OPINION OF THE COURT
One of the most persistent sources of labor litigation is the controversy that arises when an employee’s discharge is based on dual motives — one being a legitimate business consideration and the other antiunion animus. In an effort to resolve the recurring controversy over its approach to this problem, the National Labor Relations Board adopted a rule which permits a finding of a violation if the employee would not have been discharged but for his union activity.
Wright Line,
a
Division of Wright Line, Inc.,
On March 13, 1977, Teamsters Local No. 478 began an organizing campaign at a warehouse operated by Behring International in Edison, New Jersey. A majority of the warehouse employees voted against the union in the election held on April 25, and no objections were filed. About ten days after the election, however, three employees were laid off, followed by five more. on June 3. Meanwhile, on May 26, Behring subcontracted for replacement labor with an outside firm.
On July 26, the union charged Behring with unfair labor practices and, after a hearing, an ALJ found against the company. The Board affirmed the findings of the AU, issued a cease and desist order and, in addition, directed reinstatement of the employees with back pay.
*85 The ALJ found that the company violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), on several occasions before and shortly after the election. 1 In one instance, two employees, acting as agents for the company, convened a meeting of their fellow workers during business hours at the warehouse. The two employees told the workers that they would be better off without a union, and said that the company would subcontract their work or close the plant if the union were voted in. They also solicited a document requesting that the union petition be withdrawn.
After the meeting, the company established a grievance committee, an action which the ALJ categorized as a pre-election benefit. The company had already reclassified three receiving clerks to higher-paid positions in the week after the election petition was filed, and later granted an across-the-board pay raise at a point when objections to the election would still have been timely.
Another § 8(a)(1) violation was found to have occurred when the company diverted freight to a facility owned by a different firm in order to emphasize that work was slow and jobs were in jeopardy. The company also intimated that the employees might lose their stock option and profit-sharing plans, as well as their pension benefits, if the union won the election. Finally, three days before the election, a supervisor interrogated an employee to discover the names of the persons who had started the union’s organizing effort and to learn how each of the employees would vote.
The ALJ also found that the eight discharges and the decision to subcontract violated § 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). 2 Behring had argued that its actions were prompted by a severe decline in business at the warehouse, and the ALJ agreed that “subcontracting the warehouse labor ultimately could be financially beneficial.” Nevertheless, he concluded that “although the Respondent eventually could have reduced its costs by laying off most of its own warehouse employees and by subcontracting their work . .., the Respondent was motivated, at least in part, in so doing at that time by a desire to reduce the possibility of another union election in the future.”
With one minor exception, the Board affirmed the findings of the ALJ and adopted his recommendations, determining that the company’s economic defense to the § 8(a)(3) charges “failed to rebut the General Counsel’s
prima facie
case” of unlawfully motivated discharges. To support this conclusion, the Board referred to its ruling in
Wright Line,
a
Division of Wright Line, Inc.,
Behring raises three contentions on appeal. First, it claims that the § 8(a)(1) findings are not supported by substantial evidence and rest upon erroneous credibility determinations by the ALJ. Second, it asserts that it was denied a fair hearing because the ALJ revoked a subpoena duces tecum served on a Board agent who had investigated an earlier charge against the company. Third, it attacks the Board’s Wright Line test for § 8(a)(3) violations as improperly shifting the burden of proof on the issue of the company’s motive for discharging its employees and subcontracting its work.
We see no need to discuss the § 8(a)(1) violations at length. Behring strongly contests the findings of the ALJ and we might well have come to a different conclusion had we tried the case in the first instance. Our role, however, is limited to
*86
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Board’s findings of fact. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Similarly, credibility resolutions generally rest with the ALJ when he considers all the relevant factors in his explanation.
Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB,
As for the subpoena, Behring surmised that the testimony and notes of the Board agent would reveal admissions impeaching the credibility of the General Counsel’s witnesses. The agent had secured statements from employees in the course of investigating an earlier charge that had been withdrawn for cause. At the hearing, however, the ALJ revoked the subpoena after the company was given access to the statements obtained from the witnesses. The Board upheld the AU’s action because the information sought by Behring fell within the “ ‘limited evidentiary privilege which protects the informal investigatorial and trial-preparatory processes of regulatory agencies such as the NLRB,’
Stephens Produce Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
Behring contends that the subpoena should not have been quashed because the material it sought from the agent is available under the Freedom of Information Act.
But see, New England Medical Center Hospital v. NLRB,
Of far greater concern to us is the Board’s treatment of the lay-offs. An employer accused of discharging workers in violation of § 8(a)(3) may assert, as did Behring here, that it was motivated by legitimate business considerations rather than antiunion bias. When this occurs, the Supreme Court has said, “[i]t is the ‘true purpose’ or ‘real motive’ in hiring or firing that constitutes the test” whether the statute has been violated.
Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,
Despite this directive, for many years the Board took the position that a discharge violated § 8(a)(3) as long as it was motivated “in part” by antiunion animus.
See
cases collected in
Wright Line,
The Supreme Court confronted an analogous situation in
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
In
Wright Line,
“First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.”
Id. at 1089.
The Wright Line test has both substantive and procedural components. Substantively, it analyzes the connection between an employee’s discharge and an employer’s antiunion animus in terms of “but for” causation. To find a § 8(a)(3) violation, the Board must determine that the employee would not have been discharged but for his protected union activity. No violation exists if the employer would have made the same decision to discharge the employee in any event, absent the shielded conduct.
The Board’s adoption of the “but for” test is a welcome development which should reduce the confusion in this controversial area of labor law. The “but for” test satisfies this court’s requirement that the Board seek the “real motive” or “real cause” for an employee’s discharge.
See, NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp.,
“[I]f the employee would have been fired for cause irrespective of the employer’s attitude toward the union, the real reason for the discharge is nondiscriminatory. In that circumstance there is no causal connection of any anti-union bias and the loss of the job.”
Or, as we put it in
Gould Incorporated v. NLRB,
There are difficulties, however, with the procedural aspect of the
Wright Line
rule. As mentioned earlier, the Board first requires the General Counsel to make “a
prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a ‘motivating factor’ in the employer’s decision.”
The shifting burden of persuasion undermines the “but for” test and reintroduces the confusion which Wright Line purported to eliminate. To understand why, it is only necessary to realize that in establishing a prima facie case, the General Counsel need not prove that antiunion discrimination was the “real cause” of the employee’s discharge. Instead, the Wright Line procedure only requires the General Counsel to show that antiunion animus was “a” motivating factor in the employer’s decision. If the employer then proffers a legitimate reason for its action, but does not do so with enough weight to carry the burden of persuasion, the Board would rule that the § 8(aX3) charge had been proved. This would be so despite the fact that two factors — neither outweighing the other — had been advanced as causes, and the Board never determined which was the real one. As such, the procedural aspect of the rule is plainly at odds with the “but for” test.
The Board relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mt. Healthy
to support its allocation of the burden of proof. The employer there was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision not to rehire an employee would have been reached even absent his constitutionally-protected activity.
“If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint.”
As interpreted by the Board’s own regulations, this means that “[t]he Board’s attorney has the burden of proof of violations of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1981). Moreover, § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976), states that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.” Since none of these statutory or regulatory provisions were applicable in Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court was free to allocate the burden of proof. The Board, on the other hand, has no power to shift that burden onto the employer.
We believe that the more appropriate precedent is found in the line of recent Supreme Court decisions outlining the procedure to be followed in Title VII employment discrimination cases.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
Discrimination in employment because of race, religion, or nationality is often as subtle and as difficult to ferret out as that resulting from antiunion bias. The Supreme Court recognized the problems of proof in the Burdine line of cases, but concluded that only the burden of production, and not persuasion, shifts to the defendant. Since the same considerations are present where the discrimination is based on union activity, the Board should follow the Bur-dine procedure in those cases as well.
The
Wright Line
test was thoughtfully and thoroughly analyzed when it reached the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
NLRB v. Wright Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc.,
Before the First Circuit, as it does here, the Board relied on language in
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,
“[Ojnce it has been proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.”
Id.
at 34,
More importantly,
Great Dane
was not concerned with the difference between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, and terms applicable to both are used somewhat interchangeably throughout the opinion. For example, in the sentence preceding the one quoted above, the Court said that “an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge
if
the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.”
From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that the decision in many cases will turn on whether the employer’s burden is characterized as being one of persuasion or production. Nevertheless, as the Board recognized in
Wright Line,
In summary, the Board’s Wright Line test represents a substantial improvement over its prior practice and, except for its shifting burden of persuasion, meets with our approval. Under our formula, once the General Counsel has established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the employer should rebut this with evidence of a legitimate business reason for its action. The ultimate burden of proof does not shift from the General Counsel and does not devolve upon the employer at any stage. Therefore, no violation may be found unless the Board determines that the General Counsel has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s antiunion animus was the real cause of the discharge.
This case must be remanded for reconsideration because the burden of proof was misallocated. The Board held that Behring failed to substantiate its economic defense because it could not justify the timing of the discharges. The relevance of that observation is not clear from the Board’s decision. The lay-offs occurred soon after the election and, therefore, could not have affected it.
Although the ALJ referred to testimony that the company was afraid the union would try for another election in the following year, the lay-offs could hardly have been further removed in time from that possible eventuality. Lay-offs were not limited to union activists and the Board did not find a suspicious pattern in the terminations. On the other hand, the company’s evidence of shrinking revenues and mounting administrative costs was not simply *91 “poor mouthing,” but was substantiated by the ALJ’s own findings and subsequent events, including closing of the warehouse.
The Board’s citation of
Electrical Products Division of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB,
Notes
. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), provides in part: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other concerted activities for ... other mutual aid or protection
. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.”
. We recognize that there is a distinction between “pretext” and “dual motive” cases. In
Lippincott Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,
. In
Herman Bros., Inc. v. NLRB,
. The
Burdine
opinion noted that the distinction between burden of proof and burden of production is a traditional feature of the common law. The Court said, “[i]n a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”
. In
Wright Line,
the Board seized upon a few remarks in the legislative history of the 1947 amendment to § 10(c) of the Act to support shifting the burden of proof.
. Other courts of appeals that have reviewed the Wright Line test have reacted to it with general approval, but only the First Circuit has scrutinized the burden-shifting issue in depth.
In the Fifth Circuit,
TRW, Inc. v. NLRB,
In the Sixth Circuit,
Charge Card Association v. NLRB,
■ The Seventh Circuit said that it was adopting the
Wright Line
rule in
Peavey Co. v. NLRB,
In
NLRB v. Fixtures Manufacturing Corp.,
In
NLRB v. Nevis Industries, Inc.,
