9 S.E. 1002 | Va. | 1889
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is before us on a rehearing. The facts of the case are quite fully set out in the opinion of the court delivered at the first hearing, and which may be found in 5 S. E. Rep. 690. In the petition for appeal there are a number of assignments of error, but the court being of opinion, for reasons stated in its opinion, that there were no errors in the record to the prejudice of the appellants,. affirmed the decrees complained of. The case was submitted on the record and the petition for appeal, without argument, oral or printed. The petition for rehearing is based upon several grounds, a careful consideration of which satisfies us that the conclusion reached on the first hearing, namely, that the appellants have not been prejudiced by the decrees of the circuit court, is not sustained by the record, which is certainly very meager and imperfect as it comes to us, and from which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the rights of the parties with anything like absolute certainty.
There is no doubt that the point made by the appellants as to the interest of the late Coleman C. Beckham in the tract of land called ‘ ‘Ashland” is a good one ; that is to say, according to the doctrine of Thornton v. Thornton, 3 Rand. (Va.) 179, decided in-1825, he became, at the death of his
An account ought also to have been taken of the personal assets in the hands of the personal representative of the said Coleman C. Beckham, which does not appear from the record to have been done. The appellants have also the right to require the property of W. A. Beckham, for whom the said Coleman C. Beckham was surety, to be exhausted before the land devised to them is sold or taken to pay the debts asserted in this suit. And the judgment for the satisfaction of which the original bill was filed ought to be apportioned equally among the sureties of whom the said Coleman C. Beckham was one, and who were also made defendants to the bill, or such portion thereof as cannot be made out of the estate of the principal debtor, Charles Short; and, as was held in Horton v. Bond, 28 Gratt. 815, “if either should make default in the payment of his part, and his lands when sold should prove insufficient to pay such part, the lands of the others should be subjected proportionately for such part unpaid, and so on proportionately upon further default of any party occurring, until the lauds of all be sold, if •the sale of all be necessary to the complete satisfaction of the judgment. ” It follows from what has been said that