delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs Edmund Beedie and Truck Insurance Exchange brought this action in the District Court of Yellowstone County to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of defendants’ alleged negligence. The complaint was filed on October 15, 1979, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment with accompanying briefs and affidavits. The Distriсt Court held a hearing on the motions, granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action. Plaintiffs appeal from this dismissal.
Plaintiff Edmund Beedie is an emplоyee of Goodan Conoco Service Station located in Lewistown, Montana. Beedie was injured on September 8, 1976, when he was hit by defendant Marthа Shelley’s motor vehicle, driven by defendant John Shelley, as he was walking from the shop area to the gas pump island of the service station. Beedie rеceived head and leg injuries and was unable to return to work for over 12 weeks.
Beedie’s employer filed a workers’ compensation claim which was settled on July 14, 1978. Plaintiff Truck Insurance Exchange made final payments to Beedie on July 17, 1978, and has asserted a subrogation claim in the amount of $7,728.06. John Shelley movеd *558 to Medford, Oregon, in June 1978 and Martha Shelley joined him there in August 1978.
There was some question raised in the District Court concerning the reasons for this move and whether оr not plaintiffs were aware of defendants’ location. Plaintiffs contend that defendants fled the state to avoid service of process for this suit and that they were unaware of defendants’ whereabouts until September 28, 1979. They argue that this disappearance from the state tolled the statute of limitatiоns.
Defendants, however, presented evidence in the District Court showing bona fide reasons for leaving the state and also that an agent of plaintiff-insurer was aware of their new addresses. Defendants argue that they were at all times available to service and therefore the statute of limitations had run by the time the action was filed.
Although appellants raise four issues on appeal, this case can be decided on the single issue of whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations.
Appellants initially contend that the statute of limitations was tolled because respondеnts were outside the State of Montana during periods of time after the date of the accident. This contention is based on section 27-2-402, MCA. Respondents, оn the other hand, argue that although they have been nonresidents and outside Montana at certain times subsequent to the date of the accident, they have always been available for service of process under Rule 4D(3), M.R.Civ.P. (Montana’s long-arm statute).
In Montana a tort action must be commenced within three years of the commission of the tort. Section 27-2-204, MCA. Section 27-2-402, MCA, provides:
“If when the cause of action accrues against a person he is out оf the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state; and if after the cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.”
*559 Rule 4D(3), M.R.Civ.P., provides:
“Personal service outside the state. Where service upon any person cannot, with due diligence, be made personally within this state, service of summons ,and complaint may bе made by service outside this state in the manner provided for service within this state, with the same force and effect as though service had been made within this state. Where service by publication is permitted as hereinafter provided, personal service of a summons and complaint upon the defendant out of the state shall be equivalent to and shall dispense with the procedures and the publication and mailing provided for hereafter in 4(5)(c), 4(5)(d) and 4(5)(e) of this rule.”
Rule 4B(1), M.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part:
“. . . any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim for relief arising from the doing personally, through an employee, or through an agent, of any of the following acts:
“(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this state of a tort action;”
When Rules 4B(1) and 4D(3) are read together, it becomes readily apparent that respondents here were at all times subject to the jurisdiction of Montana courts and were therеfore amenable to service of process.
This Court faced a similar situation in
State ex rel. McGhee v. District Ct. of Sixteenth J.D.
(1973),
*560 In McGhee we granted рetitioner’s request for supervisory control and held that where plaintiff could effectively serve defendant outside the state, absence from the stаte would not toll the statute of limitations. We stated:
“The purpose of section 93-2702, R.C.M.1947 [now section 27-2-402, MCA], is to prevent a defendant from defeating a plaintiff’s claim for relief by leaving the state or by establishing residence in another state. But, there is an exception to this rule. In cases where the plaintiff may effect service of process by some method, even though the defendant may be a nonresident or absent from the state, the statute continues to run during the аbsence or nonresidency . . .
“The alleged tort was committed by R. W. McGhee while he resided in Montana and under Rule 4B( 1), M.R.Civ.P., this subjects him to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts. By being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court and capable of being served during the entire time, the statute of limitations was not tolled . . .”508 P.2d at 131-32 .
See also,
State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District
(1966),
*561 The delay in filing the complaint was apparently caused by appellants’ desire to ascertain whether the Shelleys hаd sufficient assets to answer for any judgment before going ahead with a lawsuit. This reason is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, as appellants could have filed the complaint before the statute of limitations ran and served it within a reasonable time thereafter. Rule 3, M.R.Civ.P. The Shelleys were residents of Montana at the time of the accident. Under Rule 4B(1) this subjected them to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts. Because they were subject to our jurisdiction and сapable of being served during the entire time, the statute of limitations was not tolled.’ State ex rel. McGhee v. District Ct. of Sixteenth J.D., supra.
Appellants next contend that the defense of statute of limitations is nоt available against its subrogation claim. We disagree. Appellants’ claim is one of subrogation. It is derived from that of the insured and is subject to the same defenses, including the statute of limitations as though the action were sued upon by the insured.
Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi
(1964),
The District Court acted correctly in granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.