*1 to confront his accuser first although denied right yet was to be held. He also attacks the hearing administrative South Dakota Administrative Procedures Act at random. Certain- lack, ly claims the concreteness properly prerequisite these resolution. judicial now entitled plaintiff judicial
We conclude that relief and that the trial court did not err its dismissal. order of Affirmed.
All the concur. Justices
BEHRNS, BURKE, Appellant Respondent
(
J. defendant and respondent.
DOYLE, Justice. Behrns,
The plaintiff, Mabel sister, was with riding her Burke, defendant LaVerna Lead, Beard aon from trip South Dakota, Yankton, South Dakota. The parties intended to leave 1-90 at U.S. 81 and drive directly south to Yankton. Defendant took an mistakenly exit several miles west U.S. 81 exit. This road intersects with U.S. which is protected at by intersection stop signs. Defendant drove her car into the intersection without obeying posted stop signs collided with another vehicle on traveling U.S. 16. plaintiff As result incurred hospitalization $16,000 expenses of approximately Mitchell and Lead. She was hospitalized for approximately and was one of the doctors
twenty-two months considered thirty disability. have a permanent percent who testified to trial, that defendant was jury At the court instructed whether issue of jury’s and left for consideration negligent as provided by without compensation was plaintiff these on the excepted statute.1 Plaintiff instructions which of the unconstitutionalitv ground the basis In her brief simple negligence. prevents as the constitutional her basis claims plaintiff her and the thereby admits status appeal impliedly absence of willful wanton misconduct.
Plaintiff was a different standard of care than protected *3 cars, in other passengers, that protecting paying guests pedes- and real are protected by trians who guests property social This claimed standard. discrimination is violate Art. negligence Constitution,2 VI, 18 of the South Dakota the equal protection § clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States VI, Constitution,3 Ill, and Art. and 20 Art. 23 of the § §§ South Dakota Constitution.4 a operator of by transported the owner or person “No 1. SDCL 32-34-1: compensation transportation motor shall have cause of action for as his without for such vehicle operator damages against such owner for or death, loss, accident, injury, in such shall have case of unless accident or op- willful and of been wanton misconduct or caused owner vehicle, and willful erator of duct motor unless such and wanton miscon- such death, injury, is to the or loss for which the action contributed brought.” Constitution, VI, passed grant- law shall 2. South Art. 18: “No be Dakota § citizen, any corporation, privileges ing to class of citizens or immunities or upon equally belong which porations.” same terms shall to all citizens or cor- Amendment, Constitution, persons 1: “All 3. United Fourteenth States § States, subject jurisdiction United and born or naturalized thereof, they the United and of the State wherein are citizens of States any abridge which No shall make or law shall reside. privileges State enforce States; any United shall immunities of citizens of the nor or life, liberty, property, process deprive any person due State of or without the law; deny any person jurisdiction equal protection of nor within its ” (emphasis supplied) the laws. of Constitution, VI, person deprived Aft. 2: “No shall be South Dakota § life, liberty process right persons law. The property without due or The last three alleged constitutional are violations III, and without merit deserve little a attention. Article § or when prohibition special private laws law is against general A applicable. legislature has avoided successfully prohibition this when statute is framed “so its it good faith terms all should of the apply parts state and on all members operate when they the class come within the scope purpose ** enactment 5'Generally, any define legislature may wishes, it all class so as long members of that class are treated prohibition alike the or laws against private special is not violated; Berndt, 1900, cf. Bon County Homme The guest statute is not to an individual “Granting ** * any special immunity or exclusive or fran- privilege, chise;” class of all members it on a individuals and treats operates III, class Article is not violated. uniformly. of that § Nor does statute violate the due process guarantee VI, clause, believe, Art. 2. That we is applicable to the facts § before us only so far as it grants every person right to
to work shall not be denied or abridged on membership account of or non- union, any membership in organization.” labor or labor Constitution, South Dakota Art. open, 20: “All courts shall every injury man an person done him property, reputation, in his or *4 law, remedy by shall have right justice, due course of admin- delay.” istered without denial or Contitution, Ill, Legislature prohibited South Dakota Art. 23: “The § * * * any private from enacting special or following laws in the cases: individual, Granting corporation any 9. an special association or or * * * privilege, immunity exclusive or franchise whatever. Legislature may repeal any “But the existing special relating law to the foregoing subdivisions. “In all general other cases a applicable where special law can be no law shall be enacted.” McQuillin, Ed., Municipal Corporations, at 82. 3rd 4.44 § the by class affected statute.6 inclusion in the on his hearing a that ‘for since “It is VI, 20, guarantee is inapplicable Article § land law of the the courts by the recognized as are wrongs such ” Kidd, 1949, Simons v. remedy.’ and afford open shall be declares that 41, injuries statute guest are not caused negligence because of host’s aby suffered ” “ land.’ the law of the by are recognized as by ‘wrongs statute her of deprives claims that the finally Plaintiff Amendment of the Fourteenth protection guarantees the equal VI, the South and Art. the United States Constitution § “equal We here that the term protec- Constitution. note Dakota VI, us in Art. research leads tion” does not appear § federal and state tests used in applying believe that 18, is, if identical. Article anything, are not guarantees than the Fourteenth. constitutional standard stringent more Amendment. Parrish, 1937, Company v. 300 U.S. Hotel process, since West Coast
6. Due courts, 703, has, ceased to be a in .the federal 81 L.Ed. 57 S.Ct. legislative and dis- judicial with creation justifying interference tool for long ago rights. has sustained statutes This court solution of substantive process-procedural due substantive due reasoning bottomed on the with process Co., 1914, dichotomy. Elevator In Street v. Farmers’ receipt grain made a challenge was to a statute that ownership grain as evidence of of that an elevator conclusive (cid:127)issued judicial prevented argued that the statute against It was the elevator. and, therefore, process. Judge ownership violated due determination actually right dealt with a substantive Whiting the statute noted then that policy. We —ownership grain was a matter of note —and In v. Farmers’ analogy present situation. Street a remarkable to our Co., receipt might supra, possible that one issued Elevator it is Nevertheless, de- grain a later date. statute owner of that been the the. us, In case before ownership laying a strict rule. clared down hospitality statutory purposes encouraging and dis- assuming undoubtedly cases where the ungrateful litigation, there are couraging hospitality the-guest statute and where given have been without would ingrati- and not out of a dire need for litigation ensues out of deprived legislature enacting has tude. The depriva- judicial ingratitude hospitality. Neither of a determination of or adopt theory process. we tion violates due that cases such as Roe L.Ed.2d We add that hesitate Wade, 113, 179, 705, 739, 1973, Bolton, 1973, 410 U.S. 410 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 93 S.Ct. 35 35 and Doe herald the revival of substantive Tribe, process. due See L.Ed.2d Law, Due of Life and a Model of Roles in the Process Foreword: Toward 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1 *5 (1973).
101 equal protection The Fourteenth Amendment clause “de- the to different power to States treatment be legislate nies] by accorded to into different classes persons placed wholly the basis criteria unrelated to the objective of reasonable, statute. A classification ‘must be arbitrary, not must upon having rest some of difference fair and ground object substantial relation to the so that all legislation, ” similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Reed v. persons 1971, Reed, 71, 251, 225, 404 92 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. 30 quoting 1920, 412, 415, v. Royster 253 U.S. 40 S.Ct. Virginia, Guano Co. 560, 989, 561, 64 L.Ed. presented 990.7 This court has been with legislation: promotion two this proposed objectives and the of collusion which will be discussed hospitality prevention later.
The hospitality rationale three factors: appears of free prevention ungrateful litigation, encouragement rides, and desire to offer the which guest only protection for he pays. (This third factor to be appears means achieving the first Without these two.) questioning desirability of ends, we cannot say the automobile removing guest from standard has no protection negligence relation the accomplishment of those ends. 18,
Article of the South Dakota Constitution has been First, enforced ways. court two this court has invalidated statutes when it has with the class disagreed lines drawn legislature.8 distinction between the classes must be “clearly wisely may drawn.”9 The legislature 7. here, Plaintiffs have made no claim right that a fundamental is involved and, therefore, arewe not asked to examine the statute under strict judicial scrutiny requiring a compelling state justify interest the classifi- See, Elections, 1966, g., Harper cation. e. v. Virginia State Bd. of 383 663, 1079, 169; 1969, U.S. 86 S.Ct. 16 Shapiro Thompson, L.Ed.2d v. 394 618, 1322, Furthermore, U.S. 89 Antonio, 22 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 600. San 1973, 1, 1278, School Rodriguez, District v. 411 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 16, appears scrutiny to have limited strict to those affecting classifications rights the exercise of rooted the constitution. 1892, 858; Scougal, 8. State v. O’Leary 3 S.D. Croghan, N.W. 844; 42 S.D. Stavig Camp, N.W. v. Van 46 S.D. 760; Jones, 1925, 192 N.W. Standard Oil Co. v. 48 S.D. N.W. Berndt, County 9. Bon Homme
“ discriminate between ‘arbitrarily in persons substantially same The situation. discrimination must rest some reason- upon * * ”10 able of difference *.’ ground This test is not a substitution of the court’s judgment for that of the legislature the wisdom of the regarding statutory purpose is an examina- —it tion court to ensure that the persons affected aby statute are those that should be reached to achieve the desired legislative Where, however, ends. the line between those touching to be remedied and problem those having no relation to the discernible, is not problem easily we have indicated we will not disturb the legislature’s classification.11 VI, 18, The second method of Art. enforcing requires that § * * the “act accomplish what is claimed for it *.”12This rule strict, rather but appears it is it in the tempered by reading Wood, 1927, context of the case in which it State v. appears. S.D. 215 N.W. involved statute the sale of forbidding patent medicines proprietary except by registered pharma- cist. We held that sale of medicines patent by pharmacists would since, harmful protect from as a public compounds matter, were in practical no better to be pharmacists position familiar with the medicines’ manufacture and than ingredients any other “We reputable merchant. unable to see wherein [were] the unlimited and restricting pharmacists sale of unregulated patent proprietary medicines protect public tend[ed] health.”13 (emphasis supplied) Watson, 1903, 486, 499, 463, 467,
10.
In re
quoting
from
People,
Lasher v.
183 Ill.
This test is not for the Brandéis brief but a request a. requirement palpably the classification scheme not test, obviously in vain. This is reasonable for to classify persons a chance classify without of result is to and without artibrarily purpose very violation of of Art. spirit *7 In these tests to the South Dakota statute -we applying guest must remember that “Statutes should not be declared unconstitu- tional unless their leaves no infringement constitutional rights Milwaukee, reasonable doubt.” Berens v. Paul St. & Chicago, Co., 1963, Pacific R.
The result the guest deny statute is to a cause of action in to automobile negligence guests who not their compensated host The drivers. behind this purposes result have been listed We believe previously. the classification and the effect of the are reasonably statute geared to these We cannot purposes. believe that the statute can never guest act as an incentive to free we transportation; cannot believe that the guest statute does not prevent in lawsuits that could be characterized as we ungrateful; nor do believe we are entitled to wisdom of the substantive decision that legislative those who do not compensate their host drivers are not to receive the protection of the standard. negligence We hold the South Dakota guest VI, statute does not violate Art. § statements,
These however, are really conclusions and are not very as to illuminating why statute is compatible with the notion of equal protection. Were we to stop here with nothing more than the statement that the elimination function, statute is judicial we would be derelict our duty to the future of the law in this VI, state. The definition of Art. 18’s guarantee is too important § be satisfied with an unexplained conclusion. The best means to this end is a full of our explanation disagreement with the case that started this recent trend of guest Merlo, 1973, challenges' 8 Cal.3d —Brown start, we say P.2d 212.14To must that we are
in partial with Brown. The rationale agreement of collusion pre- vention not support does statute under either federal clause equal protection or Art. South Dakota Constitution. of this rationale reasoning is that relation- in the ship guest-host normal situation is likely to be that of close blood friendship or relation. of this Supporters rationale believe that this type is conducive to on the relationship collusion issue of negligence especially if the defendant be insured. happens —
What assumed is is that collusion on the of willful and issue wanton misconduct more difficult than for What is negligence. overlooked, however, is the existence of a third may issue that circumvented collusion. Parties an wishing to cheat insurance need company only agree that compensation was paid.
It is that the statute is still a argued deterrent since the parties must collude twice—once on compensation once on their negligence way to insurer’s pocketbook. This —on is fallacious. Assume reasoning the following hypothetical. There *8 are first, three lawsuits. In the there is no possibility of recovery but the are negligence, parties basically dishonest and are on that issue. We colluding cannot see how the introduction of the guest statute will affect the outcome here. If parties the are collude on prepared complicated the tort issue of negligence, they will not hesitate to fabricate a simple and uncontrovertible tale about five or ten dollars changing hands. case,
In honest, the second the are parties but there is still no chance recovery on Here negligence. again guest statute makes no difference. only It bars recovery that never existed. Merlo, 14. Since v. supra, Brown have we found determining nine cases constitutionality guest of various statutes. Five upheld the statutes generally citing the broad validity conclusion — proposition the statute is and three have overturned their guest relying basically statutes Brown. Upholding guest on statute: 1974, Iowa, 687; Thompson, Keasling Limbocker, v. 217 N.W.2d v. Duerst 1974, Or., 99; Gatchell, 1974, 97; 525 P.2d Justice v. Del.Supr., 325 A.2d Oviatt, 1974, Utah, 883; Hansen, 1974, Cannon v. Colo., 520 P.2d Reisdorff, 1975, Richardson 536; 527 P.2d Botsch v. 193 Neb. 226 N.W.2d Invalidating 121. 19, Thompson statute: Hagan, 96 Idaho 1365; Hassett, 1974, N.D., 771; 523 P.2d Johnson v. Bauder, 1974, Henry v. Kan. P.2d 362. The third case out the true failure of the points guest statute. The are be parties basically normally honest would had on The here will not recover negligence. plaintiffs because the guest They prove statute. cannot willful and wanton evidence, misconduct for there not arid because enough they citizens, are they honest will not degrade courts nor cheat the compensation.15 insurers colluding statute fails to fulfill this rationale not only because it no real barrier to presents collude, those would who but because it prevents recovery by those not tainted evil with the be It remedied. punishes the honest and rewards the cheat.16
Our here, with agreement Brown ends and since we hold the hospitality rationale to statute, support we must find it constitutional. Brown maintained that the hospitality rationale “provides no explanation for the statute’s differential treatment of automobile guests as distinguished from other indeed, guests, or all other recipients of hospitality.”17 One area of differential treatment was said to exist occupiers because owe of land all persons on that land duty reasonable care while auto hosts do not owe their guests same uniform duty. Because of Christian, Rowland v. 69 Cal.2d P.2d that is the law in Dakota, however, California. South still adheres to the trespasser-licensee-invitee classification scheme for those upon the land of another.18 That this analogy is similarity hypothetical 15. Note the of this to the case before us. The parties examples prime stereotypical are of the colluder but have refused had, they they anything If do dishonest. would before this court on these issues. concurring My in their opinion simple brothers claim these hypo- jury system. integrity disagree. thetical reflect on the I This dis- merely points jury simple principal cussion out these facts: The was the statute, faith, My barrier to collusion before the and it is. still ability justices, jury that of the other in the ferret out collusion *9 really quite guest is irrelevant. The issue is whether the has statute aided obviously jury Quite the in its task. it has not. Merlo, 394, 17. Brown Cal.Rptr. at 506 P.2d 106 at 218. Park, Inc., 1970, 624, 605,
18. See Miller v. Baken
84 S.D.
175 N.W.2d
133,
560;
1969,
Corner,
modified
S.D.
85
178 N.W.2d
Wheeler v.
84
M.,
Co.,
287,
883;
Chicago,
P. & P. R.
St.
S.D.
1952,
170
Norris v.
N.W.2d
271,
792;
1938,
Co.,
74 S.D.
51
Waggoner
N.W.2d
v. E.
Northrup
B.
86,
542;
Co., 1932,
Ry.
S.D.
278 N.W.
Chicago
Anderson v.
& N. W.
516;
Reister, 1875,
Sanders v.
Reports
1 Dakota
Brown attacks
of
the widespread prevalence
with
“[T]oday,
rationale.
hospitality
and,not
the-
company,
it
the insurance
is
coverage,
insurance
wins
host,
protection
of instances
majority
that in the
generous
* * *
there
language,
In plain
under the
statute.
” in
host’s insurer.
suing your
‘ingratitude’
no notion of
simply
or
accepting
Without
397,
Brown next said “the guest statute’s purpose of fostering
rationally
cannot
hospitality
justify the
lowering
protection for
class of automobile
Cal.Rptr.
at
P.2d
guests.”
at
222. The
then
to cite
goes
court
several California cases where
Supreme
California
Court found it unreasonable to maintain
both the different standards of care owed to persons on property
immunity.
principle,
doctrine
charitable
and the
“[U]nder
the guest statute’s classification scheme is clearly unreasonable.
at
We are inclined to that the agree statute is unreason- able. is Plaintiff who widow spent twenty-two months hospitals. $16,000 She has medical expenses of approximately with no foreseeable way paying expenses. those She probably is at this date suffering permanent some law disability. Any allows one another in this person injure manner and escape fact, liability is unreasonable. In unreasonable be too kind may an expression.22 however, this cannot be
Again, the issue before Brown us. is the test of using reasonableness out of context. What California court is statute is saying unreasonable social and we policy, What constitutional examination agree. is whether the requires classification bears reasonable relation to the statutory purpose class encompasses those —whether must be persons who affected to produce desired result and “If, however, town, neighbor himself is carried to rather but his slaughterhouse, livestock many permit modern courts will full injury to the through unfortunate animal failure to use safety. reasonable care for its Is this one enlightened people answer of an ” question: to"the hallowed ‘How much then sheep?’ is a man better than a Stevens, 1959, Stevens v. 355 Mich. citing Matt. 12:11 and Authorized Version. *11 the desired will tend to reasonably produce
whether the statute between the are about the rational connection talking result. We ends, any the wisdom of and the legislative means in those ends. social embodied policy Brown ends with the argument operation injury statute is fortuitous” because “the must take guest “largely ride,’ ‘in vehicle’ and place ‘during any (3) ‘upon (1) (2) ” P.2d These Cal.Rptr. at 506 at 229. highway.’ the California statute resulted in requirements being momentarily when a ride was with the interrupted guest allowed when the car and struck door the car leaving being open denied while a Recovery rolled from its was stopped position. was inside a vehicle but was allowed to a completely who had “one foot on the and one foot on the ground running car.” 106 at P.2d board of at 229. lurching when the Finally, recovery injury had been allowed occurred not on a but on We would answer public highway private property. that the South Dakota statute contains none by noting held of the above has been qualifications apply private Park, Inc., 1970, Miller v. Baken property.
N.W.2d 605. we
It is for these reasons that must with Brown disagree Merlo, and hold the statute constitutional. We supra, with those who find the statute but we are sympathize unjust, bound exercise restraint deal of it in this judicial (a great case) and not substitute our and wisdom for that of the judgment legislature. said,
Dean Prosser has “There is no other perhaps group which have filled with appeals many statutes the courts on so entirely little otherwise knotty problems involving petty Torts, Ed., of law.” Prosser On 4th inconsequential points add have such petty points 187. We would to this seldom p. much injury.23 of law been allowed to distribute the burden of so fifty where Boyd Alguire, 23. See compensation to remove the case from cents was found to be sufficient guest statute. case this, we conclude regrettably said Having be affirmed. before us must COLER,
WINANS, specially. concur JJ., WOLLMAN DUNN, dissents. J.,C.
COLER, (concurring'specially). Justice 32-34-1 reached that SDCL I concur in the result
While
constitutional,
Doyle’s
part
I cannot concur in that
Justice
jury system.
integrity
which reflects on
opinion
over-simplify
in the majority opinion
cases set out
hypothetical
which are
legitimately brought
in those actions
the issues
with the wisdom of
also that the
deals
opinion
To the extent
jury.
*12
that,
statute,
is not the function of
it is well settled
the guest
“[i]t
wisdom,
necessity,
or
policy,
into
inquire
Court
v.
State ex rel. Dunker
Hut
Spink
expediency
legislation.”
Brethren, 1958,
215, 229,
365,
77 S.D.
terian
of a
constitutionality
“All
are in favor of
presumptions
‘
“And
when made to
only
appear clearly,
act.
it is
legislative
and
and in such a manner
as to leave no
palpably,
plainly,
minds,
or hesitation in our
that
a statute
reasonable doubt
Constitution,
and
we can
violates some
of the
provision
’ ”
Mee,
declare it void.”
State v.
consistently
omitted)
(citations
1940,
335, 339,
875,
67 S.D.
N.W.
877. “The
power
292
court
to declare an act of the
unconstitutional
is an
Legislature
be exercised in a
free
extraordinary
should
case
power
Fire,
from all
doubt.” (citations omitted) Queen City
reasonable
Basford, 1911,
164, 168,
44,
v.
Ins. Co.
27 S.D.
court,
Co., 1963,
This
in Berens v. C.M.St.P. & P.R.R.
168,
565,
Nashville,
S.D.
N.W.2d
120
C. & St. L.
citing
Ry.
80
Walters, 1935,
434,
486,
Co. v.
U.S.
L.Ed.
294
55 S.Ct.
79
405 —
949,
that,
the rule
valid when
recognized
my
enacted
“[a]
become invalid
which
conditions
it
change
[sic]
176,
Further,
N.W.2d
110 however, who rests with one The burden of proof, “ ‘must the burden of carry in a law and he a classification
assails reasonable basis but is any rest upon it does not showing but merely clearly arbitrary, possibly, not essentially ” State v. omitted) Reininger, (citations unreasonable.’ actually 849, is 1931, N.W. 851. This court 239 59 on the finder, review “is limited to what appears fact and our judicial knowledge.” and facts within the court’s face of the act Larson, 1965, v. 81 S.D. rel. State ex Kornmann 1; v. Van Camp, N.W.2d see also Stavig N.W. 731. the same rules of construction essentially
Based upon Delaware, forth, the State of set Court of Supreme heretofore Brown review the series of decisions considering after thorough Merlo, 1973, P.2d 8 Cal.3d stated:
“This contrariety of judicial opinion revolves basi- around the cally of whether elimination of Statute, conditions, Guest in the light changing within the realm of judicial action founded upon sup- facts, and few position or whether it is more properly within the realm of action founded em- upon Gatchell, pirical study.” Del.Supr. Justice A.2d 97. *13 in record case reflect such a present does not
diminution of the classification or erosion statute or decisional law of the two basic as to render the purposes legislation statute clearly unreasonable. The statement found in following Gatchell, to the supra, particularly appropriate Justice of the court in the case: position present us, “On the even basis of record before basis of information of which we take might judicial notice, we are unable to that there are no say longer corrected, evils any to be or to be permissible objectives the Guest Statute. the con- accomplished, by Whether has cept or hospitality-protection collusion-prevention conditions, been so eroded as to have dis- by changing appeared as acceptable justification for the Guest Sta- tute, is a more problem for appropriate legislative solu- tion than judicial for determination. The General As- sembly has access to relevant information bearing upon these matters more than significant any afforded this Court, bound as it is by the limitations of the record of this judicial 325 A.2d at proceeding.” I am authorized state WINANS and Justices WOLLMAN join concurrence. special
DUNN, Chief (dissenting). Justice It is my that SDCL opinion 32-34-1 violates both the equal clause protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the similar guarantee of Article of the South Dakota Constitution.
My disagreement with the does extend majority not to the Rather, authorities cited. I believe they erred in of these application principles. Unquestionably, reasonable, classification “must be arbitrary, not must rest some upon ground of difference a fair and substantial having relation to the object so that all legislation, persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Royster Guano 412, 415, 560, 562, Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 40 S.Ct. L.Ed. 989. And this court has stated that a statute will not be where “the upheld object has no relation to the sought reasonable Wood, 1927, means employed to effect the object.” State In we held Wood the sale restricting medicine to patent proprietary did pharmacists not tend protect health since public label, test, were pharmacists or otherwise required inspect, utilize their professional skills in the medicines. Even sale of these pharmacists were and were though as regulated profession licensed on the basis their and skill learning compound- medicines, ing we were that the dispensing not persuaded what claimed In accomplished my opinion, was for it. guest statute does much less claimed it accomplish what is than the Act under Conceivably, consideration there. restriction *14 of the sale patent medicines to learned professionals might
occasionally inure to the public benefit.
I can
Similarly,
conceive
of some rare instance where the
statute
might promote
free ride or prevent
ungrateful
But
this court’s
litigation.
responsibility to insure equal
under
the law
protection
is not
Rather,
satisfied
weak
speculation.
statutory discrimination
must
rest upon some reasonable ground of difference.
In re
Watson, 1903,
Logic compels
to conclude that
the insured driver does
not feel the
when
sting
ingratitude
his
seeks
compensa-
tion from the former’s insurer.
Similarly,
insured driver is not
inclined to
his
weigh
protection
under
the guest
whether
deciding
to offer
free ride. Recent decisions support
analysis
of the effect of today’s extensive liability insurance.
v.
Thompson
Hagan,
1365;
96 Idaho
523 P.2d
Johnson
Hassett, 1974,
v.
N.D.,
771;
Bauder,
Henry
362;
213 Kan.
Merlo, 1973,
518 P.2d
Brown v.
8 Cal.3d
106 Cal.Rptr.
* Ch. S.L.1933.
MILLEA, MILLEA, Respondent Appellant
(229 95) N.W.2d (File 9, 1975) Opinion May No. 11415. filed