176 N.W. 149 | S.D. | 1920
“ 'Temporary injunction’ and ‘restraining order’ are often used synonymously. Our statute and the better usage limits the meaning of ’restraining order’ to such order as is operative only until a hearing can be- had upon an application for an injunction, and of ‘temporary injunction’ to an order operative usually until the final hearing of the case in which it is issued. Code, § 241 (Gen. St. 1901, § 4688;) 8 Words and Phrases, 6902; 7 Words and Phrases, 6183, 6184; 11 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 345-349. The restraint which the order purports to impose, and not the name given to it, determines its true name and character. The order * * * enjoined the defendants until the further order of the district court or the judge thereof in the premises. It required no revocation, but expired' upon the making of an order by .the district court or judge. It was simply a restraining order.”
This distinction is clearly pointed out upon the rehearing in Sand v. Peterson, 30 N. D. 171, 152 N. W. 272, also in San Diego v. Steamship. Co., 101 Cal. 217, 35 Pac. 651; State v. Wakeley, 28 Neb. 431, 44 N. W. 488, and Wetzstein v. B. & M. Co., 25 Mont. 135, 63 Pac. 1043.
The order to• show cause did not provide for the giving of any bond before the restraining order should go into effect. Section 2427, Rev. Code 1919, provides that, upon granting an injunction, “the court or judge shall' require a written undertaking',” etc. It is only under section 2428, Rev. Code 1919, that a court is authorized to grant an order such as was granted. This section reads:
"If the court or judge deem it proper that the defendant, or any of the several defendants', should be heard before granting the injunction, an order may be made requiring cause to be shown, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted; and the defendant majq in the meantime, be restrained.”
If anything further is needed to demonstrate to a certainty that the order appealed from was understood to be a mere show cause order granted under section 2428, the restraining clause of which was a mere temporary restraining order, we have it in the various files presented by appellant on this motion. The circuit court, in the very order appealed from, twice refers to the order it is vacating as “the temporary restraining order.” Counsel repeatedly refers to said order as a “temporary restraining order” andl “show cause order.” In his affidavit asking an order fixing bond on appeal he expresses a desire to “keep said temporary restraining order in force.” It is true counsel, after the order was vacated, sometimes speaks of it as a “temporary restraining order and temporary injunction”; but by so doinghe merely discloses more clearly that he failed to distinguish between the two kinds of orders. His appeal to this court, as shown by the notice of appeal, is from “that certain order * * * ordering that the temporary restraining order * * * 'be and the same is hereby vacated and set aside.' ” In said notice, appellant further says that said appeal is also from “said order dissolving said temporary restraining order and injunction,” again evidencing the fact that in his mind a "temporary restraining order” and a “temporary injunction” were one and the same.
The attempted appeal is dismissed.