177 Pa. 252 | Pa. | 1896
Opinion by
In this case the petition for the appointment of viewers set forth that the defendant had located its railroad, and that it was necessary to occupy certain land at its terminus, of which the plaintiff was the owner, and prayed the court to appoint -viewers to ascertain the damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the occupation of his land for the purposes of the road. A description of the lot or piece of ground to be occupied was annexed. An issue was awarded by consent of the parties, “ to determine the. amount of damages which the said Henry Becker is entitled to in consequence of the entry upon, taking and occupation of premises No. 1114 Arch street, by the Philadelphia & Reading Terminal Railroad Company.” It will be seen, therefore, that the sole question to be determined was, the damages sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of the taking of certain land belonging to him. No question as to the taking or injuring of personal property was within the terms of the issue, and hence no such question was on trial. As a matter of fact no personal property was taken or injured in any way, nor was there any proposition to take or injure that kind of property. The value of land taken was the only matter for trial, or which ■could be tried under the pleadings. Nevertheless the plaintiff now complains that he was not permitted to show that he was carrying on a business of tailoring on the premises, that he had a large amount of merchandise purchased for his trade at this place, that by reason of the location of the railroad on his premises he could no longer carry on his trade there; and he offered to show the difference between the market value of bis merchandise and fabrics in the store and what they would be worth to be removed to some other place and applied to the same or
The new constitution made no change in the character of the property for which damages could be recovered. It merely enlarged the right of recovery from taking, to injury or taking. It was the taking of land only, that could be recovered for under the act of 1840, and up to the time of the constitution of 1874, and after that, it was the injuring or destroying, as well as the taking, that was to he compensated. But recovery for taking personal property unless it was as materials used in construction, was not recognized or provided for, by proceedings for condemnation, either before or after the constitution of 1874. Of course for any trespass to personal property by taking or injuring it, there was always a common law liability, but that is not this case.
We have so often said that the profits of business could not be recovered in condemnation proceedings that it seems like a waste of time to cite the decisions. As far back as Thoburn’s Case, 7 S. & R. 411, it was held that, in estimating the damages done to the landowner, the jury are to value the injury to the
In the case of Searle v. Railroad Co., 33 Pa. 57, an effort was made to recover damages for the value of the coal lying under the surface of the ground taken for a railroad. But we held this could not be done, and that the measure of damage must be the actual value of the land taken, and not the loss of profit which might be made by taking the mineral underneath it. Lowbus, C. J., speaking of the rejection of an offer to prove that there was $4,000 worth of coal under the land, about one acre, said, “ We do not measure the value of land by such facts. Land may have $4,000 worth of coal per acre in it, and yet sell at $40.00 per acre. . . . Moreover the offer impliedly requires a degree of refinement in the measure of values winch seems to us totally incompatible with the gross estimates of common life. Though we might have the most accurate calculation of the quantity of coal in the land, yet, without knowing exactly the expense of bringing it to the surface and carrying it to market, and the amount likely to be lost in mining and conveying and the times in which it would be brought out, and the market prices at those times, the quantity would not help us to the value of the land. The gross estimates of common life are all that courts and juries have skill enough to use as a measure of value. All other measures are necessarily arbitrary and fanciful.”
And so here, the question whether or not the plaintiff’s business, with the stock of goods on hand, could be carried on at a greater or less profit at some other place than on these premises is altogether speculative, remote, imaginary and uncertain. No one can possibly have definite knowledge upon such a subject. It would depend upon contingencies, events and methods which are incapable of statement, appreciation or knowledge. What one man might do at a profit, another might only do at a loss. What this plaintiff might be able to do with his stock at another building, neither he nor any one else could possibly know. Perhaps he might do better and perhaps he might do worse. It is enough to say that such contingencies are too uncertain and too remote to be tolerated as a source of proof upon which courts and juries could act with any safety. In Railroad v. Balthaser, 119 Pa. 472, we held that the value of the plaintiff’s
There are many authorities that the removal of personal property cannot be considered as an item of damages in the taking of real estate. In Lewis on Eminent Domain, 488, it is said, “But the damages to personal property, or the expense of removing it from the premises, cannot be considered in estimating the compensation,” citing a number of cases. In Cobb v. Boston, 109 Mass. 309, it was held that, in assessing the value of a leasehold estate, damage to the business of the lessee and its good will is not to be included. The'Court said, “ The only question was as to the value of his unexpired lease, and not as to the profits of his business or the inconvenience of removing it to some other place.” To the same effect is Edmonds v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535. Further references are unnecessary. The first and second assignments of error are dismissed. There is no merit in the third and ninth assignments. The learned court below charged the jury on the subject of interest in precise accordance with the decision of this court in the case of Klages v. Railroad, 160 Pa. 386, where this whole subject was exhaustively reviewed by our Brother Williams.
The rulings of the court below as to the testimony in relation to sales of particular properties in the neighborhood were in conformity with our most recent decisions, and were therefore free of error. In Railroad v. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461, we held that the market value as a measure of damages for land taken or injured by a railroad company, cannot be ascertained by evidence of particular sales of other properties alleged to be situated similarly to the one in question. Such evidence would introduce collateral issues, and is not admissible in such proceedings. See also Railway v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325, and Curtin v. Nittany V. R. Co., 135 Pa. 20. Of course such evidence may be brought out by the cross-examination of witnesses. In view
The remaining assignments of error are not pressed in the argument for appellant, and we think they are without merit and hence are not sustained.
Judgment affirmed.