have been careful, as all our cases show, to give effect to these peculiar incidents which naturally and logically attach, especially to its chief distinguishing incident which exempts it from the ordinary legal process to which all other estates are subject. Fundamentally the estate rests on the legal unity of husband and wife; it is therefore a unit, not made up of divisible parts subsisting in different natural persons, but is an indivisible whole, vested in two persons actually distinct, yet to legal intendment one and the same. Each is seized of the whole estate from its incep
It is this striking peculiarity of the estate — the entirety alike in husband and wife — that operates to exempt it from execution and sale at the suit of a creditor of either separately. The enforcement of such process would be the taking of the property of one to pay the debt of another. But may not the interest of either be seized in satisfaction of his or her appropriate and exclusive debt? Before answering let us clearly understand what is here meant by interest. For convenience of illustration take the case of a husband. Towards everybody in the world except the wife he has exclusive possession during her lifetime, and his right to the enjoyment of the estate during this period may not be interfered with at the suit of his creditor. So much is conceded, and has been expressly decided by this court in a number of cases, notably in McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa.
This case stands as authority with respect to what it expressly rules, viz: that the interest of husband and wife where they hold by entireties may be the subject of lien, and that upon the death of either the lien against the survivor may be enforced. It is to be observed that it does not rule that there can be a severance in ownership in any other way than by the death of one or other of the parties, or by voluntary alienation by both. So it will become apparent on a recital of the facts we have here, that the present case falls without the scope of that. Here the estate in the land as originally created continues, and what we have tó determine is the capacity of the parties, husband and wife, by their joint deed to convey the interest of both free and discharged of the lien of the husband’s judgments. The property was acquired by deed of conveyance to husband and wife in 1903. On the 2nd of July, 1909, the husband, Ernest H. Beihl, by the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was adjudged a bankrupt, his wife not being a party to the proceeding or consenting thereto. On the same day several judgments were entered against the husband by creditors who subsequently filed their respective claims with the referee appointed in the bankruptcy proceedings. In September, 1911, Beihl and his wife entered into articles of agreement with William J. Martin, the defendant, whereby for consideration of $6,500 they covenanted to sell and convey the property so above ac
The effect sought to be given the case of Fleek v. Zillhaver, supra, has made this discussion seem necessary, But for that case we might well have rested this on what we regard as the decided weight of authority in other jurisdictions touching the questions here directly involved. We attempt no discussion of these conflicting decisions. They may be found cited and reviewed in a very carefully prepared annotation in the case of Jordan v. Reynolds, Maryland Court of Appeals, reported in 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) — page 1026, where the following conclusion is expressed by the learned editor. “The weight of authority founded as we think upon the better reasoning, is that such acts (the reference being to enabling acts with respect to rights of property in married women) do not in any way effect estates by entirety, except that they deprive the husband of the right to the possession and enjoyment of the property held by himself and wife in this manner, to the exclusion of the wife. That such acts have the effect of freeing the wife’s property from any liability to his creditors, and that, therefore, her rights to the possession and enjoyment of property held in common with her husband by entirety cannot in any way be interfered with by his creditors; and hence the entire property, during their joint lives, is free from judgment or execution lien directed against either of them?” In this conclusion we entirely concur, saving, however, whatever exception may be required to give effect as above indicated to the doctrine asserted in Fleek v. Zillhaver.
The decisions holding to a different view than that we here express would seem to rest largely upon considerations of policy; the governing consideration in each seeming to be that the exemption of the estate from executions and liens directed against husband or .wife would be an invitation to fraud, and would operate
The learned court below adjudged the deed in this case from husband and wife sufficient to pass title free from the effect of the bankruptcy proceedings and the judgments against the husband, and free from any contingent interest or ownership therein by the said trustee in bankruptcy in the event of the bankrupt surviving his wife. In this the court was correct. The exceptions are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.