31 A. 582 | R.I. | 1895
The declaration in this case, as originally framed, charged the defendants with negligence in failing to guard an elevator well, whereby the plaintiff, a fireman in the discharge of his duty, fell and was injured. A demurrer to this declaration was sustained upon the round that it set forth an entry by the plaintiff into the defendants' premises only as a licensee, to whom the defendants owed no duty;
In the former opinion we said that the owner owed no duty to a licensee, as to the condition of his premises, unless imposed by statute, save that he should not knowingly let him run upon a hidden peril or wilfully cause him harm; while to one invited he is under obligation for reasonable security for the purposes of the invitation. The declaration did not set out a cause of action upon either ground. The present amendments are made to inject into the statement of the case a statutory duty and an invitation. The first question, therefore, is whether there was a statutory duty. In considering this question we need not discuss the limit of legislative power in imposing such a duty, for it is not necessary to decide it. We may assume it, and the question still remains whether an actionable duty is imposed by this statute. It has been before the court in several cases. InGrant v. Slater Mill Power Co.,
Whether the defendants in this case are owners or tenants does not appear. The declaration simply states that they were in possession of the building on the day of the accident.
But even if their relation to the property were stated we do not see how it could avail in view of the difficulties set forth in the previous decisions under this act. In Parker v.Barnard,
The fourth count seeks to state a case of legal liability by averring an invitation to the plaintiff to enter the premises in question; but, as it is an implied invitation, the declaration, accurately drawn, sets out the facts as stated above, from which the invitation is to be implied. The idea is that *52
the plaintiff is in the employ of the taxpayers collectively and so of the defendants individually; that the relation sustains the invitation and that he is thus invited to enter the premises of his employers in the discharge of his duty. This presents the same question which we considered in our former opinion, the only difference being that now the invitation is averred which was then claimed to be implied from the facts, and there is also now added the fact that the defendants are taxpayers in Providence. The question however is the same and the answer must be the same, that the facts do not amount to an invitation. There is no relation between a fireman and a taxpayer to raise it. There is no individual employment nor responsibility in respect to public officers or servants on the part of taxpayers and so no basis for an implication of service and invitation. Of course firemen have a right to enter premises to stop a fire, but it is under the same law which allows others to enter, called by Judge Cooley, "the law of overruling necessity." Cooley on Torts, *313. None of the cases cited by the plaintiff and considered by the court in the former opinion, go so far as his claim in this respect. In each of them, excepting Parker v. Barnard, there was something in the nature of a personal and direct invitation which does not enter into this case; e.g. the calling of a police officer in; Learoyd v. Godfrey,
The reasons for holding that there was no invitation in this case were sufficiently stated in the former opinion.
The demurrers are sustained.
SEC. 25. In every building in which there now exists or hereafter shall be placed any hoistway or elevator, not enclosed by fire-proof partitions and doors, nor placed in the well-hole of the stairs, the opening thereof through and upon each floor shall be provided with, and protected by a good and substantial railing, and good and sufficient trap-doors with which to close the same; and such trap-doors shall be kept closed during the night time, except said hoistway or elevator shall then be in actual use.