443 N.E.2d 539 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
Appellant's claim under the Workers' Compensation Law for injury arising out of his employment was denied by the Industrial Commission, and his appeal to the court of common pleas was dismissed on summary judgment. His single assignment asserts that the dismissal was erroneous, claiming that there is a genuine issue of fact, to wit, whether the injury was within the "zone of employment." We find no error.
The injury occurred after the workday had ended at 4:00 p.m. on July 3, 1975, as appellant was placing his own tools in the trunk of his car in a public parking lot adjacent to the construction site on which he was employed. The appellant's leg was broken when a co-worker's automobile backed into appellant's car, crushing his leg between the two cars.
Appellant first brought suit against David Brieg, the co-worker, for personal injuries caused by Brieg's negligence. In connection with appellant's motion for summary judgment on the question of liability, he filed an affidavit stating that the injury occurred after termination of the workday while appellant was conducting his personal affairs, that he was in process of returning to his residence, that he was not acting in furtherance of his employment duties which would not resume until the next workday, and that his employer neither owned nor controlled the parking lot and had not instructed or advised him to park there. Despite this obvious attempt to avoid the immunity granted to a co-worker by R.C.
Appellant settled the suit against Brieg for $17,500, and then filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, the denial of which constitutes the subject matter of this appeal.
An admission by a plaintiff during cross-examination that she was guilty of negligence contributing to her injury precludes any recovery against the alleged tortfeasor. Winkler v. Columbus
(1948),
Judgment affirmed.
BLACK, P.J., SHANNON and KLUSMEIER, JJ., concur. *28