31 W. Va. 1 | W. Va. | 1888
In 1883, Charles Bayne, trustee of Sarah A. Beckwith, and Sarah A. Beckwith, filed their bill in the Circuit Court of Upshur county, against F. A. Seborn, executor of the will of William Crabtree, and F. A. Seborn in his own right, and 0. F. Bid gw ay, administrator of Abram C. Howard, deceased, to set aside and annul a certain tax-deed. The bill alleges that on the 26th day of July, 1860, John S. Flesher conveyed to Charles Bayne, as trustee, for the sole and separate use of plaintiff, Sarah A. Beckwith, a tract of over 1,420 acres of land in said county; that said tract of land was duly entered on the land-books of said county in the name of Charles Bayne, trustee for Sarah A. Beckwith; that on the 20th day of February, 1865, one A. C. Howard, representing himself as trustee in the place of the said Charles Bayne, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, and without in fact any authority to act as said trustee, borrowed from said William Crabtree $2,750, and the said Howard,-to secure to said Crabtree the payment of the said sum, did, on the fifth day of February, 1870, as trustee, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, Sarah A. Beck-with, execute to said Crabtree a mortgage on said tract of land, and signed and sealed said mortgage, “A. C. Howard, as trustee of Sarah A. Beckwith that said mortgage was
C. O. Higginbotham, in his deposition, says that the taxes for 1879 were by him, as the agent of F. A. Seborn, paid to the sheriff on or before the 6th day of March, 1880, and amounted to $28.41; and that the taxes, up to and including the year 1883, had been paid by Seborn, by witness as his agent. These are the only two depositions taken.
On the 25th day of February, 1885, the cause was heard on the bill taken for confessed as to Bidgway and Seborn, executors, and upon the answer of F. A. Seborn, general replication thereto, and the exhibits and depositions; and the court dismissed the bill with costs. From this decree Sarah A. Beckwith appealed.
It is well settled that whenever a party holds such a relation to the land or its owner, whether by express contract or by implication of law arising on such relations that it is his duty to pay the taxes, he can not allow the land to be sold for the taxes, and become the purchaser, and thus defeat the title of the owner. He can not build up a title on his own neglect of duty. Burroughs Tax’n, 352. A tenant, who is under obligation to his landlord to pay the taxes on the land he rents, is disqualified from being the purchaser of the land at a tax-sale. Williamson v. Russell, 18 W. Va. 613. If
A mortgage is a mere security for a debt, and there is no such relation of trust or confidence between the maker and holder of a mortgage as prevents the latter from acquiring title to its subject, under his own or any other valid lien. He might pay the taxes or not, as he chose; or he might stand upon his general rights and purchase at a tax-sale of the land. Williams v. Townsend, 31 N. Y. 415.
This Court held in Summers v. Kanawha Co., 26 W. Va. 159, that where a debt is secured by a deed of trust upon the land of the debtor, not in possession of the creditor, who is not otherwise interested in said land, such creditor is under no obligation to pay the taxes upon said land, in the absence of any covenant, promise or agreement to do so ; that where such creditor is neither in possession of the land charged with such trust-debt, nor bound by any covenant, promise or agreement to pay the taxes charged thereon, and where no relation of trust or confidence between him and the trust-debtor exists, he is not precluded from acquiring at a tax-sale the title to the land conveyed by said deed of trust to secure the payment of his trust-debt.
So Crabtree, the mortgagee, could have been a purchaser at the tax sale, and acquired title to said land, and, of course,
It is charged in the bill, not that there was any promise on the part of the mortgagee, who it is not claimed was in possession of the land, to pay the taxes, but “that after the execution of the mortgage, and after the same was admitted to record in the said county of Upshur, the said William Crab-tree caused the said land to be dropped from the land-books of the said county in the name of the plaintiff’s trustee, as aforesaid, and placed the same on said book in the name of William Crabtree, and that this was done without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, or either of them.” This part of the bill, so far as it charges I hat Crabtree had the land put on the books in his name, is denied by the answer of Seborn, and there is no evidence except the circumstances to sustain the charge. But it is clearly alleged in the bill, and not denied by the answer, that shortly after the mortgage was recorded, which was on the 5th day of February, 1870, the name of the trustee of Sarah A. Beckwith was dropped from the land-books, and the said land charged thereon for taxes in the name of the mortgagee, William Crabtree, and that said land remained so charged in the name of William Crabtree from that time until the year 1878, when it was returned delinquent for the non-payment of the taxes for that year; that two chancery suits — one in the name of Brooks, Assignee, etc. v. Eli Beckwith and, others, and the other in the name of Crabtree's Executors against Eli B. Beckwith and others — were instituted in the Circuit Court of Upshur county, to adjudicate and settle the rights of the parties to this suit as to said 1,420-acre tract of land, and it was asked that the suits be heard together,
From these circumstances, that shortly after the mortgage was admitted to record the land was charged for taxes in the name of the mortgagee, William Crabtree, and not thenceforth charged in the name of the trustee for Mrs. Beckwith ; and there being litigation about Mrs. Beckwith’s right to the land ; and after it had been thus charged on the
It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the land was redeemed. H.ow far it is necessary for a person seeking to redeem to inquire how much taxes have been paid by the purchaser since the sale, or whether, where the purchaser is a non-resident, the certificate of redemption by the clerk is conclusive, we will, not in this cause inquire.
It is claimed in the argument of counsel for appellee that the fact, that Bayne was not the trustee, — having been superseded by the appointment of A. C. Howard, — and therefore not a proper party, was a sufficient reason for dismissing the bill. With this position we can not agree. Bayne was not a proper party; he had no interest, as trustee or otherwise, in the subject-matter of the suit. The trustee, Howard, was dead, and, there being nothing in the deed creating the separate estate directing who should be the holder of the legal title in the event of the death of the trustee, and no appointment having been made by the court, the administrator of Howard, the deceased trustee, held the legal title. Section 6, ch. 132, Code 1878. The said administrator is a party to the suit. The plaintiff had the right to maintain the suit, and the mere fact that an improper party was joined with her as plaintiff can not affect that right.
The record shows that on 22d day of February, 1884, Sarah A. Beckwith, the plaintiff, by her attorney, paid into court
The decree of the Circuit Court is'reversed, the tax-deed cancelled, and the cause remanded with instructions to dispose of the said $265.00 as above indicated, and to enter a decree for the costs to the plaintiff.
ReveRSed. Remanded.