Plаintiff Charles Beer, City Administrator for the City of Fraser, suspended city police Sergeant Norman Spinelli for 30 days and recоmmended his permanent suspension to the city’s civil service commission. Sergeant Spinelli appealed the аdministrator’s suspension to defendant commission, which conducted a hearing. On April 15, 1981, the commission reversed Spinelli’s suspension and ordered that he be reinstated.
Charles Beer, as city appointing authority, and the City of Fraser thereaftеr filed an action for superintending control against the civil service commission, contending that the commission’s aс *241 tion was contrary to law because there was no evidence to support the decision to reinstate Spinelli. Plaintiffs sought an order from the circuit court compelling the commission to suspend and discharge Sergeant Spinеlli. Defendant commission filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that under the firemen and policemen’s civil service act, specifically MCL 38.514; MSA 5.3364, only the "person removed” may appeal the commission’s decision and that the city and city manager have no standing to appeal the commission’s decision.
The circuit court granted the commissiоn’s motion, relying upon
Hendricks v Sterling Heights Police & Fire Dep’t Civil Service Comm,
In Hendricks, a suspended Sterling Heights police officer appealed to the Sterling Heights Civil Service Cоmmission and the commission ruled his suspension improper and ordered his reinstatement. The city manager then filed a complaint for superintending control in the circuit court, seeking reversal of the commission’s ruling. The circuit judge reversed, but this Cоurt vacated the decision of the circuit court and reinstated the decision of the civil service commission, holding that the city manager lacked standing to obtain review of the commission’s decision in the circuit court and, therefоre, the circuit court’s order on appeal was void.
The Court in Hendricks noted that, although the issue was one of first impression in Michigаn, the Court was following the majority of other jurisdictions in holding that an administrative officer of a governmental entity (or the governmental entity itself) lacks standing to appeal the decision of a *242 reviewing agency of such governmental entity, except to the extent that legislation gives the officer the right to do so. The Court went on to find that, while the apрlicable legislation, the firemen and policemen’s civil service act, MCL 38.501 et seq.; MSA 5.3351 et seq., provides for appeal to circuit court by the removed employee, it is silent with respect to any appeal by the city or its administrator. The Court interpreted that silence as indicating that the Legislature considered the decision of a city’s civil service сommission as a final decision of the city and thus the city would not appeal its own decision.
With the exception thаt the city, as well as the city appointing authority, has sought to challenge the commission’s decision in the instant case, the facts here are virtually identical to those before the Court in Hendricks. The Court in Hendricks, however, failed to take into accоunt the unique nature of the action brought in circuit court. At issue was not whether the city or city official had authority to appeal to the judiciary the decision of the civil service commission; rather, the issue was whether the city or city official had standing tо seek an order for superintending control against the commission where it was alleged that the commission actеd unlawfully. These are separate and distinct actions with different parties and different purposes.
The process of seeking an order of superintending control is not an appeal. It is an original civil action designed to requirе the defendant to perform a clear legal duty.
People v Flint Municipal Judge,
*243
A superintending control order enforces the superintending control power of a court over lower courts or tribunals. GCR 1963, 711.1. A cirсuit court has jurisdiction to issue orders of superintending control over administrative tribunals of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature.
Lepofsky v City of Lincoln Park,
An order of superintending control is not available to a plaintiff who hаs another adequate remedy by way of an appeal. GCR 1963, 711.2. The determination, made by the Court in Hendricks, that a plaintiff has no right to appeal is but a necessary first stеp in the determination of whether a plaintiff can bring an action for superintending control.
Admittedly, a party seeking an order for superintending control must still have standing to bring the action. Standing is the legal term to be used to denote the existence. of a party’s interest in the outcome of a litigation; an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advoсacy.
Michigan License Beverage Ass’n v Behnan Hall, Inc, 82
Mich App 319, 324;
We believe that, where the party challenging the commission’s action is the city itself, a political subdivision rather than an officious public officer, there exists a sufficient interest in the outcome to *244 insure sincere and vigorous advocacy so as to confer standing. Unlike the city, the individual officer may challenge the commission’s decision merely because he is disgruntled at being overruled or seeks some political advantage; he has no direct or legal interest in the outcome. The city, on the other hand, as the political unit employing the police officer, is directly affected by the commission’s decision that the employee may not be dismissed. Thus, to the extent, dicta in Hendricks indicates a city lacks standing to seek an order of superintending control over its civil service commission, we decline to follow that decision.
The decision of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs’ action is reversed and remanded as to the City of Fraser and affirmed as to Charles D. Beer, the city appointing authority.