Becklund v. DanielsBecklund v. Daniels
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Loring
This is an action for personal injuries received by plaintiff October 18, 1946, while walking across the intersection of Cedar avenue and Sixteenth avenue south in Minneapolis when he came in contact with a car driven by defendant Elias Daniels and owned by defendant Kenneth Keisling. The jury rendered a verdict for defendants, and plaintiff appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
This case has been tried twice. In the first action, the jury also found for defendants, but the court granted plaintiff’s motion for new trial.
Cedar avenue runs north and south from Seven Corners, and Sixteenth avenue south runs in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction at the point where they intersect, making an oblique angle with Cedar avenue. Sixteenth avenue terminates at Cedar avenue, and Third street runs east from that intersection. Two and One-Half street intersects with and terminates at Cedar avenue at a point about half a block north of the Sixteenth avenue intersection. About 8 p. m. on October 18, 1946 — a dark night — plaintiff was walking north on Cedar avenue on the west side of the street. He had come from a bar where he admitted that he had had two drinks of Paul Jones whiskey. When he reached the intersection at Sixteenth avenue, he looked in both directions but asserts that he saw no car coming. He then proceeded north across the intersection of Sixteenth and Cedar avenues. Because of the diagonal intersection, the distance from curb to curb is 126 feet. The lights at the intersection were so placed that there was a dark spot about midway
Does the evidence sustain a finding of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff?
Plaintiff relies on M. S. A. 169.21, subd. 2, which provides:
“Where traffic-control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk, at an intersection, except as otherwise provided in sections 169.21 and 169.22.”
The law is clear that plaintiff was not absolved from the duty of exercising ordinary care for his own safety merely because he was on the crosswalk and had the right of way. Bolster v. Cooper, 188 Minn. 364, 247 N. W. 250; Murray v. Jacobson, 195 Minn. 153, 262 N. W. 152. A pedestrian has a right to assume that a driver at an intersection will respect his right of way, but this cannot be turned into a rule which absolves a person from exercising the ordinary care of a prudent and reasonable man. Cf. Bradley v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 161 Minn. 322, 201 N. W. 606, 46 A. L. R. 993; Heath v. Wolesky, 181 Minn. 492, 233 N. W. 239; Reddy v. Rex Oil Co. 182 Minn. 139, 233 N. W. 853. The darkness of the night, the dark area in the middle of the intersection, and the fact that plaintiff saw de
Plaintiff contends that defendant Daniels was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. While this question may not properly be before us on this record, we do not agree that the evidence compels a finding that Daniels was negligent as a matter of law. Section 169.96 provides that violation of the provisions of that chapter is prima facie evidence of negligence only. Consequently, it is otaly when the evidence of the violation is unopposed by other evidence tending to show a reasonable explanation which might excuse the failure to comply with the statute that the violator may be negligent as a matter of law. Lee v. Molter, 227 Minn. 557, 35 N. W. (2d) 801; Olson v. D. M. & I. R. Ry. Co. 213 Minn. 106, 5 N. W. (2d) 492. In the case at bar, we cannot say that defendant Daniels was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to see plaintiff, where there was evidence that the accident occurred on a dark night; that the street was dark where plaintiff was walking; that he was wearing dark clothing; and that defendant had his city lights on. There were also facts tending to prove that Daniels did not see plaintiff until the moment of collision and that plaintiff collided with the side of Daniels’ car. Since there was evidence tending to support a finding that the violation of the statute was excusable, the issue of Daniels’ negligence was properly submitted to the jury. The charge of the court adequately covered the question of his negligence. The charge in its entirety was fully as favorable to plaintiff as the evidence would justify.
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing his requested instructions No. 1 and No. 2. No. 1 provided:
“Under Section 169.21, Minnesota Annotated Statutes, the Statute imposes duty on automobile drivers of yielding to pedestrians on crosswalks, not mere obligation to use ordinary care.”
“You are further instructed as a matter of law that this Plaintiff in crossing this intersection after he had entered the intersection and proceeded across the center of intersection and was approaching the other side, that it was the duty of this defendant traveling from the north and on his right side of said intersection, to yield the right of way to this pedestrian. In other words, it was his duty to see him as he was crossing in the manner in which he claims; that is, if he were crossing as he claims, it was the defendants [sic] duty to see him and yield the right of way to him and avoid striking and running into him.” (Italics supplied.)
As to requested instruction No. 1, it was adequately covered in the charge. The court read the statute which accords to pedestrians the right of way when within crosswalks. It also stated:
“If there has been a violation of the law, it has this effect. In the absence of valid excuse or justification, the violation of the duty imposed by statute or ordinance, proximately resulting in injury to one for whose benefit such laws were enacted results in liability, irrespective of such conduct as would constitute negligence in the absence of such law.”
The court then proceeded to read to the jury the provisions on maintaining reasonable speeds under the conditions and circumstances of the highway, and a provision similar to § 169.21, subd. 2.
As to requested instruction No. 2, the court did not err in refusing this instruction, because it ignores § 169.96, which provides that violation of the provisions of that chapter shall, in civil actions, be prima facie evidence of negligence only.
Order affirmed.