LYNNE BEGGS, Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MURPHYSBORO COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 186 et al. (The Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, Appellant)
No. 120236
Supreme Court of Illinois
December 1, 2016
2016 IL 120239
Illinois Official Reports
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fifth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, the Hon. W. Charles Grace, Judge, presiding.
Judgment: Appellate court judgment affirmed; Board order reversed.
Counsel on Appeal: Ian P. Cooper, Merry Rhoades, D. Shane Jones, and Kameron W. Murphy, of Tueth, Keeney, Cooper, Mohan & Jackstadt, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellant.
Ralph H. Loewenstein, of Loewenstein & Smith, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee.
Stanley B. Eisenhammer, Jessica A. Walker, and Mary A. Karagiannis, of Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, of Arlington Heights, for amici curiae Illinois School Board Association et al.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Lynne Beggs, a tenured teacher, was dismissed for cause from her employment by defendant, the Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186 (the Board). Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing before a mutually selected hearing officer under section 24-12 of the Illinois School Code (Code or School Code) (
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Plaintiff was a full-time tenured math teacher at Murphysboro High School, beginning her 18-year-long employment there during the 1993-94 school year. Plaintiff never received an unsatisfactory evaluation or one that rated her as needing improvement during that time. However, after the death of her father in the summer of 2011, plaintiff‘s mother‘s health began to deteriorate, resulting in frequent hospitalizations.1 As a result of assisting with her mother‘s care, plaintiff was either absent from school or late in arriving for a considerable number of days during the 2011-12 school term.2 The school administrators—including the principal, Vincent Turner, the assistant principal, Jeff Keener, and the superintendent, Christopher Grode—were aware of plaintiff‘s mother‘s declining health. Nonetheless, the administration became increasingly concerned over plaintiff‘s late arrivals, her failure to submit lesson plans
¶ 4 On January 30, 2012, Principal Turner issued a “Letter of Concern” to plaintiff, detailing a number of matters that plaintiff needed to correct. Specifically, the letter requested plaintiff to remedy her propensity to arrive late for work and her failure to submit lesson plans for the days she is absent or to timely submit plans for those days.
¶ 5 Plaintiff arrived late the next two days after receiving the letter, i.e., on February 1-2, 2012. Grode and Turner met with plaintiff on February 2 to discuss her late arrivals and her lesson plans. Grode told plaintiff that he knew she had again arrived late on that day and that he intended to recommend to the Board that it issue a “Notice of Remedial Warning.” Also on February 2, Grode gave plaintiff a letter documenting the two late arrivals since the warning letter of January 30, 2012, and noted that a remedial warning notice was being drafted. The letter of February 2 concluded by cautioning as follows: “Any further late arrivals to work will result in discipline including suspension without pay and possible termination. Please understand we consider this a very serious situation, and we expect you will correct it immediately.”
¶ 6 On February 8 and 10, 2012, plaintiff was again late to arrive at school. She met with school administrators on February 10, and she told them that she was late as a result of having to stay with and care for her mother the evening before. She was physically and mentally exhausted from the ordeal and had overslept. Plaintiff was suspended with pay from February 10, 2012, through February 21, 2012.
¶ 7 Superintendent Grode issued plaintiff a letter on February 15, 2012, memorializing the suspension and further noting that he was recommending that the Board issue a notice of remedial warning and suspend plaintiff without pay for a period of time. Grode‘s letter noted that he was taking the action because of plaintiff‘s continual tardiness, especially after the January 30, 2012, warning letter. Grode wrote, “When a teacher cannot arrive to school on time to instruct students, I cannot condone the action by the teacher.”
¶ 8 Grode also wrote a six-page letter for the Board, dated February 21, 2012, that detailed plaintiff‘s late arrivals and recommended that the Board adopt a resolution authorizing the issuance of a notice of remedial warning. Grode also asserted in his letter to the Board that plaintiff‘s late arrivals and absences from the classroom were having a detrimental impact on plaintiff‘s first-hour students, as they were one chapter behind other geometry classes at the school.3
¶ 9 On February 21, 2012, the Board suspended plaintiff without pay for the period running from February 10, 2012, through February 21, 2012, effectively converting her prior suspension with pay to one without pay. The Board also adopted a resolution authorizing a notice of remedial warning, which was issued to the plaintiff the next day on February 22, 2012.
“1. You were insubordinate when you failed to follow the written directive provided to you on January 30, 2012 *** [and] you arrived after the designated work day start time [on February 1, 2, 8, and 10].
2. You were insubordinate when you failed to follow [Grode‘s] verbal directive to you on February 2, 2012, [and] you arrived past the designated start time on both February 8, 2012, and February 10, 2012.
3. You have repeatedly violated section 4.3 of the [CBA] in that you have continually arrived late for your job.
4. You have engaged in unprofessional conduct by leaving your classroom unattended and/or unsupervised during instructional time. This is a direct result of your failure to report to work as required by the [CBA], as well as the directives of your supervisors.
5. You have engaged in unprofessional conduct of failing to use classroom and instructional time appropriately and effectively, resulting in misused or ineffective use of instructional time.4
6. You have engaged in unprofessional conduct by not timely reporting the grades of students assigned to your classroom.
7. You have engaged in unprofessional conduct by not preparing adequate lesson plans that will enable substitute teachers to provide adequate instruction for students during your absences.”
¶ 11 The Board‘s notice stated that if any of the deficiencies listed above were “repeated any time in the next two years,” it may result in plaintiff‘s dismissal.
¶ 12 Plaintiff returned to work on February 22 and 23, 2012, with no performance issues but then requested and was granted a leave of absence from her duties from February 27, 2012, through March 14, 2012, due to the continued failing health of her mother. Plaintiff was excused from her responsibilities to prepare and submit lesson plans during this extended leave.
¶ 13 Plaintiff voluntarily resumed her position and was present at school on March 19 and 20, 2012 (March 15 and 16 were school holidays). Because of her mother‘s health, plaintiff again took sick leave on March 21, 22, 23, and 26, 2012. She returned to work on March 27, 2012, but was immediately suspended from her teaching position. On April 23, 2012, the administration advised her that it intended to recommend to the Board that her employment be terminated.
¶ 14 On April 30, 2012, the Board adopted a resolution to dismiss and to authorize a notice of dismissal pursuant to the School Code, which would terminate plaintiff‘s employment and suspend her without pay pending a final disposition of the dismissal proceedings.
¶ 16 Carolina Badiano, an aide hired by the school to translate for a Spanish-speaking student, testified at the January 2013 hearing about the events that occurred during the first-hour geometry class on March 19, 2012. Badiano stated that plaintiff had arrived early for class on that day and was looking and sifting through papers at her desk, which “continued until after the [8:30] bell rang for like ten or 15 minutes.”5 Badiano testified that she felt compelled to bring the incident to the attention of the administration because, during the time plaintiff was looking at papers, students were “just sitting or on the phone or someone was sleeping.” Badiano acknowledged that after the first-hour bell, announcements begin, the pledge of allegiance is said, and teachers report attendance on the Teacherlogic computer system. Badiano further stated that during the 10- or 15-minute period in question, plaintiff was not answering questions from the students. However, when class did begin, plaintiff fielded questions from the class and retaught some material that they had not understood before moving on to a new section. Badiano also acknowledged that there was no confusion in the classroom the rest of the week about what should be covered.
¶ 17 Matt Morefield, a student in plaintiff‘s first-hour geometry class, was called to testify by the Board. Morefield opined that it was the substitute teachers who were ineffective in teaching the first-hour class, not plaintiff. According to Morefield, there was never any concern expressed about plaintiff‘s actual teaching; rather it was her absences that affected the students’ ability to learn because the substitute teachers were not as effective at presenting the material in a way that could be understood. Furthermore, Morefield testified that there were no problems with lesson plans in plaintiff‘s first-hour class on March 21 and 22, 2012. Morefield explained that he delivered the lesson plans himself on March 21 to the substitute teacher, Mr. Sendek. In that regard, Morefield testified that he was on his way to class when Mr. Manwaring, another teacher at the school, called him aside to deliver plaintiff‘s lesson plans that she had sent in for Mr. Sendek that day. Morefield then delivered the plans to Mr. Sendek within a minute of the 8:30 bell.
¶ 18 Plaintiff testified that she arrived at school at 8:10 a.m. on March 19, 2012. She knew her first-hour class would be somewhere around chapter 10, a chapter she was very familiar with, having taught it twice a year for the past 16 years to her geometry classes. When she arrived at her classroom, she unlocked the door and sat down at a desk to review notes that Mr. Sendek had left on it. She finished reviewing them by 8:30, at which time announcements were heard and the pledge of allegiance was said. This took about seven to eight minutes. A student then came into the class late, and plaintiff had one new student she was not aware of. She took attendance, and by this time it was 8:40. By that point, the students had been telling her that they did not understand the material taught by Mr. Sendek. Plaintiff perused Sendek‘s notes
¶ 19 Plaintiff further testified that on the evening of March 19, 2012, she visited her mother in the hospital in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Her mother had contracted pneumonia, and when plaintiff left the hospital to return home, she did not know if her mother would make it through the night. Plaintiff called Superintendent Grode in the morning before school on March 20 to explain the situation and to tell him that she was going to be in after 8:15 a.m. but that she did not want to call in sick. Grode told her he would excuse the late arrival and that she would not be disciplined for it. She then arrived at school before 8:30 a.m. and taught her classes—including her first-hour geometry class—without incident.
¶ 20 Plaintiff also testified that on the evening of March 20, 2012, she received a call that her mother had suffered heart failure. Plaintiff called in sick on the morning of March 21 around 7 a.m. and told Linda Homan, a fellow teacher at the school, that she would send her the lesson plans for her first-hour geometry class. The transmittal note from the computer shows that Homan received the plans at 8:30 a.m. On the evening of March 21, plaintiff called Keener, the assistant principal, and told him she would be on sick leave the rest of the week because of her mother‘s illness. Plaintiff also called Homan, who again agreed to receive an e-mail of plaintiff‘s lesson plans. The transmittal shows that those plans were received by Homan at 8:30 a.m. on March 22.
¶ 21 Linda Homan testified that she received plaintiff‘s lesson plans by 8:30 a.m. on both March 21 and 22, 2012. Homan immediately took the lesson plans to the substitute teacher herself or had someone else do it. It would have only taken 5 to 10 seconds to take them to the classroom. Homan did not lose any of her own instruction time in helping out, and the plans would have been with Mr. Sendek well before announcements were completed.
¶ 22 Joseph Sendek testified that he was the substitute teacher during the period in February and March 2012 when plaintiff was either suspended or on sick leave from her first-hour geometry class. Sendek recalled substituting on March 21 and 22, 2012, for the first-hour class but could not recall whether lesson plans were available on those dates. He also did not recall if Grode had asked him about the availability of lesson plans for those days. Sendek testified that he used a department syllabus to plan for the class when he was substituting for the long stretch in February and March when plaintiff was out because of sick leave or suspension. Sendek stated that there were times when lessons plans were late, but this could have been in February, and he did not remember the dates for sure. Sendek offered that lesson plans should arrive before class starts because the substitute needs time to prepare for class. Sendek did not testify as to how much time he would need to review a lesson plan before starting to teach the class.
¶ 23 Christopher Grode testified that he was superintendent of schools for the district. He noted that he met with Badiano and Sendek on March 22, 2012, to discuss plaintiff‘s conduct and took notes of his conversations. Grode‘s notes indicated that plaintiff‘s lesson plans were transmitted by computer at 8:30 a.m. on both March 21 and 22 and then had to be transported to Mr. Sendek at the classroom. Grode‘s notes from his interviews also showed that lesson plans arrived late to the classroom on March 21 and 22, 2012. Grode testified that he excused plaintiff‘s late arrival on March 20, 2012, but he did so because he would not have been able to get a substitute if plaintiff had gone ahead and taken a sick day.
¶ 25 As to the events of March 19, Crystal found that plaintiff credibly testified as to how the first minutes of class were used (that being announcements, the pledge of allegiance, and addressing student complaints that they did not understand the material that the substitute teacher had covered) and that, due to Badiano‘s lack of teaching experience generally and lack of math experience specifically, Badiano‘s description should have “given the District pause before it placed such strong reliance on her assessment of what did or did not take place in the classroom.” Crystal found that the evidence did not show that plaintiff failed to use classroom time “appropriately and effectively” on March 19.
¶ 26 With respect to the events of March 20, 2012, the hearing officer found that plaintiff contacted Superintendent Grode early that morning to let him know that she would not be able to arrive at school by 8:15 a.m. because of her having had to deal with her mother‘s health issues. The administration then agreed to excuse the late arrival, and plaintiff was able to arrive at school by 8:30 a.m. that day and teach her class.6
¶ 27 As to the events of March 21 and 22, 2012, Crystal found that after learning of the gravity of her mother‘s current condition on the evening of March 20, plaintiff contacted the school to relate her mother‘s situation and to say that she would likely not be coming to work for the remainder of the week; plaintiff also contacted Homan to make an arrangements for e-mailing the lesson plans to Homan. Crystal noted that Homan confirmed that the lesson plans were received around 8:30 a.m. on March 21 and 22 at the school. Crystal found that while Sendek was a reliable witness at the hearing, Sendek could not remember whether lesson plans were available on March 21 and 22 or when they arrived in the classroom. Crystal conceded that plaintiff failed to fulfill her responsibility to the letter with respect to lesson plans on these days but concluded that lesson plans did in fact arrive and that the students were impacted minimally, if at all, by the timing of their arrival and that very serious parental health matters played a role in plaintiff‘s actions on these days. Crystal did not find plaintiff‘s conduct “to have been the type of serious breach of [the notice] such that it supported, or could form the basis of, the decision to terminate her.”
¶ 28 Crystal found that during the short remediation period following the notice, plaintiff had no unexcused late arrivals and fulfilled her obligations regarding substitute lesson plans. Crystal noted that while the directives were reasonable, he did not find that the perceived violations were either willful or intentional on plaintiff‘s part. Crystal emphasized that plaintiff was not provided a “reasonable opportunity to correct the job performance deficiencies” and “the fact that the District permitted [plaintiff] to continue as a teacher yet perform her duties in what it viewed as an unacceptable manner for months before issuing its Notice does not privilege the District to compress the time period for potential remediation.” Crystal noted that plaintiff‘s
¶ 29 The Board reviewed hearing officer Crystal‘s findings of fact and recommendation. Under the authority of section 24-12(d) of the School Code (
¶ 30 With respect to the events of March 20, 2012, the Board supplemented facts regarding plaintiff‘s morning phone call to Grode, noting that he testified that when plaintiff called to say that she would be late on that day, she did not want Grode to “hold it against [her].” Grode explained that he decided to excuse her tardiness because there was no substitute teacher in place and he was aware that plaintiff‘s first-period class was already behind in their coursework. The Board also supplemented plaintiff‘s testimony, noting that she requested a reprieve that day because although she had been told to call in sick on any day that she thought she would be in after 8:15 a.m., she testified: “I don‘t want to do [those] kinds of things to the District. I wanted to be there and I wanted to be there for my students.”
¶ 31 Regarding the lesson plans of March 21 and 22, 2012, the Board discredited Homan‘s testimony, noting that it was “ambiguous and uncertain” as to the manner and timeliness of the substitute‘s procurement of the lesson plans. The Board supplemented the facts with testimony from Morefield, a student in the class who stated at the hearing that it was obvious no lesson plan was available because the substitute teacher would leave the classroom to consult with other teachers, and “some days [the substitute teacher] would come back with one [and] some days he wouldn‘t. And it was kind of obvious where he was getting them from.”7
¶ 32 The Board also supplemented Crystal‘s facts with testimony from then-Board President Mike Austin, who testified at the hearing that plaintiff dismissed the remedial warning and wanted to “play by her own rules” to the detriment of the students. Then-Board Vice President Mike Cripps testified that plaintiff was dismissed because she did not comply with the directives of the remedial letter—that is, at the time of dismissal, the issues of timely reporting to work, inadequate or nonexistent lesson plans, and insubordination for failure to comply with these requests remained.
¶ 33 In the “Decision and Conclusion” section of the Board‘s decision, it found plaintiff‘s conduct did not follow the Board‘s directives and this provided sufficient cause for her dismissal. The Board found that plaintiff violated the notice of remedial warning in three ways: (1) by failing to timely report to work by 8:15 on March 20, 2012, (2) by failing to have lesson plans available to the substitute teachers, and (3) by failing to teach her students “from bell to bell” and therefore losing instruction time on March 19, 2012, as the “Board concludes there
¶ 34 The Board concluded that plaintiff‘s misconduct was detrimental to the District and to the best interests of the students, providing sufficient cause for her dismissal. Specifically, the Board found that plaintiff‘s call-in on March 20 was detrimental, as she placed her own needs ahead of her classroom by cornering Grode into either excusing the late arrival or having no teacher for the first-period class that day. The Board also found that plaintiff‘s failure to have lesson plans available for March 21 and 22 was detrimental, as the late arrival of lesson plans, even if only shortly after 8:30 a.m., means loss of instruction time. Finally, the Board found that plaintiff‘s failure to teach “bell to bell” on March 19 was a detrimental loss of instruction time of particular importance, as the first-hour class was one chapter behind plaintiff‘s sixth-hour geometry class. With respect to Badiano‘s observations, the Board found that “any competent adult, whether trained or not, can determine whether students are engaged in class.” The Board also considered hearsay evidence in the form of Grode‘s notes of interviews with 17 students from the class, wherein 12 of the students reported a late start of instruction on March 19.
¶ 35 The Board concluded that plaintiff‘s last-minute call to Grode and her failure to have lesson plans available for the substitute was insubordination warranting dismissal and that her ongoing behavior showed that she did not and would not correct her behavior. The Board, agreeing with Crystal that plaintiff understood the directives of the notice, noted that plaintiff voluntarily chose to return to work that week, an indication that she was ready to perform her duties and comply with the administration‘s expectations. Contrary to Crystal‘s suggestion that plaintiff should have been provided a reasonable time to remediate with a “last chance understanding,” the Board emphasized that plaintiff was, in fact, given an opportunity to correct her behavior. She was aware her conduct needed to be corrected “immediately upon receipt” of the notice, yet she proceeded to violate the directives each day following her return to work. The Board concluded that the best interests of the school required that plaintiff no longer serve as a teacher in the District and ordered plaintiff‘s dismissal.
¶ 36 On September 3, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board‘s decision in the circuit court of Jackson County pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Law (Act) (
¶ 37 On October 15, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended affidavit of last known addresses and requested an alias summons. The alias summons was issued on October 21, 2013, some 50 days after the complaint for administrative review was filed and 49 days after the Board received, despite the error, the original summons with the complaint attached. The Board again moved to dismiss on the same grounds, arguing that the alias summons did not remediate her failure to comply. The circuit court found that the Board‘s receipt of the original summons was within the requisite time period prescribed by the Act and plaintiff also had an alias summons issued with due diligence and served within 50 days. The court denied the Board‘s motion to dismiss.
¶ 38 The circuit court then turned to the issue of plaintiff‘s dismissal from her teaching duties by the Board. Noting that section 24-12(d)(9) of the School Code requires consideration of both the Board‘s decision and supplemental findings of fact as well as the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and recommendation in making its decision (
¶ 39 The appellate court affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 2015 IL App (5th) 150018, ¶ 49. In so doing, the appellate court first addressed the Board‘s motion to dismiss on the basis of the irregularity in failing to correctly name the Board‘s president and the Board‘s current address. The appellate court noted that failure to correctly name the Board president was not a proper ground for dismissal, as the Act expressly prohibits dismissal on that ground as long as the Board has been named (see
¶ 40 The appellate court next addressed the appropriate standard of review to be applied in teacher dismissal cases. It began by noting that 2011 amendments to the School Code changed the dismissal procedure for downstate tenured teachers so that it now resembles the statutory procedure in place for the Chicago area public schools (upstate procedures), which gives deference to the final decision-making authority of the school board (see
¶ 41 The Board filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court, which we allowed.
¶ 42 ANALYSIS
¶ 43 I. Whether Statutory Jurisdiction Was Invoked
¶ 44 The Board argues before this court that plaintiff‘s deficiencies in the service of process procedure caused the circuit court to lack statutory jurisdiction to hear the case and, therefore, the lower courts erred in denying the Board‘s section 2-619 motion for involuntary dismissal of plaintiff‘s complaint. To support its argument, the Board relies upon Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169 (2007), Mannheim School District No. 183 v. Teachers’ Retirement System, 2015 IL App (4th) 140531, and Spicer, Inc. v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 212 Ill. App. 3d 16 (1991). We note that our review of this issue is de novo. Ultsch, 226 Ill. 2d at 178.
¶ 45 The Illinois Constitution grants an appeal as a matter of right from all final judgments of the circuit court (
¶ 46 Section 3-102 of the Administrative Review Law provides that unless review is sought “within the time and in the manner” set forth in the Act, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision.
¶ 47 There is no question in the present case that plaintiff filed her complaint for administrative review and issued summons within the 35-day window provided by the Act. Moreover, the Board concedes that plaintiff named the Board as a proper party. Thus, we find the cases relied upon by the Board to be distinguishable. In Ultsch and Mannheim, the wrong parties were named as defendants in the complaint (and additionally in Mannheim, a summons was not issued at all within the 35-day period), and in Spicer, the plaintiff failed to name the necessary parties as defendants and failed to timely file the complaint and issue summons.
¶ 48 In contrast, the Board in the present case contends that plaintiff directed the summons to an individual unaffiliated with the Board and mailed the summons to an address other than the Board‘s address. We do not find that these matters deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction under the particular circumstances of this case. The Board concedes that it was correctly named in the complaint as a party. Given that the Act specifically prohibits the dismissal of an action for failure to correctly name the Board president where the Board itself is named in the complaint, we do not find a lack of strict compliance in connection with incorrectly identifying the Board president in the summons. We also note that the address listed in the affidavit for the summons was the previous address of the Board. The summons itself was then correctly routed to the Board and received by it on September 4, 2013, which was within the 35-day period set forth in the statute for the issuance of summons.10 The Board suffered no prejudice on account of the irregularity, and plaintiff‘s counsel sought leave to issue an alias summons shortly after he became aware of the incorrect address. Under these specific circumstances, we find that the appellate court did not err in finding that the circuit court had statutory jurisdiction to conduct administrative review of the Board‘s decision.
¶ 49 II. Standard of Review
¶ 50 We now consider the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this case to assess whether plaintiff‘s dismissal by the Board was proper. The proper standard of review in cases involving administrative review depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 (2008). An administrative agency‘s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are considered prima facie true and correct.
¶ 51 The Board argues that the appellate court applied the wrong standard of review when it departed from the well-settled principles noted above and instead gave deference to the findings of fact and recommendation of the hearing officer rather than to the Board‘s decision, even though the Board is now considered by statute as the entity that makes the final decision for purposes of administrative review. Plaintiff, on the other hand, tracks the appellate court‘s analysis and argues that while amendments to the School Code made the Board the final decision maker, other legislative changes, changes that differ from those set forth by statute for Chicago-area teachers, suggest that the hearing officer‘s fact finding plays the pivotal role upon administrative review. Plaintiff argues that it is the hearing officer‘s recommendation that should be given deference and this court should use the hearing officer‘s findings of fact to determine whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 52 The issue raised by the parties concerning the appropriate standard of review involves construing the statutory framework and is a pure question of law that we review de novo. See, e.g., Exelon Corp., 234 Ill. 2d at 274. When construing a statute, this court‘s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441 (2005). The best signal of legislative intent is the language used in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Gillespie Community Unit School District No. 7 v. Wight & Co., 2014 IL 115330, ¶ 31. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court must give it effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. Exelon Corp., 234 Ill. 2d at 275. It is never proper for a court to depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Id.
¶ 53 Section 24-12(d) of the School Code provides that if a dismissal of a teacher in contractual continued service is sought for cause, the board must first approve a motion containing the specific charges by majority vote.
¶ 54 Section 24-12(d)(7) of the School Code provides that the hearing officer must “report to the school board findings of fact and a recommendation as to whether or not the teacher shall be dismissed for cause and shall give a copy of the *** findings of fact and recommendation to both the teacher and the school board.”
¶ 55 Section 24-12(d)(8) of the School Code sets the parameters for a school board‘s written order of dismissal of a tenured teacher following a recommendation of a hearing officer and provides as follows:
“The school board‘s written order shall incorporate the hearing officer‘s findings of fact, except that the school board may modify or supplement the findings of fact if, in its opinion, the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
If the school board dismisses the teacher notwithstanding the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and recommendation, the school board shall make a conclusion in its written order, giving its reasons therefor, and such conclusion and reasons must be included in its written order. *** The decision of the school board is final, unless reviewed as provided in [section 24-12(d)(9) of the School Code].” Id.
¶ 56 Section 24-12(d)(9) of the School Code essentially provides that the Board‘s decision is final unless administrative review is sought in circuit court under the Act, and “[i]f the school board‘s decision to dismiss for cause is contrary to the hearing officer‘s recommendation, the court on review shall give consideration to the school board‘s decision and its supplemental findings of fact, if applicable, and the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and recommendation in making its decision.”
¶ 57 We believe that the plain statutory language of section 24-12 provides that the decision of the school board is the final decision for purposes of administrative review. As such, the attendant deference to the agency‘s final decision noted in the above-cited case law applies with equal force here. The legislature is presumed to know of the traditional standards governing administrative review, and if it had desired a different result, it would have made clear that the hearing officer‘s findings are entitled to deference. Instead the legislature reformed the School Code to eliminate the hearing officer as the final decision maker.
¶ 58 The appellate court decided to reject the normal deference that would be afforded to the Board as an entity making a final administrative decision and instead decided to give “a certain level of deference” to the hearing officer. 2015 IL App (5th) 150018, ¶ 43. The appellate court chose this course for several reasons. First, it believed this course “better reflects our legal tradition of giving deference to the impartial entity charged with hearing evidence and evaluating witness credibility,” and the school board neither hears the evidence nor is it impartial. Id. Second, the appellate court observed that section 24-12 contains “procedural hurdles” that (1) require the board to incorporate the hearing officer‘s factual findings, (2) prohibit the board from departing from the hearing officer‘s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) require a certain level of qualification on the part of the hearing officer. Id. And finally, the appellate court found that it was “unclear what weight the legislature intended a reviewing court to give a *** hearing officer‘s recommendation” because the legislature stated only that the reviewing court “give consideration” to the school board‘s decision and the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and recommendation when conducting its review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 59 We believe that the appellate court overstated each of these points in relying upon them to find that the Board was not entitled to the normal deference accorded a final agency decision
¶ 60 This does not mean that the hearing officer does not play a strong role in the process. The hearing officer is the one who hears the evidence and makes the record for the Board‘s review. This explains the requirements in the statute designed to ensure that hearing officers are disinterested and highly qualified. The statute then sets forth a manifest weight of the evidence standard to steer the Board‘s review of those findings. This does not equate, however, with a requirement that a reviewing court give deference to the hearing officer‘s findings in such a case. See Acorn Corrugated Box Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm‘n, 181 Ill. App. 3d 122, 136-40 (1989). Again, this is because the statute plainly vests the Board with final decision-making authority after the hearing officer‘s “recommendation” is reported to the Board.
¶ 61 Section 24-12(d)(9) also directs the reviewing court to “give consideration to the school board‘s decision and supplemental findings of fact, if applicable, and the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and recommendation.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 63 Thus, we will review the Board‘s supplemental factual findings, as well as the factual findings of the hearing officer that were incorporated unmodified into the Board‘s decision, to determine whether those findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. In discharge cases, the scope of review is generally a twofold process. See Porter, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 718. First, as we have just stated, we apply the manifest-weight standard to the factual determinations. Second, we must determine whether the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency‘s conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm‘n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 551 (1981). A school board‘s determination of cause to discharge is not prima facie true and correct; it is instead subject to reversal where it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service. See Porter, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 726. We apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to this mixed question of fact and law, i.e., whether we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” when applying the established facts to the applicable legal standard for discharge. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See AFM Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 393, 395.
¶ 64 III. Whether the Board‘s Supplemental Factual Findings Are Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 65 Having concluded that traditional standards of review for administrative proceedings are applicable to the present case, we turn to the question of whether the Board‘s supplemental factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board determined that there were three violations of the remedial notice over a four-day period from March 19, 2012, through March 22, 2012, that supported cause for dismissal. Specifically, the Board determined plaintiff violated the warning notice in three respects: “(1) on March [20], she did not report for work by 8:15 a.m.; (2) on March 21 and 22, she did not have lesson plans available on these days, so that the substitute teacher could provide instruction to the students; and (3) on March 19 she was not prepared to and did not start teaching at 8:30 a.m. (from bell to bell).”
¶ 66 With respect to plaintiff‘s late arrival to work on March 20, we note that plaintiff called in that morning after spending the night with her gravely ill and apparently dying mother. She spoke to Superintendant Grode on the phone, and he expressly excused the late arrival. Plaintiff then arrived before 8:30 a.m. and taught her first-hour geometry class without incident. These are the undisputed facts. Given that Grode specifically excused the late arrival,
¶ 67 Regarding the lesson plans of March 21 and 22, we note that it is undisputed that plaintiff transmitted those plans to the school at 8:30 a.m. The notice of remedial warning does not indicate the time by which the school would have had to receive the plans to fulfill the obligation spelled out in the warning. The substitute teacher for those days could not recall when he received the plans but noted that he would have needed some time to review them, though he did not specify how much time that would be. The Board‘s own witness, Morefield, testified that he delivered the plans himself on March 21, 2012, and that they arrived around the time of the 8:30 bell. It was also undisputed that a few minutes of preliminary announcements are heard after 8:30 a.m. before any instruction time could take place. Homan also testified that she received plaintiff‘s lesson plans on those days at 8:30 a.m. and they would have been delivered within seconds to the substitute teacher in plaintiff‘s first-hour geometry classroom. Grode‘s own testimony also indicated that the plans were received at the school at 8:30 a.m. The Board did not place in its notice the time by which the plans must be received at the school—e.g., by 8:15 a.m. when teachers are also expected to arrive at school. Given that the plans arrived to the school by the start of class, we can only conclude that the Board‘s finding that plaintiff “did not have lesson plans available on these days so that the substitute teacher could provide instruction to the students” was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as a conclusion opposite of the Board‘s is clearly evident.
¶ 68 We next consider the Board‘s finding that plaintiff violated the notice provision that she provide effective classroom instruction in that she failed to teach bell to bell on March 19. We begin by noting that, unlike the appellate court and the hearing officer, we fully credit Badiano‘s testimony that plaintiff did not teach for a stretch of time at the beginning of the first-hour geometry class that day. Thus, we would conclude that a finding that at least a technical violation of the remedial notice occurred on March 19 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also note that the lower courts were only able to render a contrary conclusion by reweighing the evidence and failing to give deference to the Board‘s findings and failing to credit Badiano‘s testimony and the administrator‘s notes from the interviews of the students who were in the class. This was obviously error.
¶ 69 Nonetheless, we note that the Board‘s conclusion appears troubling when considered in the context of other undisputed evidence. In that regard, we note that the Board concluded that “at minimum a 15-minute delay from the start of student instruction at 8:30 a.m.” occurred. But it was undisputed that much of the first 10 minutes of first-period classroom time is taken up by announcements, the pledge of allegiance, and recording student attendance. It was also undisputed that plaintiff arrived at school that day in a timely manner at 8:10 a.m. It was also undisputed that that there had never been any problem with plaintiff teaching her class when she was actually present and in the classroom. The Board‘s concerns in the remedial warning seem to be spawned from plaintiff‘s late arrivals and lack of lesson plans. Thus, it is puzzling why the requirement to use classroom time effectively was even included in the notice unless it was related entirely to plaintiff‘s late arrivals. Given that plaintiff was on time that day, the incident of “ineffective teaching” on March 19, especially coming after plaintiff‘s long absence from the classroom, seems to evaporate as a cause for dismissal. Additionally, there was evidence presented that students were on their cell phones and one student slept while
¶ 70 IV. Whether the Board‘s Decision to Discharge Was Clearly Erroneous
¶ 71 We have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that two of the three violations of the remedial notice found by the Board were not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. The third violation, though technically supported by the evidence, seems to be an understandable and minor breach given plaintiff‘s long absence from the classroom and the difficulty the first-hour geometry class had generally in learning from the substitute teacher.
¶ 72 While the Board‘s frustration with plaintiff prior to the notice of remedial warning is understandable and well documented, it is unclear from the Board‘s decision whether it would have found cause for discharge based on the incident of March 19, 2012, alone. Only a clear and material breach of the warning notice that was causally related to plaintiff‘s past deficiencies would support her dismissal. We conclude, based on the undisputed circumstances noted above, that this single incident was not a clear and material breach of the warning notice. Thus, the Board‘s decision to discharge plaintiff was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unrelated to the requirements of service, and we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
¶ 73 CONCLUSION
¶ 74 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Board‘s decision to discharge plaintiff was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court‘s decision and reverse the decision of the Board.
¶ 75 Appellate court judgment affirmed; Board order reversed.