Beck v. StateBeck v. State
Beck and Ashley forced entry into the home of their former employer, shot and killed him with a pistol, robbed him of a sum of money, and fled. Both were apprehended. Ashley confessed, and Beck made incriminating statements concerning the murder weapon, which he had taken from his mother’s home, and a $100 bill, which he had taken from the victim’s home.
Ashley pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Beck was tried for murder, armed robbery, and burglary. The jury returned the following verdict: “We, the Jury find the Defendant Eli Beck, guilty of malice murder, guilty of armed robbery, and guilty of burglary.” He was convicted on each count, and thereafter was sentenced to death. 1
*52 Because the death sentence must be set aside, we will consider on this appeal principally those enumerations of error which relate to Beck’s conviction.
1. The trial court did not err in refusing to set bond in any amount, upon a finding that Beck might flee the jurisdiction, or might be of danger to the community.
Lane v. State,
2. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a change of venue by reason of pre-trial notoriety. Only seven veniremen were excused because of the possible impact of publicity. “[A] trial court’s finding that a defendant can receive a fair trial in the county in which the crime was committed will be upheld unless manifestly erroneous.”
Devier v. State,
3. The trial court did not err in failing to grant funds for a challenge to the array of the grand jury, based upon an alleged under-representation of persons between 18 to 30 years of age. We have held consistently that this is not a discernible class.
White v. State,
4. There is no merit in Beck’s contention, relative to that count of the indictment brought under
5. The absence of the term “therein” in the count of the indictment charging Beck with burglary (that he entered the dwelling house of another “with the intent to commit a felony or theft”) does not render the indictment fatally defective.
DePalma v. State,
6. The trial court instructed the jury relative to the elements of malice murder and felony murder, and declined to submit to the jury in interrogatory form a special verdict wherein the jury would designate whether the defendant was guilty of felony murder and to specify whether Beck did, or did not, attempt to kill or intend to kill the victim. As these elements of the charge were correct, we find no error.
7. The trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence seized
*53
under a warrant, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. As these findings are not clearly erroneous, there was no error.
Dean v. State,
8. After conducting a Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court found that Beck’s statements while in custody were made voluntarily. A review of the record establishes that this finding was not clearly erroneous, and this enumeration is without merit.
Powell v. State,
9. Photographs of the crime scene were not unduly prejudicial, inasmuch as they reflected the result of the homicide, robbery, and burglary. No autopsy photographs were admitted.
Brown v. State,
10. During the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, Beck sought to introduce evidence of extrajudicial statements made by Ashley which indicated that Ashley had fired the murder weapon. (These statements were admitted, in mitigation, at the sentencing phase.) There was no foundation under the rule laid down in
Gibbons v. State,
11. The trial court did not err in excluding from evidence letters written by Beck, which were later seized by law enforcement authorities, as they were merely self-serving declarations.
Dickey v. State,
12. Over objection, the district attorney asked Beck on cross-examination: “In a physical confrontation do you believe you could handle Mrs. Porter?” The district attorney referred to Ashley also in cross-examination, as a “bloodthirsty person.”
A party is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination.
Casey v. State,
13. While not enumerated as error, we have reviewed the record in this case and find that the evidence is amply sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Beck guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
14. Nonetheless, we find it necessary to vacate the sentence of death, and to return the case for a new trial as to sentence.
Beck called several witnesses on his behalf at the sentencing hearing. On conclusion of the evidence, the trial court, over the objection of defense counsel, directed that the state would have the opportunity to open and to conclude the argument.
Beck assigns this as error. The state contends that the above provisions must be read in connection with
Because Beck presented evidence as to sentence, the state contends he lost his right to the concluding argument. With this we cannot agree.
“This right to open and conclude when the defendant introduces no evidence has been the law of this State since January 22,1852 (Ga. L. 1851-52, p. 242; [
“This defendant was entitled to a trial in accordance with law, which included the exercise of this right.
“Speculation as to whether its denial was prejudicial to him has no place here. In this instance the death penalty was imposed. It cannot be said that the error was harmless.”
Park v. State,
Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated, and the case remanded for a new sentence trial.
15. Because of the foregoing disposition, we need not comment upon the district attorney’s remarks to the jury concerning the possibility for parole. We note, however, that this is dangerous ground.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Notes
The crime was committed on January 16,1984. Beck was convicted on July 18,1984. He filed a motion for new trial on July 23,1984, which was voluntarily dismissed on November 1, 1984. He filed his notice of appeal on November 1, 1984. The transcript was filed in the superior court on November 9, 1984, and the appeal docketed in this court on November 21, *52 1984. The case was argued on January 22, 1985.