83 P. 764 | Idaho | 1906
— This is an action commenced for the purpose of foreclosing certain farm laborers’ liens filed upon a crop of hay. Defendant Griffith filed a general demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled. He then answered and the facts were stipulated. The other defendants defaulted. The facts as stated by counsel for appellant, and conceded in the main to be correct by counsel for respondent, are that one T. F. Scott leased a ranch of about sixteen hundred acres from H. O. Harkness; that said T. F. Scott subleased the same to one William F. Scott, his son, and was to receive one-half of the hay raised upon said ranch in the stack for his rental. In the year 1904 said sublessee, William F. Scott, commenced to harvest and put up the hay by hiring men and teams to assist him; this work commenced the latter part of June or the 1st of July, 1904, and ended on or about the seventh day of September, 1904, when about seven stacks of hay had been cut and stacked on the premises; that on or about the seventh day of September, 1904, the said William F. Scott let a contract to one W. F. Hard-wick to put up and harvest the remainder of the hay, which turned out to be about fourteen stacks, and that was also stacked upon the premises in different parts of the ranch the same as that put up by Scott; that all of the said liens were filed for record about the time Hardwick completed his contract for harvesting and putting up said hay. The whole ranch is strictly a hay ranch, and nothing else is attempted to be raised thereon in the way of agricultural products. It is shown by the complaint that defendant Griffith was at the time of the commencement of the action, and prior thereto,
Defendant Griffith demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled. He then answered, putting in issue the material allegations of the complaint, and justifying his possession of the property by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the district court of Bannock county, and placed in his hands as sheriff of Bannock county, and levied upon the property in dispute, as the property of William Scott. The other defendants defaulted. The facts are stipulated as follows:
“For the purpose of avoiding the costs of procuring evidence, and for the mutual convenience of the parties, it is hereby stipulated by and between Standrod & Terrell, as attorneys for the plaintiff, and S. C. Winters, as attorney for the defendant, George Griffith, as sheriff of Bannock county, as follows:
“1. That all of the allegations of each of the causes of action stated in the plaintiff’s complaint are true, except the allegation as to a reasonable attorney’s fee, and it is hereby agreed that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action that the sum of one hundred dollars is a reasonable attorney’s fee and may be allowed to the 'plaintiff for the prosecution of said action.
“2. It is further agreed that on or about the thirtieth day of August,' 1904, the defendant, George Griffith, as sheriff of Bannock county, received a writ of attachment issued out of*742 the above-entitled district court, and that upon said writ of attachment he made the following return, to wit:
“ ‘I hereby certify that I received the within writ of attachment on the twenty-ninth day of August, 1904, and served the same on the thirtieth day of August, 1904, by levying, attaching and taking into my possession the following described personal property belonging to the defendant, "W. F. Scott, to wit: An undivided one-half interest in and to ten stacks of hay; one mountain spring wagon; two bull rakes; one Copper wagon and box; one hay rack; an undivided half interest-in and to all growing crops, pasture and pasture rights. All the- above property is on the ranch known as the Catherine Harkness ranch near the town of Oxford, Bannock county, Idaho, now operated and controlled by the defendant, W. F. Scott. (Signed) George Griffith, Sheriff, by ¥m. H. Edgley, Deputy. ’
“3. That the said ranch known as the Catherine Harkness ranch is a hay ranch, and a crop of hay grew thereon during the year and season of 1904, of which crop of hay about seven or eight stacks of hay had been cut, harvested and stacked when the said sheriff made or attempted to make his said levy thereon, and the whole of remainder of said crop was then standing in the field, uncut and unstacked, and which was afterward cut and stacked by one "W. F. Hardwick, under a contract thereafter made with W. F. Scott; that said Hardwick thereafter cut, stacked and harvested the remainder of said erop of hay, which amounted to about twelve or fourteen additional stacks of hay; that the work, labor and assistance rendered and performed by the plaintiff’s several assignors was rendered and performed in the cutting and harvesting of the seven or eight stacks of hay of said crop cut and harvested prior to the seventh day of September, 1904, that being the date when said Hardwick began work under his said contract.
.“It is further agreed that the whole of the eight hundred tons of hay, stacked in about twenty-one stacks, mentioned in the plaintiff’s complaint, and the respective exhibits thereto, is one crop of hay grown upon the ranch above mentioned during the year 1904, and the only crop cut, harvested or*743 grown upon said ranch during said year, the said eight hundred tons stacked in about twenty-one stacks, being the whole of said crop of hay harvested and grown upon said ranch during the year 1904, and the only crop of any kind that was grown or harvested thereon or therefrom during said year; that said ranch contains about sixteen hundred acres inclosed by one fence and all planted to hay; that said hay raised upon said ranch is produced without irrigation but is watered by seepage, and no labor is required to irrigate same.”
“AMENDED STIPULATION.
“For the purpose of making clear facts intended to be covered by the original stipulation on file herein, and as supplemental thereto, it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant, George Griffith, as follows:
“That this plaintiff’s assignors personally rendered and performed the services and assistance mentioned in the complaint on file herein, in harvesting about seven or eight stacks of hay on the premises mentioned in the complaint, between the fifteenth day of June, 1904, and the seventh day of September, 1904, the said stacks of hay so harvested being the first part of said crop that ,was harvested, and which was so cut and harvested by the plaintiff’s assignors prior to the seventh day of September, 1904, and thereafter one William F. Hard-wick cut, harvested and put up the remainder of said crop of hay under a contract with William F. Scott, which is the subject of litigation between said parties in this court in another suit; and that the hay above mentioned which was harvested by the assignors of this plaintiff was all cut and harvested prior to the levy upon said hay by the defendant, George Griffith, sheriff; and was a part and parcel of the crop of, hay grown upon said ranch during said year, under the lease held by said William F. Scott.”
Appellant submits three reasons why the judgment should be reversed: 1. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; 2. That the liens, and each of them, as filed, are void for uncertainty; 3. That the
Counsel for respondent earnestly insists that the liens themselves, as well as the stipulations, fall short of the requirements of section 7, chapter 2 (Sess. Laws 1899, p. 151), to wit: “Every person within sixty days after the close of the rendition of the services, or after the close of the work or labor mentioned in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter, claiming the benefit hereof, must file for record with the county recordei»of the county in which such saw logs, spars, etc., .... notice of claim containing statement of his demand, and the amount thereof, after deducting, as near as possible, all just credits and offsets, with the name of tl|e person by whom he was employed. The notice of claim shall state what such service, work or labor is reasonably worth; and it shall also contain a description of the property to be charged with the lien sufficient for identification with reasonable certainty.” Section 1, chapter 3 (Sess. Laws 1899, p. 153), provides: “Any person who does any labor on a farm or land in tilling the same, or in cultivating, harvesting, or housing any crop or crops raised thereon, has a lien on all such crop or crops for such labor, and such lien shall be a preferred and prior lien thereon to any crop or chattel mortgage placed thereon, and all chattel or crop mortgages of any crop or crops, upon which any person shall perform labor in cultivating, harvesting, or housing the said crop, shall take such mortgage subject to, and said mortgage shall be a subsequent lien.” Section 2, chapter 5 (Sess. Laws 1899, p. 155), relating
Speaking of the farm laborers’ lien law in that territory (now state) of Washington, the court said: “It was intended to secure and protect personal earnings of laborers beyond question, and whether a man, because he may be doing labor, yet in the same labor is employing other laborers, and is thus also an employer or contractor, can come within the scope of this act is a very important question. So far as he may actually labor, he may come within the beneficent provisions of this law, but so far as his labor consists in looking after his laborers and supervising his contract, this comes rather in the line of a business, employment, or speculation, than that of personal labor. There is a clearly defined line between the contractor, the employer, and the laborer, and, although each may labor in his own way, the class to which the ‘laborer’ belongs is plain, and the contractor or employer certainly does not come within it. ’ ’ It will be readily seen that the question discussed and passed upon by the Washington court was the right of the contractor to obtain the benefit of the laborers’ lien law (which is very similar to ours) by claiming in his own name for the labor of others. The last sentence of the opinion says: “He relies squarely upon his right as an employer to claim a lien covering his employees’ labor. This he cannot do.” We think a correct construction of the law was announced in this case, and were the facts the same in the case at bar, we would perhaps follow it without hesitancy. Again, it is urged by counsel for appellant that the demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained for the reason that it does not comply with the provisions of the statute providing for laborers’ liens, in that “it does not state that he performed labor in caring for the crops to any amount or price, or that the labor performed was reasonably worth any amount or sum; it does not describe the property to be charged with any certainty whatever, nor could it be ascertained from the description; an officer could not find it
The third paragraph of the complaint says: “That between the thirtieth day of June and the seventh day of September, 1904, at the special instance and request of defendant, William Scott, William Pilgrim rendered and performed labor and services and assistance to said defendant, William F. Scott, in harvesting said crop of hay growing and grown upon said ranch during the said year 1904 to the amount and value of $16.87, which said services were then and now are reasonably worth the said sum of $16.87, and under the terms and conditions of such employment on or about the seventh day of September, 1904, the said ■ defendant and the said’ William Pilgrim had a settlement, and the balance then found to be due to the said William Pilgrim was determined, ascertained and agreed upon and found to be the sum of $16.87, which said sum said defendant agreed and promised to pay.” This paragraph is reiterated in each cause of action stated in the complaint with reference to the various assigned liens to plaintiff. This statement is a substantial compliance with' the statutes; it not only says that the services were reasonably worth the amount stated to be due, but also says that on settlement with defendant, William F. Scott, the amount claimed in the license was settled and agreed upon by said Scott, for whom the service was rendered, and the claimant, and that the same has not been paid. There was no error in overruling the general demurrer.
It is also urged that the description of the property described in the liens is too indefinite, in that “the liens and each of them cover twenty-one stacks of hay, being about eight hundred tons, fourteen of which were harvested and cared for some time after the lienholders in this action had ceased to labor, and was harvested and cared for by one Hard-wick under contract.” It is shown by the agreed statement of facts that the ranch from which the hay was cut consists of about sixteen hundred acres, all under one fence, and that no crop was harvested from this ranch excepting the twenty-one stacks of hay, which was harvested and stacked during the
Appellant asks, “What stack or stacks of hay did either of these lienholders perform labor upon — the ones stacked in June, the ones stacked in July, the ones stacked in August, the ones stacked in September, or the ones stacked in October ? On what part of the sixteen hundred acres of land is the hay stacked upon which they or either of them worked?” We think section 1, chapter 3 (Sess. Laws 1899, p. 153), supra, answers all these questions. It says the laborer shall have a preferred lien on all the crops produced. Complying with this provision of our statute, respondent and his assignors filed their liens on all the hay produced on the Harkness ranch in the year 1904. The word “all,” as used in this provision of our law, has but one common and accepted meaning: it means the entire quantity, the whole amount, and when it says the laborer shall have a lien on all the crop produced, it does not mean that he shall file his lien on any particular or specified portion of the crop. He is not required to designate any particular stack or stacks of hay produced, or on what particular portion of the land the crop was produced or in what month it was harvested. If such had been the intent of the legislature, the language would have been: “The laborer shall have his lien on such portion of the crop produced as his labor contributed to produce or harvest, and his said lien shall describe with sufficient particularity such portion, etc.” Either this language or language of similar import would have been employed.
Another question arises as to the sufficiency of the answer filed by defendant sheriff to raise a number of the questions urged by counsel for appellant. It will be observed that both in the answer and the stipulated facts he does not pretend to inform the court the nature of the claim sued upon, and upon
The stipulated facts add no additional force to the answer. Thus we have the defendant sheriff, who is merely brought into this action by reason of being sheriff of Bannock county, and required to set up and present to the court whatever right or claim he may have to the property in controversy in his answer, challenging the sufficiency of the liens and every material allegation of the complaint. This he may not do until he has first shown all the jurisdictional facts. He does not show that he has any interest in the property other than that he levied an attachment on a portion of the pronertv
In Fisher v. Kelly, 30 Or. 1, 46 Pac. 146, and opinion by Chief Justice Moore of the supreme court of Oregon, in discussing the question of the sufficiency of the answer of an officer who attempts to justify his possession and right thereof, by virtue of a seizure and levy under a writ of attachment, at page 148 (46 Pac.), he says: “And the officer who acts for such creditor, in justifying an attachment of the property and his right to hold the possession thereof, must allege and show a debt due to his principal from the defendant in the writ. (Damon v. Bryant, 2 Pick. 411.) The rule is universal that an officer in justifying his right to hold the possession of attached property claimed by a stranger must allege and prove all the facts necessary to support the writ, and also that a debt existed in favor of the attaching plaintiff against the defendant therein; and having thus established the fact that the person for whom he acted is a creditor of such defendant, and by his lien upon the property had become in privity with it, he may then attack the title of the person claiming the property so attached. ’ ’ In support of this conclusion he cites Sanford Mfg. Co. v. Wiggin, 14 N. H. 441, 40 Am. Dec. 198; Thornburgh v. Hand, 7 Cal. 554; Noble v. Holmes, 5 Hill, 194; Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah, 126; Trowbridge v. Bullard, 81 Mich. 451, 45 N. W. 1013; Glazer v. Clift, 10 Cal. 303; Braley v. Byrnes, 20 Minn. 435 (Gil. 386), Howard v. Manderfield, 31 Minn. 337, 17 N. W. 946. Many
