287 Mass. 191 | Mass. | 1934
The plaintiff has brought an action of contract against his nephew, the defendant, to recover the sum of $5,000 which the declaration alleges was loaned by the plaintiff to the defendant. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant’s bill of exceptions presents his exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to give certain requests for rulings, to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict, and to portions of the judge’s charge.
Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff the evidence may be summarized as follows: The plaintiff in 1923 deposited in a savings bank $2,000 of his own money in his own name as “Trustee for . . . [the defendant], in case of death of Trustee amount to be paid to the beneficiary” and said to the defendant: “When I . . . die you take the bank book.”
The jury was warranted in finding that the rights of the parties in the deposit were only those fixed by the terms of the contract of deposit made with the bank and that there was not, as the defendant contended, also a gift to him of the deposit itself as distinguished from a gift of an interest in the deposit by virtue of the contractual right against the bank given him by the agreement of deposit (see Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499). The contract creating the joint account gave each party the right to withdraw any part or even the whole of the deposit. It might have been found that the withdrawal of the sum of $5,000 was actually made by the
The defendant at the trial among other things contended that he had a greater right in the deposit than that given him by the terms of the agreement of deposit which the parties made with the bank. This contention was based on his testimony that after the original deposit in 1923 in the name of the plaintiff as trustee for the defendant and after the deposit in 1924 on a joint account, on each occasion the plaintiff handed the defendant the bank book and said in substance that he gave it to the defendant. The plaintiff did not admit this; his conduct throughout as well as certain conduct of the defendant negatived it, but this testimony presented a question of fact for the jury and afforded the defendant a basis, if he were believed, for the contention that there had been a gift to him of the entire deposit freed from the rights of the plaintiff under the terms of the agreement of deposit. It required the judge to instruct the jury as to the circumstances in which a gift of the deposit in the joint account might be found. The defendant’s counsel at the close of the judge’s charge stated that he took exception to the portions thereof where the judge said that “the delivery of the joint account was necessary to make a gift” and “there was no gift if there was no delivery of the joint account bank book.” The record, which purports to contain the entire charge, does not show that this language was used by the judge and it is not very clear as to what part of the charge it was intended to take an exception. Assuming it to have been the scattered
The defendant in support of his contention that there was “a completed gift ... of the joint account” relies on Kentfield v. Shelburne Falls Savings Bank, 273 Mass. 548; Chase v. Smith, 257 Mass. 252; Battles v. Millbury Savings Bank, 250 Mass. 180. These cases hold that where by the terms of a contract of deposit on a joint account made with a bank one is given a joint interest in a deposit, it is not essential that there be a delivery of the bank book. They do not support the contention that there may be a gift of
There was no error in the refusal to give the defendant’s request for the instruction that “If the plaintiff put title to the deposit in the defendant as joint tenant then he made a completed gift.” If this means a gift of the deposit itself it is not true because like any gift that could not be completed without a delivery. If it is to be taken to mean a gift of rights as coowner by virtue of the contract creating the joint account, “The mere form of the instrument of deposit does not settle the matter,” McKenna v. McKenna, 260 Mass. 481, 484, without regard to the question of intention.
Exceptions overruled.