Becker v. L. & N. R. R.

110 Ky. 474 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1901

Opinion op the court by

JUDGE GUFFY

Reversing.

It is substantially alleged in the petition that one Mary Vanarsdale, an infant between twelve and fourteen years of age, was upon the railroad bridge of the defendant at said time and plaee, and in front of said approaching train, and in great danger and peril of being run over by said train, and was placed in said danger and peril aforesaid by the. gross negligence of defendant in failing to slacken said speed of said train after it became aware of her presence on said track and bridge, and by the gross negligence of the defendant in failing to stop said train after it became aware of her presence on said track and bridge, and by the gross negligence of the defendant in the operation of said train after it became aware of her presence thereon, and that defendant became aware of her presence on said bridge in ample time to slacken the speed of said train to avoid running over and upon her and relieve her of said danger and peril. It is further alleged that plaintiff, Becker, undertook to rescue the said Vanarsdale from her peril and danger, and to enable her to escape from being killed by said train by the gross negligence of defendant, and in his efforts to rescue said Vanarsdale, and while he was endeavoring to do so, the train ran over him, knocking him from said bridge, and permanently injuring him, to the damage of $5,000, for which he prayed judgment. The answer denies that on the occasion mentioned it could Imre slackened the speed of its train any more than it did after it became aware of the presence of said Yanarsdale and plaintiff, or that after it became aware of their presence on the bridge it could have avoided running over them. Denies any negligence at all. The answer may also be treated as pleading contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff. It is also pleaded that neither plaintiff nor Yanarsdale had any right to be upon the bridge in question. The affirmative averments of the answer were properly denied by reply. After the pleadings were made up, and various motions disposed of, which we deem it un-. necessary to notice, the trial was entered into; and at the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony the court, upon motion of defendant, instructed the jury peremptorily to find for the defendant, which was accordingly done. And, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial having been overruled, he prosecutes this appeal.

The sole question presented for decision is whether the plaintiff was entitled to have the case submitted to the jury, or, in other words, was there sufficient evidence from which the jury might find a verdict for the plaintiff? It appears from the evidence in this case that five children, to-wit, Ed Hunn, Katie Hood, Lillie Owens, Mary Vanarsdale, and plaintiff, the ages of whom are about as follows: Lillie Owens, between eight and nine; Ed Hunn, in his fourteenth year; Kate Hood, about fifteen; Mary Yanarsdale, between twelve and thirteen; and the plaintiff, in his fourteenth year- — had" gone to the creek for the purpose of fishing, and, not being satisfied with the first point they reached, decided to go to another place, and, to reach it, decided to cross the creek on the railroad bridge, and while crossing it they heard or by some means became aware of the approaching freight train, ana at once made an effort to get out of the way of the train,, by continuing to cross the bridge to the other side of the creek. Three of the party escaped, but Miss Vanarsdale, it seems fell through between the ties or bars of the bridge; and the plaintiff, who seems to have been her escort, sought to rescue her, and perhaps pulled her up once out of the opening in which she had fallen, but she again fell into another, and as the result of this delay she was killed, and the plaintiff suffered the injuries sued for in this action.

It is the contention of appellee that plaintiff had no right to be on the bridge, and that it owed him no duty until after it discovered his peril, which it claims it did not do in time to avoid the injury; also that he was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar his right to recover. It is evident that it was the- legal right as well as the moral duty of the plaintiff to remain with and seek to rescue his companion, and, so far as that question is concerned, the law seems to be well settled that he was not guilty of any contributory negligence for remaining on the said bridge for the purpose of saving the- life of his companion.

It is the contention of appellant that the defendant or its agents discovered those parties upon the bridge in ample time to have slackened the speed of the train so as to enable the plaintiff to have avoided the danger. The evidence conduces to show that the- engineer could, see the whole bridge from a distance' of 960 feet, and one standing on the track at the bluff can see the whole length of the bridge for 320 yards; that a man in the cab could see the bridge 120 feet further back. The proof also conduces to show that a man in the cab could see the bridge 120 feet further back than if on the ground. It is also evident from the proof that for a considerable distance from the bridge it is np grade in reaching the bridge in question. There is also some proof tending to show that some one on the engine was seen to put his head out, as if looking toward the bridge, at some distance from it. It seems to us, from the evidence, that the jury were authorized to believe and to have found that the defendant’s agents and servants saw those children upon the bridge in ample time to have so slackened the speed of the train as to enable them to have escaped the danger. There is hardly room to doubt this, from the map and evidence filed in this action. It is not at all reasonable to suppose that the defendant, if it had a right to do so, was indifferent as to the condition of the bridge it had to cross. It can hardly be presumed that the defendant would not feel enough of interest in its’ own train and those aboard to risk running on the bridge without looking to see whether the bridge was in a condition to be crossed in safety to the crew, and if the defendant was on the lookout it must have seen those children in time to have slackened the speed of the train and thus have prevented the injury. The reasonable conclusion is that the children were seen, but the defendant supposed that they had ample time to complete the crossing of the bridge and thus escape Injury, which the proof evidently show7» thyw would have done but for the misfortune of Miss Yanarsdale in falling between the ties or bars of the bridge. If it be conceded that the plaintiff ,was a trespasser, and that defendant owed him no duty except to protect him after discovering his peril, it is clear that when discovered upon the bridge the defendant should have given him ample time to have escaped. If he had simply been on the railroad track in the open country, it might be said that defendant had .a right to presume that he would step off the’ track and get out of the way of the train; but if a party having started to cross a bridge of as much length as the one under consideration, had no means of escape except to reach the termination of the bridge, common humanity demands that, even if a trespasser, he should not be wantonly run over, but should have a reasonable chance to cross the bridge in safety. A few minutes’ delay of the train would have saved plaintiff the great personal injury which he suffered in the vain attempt to save the life of the little girl with him. It is said in section 483, 2 Shear. & R. Neg.: .“The rule stated in section 99, that the plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding his contributory negligence, if the defendant, after becoming chargeable with notice of the plaintiff’s danger, failed to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him, has been enforced in many railroad cases. . . . Thus, a locomotive engineer or motorman, after becoming aware of the presence of any person on or dangerously near the track, however imprudently or wrongfully, is bound to use as much care to avoid injury to him as 'he ought to use in favor of one lawfully and properly upon the “track; that is to say, ordinary care with respect to anticipating injury before it becomes imminent, and the utmost care and diligence of which he is personally capable after he knows that it is imminent. He must promptly use all the usual signals to warn the trespasser of danger, and he must also check the speed of his train, and even bring it to a full stop, if necessary, unless the circumstances are such as to justify him, acting prudently, in believing that the traveler sees or hears the train, and will step off the track in ample time to avoid all danger without any diminution of the speed of the train. These rules apply to all cases, even of the most outrageous negligence on the part of a person on the track — as, for example, where a person attempts to cross in the very front of a train, or where children or drunkards have actually fallen asleep, lying across the rails. If the engineer becomes aware of anything lying upon or dangerously near the track, which may possibly be a human being or. a valuable animal, he is bound to check the speed of his train so. as to enable him to stop! in time to avoid injury; and, if injury ensues from his neglect to do this, his sincere belief that the object was worthless is of no defense. In general, an engineer has the right to assume that a person walking upon the track is free to act, and is in possession of all ordinary faculties, and will therefore act with ordinary prudence; but, when the conduct of the traveler is such as to excite a doubt of this, the engineer is bound to use greater caution, and to check or even stop the train, as may be necessary. So, where he sees a little child upon the track, he has no right to assume that the child will use the same discretion for its own protection as an older person would; 'and he must bring the speed of the train under control as quickly as possible, so as to be able to stop it altogether if the child does not appreciate its danger.” In section 484, Id., it is said: “The rule stated in the last section, however, does not cover the whole groúnd. The defendant is responsible not only for what he actually knows,, but for that which he is bound to know. It is- clear that the frequent statements that contributory negligence is an absolute bar to recovery, except where the defendant’s conduct has been ‘reckless,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘wanton,’ or even grossly negligent, are not sound. No courts have in actual practice adhered to this imaginary rule. It has been explicitly overruled, and, indeed, it has been explained away or disavowed by courts which had previously stated it.”

After a careful consideration of the evidence in this case, as well as the law applicable thereto, we are clearly of the opinion that the court erred in giving the peremptory instruction. The evidence made a prima facie case which would entitle plaintiff to recover. The .judgment appealed from is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to award plaintiff a new trial, and for proceedings consistent herewith.

Petition for rehearing filed by appellee and overruled.